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  • Hello, everybody.

  • Welcome to the Minnesota State Office Building Room 300 South for today's presentation on the 1918 influenza pandemic.

  • My name is Brian McDaniel and I will be your moderator today.

  • This is a topic that interests me.

  • Ah, lot in my capacity as lobbyist for many health organizations, but probably most closely associate ID.

  • But this would be the local Public Health Association of Minnesota before I introduce our panel.

  • Just wanted to give you a little bit of a few seconds of background on what will be talking about today.

  • The 1918 pandemic flu pandemic, which went from January 1918 to December of 1920 was an unusually deadly influenza pandemic involving the H one n one influence of iris, which we're all aware of.

  • It infected 500 million people around the world and resulted in the deaths of 50 to 100 million or 3 to 5% of the world's population, making it one of the deadliest natural disasters in human history.

  • This month marks the 1/100 anniversary of the first case of the in the United States, and we're pleased to have this panel of history and public health experts with us to discuss the 1918 pandemic and what lessons we can draw from it today.

  • Thank you all for being here, and we welcome you here.

  • Next week when we're gonna be presenting Pandemic the Musical, you will see me as worried.

  • Boy number four, Our panel today, Dr Michael Foster.

  • Home to my right is our region's Professor McKnight, Presidential Endowed Chair in Public Health, The director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, a distinguished teaching professor in the division of Environmental Health Sciences School of Public Health, a professor in the Technological Leadership Institute College of Science and Engineering and the agent professor in the medical school, all at the University of Minnesota.

  • He is the author of the 2017 book Deadliest Enemy.

  • Our War Against Killer Germs, in which he not only details the most pressing infectious disease Threats of our day believes out a nine point strategy and how best to address them with preventing a global flu pandemic.

  • At the top of the list to my left is Chris Harrison on epidemiologist and director of the infectious disease de Mi Ology Prevention and Control Division at the Minnesota Department of Health.

  • In this role, she is responsible for HIV, STD, TB, refugee health and immunization programs, as well as the emerging infection, home, home, food borne, vector born and zoonotic disease activities.

  • Come on, people.

  • Um, it's really yeah.

  • Miss Erismann received her bachelor of science and nursing from ST Olaf College and her master of public health and epidemiology from the University of Minnesota to my far right is Lois Henrickson, and she is the curator of the wagon Steen Historical Library of Biology and Medicine at the University of Minnesota.

  • She has an MLS from the University of Denver and a love of history, which led her to a career in archives and special collections.

  • She worked in the University of Minnesota's archives for a number of years and later made the move too rare.

  • Books and manuscripts in the Wing and Steam Historical Library, which has a specialization in medicine and natural history before 1930.

  • Now that I've given everyone's credentials, we're out of time.

  • Thank you so much.

  • Uh, no, Miss Hendrickson.

  • You wanted to give a little bit of ah, background.

  • Yeah, off the 1918 pandemics, So I thought I'd um as ah, historian and library in a curator of rare materials.

  • Talk a little bit about the pandemic here in Minnesota, and you notice that in front of me, I also have some materials from our collection.

  • So while we are rare book collection, we also have some artifacts.

  • So in front of me, I have a Grey's Anatomy that belonged to the second director of the Minnesota Department of Health, Henny Bracket, and to the right, I have some artifacts from our collection.

  • In front, you'll see a map that was a Saint Paul map of influenza by the Citizens Committee.

  • And so if we have time at the end of this session, you're welcome to come up and and look at some of the artifacts.

  • There's cold remedies, things you might recognize, like Vicks vapor rub things for, um, gargling porters that are antiseptic.

  • The germ theory is fairly new at this time, and of course, there would also have been things like aspirin and things that we still use today.

  • So in Minnesota, um, as Brand said, um, a small group of people compared to 100 million that died, there were about 100 40,000 influenza cases in about 12,000 Minnesotans out of the roughly 2,000,007 the 5705 listed in 1910 cents.

  • It's tied This influence up Pandemic was concurrent with both the World War.

  • It was near the end of World War One and here in Minnesota with the Cloak, a Duluth Moose Lake.

  • Natural History, natural disaster of fire that burned 1500 square miles and left 450 people debt.

  • So they held.

  • Service is here in Minnesota were stressed when the influenza pandemic came along.

  • Um, Minnesota's mortality rate ranked 26 out of 27 states.

  • Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey had the highest mortality rates.

  • Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin had the lowest, and in both Minneapolis and ST Paul.

  • The first Peak Accord accord on October 19th through October 22nd Um, and a second peek a little bit later.

  • So what were some of the issues people faced communications regarding influenza coordination between different levels and branches of government containment measures, Infection control, medical resource is and future, uh, epidemic preparedness planning.

  • So I just want to talk about a few of them with regard to Minnesota communication.

  • Of course, newspapers were that one of the primary means of communication in 1918.

  • But in World War, people were encouraged to print positive news.

  • So it took a while for Spanish flu to really make it onto the front page of the paper.

  • Finally, here in Minneapolis, Sense of September 14th in the Minneapolis paper, the first article appeared abouts influenza, also known as Spanish flu.

