Name: 人工衛星が明かす中国の台湾侵略計画 (How Satellites Reveal China's Taiwan Invasion Plans)
Uploaded: 2025-07-17T08:37:56.000Z
Duration: 38 min 32 s
Description: VoiceTubeの動画で発音を聞きながら英語表現を覚えよう！学べる英語：

In early January of 2025, a satellite captured a curious image of something happening in the

2025年1月初旬、人工衛星がとらえた不思議な映像があった。

関係詞節（制限と非制限）

Chinese megacity of Guangzhou near the country's southern coast. A dry dock in the city was busy constructing this strange-looking ship, something that a handful of foreign intelligence analysts at the time suggested could be a Chinese landing vessel. And then only a couple of months later, in March of 2025, the completed vessel and two other similar-looking ships were spotted by satellites again, this time off of China's far southern coastline practicing a series of interesting maneuvers. This time, the satellite captured the three barges connecting together to form a huge causeway from the rearmost barge, and then through the front barge directly towards a beach, with accompanying Chinese civilian cargo ships and ferries practicing right alongside them.

中国南部の海岸近くにある巨大都市、広州。広州の乾ドックでは、この奇妙な船の建造に追われていた。当時、一握りの外国情報アナリストは、中国の揚陸艦ではないかと指摘していた。そしてわずか数カ月後の2025年3月、完成した船と他の2隻の似たような船が再び人工衛星によって目撃された。このとき衛星が捉えたのは、3隻の台船が連結し、最後部の台船から巨大な土手道を形成し、前部の台船を通って直接海岸に向かい、そのすぐ横で中国の民間貨物船やフェリーが練習している様子だった。

上級受動態

And then, only a few weeks later after that, a series of photos taken by the Chinese themselves of the exercises began spreading around on the internet, showing the three barges from the perspective of being down on the ground on the beach itself, showing the long causeway from the rear barge connecting all the way to the front barge with an offloading ramp extending directly onto the beach, interestingly just wide enough to accommodate the offloading of a heavy main battle tank. It didn't take very long for many analysts to begin recognizing that these new barges could be a part of China's ever-evolving strategy to launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan at some point in the future. The island that the government of China regards as a rogue, renegade province that China's leader, Xi Jinping, has repeatedly promised would be brought under

後部の台船から前部の台船まで長い土手道がつながっており、荷揚げ用のタラップが直接浜辺に伸びている。多くのアナリストが、これらの新型台船が、将来のある時点で台湾への全面侵攻を開始するための、中国の進化し続ける戦略の一部である可能性を認識し始めるのにそれほど時間はかからなかった。台湾は、中国政府がならず者で、中国の指導者である習近平が何度も約束した反抗的な省とみなしている島である。

Chinese Communist Party rule some way or another, either through diplomacy or through force.

中国共産党は外交か武力か、何らかの方法で支配している。

Of course, one of the biggest obstacles that has been standing in the way of an all-out Chinese invasion of Taiwan for decades has been the fact that Taiwan is an island, and in order to get their army over to that island, China will need to transport their soldiers, vehicles, and equipment over the sea in a titanic amphibious invasion like a modern 21st century version of the D-Day invasion of Normandy during World War II. And China is aware that any amphibious invasion of an enemy consists of two different steps. The first step is rather straightforward, and consists of actually assaulting the beach, storming and overcoming local enemy positions, and establishing a localized beachhead. The second step is more complicated, and is likely what these new barges are designed to help out with. After the initial beachhead is established, the invading force has to make the beachhead sustainable in order to actually hold onto it, and to expand their control even deeper into the enemy's territory. The beachhead has to be logistically supplied with adequate amounts of reinforcements, ammunition, fuel, food, medical supplies, and other materials to make sure that they don't just run out of supplies surrounded by hostile territory and implode in on themselves. So in order to make a beachhead sustainable, the invading force usually has to take over a nearby port that's ideally closely located to the initial beachhead. Through which they can then begin bringing in all of their necessary supplies and reinforcements for the troops to hold the beachhead, and then expand beyond it. But in most cases, securing a nearby enemy harbor to the beachhead that's still perfectly intact is no easy feat. During the Allied amphibious invasion of Normandy during