  • Six days later, the city health commissioner of Minneapolis, H.

  • M.

  • Guilford, said Spanish flu does not exist in Minneapolis and never has, but it will probably reach here during the fall.

  • Eight days later, the first case appeared in Wells, Minnesota, and on September 29th.

  • A few days later, they officially declared that influenza had made its way to Minneapolis on October 1st.

  • So about two weeks after the newspaper first announced Spanish flu, Guilford says that Spanish influenza is becoming increasingly of interest to civilians.

  • But it's not reportable by law, and Health Department has kept informed on Lee by the courtesy of physicians so gathering information, the State Board of Health is up against some serious difficulties.

  • Other documents, official documents spread the news.

  • Dr Bracken Who's Grey's Anatomy?

  • We have up here sent a telegram at night to the U.

  • S Public Health Service on October 2nd saying, Please send 100 copies of your supplement epidemic influenza.

  • The next day, October 3rd, he sent another night telegram.

  • Please send 10,000 copies.

  • The flu is moving very rapidly.

  • Other means of communication were enlisted.

  • Postal workers, Boy Scouts, teachers, mail carriers, teachers who were out of work from the closing of the school were asked to volunteer and actually to canvass from home to home to see how families were doing.

  • So.

  • Coordination between levels of government, where that wanted to close the schools were another issue, and the two cities had really different philosophies on whether they should close their schools or not.

  • ST.

  • Paul Sport of help, headed by Dr Simon, said that school nurses were the best defense against the spread of disease, and closing the schools would allow school Children's cases to go undetected.

  • Minneapolis Doctor Gil for disagreed, saying that the 30 school nurses they had would not be able to adequately care for the 50,000 pupils in this system.

  • That was the last time that Minneapolis and ST Paul ever disagreed.

  • So, really, at the heart of this matter was whether or not the Board of Health had the legal authority to close schools.

  • And Guilford in Minneapolis kind of threw down the Gotland.

  • And, he said, the direct snapping of the fingers of the Board of Education in the face of the health Department As a matter that requires the attention of the courts.

  • And if the justice system were not enough, he added, he intended to use police force Children who were either in closed schools or not.

  • We're encouraged to practice their own preventive mesh INS measures.

  • There was a poem that appeared in the Minneapolis Tribune.

  • It said, Protect your schoolmates from disease.

  • Use your handkerchief when you sneeze.

  • Municipalities and governments also responded with additional containment measures, which sometimes today are called non pharmaceutical interventions.

  • Community mitigation guidelines.

  • Your social distancing measures.

  • Dr.

  • Guilford in Minneapolis tended to be rather proactive.

  • Dr.

  • Simon and ST Paul asserted that the isolation of influenza cases would be more effective in preventing the spread of disease, and so these two approaches play out in public spaces in really different ways.

  • The local, the Minnesota State Board of Health Underhanded bracket Random recommended that theaters movie houses be allowed to open so long as proper ventilation was used and dangerous coffers were excluded.

  • Dance halls and pool room's, on the other hand, should be closed.

  • Dr.

  • Guilford ordered all Minneapolis schools, churches, theaters, dance halls, a 1,000,000,000 pyre, Alors, to be closed, saying, I do not want to be alarmist but diseases not controllable by ordinary measures.

  • The same poll council did not follow suit but did issue an emergency or in regulating the business hours of stories and theaters to keep streetcar congestion to a minimum, and eventually they closed their public places.

  • On November 6, Sample also had a citizen's committee, 15 physicians, church leaders and community members who were recommending policy changes.

  • Other measures of containment we're suspending church service is asking people whose names were air L to go to the nine o'clock service and dizzy to go to the 10 o'clock service and in saloons.

  • Each man was supposed to have three feet around him at the by rail, and an inspector was sent out to measure that it wasn't quite enough work for them to do right.

  • I'll state these containment ushered.

  • Measures also were reflected.

  • Northfield closed its public meeting spaces, and some of the schools that you saw in Northfield Carlton ST Olaf had cases 29 at Carlton 41 at ST Olis.

  • Also, there were guidelines implemented for infection control for the public.

  • The Minneapolis Tribune noted that because of the widespread nature of epidemic, quarantine will be impossible save as individuals and physicians are able to establish voluntary court quarantine, both cities attempted to combat.

  • Influenced by limiting crowding your places.

  • Both cities enacted streetcar regulations aimed to keep the air fresh by mandating open windows.

  • This cost several complaints in Minneapolis because people were getting sick, or they said they were getting six due to winter cold.

  • So a compromise was reached, allowing streetcars with heating and ventilation systems to close their windows once the temperature dropped to 30 teary 32 degrees Fahrenheit.

  • ST.

  • Paul targeted elevators is a place where influenza could easily be transmitted.

  • Buildings with fewer than six stories were not permitted to use their elevators and inch aska where, uh, Anthony Simon's died.

  • Mourners were so concerned about for his contagiousness that they said their rosaries across the street and did not enter the parent's home.

  • So citizens also practice infection control measures.

  • Um, in a little black box on the front page of the September 25th Minneapolis Tribune.

  • They had some advice.

  • Do this and foil the germ of influenza.

  • Avoid crowds.

  • Keep away from persons who cough or sneeze.

  • Have all fresh air possible.

  • Sleep with your windows open where warm clothing.

  • Keep your feet dry and do not use individual and use individual drinking cups.

  • People especially vulnerable to influenza letter carriers.

  • Mass transit workers.

  • Others who came in contact with the public.

  • People used over the counter remedies.

  • Some of what you see up here.

  • Antiseptic powders.

  • Quiet.

  • I used to keep fever, stone and malaria name brands like Dover's powder appropriation of epic epic opium and potassium sulphate used to induce sweating an aspirin, which was fairly recent, maybe about 20 years available to people but not fully understood because it was suggested that a person take 1000 milligrams every three hours, the equivalent of almost 25 standard 325 milligram aspirin tablets.

  • This is about twice the daily dosage generally considered safe today and of course, medical resource is were at the epicenter.

  • Hospitals were placed off limits to all visitors.

  • Private hospitals volunteered to relieve the city hospital of non influenza patients and reported in on October 8th in Minneapolis, so many cases were taken to the city hospital yesterday that the attendants had not finished counting them last night.

  • All of the city hospital ambulance have been turned over to influence a calls.

  • Emergency calls are being answered by the police ambulance.

  • The Saint Paul mayor told residents.

  • With more than half our doctors and nurses in war service, we dare not take any chances of a possible epidemic here and placed patients in isolation wards in the city hospital.

  • Your son was a critical part of medical response, but nursing staff was can't contracting influenza as well, and hospitals were desperate for staff.

  • So they reached out for volunteers, citizens committees, the Red Cross and, um, mothers to go and help people who couldn't manage their homes and take care of their Children, including getting terrible organizations like the wild day nursery involved.

  • Because so many Children are left either temporarily parentless or orphans because of the influenza economically, um, most of the evidence shows that the pandemic was economic influence with short term.

  • But interestingly, it shows that it caused a reduction in human capital for individuals who were in utero during the pandemic and that had economic implications for decades after the pandemic.

  • There's lots of lessons to be learned from the pandemic, recognizing that there's a lot of differences between now and 1918.

  • Just, for example, there's a different understanding of privacy, civil and constitutional rights as they relate to public health.

  • There's changes in transportation with aviation, personal computers and understanding of diseases.

  • And so how did the change in Minnesota?

  • So because physicians were obligated to report cases to the authorities, they failed to see the pandemic coming.

  • So the cornerstone of public health epidemiology, the study of patterns, causes and effects of disease now find the received full recognition as a science.

  • Epidemiology requires data, so gathering data became more important.

  • By 1925 all U.

  • S.

  • States had a national disease reporting.

  • Sorry, you ever just coughed?

  • They're reporting in public health policies changed and the lesson health it took health authorities took away that from the catastrophe was there was no reason to blame individuals and government saw the benefit of starting to change their concept of medicine.

  • The United States.

  • We went with employer based insurance systems, other places.

  • Other countries went with socialized medicine.

  • And finally, in 1919 we saw the beginning of today's International Bureau for Fighting Epidemics of Forerunner of today's World Health Organization.

  • I had no idea at the video it's sense of, you know, I tried to the 1918 one.

  • Well, I think Andi think you misunderstood.

  • I think first thing after asking, maybe you everyone feel for you to China.

  • But Alaska, Dr Earl Strom was this particular strain of H one n one in 1918 especially lethal, or were there other circumstances that intensified?

  • It's a fact.

  • Well, first of all, one has to take a step back, understand what pandemic influenza really is.

  • Influenza viruses are naturally occurring events in while aquatic birds and have been for several 100 million years.

  • And what has happened a revolutionary time is those viruses that, attached to the cells of the intestine to the duck or other aquatic bird can infect humans.

  • But over time, if they were able to escape the aquatic bird and get into one of several other animal species they didn't acquire.

  • The ability to basically with a lock and key get into the human lung cell in the pig is one of the most notorious of all of the middle.

  • You might say game players, because they have receptor cells on their lungs for both bird viruses and human viruses.

  • And so we get these viruses mixed up in the pig's lung salad niks come out.

  • That's where the term swine flu comes from.

  • Now we do know that in some cases, while bird viruses can get in domestic poultry and then changed there, too, as we've seen recently in China and so forth.

  • But to say that this would happen in 1918 is our history is really to say, That's all our review.

  • American C Back.

  • For those of you who have studied this carefully, we know that there were at least 16 influenza pandemics dating back to the 16 hundreds.

  • Hippocrates wrote about a very classic influence.

  • A pandemic that may have been every bit of it is dangerous and disruptive.

  • It was the 19 pandemic, so we have to be careful not to say that this was an unusual event, and that's one of the reasons why we're so concerned about what could be the next time.

  • We have a 1918 event because history surely shows that that could happen now in terms of Was this a more lethal virus norm during normal seasonal flu years, where we have different strains of seasonal flu virus?

  • Which, by the way, is the residual strains of a previous pandemic that hung around in people.

  • You'll see very different patterns of illness in terms, whether they're very young or very old.