もちろん、何十年もの間、中国による台湾への全面侵攻を阻んできた最大の障害のひとつは、台湾が島であるという事実である。その島に軍隊を上陸させるためには、中国は、第二次世界大戦中のノルマンディーへのDデイ侵攻の現代21世紀版のような大規模な水陸両用侵攻で、兵士、車両、装備を海上輸送する必要がある。そして中国は、敵国への水陸両用侵攻は2つの異なるステップからなることを認識している。第一段階はかなり単純で、実際に浜辺に突撃し、現地の敵の陣地を襲撃して制圧し、局地的な橋頭堡を築くことである。第二段階はより複雑で、お

World War II, the Allies' solution to this problem were the now famous Mulberry Harbors, which have no doubt been studied extensively by Chinese military planners for a possible Taiwan amphibious invasion today. Rather than spending huge amounts of time and resources trying to capture well-defended enemy-occupied ports, that would probably be sabotaged and damaged anyway, and take even more time to repair and bring back online, the Allies' solution was to simply bring their own temporary portable harbors to the coast of Normandy instead. Merely hours after the Allies had established their beachheads in Normandy after the initial D-Day amphibious assaults, the many sections of the Mulberry Harbors were towed from England across the Channel and put into position in two different beachhead locations, Mulberry A and Mulberry B.

第二次世界大戦中、この問題に対する連合国側の解決策は、今では有名なマルベリー港であった。この港は、中国の軍事プランナーによって、今日起こりうる台湾の水陸両用侵攻のために広く研究されていることは間違いない。莫大な時間と資源を費やして、敵に占領された防備の固い港を占領しようとするよりも、どうせ破壊工作されて損傷し、修理してオンラインに戻すのにさらに時間がかかるような港を占領するよりも、連合国の解決策は、ノルマンディーの海岸に自分たちの一時的な携帯港を持ち込むことだった。Dデーの最初の水陸両用攻撃後、連合軍がノ

The Mulberry Harbors basically consisted of a series of floating breakwaters, pontoons, piers, and floating roadways that the Allies were then able to stitch together and use to rapidly offload reinforcements and supplies through onto the beachheads, which enabled them to become sustainable and to be able to expand deeper into the interior without the need to spend crucial time and effort capturing any of the sabotaged German-occupied ports in northern France instead. Nonetheless, even during this operation, Mulberry Harbor A was destroyed by a violent storm just a few days after it had been established, limiting the Allies to the use of only Mulberry

マルベリーハーバーは基本的に、一連の浮き防波堤、ポンツーン、桟橋、浮き車道で構成されており、連合軍はこれをつなぎ合わせて使用することで、増援部隊や物資を迅速にビーチヘッドに送り込むことができた。それにもかかわらず、この作戦の最中にも、マルベリーハーバーAは設置からわずか数日後に激しい嵐によって破壊され、連合軍はマルベリーハーバーAのみを使用することに制限された。

Harbor B for the next several months. Now, for China's modern considerations for a 21st century amphibious invasion of Taiwan, there are many geographic facts about this part of the world that will make it even harder to pull off than the Allied invasion of Normandy was.

今後数ヶ月間、ハーバーBは続く。さて、中国が21世紀の台湾への水陸両用侵攻を現代的に検討する場合、この地域には、連合軍のノルマンディー侵攻よりもさらに困難な地理的事実がたくさんある。

The distance that the Chinese invasion fleet will have to travel across the Taiwan Strait will be roughly similar to the distance that the Allied invasion fleet had to travel across the English Channel. And just like the Allies experienced in Normandy in 1944, the Chinese can also expect that Taiwan's defenders today would likely sabotage their own ports rather than risk them falling into Chinese hands intact. Which means that the

中国の侵攻艦隊が台湾海峡を横断しなければならない距離は、連合軍の侵攻艦隊が英仏海峡を横断しなければならなかった距離とほぼ同じである。そして、連合国が1944年にノルマンディーで経験したように、中国側もまた、現在の台湾の守備側は、港がそのまま中国の手に落ちるリスクを冒すよりも、自国の港を破壊する可能性が高いと予想できる。つまり

Chinese will have to bring their own ports with them in order to sustain their initial beachheads.