  • For example, in 1918 the average age of deaths actually was about 28 years of age in 1968 and 19 1957 1968 when two additional pandemics came along.

  • H two into a three into the average age of death was in the high sixties, which was much more.

  • What you would expect to see with life expectancy 19 8 are in in 2009 actually came along.

  • Another H one n one, which didn't have the number of cases but surely had a very significant impact on those that got it.

  • And the average age of deaths in the United States was 38.

  • If you adjust for life expectancy, that number of the age of deaths and 90 and 2000 and nine was younger than it was in 1918.

  • And so flu viruses interact differently with different people we know about the 1918 virus, and we saw again in 2000 and nine is the fact that these viruses actually caused the immune system of the host to react.

  • Many of the deaths of seasonal flu occur when somebody developed a secondary bacterial pneumonia as a result of damage to lungs.

  • In this case, this cause we call a signing kind storm cited kind storms are where you set off almost like a septic shock picture.

  • But you don't have bacteria in your blood, and it causes severe damage to all your internal organs.

  • Today, we can't handle these kinds of illnesses with this sign, a kind storm any better than we did in 19 8 It's not about antibiotics.

  • And so what we worry about is that coming back again, because in that case, modern medical science was gonna do a whole lot for us.

  • We have a machine called ECMO machine, which can basically breathe and sense.

  • Pump your blood for you.

  • That can help, but they're very limited number.

  • So we're just a vulnerable today toe.

  • A 1918 pandemic is Warren 1918.

  • In terms of that, if, in fact it is this virus human immune system response damage that occurs you had mentioned of the progression from poultry pigs.

  • Your working theory is that that is how the 1918 pandemic started.

  • Is that still something that people have believer ascribed?

  • Well, you know, we don't know for certain where 1918 started, there is, I think the most reasonable date actually says it may have been in Kansas, and it may have been associated with the military base there that actually training for World War soldiers.

  • I might add that very few people realize this, But for historical standpoint, eight times as many soldiers died in Europe from swine flu has died from all the war combined.

  • So it was clearly something that was on the mind set of.

  • The Defense Department might also add another very sobering figure.

  • We have Data from Boston, which is the best more Children in Boston, died in October November of 1918 under the age of five, then died in Boston next 20 years combined.

  • So it gives you a sense of all this two month period what things were like.

  • It was tragic.

  • So So I think just to come back and to say that, uh, today, when we will we look att pandemic influenza.

  • One of the things that were very acutely aware of is the fact that we have a very different food production system in the world to feed 7.6 billion people.

  • The protein needs are so different than they were in 1918 even let me just give you an example.

  • Any given month, 125 million new chickens were born in the peri urban region of Shanghai just to feed Shanghai.

  • The average time from a chicken being hashtag it's on your plate is about 35 days.

  • So every month, 125 million new chickens were born just there.

  • When you look at the global distribution of culture today, it dwarfs anything we ever saw in all of human history.

  • And so we're seeing mixing and and a movement of influenza viruses and birds today, this unprecedented absolutely president, and this is wondering why we're so concerned about the future for pandemic influenza.

  • Emerging again soon is because of that.

  • I mean, imagine in the old days, you know, the food virus may have had one throw energetic roulette table every month.

  • Now it has millions and millions of throws virtually every hour.

  • And so you know, we have to be prepared again because this animal human inter practices moving these viruses a lot is that when the Department of Health Minnesota has the program Cockle doodle do wash your hands?

  • Yes, well, I'll just add to take it to kind of the local level is that we do monitor in our influence of surveillance system.

  • We do monitor for swine flu in human.

  • So in other words, you know, humans who have developed influenza from swine as well as we're looking for a through and we do this is not common, but we do get cases, and it is something that we monitor foreign.

  • In fact, even as part of the planning that is being done for high path avian influenza, so focusing on what can happen to birds we are part of the team that department of agriculture has to make sure that we're focusing on worker health because of the potential on the issues for transmission between species.

  • So we do Look at that even today in our if I could just add additional piece of that we don't realize.

  • But we happen to be sitting on the mother lode event potential for that.

  • What I mean by that is several years ago, as you know, we had an H five into avian virus enter into the state had not previously been seen.

  • And in Minnesota and I, well, we lost over 50 million poultry, a za result of that epidemic.

  • It was incredible.

  • What very few people realize is one of the highest concentrations of poultry direction.

  • United States is candy.

  • Oh, hi, County, Minnesota.

  • You also know that one of the highest production capacities for swine in the United States is candy.

  • Oh, hi Counter Minnesota.

  • And you could not have put to mixing vessels together in a more concentrated manner than we do in candy.

  • Oh, Minnesota.

  • And so, from the standpoint of potential future epidemics emerging into pandemics, we surely worry about that a lot.

  • And we now know today that these flu virus is out of the poultry.

  • Barnes may move 10 20 miles in the wind, and that's why we have such a hard time containing it back in two years ago because the virus is just blew across counties.

  • And so today we know pigs get infected easily.

  • So So, you know, we don't have to look at China unnecessarily or some foreign country to know that we could have it right here our backyard.

  • So it sounds like it definitely concerned.

  • How often does the jump from animals?

  • Humans well, actually jumps fairly often.

  • But the real challenges wind is the thin jump from human to human.

  • And so we have a whole series of cases h seven, n nine h five n.

  • One ah, number of these flu virus is where we do get jumps into two people.

  • And in fact, we were very concerned a year ago with a strain called H 17 which had not caused much illness and the birds.

  • But humans in contact of these birds got it in over 500 Chinese workers in markets handling the birds developed age seven and nine in the 2016 17 flu season, and 1/3 of diet.

  • Now, the fortunate good part is that the virus was not yet genetically stable enough to go from human to human.

  • That was kind of the next step.

  • Once that happens, all bets are gone.

  • When we, uh, watch the 2009 H one n one pandemic emerge in Mexico, it surely emerge in a swine concentrated area.

  • We believe that that's where it came from.

  • And by the time we picked that up, which was probably a good month of transmission in Mexico, it was actually determined to be a new swine flu virus in humans.

  • By testing in San Diego, where somebody from Mexico City has come to San Diego got sick and tested and every thought Oh, my gosh, we got to shut this down.

  • Let's close the border from Mexico and a retrospective.

  • We realize that this fiber starting and 28 different countries before we even picked up the first training on.

  • So once these things move.

  • So today, the potential for these things to take off quickly Israel and all we're worried about is when is the next time that one of these viruses going to successfully not just make it to a human.

  • But then humans going in that case be able to transfer to other humans.

  • And once that happens, it is we're off to the races.

  • So you mentioned you mentioned the virus.

  • You're the things being in the West.

  • Do humans contracted from animals airborne, or is it from consuming the animals?

  • It's all airborne.

  • And in one of the things we're learning about, First of all, let me I should have given a disclosure to this group before I started so that you know that any conflicts of interest I have I know a hell of a lot less about flew today than I did 10 years ago.

  • And s o take anything I say today with great assault.

  • Necessarily.

  • We've learned so much new information about twins in the last 10 years, and one of things we've learned is is that by far the most effective transmission may not be what we once thought.

  • Surfaces probably play a very limited, if any role at all.

  • Yet we talked about hand washing surfaces droplets which we thought were the primary mode of transmission, which are those big boulders we blow out that actually go no further than 4 to 5 feet were thought to be the primary way.

  • Now we have very good data showing that aerosols the things that just me talking up here that may fill this entire room in a matter of minutes.

  • If you want understanding aerosol next time you go to a major department store and your four aisles away from the perfume department still smell the perfume that's in Arizona.

  • And so we actually think that that has a very key role in transmission, which means then just being anywhere in public is going to facilitate the transmission.

  • You don't have to be near somebody.

  • The other challenge we have is we now know today that people may actually be highly infectious and 25 where they have the first simple.

  • And so the problem you have today is that anyone who is in this room could come down with flu tonight or tomorrow morning and be highly infectious sitting next to someone and you appear to be completely well, and that's that's another challenge with flu transmission.

  • Dr Roh's room.

  • You said that one of the theories of where the that particular 1918 h one n one originated might have been on the Kansas military base.

  • I grew up in Chicago, where we're told stories of Mrs O'Leary's cow and how how that's what started the great Chicago Fire.

  • We not?

  • No, that's probably not not how it worked.

  • What are the theories on how the virus got to soda and are there anything concrete or is it really just stories?

  • Well, first of all, even back in 1918 with limited travel trained, you know, boat, remember what happened with it?

  • Moving to Europe.

  • You have to understand that speed, it was, just could move even a fast freighters.

  • Europe was still 7 to 10 days away at that time in 1918 yet we saw it get there very quickly.

  • I mentioned earlier with modern jet travel today.

  • Obviously, we saw it in all these countries very quickly out of Mexico.

  • So it's just the mere movement of people and goods that we move around.

  • We moved so many things, so so just it's not a surprising that that when it emerged out of Kansas or wherever it really started from, it was within the United States and almost a month, most states had now is you know, it's very nicely laid out where it had its maximal impact varied in some cases by up to several months and several ways.

  • There was a wave clearly in the early spring of 18 that was actually a much milder illness.

  • And actually those people will look to be protected against the subsequent.

  • That's what made us think this was a real wave.

  • But something changed in addition to the virus.

  • So when the September wave came along, yet, in fact was the very severe virus.

  • In that case, we saw kind of the peak in some places in September, some in October, some in November in the United States.

  • But it was across the world.

  • And remember, by October it was already having a major impact on our troops in Europe.

  • It was already impacting countries like India and China.

  • So I mean, it made its way around the world very quickly.

  • Now, in Minnesota, we all know that we're special.

  • Um, was there anything unique about the viruses presence in Minnesota?

  • No, I think it's been a really good job, and I think this was a very important message for lessons learned for today we live in a very different world today, so we can't go back and say what happened in 1918 will be what will happen today.

  • But a brown communication.

  • It's no different today than it was in 1918 and I think you're very poignant stories of what happened between just Minneapolis and ST Paul.

  • And if there's any one thing that's gonna have to happen is we're gonna lose public trust very quickly when you have a crisis like this, you know, if unearth quake happens, a tsunami happens.

  • So many things like that.