中国は、最初のビーチヘッドを維持するために、自国の港を持ち込む必要がある。

However, a significant amount of the Taiwanese coast is ringed by extensive coral reefs that in some locations can stretch for hundreds of meters off the beaches, severely complicating the ability for an invasion force to bring their own Mulberry Harbor style portable ports to bear.

しかし、台湾の海岸のかなりの部分は広大なサンゴ礁に囲まれており、場所によっては海岸から数百メートルも離れている。

Moreover, the island of Taiwan just also has very few suitable beaches that a traditional amphibious invasion force can choose from to attack with any good odds of success.

さらに、台湾島には、従来の水陸両用侵攻軍が攻撃するのに適したビーチがほとんどない。

The island only has a total of 14 so-called red beaches dotted around the island where conditions are considered optimal for an amphibious assault. Where the coral reefs extending from the shoreline are either small or non-existent, where the terrain is relatively flat and easier to assault than the rugged towering cliffs that are seen across most of the island's east coast, and where the beaches themselves are also located nearby to strategically crucial targets for the Chinese to capture. Such as Taiwan's capital and the largest city in the north, Taipei, and Taiwan's principal and largest maritime port down in the south, Kaohsiung.

この島には、水陸両用の攻撃に最適な条件とされる、いわゆるレッドビーチが合計14カ所点在しているだけだ。海岸線から伸びるサンゴ礁が小さいか存在しないか、島の東海岸の大部分に見られる険しくそびえ立つ崖よりも地形が比較的平坦で突撃しやすい場所、そしてビーチ自体も中国軍が戦略的に極めて重要な目標の近くに位置している場所である。例えば、台湾の首都であり北部最大の都市である台北や、南部の主要かつ最大の海港である高雄などである。

However, the vulnerability of all 14 of these red beaches are very well understood by Taiwan, and so they're consequently the most heavily fortified and well-defended beaches on the entire island, making any traditional amphibious assault on them a difficult task.

しかし、これら14の赤い砂浜の脆弱性は台湾によく理解されているため、結果的に全島で最も厳重に要塞化され、よく防衛された砂浜となっており、伝統的な水陸両用攻撃は困難なものとなっている。

All of these problems though can potentially be solved by China's new invasion barges that have been spreading around the internet these past few months, which western intelligence sources have nicknamed the Shui Kao class of vessels, literally Mandarin Chinese for water bridge.

しかし、これらの問題はすべて、ここ数カ月インターネットを中心に広まっている中国の新しい侵略用はしけによって解決される可能性がある。西側の情報筋は、水橋を意味する中国語（北京語）で水橋（Shui Kao）級とあだ名している。

When hypothetically approaching the Taiwanese coast, these Shui Kao barges, which will probably always operate in pairs of three, will carefully position themselves one after the other in a row. With the smaller barge of the trio in the front, the medium-sized barge in the center, and the largest sized barge back in the rear. Each of the barges carries a set of super heavy retractable legs with them on board. When the barges are still in transport, these legs will be retracted and stowed above the ship. But once they're in position near the beachhead, the legs will be lowered to pin them down to the seabed beneath them, and to lift their hulls out of the water, giving them increased stability in the choppy coastal waters almost like miniature offshore oil platforms. Each of the barges also has a tower in their front and a long bridge stored on their decks while in transport. Once the legs have stabilized the barges in place, the towers at the front will telescope out their bridges to create a giant portable causeway extending out from the rear barge to the center barge to the front barge to the shore, extending out nearly 825 meters from the rear barge. It's also been suggested by several other analysts that these heavy-duty bridges will be capable of supporting and fitting heavy vehicles such as armored personnel carriers and even main battle tanks. Together, the Shui Kao barges effectively function as both a movable port and a movable bridge at the same time.

仮に台湾沿岸に接近する場合、この水澳バージは、おそらく常に3隻1組で行動し、注意深く1列に並んで配置する。3隻のうち小さいほうの船を前方に、中型の船を中央に、一番大きい船を後方に配置する。それぞれのバージには、超重量級の開閉式脚が搭載されている。はしけがまだ輸送中であるとき、これらの脚は格納され、船の上に収納される。しかし、一旦ビーチヘッドの近くに配置されると、脚を下ろして船底に固定し、船体を水面から浮かせることで、まるでミニチュアの海上石油プラットフォームのように、不安定な沿岸海域での安定性を高めること

Working in unison with Chinese civilian roll-on roll-off or row-row ferries commandeered for military service, the People's Liberation Army can then rapidly dock these row-row ferries carrying vehicles with the larger rear barge and disgorge their heavy vehicles and equipment into it. They can then rapidly storm ahead across the causeway and directly onto the beachhead.