  • It happens and you go into recovery immediately.

  • And when you can get into recovery, people have very different mindset.

  • But when that hammer is coming down on you, day after day after day after day after day after day, fatigue starts to take over when so many health care workers get sick and die and you can't even staff.

  • The basic service is.

  • Then you start to fray society in ways that we don't really understand completely here, and so I think that that's the challenge, then is who is going to be the voice that people will look to and trust because they want that voice.

  • And if you have mixed messages in public health, we are in big trouble because at that point immediately the public will have doubt that anybody knows what's going on.

  • So I think that your messages about 1918 were very key.

  • The other piece, I would just add about what's gonna happen today.

  • A pandemic today is going to take a toll much higher than 1918 if it's a 1918 like pandemic.

  • And the reason for that has nothing to do with dying from flu.

  • It turns out that when you look at the modern world we live in today, we have a large segment of our population is being kept alive today, a number of very critical drugs that they need every day and summery man who compromise.

  • Some have cardiac disease.

  • Some have any number of different conditions.

  • And we did a study several years ago where we surveyed a worldwide renown group of Farm D's and we said, What are those drugs you have to have every day or people die?

  • Not not cancer drugs, such not most antibiotics, none of those no lifestyle drugs at all.

  • What's on the crash cart in the emergency, and we came up with 28 drug drug categories for which all 28 or generic all 28 are made outside the United States, most of them in China.

  • All of them have a razor thin supply chain mean It's just in time delivery and there's no stock pilot.

  • So we have a major influenza impact in Asia that shuts down manufacturing, trade, travel.

  • We will run out of those drugs quickly, and it wouldn't be surprising to me to see many more deaths up loaded up front in an influence opinion had nothing to do with flu itself.

  • But you can't get the light if you can't get insulin.

  • You know, how many days can you go without insulin?

  • You know, if you can't get these drugs and that's what's gonna cause the first real waiver impact, that's gonna be huge.

  • And then the flu deaths will actually accumulate after that.

  • And so I think people to understand that even though we live in this modern medical society world, it's a very different world today from vulnerability standpoint, it was 1918 people were kept alive on these drugs.

  • They died And so the people who died in 1918 largely died from influenza, where its ancillary impact and Lois again highlighted.

  • I mean the stories.

  • Philadelphia is one of the cities that really describe how many Children starved it up in Philadelphia during the 1918 pandan because both parents died dead in the house and nobody ever checked on him and these young kids under age five started.

  • And that's how tragic waas gonna ruin my next question with kid.

  • Go for it.

  • I'm not diabetic.

  • I don't have insulin.

  • My house don't show up if there's a problem because you share, um, what lessons have we learned?

  • I mean, you just You just said that, you know, if something like this were to happen again, we're probably not particularly well situated to at it.

  • But with the population being so much greater than it was, then, you know, are there any places that are doing it right?

  • Well, nobody's doing it right, But let me give you some examples of people that are trying to make a difference.

  • Right here in Minnesota are Mayo Clinic has been one of the most thoughtful institutional organizations in the world, and preparing for the next influenza pandemic.

  • They've really done a lot of work.

  • And one of the things they realized early on was, There's no way in hell they could stock piling up in 95 respirators things that will actually protect health care workers against, you know, the influenza virus.

  • And it's aerosol form.

  • And so they're gonna run out.

  • They're gonna ask workers to come to work with no respiratory protection in what will be a hotbed of influenza virus.

  • But they figured out that they couldnt stockpile enough Tamiflu, the drug that and also rotated that they could provide Tamiflu to every one of their employees and all the employees, family members.

  • And so today, if you work at the Mayo Clinic, you're actually guaranteed If we have an influenza pandemic, you may run out in 95.

  • But if you get sick of your family members get sick, we will supply you with Tamiflu.

  • So they thought about how to get ahead of the curve and howto because as a worker, I'm gonna come to work.

  • My God, if I know I have access to Tamiflu and nobody else does, Okay, so I think that there have been created, things like that.

  • What is actually been heartening for me and Chris and others in the room?

  • No, this, You know, I wrote my first article in 2003 and why we needed a universe or game changing flu vaccine because the current vaccines were inadequate in 2000 and Love in our group published the first seminal paper on showing how ineffective our current flu vaccines are and that that has been a deterrent to getting new and better flu vaccines, cause we grossly overstated how effective they were.

  • And finally, this year there has been a real attention paid to We do need doing better flu vaccines.

  • And I think that, you know, in 1983 I got into a little bit of trouble.

  • Which those that the Health Department No, it's not unusual, I was quoted New York Times the day after Secretary Margaret Heckler from HHS and Bob Gallo co discover the AIDS virus, had a press conference and said, Now that we've discovered this virus, we're gonna have a vaccine in three years, and I'm quoting that article saying, Hell, we're not gonna have a vaccine in my lifetime for AIDS.

  • And for all the reasons why I laid out.

  • But what I know about retroviruses and of course back then that was bad news.

  • How could you say that?

  • Well, here I sit in 2018 and we're not any closer, ineffective AIDS vaccine today, despite spending a $1,000,000,000 a year for the last eight years and flew on influence on HIV vaccine research.