人民解放軍は、軍用に徴用した中国民間のロールオン・ロールオフ・フェリーや手漕ぎフェリーと一体となって、車両を積んだこれらの手漕ぎフェリーを、より大きな後部の台船に素早く接岸させ、重車両や装備をその中に降ろすことができる。そして、土手道を横切って、直接ビーチヘッドに突入することができる。

Two analysts affiliated with the China Maritime Studies Institute, J. Michael Damm and Thomas

中国海事研究所に所属する2人のアナリスト、J.マイケル・ダムとトーマス・ダムは次のように述べている。

Shugart, argued in a paper they wrote in March 2025 about these Shui Kao barges that they would likely be capable of offloading onto the beach an entire heavy combined arms battalion, including roughly 150 vehicles in only about 40 to 60 minutes after they had extended their causeway.

シュガートは、2025年3月に彼らが書いた論文の中で、この水カオのバージ船は、土手道を延長した後、わずか40分から60分程度で、およそ150台の車両を含む重兵科連合大隊全体を浜辺に降ろすことができるだろうと主張した。

Over the course of a full day, they could theoretically unload several hundred armored vehicles, all brought to them by any number of China's dozens of civilian row-row ferries commandeered for military service, which have all been intentionally designed for dual-use purposes with the capability to handle unloading and offloading heavy-duty military vehicles like tanks.

理論的には、丸一日かけて数百台の装甲車を降ろすことができる。これらの装甲車はすべて、中国が軍用に徴用した数十隻の民間の手漕ぎフェリーで運ばれてくるが、これらのフェリーはすべて、戦車のような頑丈な軍用車両の積み下ろしに対応できるよう、意図的に両用目的に設計されている。

With their long length far out from the beach, the row-row ferries will be able to safely offload all of their vehicles onto the rear Shui Kao barge without any fear of them running aground in the shallower waters closer to the beach. With their very shallow draft and distance out from the shoreline, the Shui Kao barges also appear to be designed to overcome Taiwan's coastal coral reefs that ring most of the island, opening up more potential beaches beyond the 14 well-known and well-defended red beaches that the Chinese invasion force could potentially assault.

ビーチから遠く離れているため、列曳きフェリーは、ビーチに近い浅瀬で座礁する心配がなく、安全にすべての車両を後部の水澳台船に積み下ろすことができる。喫水が非常に浅く、海岸線から距離があるため、水澳バージは台湾の沿岸のサンゴ礁を克服するように設計されているようだ。

Going even further, the Shui Kao barges could also theoretically extend their causeway to connect directly to one of Taiwan's coastal highways, disgorging their vehicles directly to the island's highway system and ignoring the beaches altogether. This is potentially the biggest threat that the new Shui Kao barges pose to Taiwan's defense. They've been estimated by some analysts to potentially expand the number of beaches that the PLA could land at on Taiwan by around 40, on top of the original 14 red beaches, greatly expanding the number of potential beaches that the Taiwanese will now have to consider preparing for their defense and risking them spreading out their limited resources too thin and leaving behind weaker vulnerable defenses at some beaches that the PLA could find and exploit during an invasion scenario. The PLA would likely only utilize the

さらに踏み込めば、水澳バージは理論上、土手道を延長して台湾の沿岸高速道路に直接接続し、車両を台湾の高速道路システムに直接降ろし、ビーチを完全に無視することもできる。これは、新しい水澳バージが台湾の防衛にもたらす最大の脅威となる可能性がある。一部のアナリストは、水澳バージによってPLAが台湾に上陸できる砂浜の数が、当初の14の赤い砂浜に加えて、約40に拡大する可能性があると見積もっている。PLAは、おそらく

Shui Kao barges after their navy and air force had already achieved maritime and aerial supremacy and after the initial beachheads on the shore have already been established by the first wave of D-Day style amphibious assaults, granting the PLA the ability to then rapidly offload their heavy equipment and supplies onto the island to press on the assault deeper into the island's interior. If the Shui Kao barges arrive too early without PLA maritime or aerial supremacy established first, they'll just be sitting ducks while trying to offload their equipment and will be easy targets to defending missiles, drones, and artillery. Moreover, the satellite images that have captured the Shui Kao barges practicing have so far only shown them operating within calm waters, which might mean that they could struggle in rougher weather conditions that commonly happen within the Taiwan Strait, just like what the Mulberry harbors experienced during the Normandy landings when one of them was destroyed by inclement weather within only a matter of days.