  • And so having said that, that's the one out of sight of myself, the other honest site says.

  • But we do have enough data today.

  • Say we may very well be able to make a universal flu vaccine, one that you could give once every 10 to 20 years because we can go up parts of the virus that actually protects you against multiple strains and for a long duration of time and the problems We just never did it.

  • We didn't have a Manhattan project where we basically crashed it much like even we're doing with eight with AIDS vaccines today.

  • So I'm very pleased that that's finally gotten attention.

  • Last week, the president signed legislation that actually appropriate $100 million I aged fast forward universal flu vaccine work now that's surely a pittance of the amount that we need, and it will take a while.

  • But we're for the first time C net, and I actually envision I mean, this is not pipe dreams.

  • We could vaccinate the world one day like we did for smallpox and actually protect the world against a flu pandemic from ever emerging and have a major impact on seasonal flu every year with the vaccine that may only be given once every 10 to 20 years.

  • Imagine that if we could take flew off the table, what an incredible human accomplishment that would be.

  • It would rival surely smallpox and anything we did, I actually that's possible.

  • He's just not gonna happen today, and I'd like to give this a little bit of a positive spin in terms of where we're at being prepared to respond to a situation.

  • Certainly there there's a reason that they causing disasters and all of the planning that we do what make a disaster.

  • Golway.

  • But we have had a lot more, Um, when Lois was talking about sort of lack of coordination between government and two teas and things, I wouldn't say that we've reached Nirvana, but we have certainly had a lot more communication, a lot more planning.

  • And so I think we're in a better place with that.

  • Then we were in 1918.

  • Um, when I Well, I was, I guess, at the health for a few years.

  • But we started doing pandemic planning in 1999 and the phrase at that time was the clock is ticking, and we don't know what time it isyou know this sort of imminent do.

  • And when we started that planning, I mean, I was an epidemiologist and I didn't have a clue about emergency preparedness.

  • I didn't understand any of the resource is that were available to the Health Department in terms of responding, and since that time we have really matured.

  • And again, I don't want to give the impression that, you know, if we had a 1918 happen in 2018 that it would be a piece of cake by any stretch.

  • But we really have are arsenal, I guess in terms of just coordination and preparedness has really advanced.

  • So we are participating with our partners and emergency response and emergency planning, and we do have surveillance system so as Lois said Influence.

  • It was not reportable back in 1918.

  • It is a disease that we do surveillance on now, and our laboratory does, ah, huge amount of testing.

  • So when we are looking to see what circulating, we actually have information to say.

  • This is what circulating in Minnesota.

  • This is how it compares to what's in the vaccine and occasionally will have a situation in which the lab is unable to really identify that.

  • What the virus that they're looking at doesn't match the re agents that we've received from CDC, which says it isn't what was expected, and we can follow up with CDC and with other laboratory ins who can look into that.

  • So we have systems in place that can help us be just slightly more prepared.

  • A not caught off guard, you know, in the case of a pandemic.

  • So, as I said, I really don't want to give the impression that we've got it all wrapped up in a box, but definitely the surveillance systems that we have.

  • We we currently do surveillance and long term care in schools.

  • We have sentinel sites and we're doing surveillance year round for influenza Saul, though you hear about it from October to make a kind of the peak flu season, we're constantly monitoring what's happening.

  • So, um, we've come a long way, but we have a way to go.

  • And I think one of the things that's important to keep in mind is that when you when you invest in public health and I'll say this because we are speaking here in the state office building.

  • But when you invest in public health, you're investing in infrastructure that allows you to have the capacity that you need to respond to events.

  • So whether it was measles in 2017 or it's the next pandemic that hits, it's important that you have infrastructure that allows you to be nimble when on infectious disease crisis comes along.

  • If I could just add a piece that could, I think Chris is absolutely right, and I think we've learned a lot since 9 11 about how to implement the incident command approach, how to bring together organizations, and I think in a very limited event, but you had a very critically event.

  • The bridge collapse in Minneapolis was an example of where all that training and and activity played off because it was a highly coordinated, very well done response to that.

  • The challenge with flu that none of us are really comfortable with prepared for really takes a page out of the military.

  • That is, when you're in war.

  • If your lieutenant get shot and killed, your sergeant becomes a lieutenant.

  • When your sergeant gets shot and killed, your private becomes the lieutenant.

  • And what we don't think about is what happened in 1918.

  • And we've seen happen in situations like this, where those people who were in charge die.

  • We saw that in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone with Ebola, the primary healthcare providers were all dying from Ebola from their exposure.

  • When you take that kind of leadership away, this is why when we talk about planning for this, you should be always planning three deep.

  • So what happens when seven of your top 15 public health people are either desperately ill or debt?

  • What happens with your leadership in general?

  • And so one of the things we haven't done yet is understood?

  • How will we respond when that valued spokesperson is no longer there because of her debt, which actually does two things when it takes her voice away and again it scares the public even more because the voice they had trusted is no longer there.

  • And I think that that's gonna be the biggest challenge that comes back to Lois's earlier point about communication and who's in charge?

  • How are they in charge?