水澳バージ船は、水軍と空軍がすでに海上と空中の覇権を確立し、D-Dayスタイルの水陸両用攻撃の第一波によって海岸の最初のビーチヘッドがすでに確立された後に到着する。もしPLAが海上や空中での優位を確立することなく、水高はしけの到着が早すぎれば、装備を積み下ろそうとしている間にカモにされ、防衛ミサイルや無人偵察機、大砲の格好の標的になってしまう。さらに、水高はしけが練習しているところを捉えた衛星画像は、今のところ穏やかな海域で行動しているところしか写っていない。これは、台湾海峡でよく起こる荒れた気象条件では

A second set of Shui Kao barges have already been observed by satellites to be under construction in the same Guangzhou shipyard in China right now, and if China ends up building enough of them, it's conceivable that they could help China overcome one of their greatest challenges of all when it comes to an invasion of Taiwan, seizing control of the island before anyone from the outside world can intervene against them and stop them, like the United States, Japan, and Australia. If the initial PLA amphibious assaults are successful at establishing their beachheads on Taiwan like the Normandy landings were, and then if the Chinese can bring in their Shui Kao barges and their commandeered civilian Roro ferries, within hours of that happening like the allies were able to do with their Mulberry harbors and Normandy, Thomas Shugart wrote in his paper that I mentioned earlier that it would be conceivable that the PLA could unload up to eight heavy brigades complete with all of their vehicles, supplies, and around 60,000 troops on a Taiwan during just the first wave of the attack within just the first 24 hours, with significant reinforcements being delivered over the following few days. If the PLA could achieve a rapid takeover of Taiwan before the outside world even had the time to react to it, then would they? Some other analysts argue that in this light, the

もし中国が十分な数の水荷船を建造することになれば、中国が台湾侵攻の際に最大の難関のひとつである、アメリカや日本、オーストラリアのように外敵が介入して阻止する前に台湾を掌握する、という難題を克服する手助けになるかもしれない。もし中国共産党の最初の水陸両用攻撃がノルマンディー上陸作戦のように台湾にビーチヘッドを設置することに成功し、その後、中国が水高はしけや徴用した民間のロロフェリーを持ち込むことができれば、同盟国が桑港やノルマンディー上陸作戦でできたように、数時間以内に台湾に上陸することができる、トーマス・

Shui Kao barges are designed as a psychological weapon just as much as a real weapon. They serve as a major symbol that China is very serious about investing resources into establishing their ability to actually invade Taiwan, and they add a degree of plausibility to Xi Jinping's frequent threats of invasion. China, naturally, would rather that Taiwan surrender without a fight at all, and convincing Taiwan's leadership that the invasion will be both inevitable and successful is the best way to do that, and these new Shui Kao barges certainly send a message that the odds of an invasion are at least more plausible than they were before. Regardless, in order to even use the barges in the first place, the PLA will have to face fierce resistance from determined

水澳バージは、実際の武器と同様に心理的な武器として設計されている。中国が実際に台湾を侵略する能力を確立するために資源を投入することに非常に真剣であることを示す重要なシンボルとして機能し、習近平の頻繁な侵略の脅しにある程度の説得力を与える。中国は当然ながら、台湾が戦わずに降伏することを望んでおり、台湾の指導者に侵略が避けられず、成功することを納得させることは、そのための最善の方法である。とはいえ、そもそもこのバージ船を使うためには、PLAは断固とした抵抗勢力からの激しい抵抗に直面しなければならないだろう。

Taiwanese defenders while crossing the Taiwan Strait and while assaulting the beaches to establish the initial preliminary beachheads, and they could potentially face determined American,