  • And so when we do tabletop exercises with organizations, the one thing I love to do that one part of the tabletop we suddenly take many of the senior leadership people and we tell your no dead you're no dead.

  • You're no, don't shut up.

  • You can't say another word.

  • And suddenly they're watching their three deep for people making all these critical decisions that never thought they'd have to make it cause the boss was in the room.

  • Well, the boss is now dead, you know?

  • So I think that's gonna be one of the interesting challenge is how do we implement that?

  • Because it'll be across all society.

  • It'll be health care workers will be elected officials.

  • It'll be ministers and priests and rabbis are my element.

  • It'll be.

  • The whole group will recognize the impact of that That point, first of all, everyone should stop looking at Commissioner Malcolm.

  • But what role?

  • What role?

  • I want the audience to come up with a few questions if you have some, so be thinking of that now.

  • But what role could technology have in keeping healthcare leadership in health care workers safe?

  • Something like telemedicine?

  • Well, I think that certainly is an option we're looking to use that we use it now in public health for directly observed therapy for tuberculosis.

  • And it's used in part as our way to, you know, sort of stretch resource is because oftentimes in Greater Minnesota, people are driving out to someone's home every day to watch him take medications that's really time and labor intensive.

  • So that's an option, but certainly with a strong infrastructure, that would be a way to avoid what Dr Ostrum said was the aerosol cloud of spewing drunk.

  • Because you can't do that via, you know, the Internet.

  • So there certainly are some advantages, but their capacity issues as well.

  • With that, I think I mean, I think that I tend to be probably more optimistic than I should.

  • But I think on the optimistic side, I think that we have come a long way in terms of our understanding.

  • Back in 1918 they they didn't realize that influenza was caused by a virus.

  • They thought it was caused by a bacteria.

  • And the vaccines that they were offering had Wheatley the wrong organism, the wrong pathogen in it.

  • We've got issues with our current vaccine, but we're we're a lot farther along in terms of our understanding of the virus, in terms of our understanding and public health.

  • I mean, I I certainly don't want to be the person that's dead in the next pandemic, but I do have great confidence in the staff that we have at the health department.

  • We have a really great team.

  • That definitely goes beyond just some of the leadership.

  • So I have reason to be optimistic.

  • But I still dread the thought of a pandemic that could in perspective to that.

  • We asked about technology.

  • I mean, it really is vaccine vaccine vaccine vaccine, and yet today, on a global basis, we could probably provide even in effective vaccine by the second wave of the pandemic to less than 2% of the world's population.

  • When you live in a global just in time economy, That means the implications we felt worldwide because the vast majority the world will never have access to flu vaccine.

  • Even if we have.

  • And even if we have, it wouldn't get.

  • Here is we are group demonstrated in a report that we did, Um by the time we got the flu vaccine in 2000 and nine, the peak of the second wave, the key wave had already weighing to the point of where way had limited virtually almost no impact on the 2009 pandemic.

  • Flu vaccine was too late, too late, and if we could incrementally get that a little better, that would help.

  • But still, for the world's perspective, there is no capacity out there to get the world flu vaccine.

  • And so I think that one of things we have to realize is pandemics.

  • The worldwide event number two.

  • We are victims of a worldwide event when the critical products and service is that we need can't be delivered and we have become outsourced so much I mean something jumping is simply yet is critical is the drugs I mean today if I were to share with you, which I can't, but the number of areas were concerned about in the military.

  • Right now, we're very key Aspects of military operations are dependent on products that remain outside the United States.

  • And we forgot about that.

  • You know, we just assumed that will be there.

  • And so I think that that's key.

  • The other thing I think it's gonna be a challenge for communication is if we do have a vaccine who gets it first, and we tend to go with our hearts and not our heads.

  • So young kids and Grandma and Grandpa should get first off.

  • We think about that when I would argue.

  • If you want to save more kids and Grandpa and Grandma no, make sure the people are on the electrical grid system.

  • Get it first, make sure that doctors and nurses get it first.

  • Make sure because I want Grandpa and Grandma to live.

  • And the way they're gonna live is if we don't have a breakdown, for example, of electricity if we don't have a breakdown in certain critical movements of goods.

  • If in fact we actually have a physician, nurses and ancillary staff in a health care facility, if you do come in that they can help you the best they can.

  • Which, by the way, most medical Carol be nursing care.

  • If we want to understand the critical importance of nursing care, wait till the next bad pandemic nursing care will be job 12 and three, not intense medical care.

  • And I think that that's what we also have to then adjust to Is that nature of that?

  • It will be important.

  • We're getting close to time, but I want to make sure we had a little bit of time for questions from the audience.

  • Does anybody have anything?

  • Yes.

  • Years ago.

  • Yeah, I was quite a controversy in the scientific community.

  • While some researchers from Temple Netherlands referring the development Oh, thank you.

  • Communicable viruses.

  • And I remember that you at the time, because this is a national security problem.

  • We can't let them publish this.

  • Right?

  • Um, what's happened since then on that front regarding publication off potentially very lethal.

  • Oh, viruses.

  • Well, first I was their bills.

  • Well, failure. 00:53:08.060 --> 00:53:

Hello, everybody.

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