台湾の守備隊は、台湾海峡を横断している間や、最初の予備堡塁を築くために海岸を攻撃している間に、アメリカの決然とした態度に直面する可能性があった、

Japanese, Filipino, and Australian auxiliary defenses as well that could all work to deny them the ability to even accomplish this first phase of the amphibious assault altogether, and render the Shui Kao barges a rather moot point. So in order to reinforce both the psychological and real potential of the Shui Kao barges, China has to be able to credibly threaten the destruction of any allied intervention on Taiwan's behalf as well. In order to try and deter any allied intervention from happening in the first place that could slow their invasion down and potentially defeat them, and in order to understand how the PLA is doing that, we actually have to travel very far away from Taiwan and the seas around the island to a very unlikely location, the remote and sparsely populated deserts of far northern and northwestern China, thousands of kilometers away. This is the

日本、フィリピン、オーストラリアの補助的な防衛も、水陸両用攻撃のこの第一段階を達成する能力さえも完全に否定し、水澳バージをむしろ無意味なものにする可能性がある。水高はしけの心理的、現実的な可能性を強化するために、中国は台湾のために介入する同盟国を破壊すると脅すことができなければならない。そもそも同盟国の介入を抑止するためには、台湾の侵攻を遅らせ、台湾を打ち負かす可能性がある。PLAがそれをどのように行っているのかを理解するためには、台湾や台湾近海から遠く離れた、ありそうもない場所、中国北部や北西部の人里離

Dingxin Test and Training Base located in China's section of the Gobi Desert, a massive facility used by the People's Liberation Army Air Force for weapons integration testing, training, and tactics development. It is an ideal location for them to do all of this because it's in a very remote sparsely populated location with huge amounts of wide open airspace, leading some analysts to compare the importance of Dingxin to China to Nellis Air Force Base in the deserts of Nevada to the United States.

中国のゴビ砂漠の一角にある頂新試験訓練基地は、人民解放軍空軍が兵器の統合試験、訓練、戦術開発に使用する巨大な施設である。この基地は、人里離れた人口の少ない場所にあり、広大な空域が広がっているため、このようなことを行うには理想的な場所である。一部のアナリストは、中国にとっての定新の重要性を、アメリカにとってのネバダ州の砂漠にあるネリス空軍基地と比較している。

And relatively nearby to the Dingxin Test and Training Base out in another one of China's remote deserts known as the Taclomacan, satellite imagery has recently captured a lot of things that kind of seem to indicate what the People's Liberation Army Air Force is actively training for. On the 1st of January of 2024, Planet Labs released an image that one of their satellites had captured in China's remote Taclomacan desert, showing what looks like a mock-up of an aircraft carrier, and not just any aircraft carrier, but a nearly perfect one-to-one identical mock-up of one of

そして、タクロマカンと呼ばれる中国の辺境の砂漠にある定新試験訓練基地の比較的近くでは、人民解放軍空軍が活発に訓練を行っていることを示すかのような多くのものが、最近、衛星画像によって捉えられている。2024年1月1日、Planet Labs社は、衛星の1つが中国の人里離れたタクロマカン砂漠で捉えた画像を公開した。そこには、航空母艦のモックアップのようなものが写っていた。

America's most advanced current nuclear-powered supercarriers, the Gerald R. Ford Class. There is a structure in the mock-up that's almost precisely in the same location as the Ford Class' island, and there are exactly four mocked-up catapult launcher tracks on the deck that are located exactly where they appear on the real Ford Class carrier. Based on Planet Labs data, it appears that the PLA began constructing this mock-up US carrier in the desert sometime in

アメリカの最新鋭原子力空母ジェラルド・R・フォード級。模擬空母の中には、フォード・クラスの島とほぼ同じ位置にある構造物があり、甲板には、本物のフォード・クラスの空母にあるような、正確に4つの模擬カタパルト発射台がある。プラネット・ラボのデータによれば、PLAがこの模擬空母を砂漠に建造し始めたのは、1994年のことである。

November of 2023, fairly recently. However, going further back in time, there's been a general outline of an aircraft carrier here in this exact location for a while, since at least 2021.

2023年11月、かなり最近のことだ。しかし、さらに過去に遡ると、少なくとも2021年以来、しばらくの間、この正確な場所に空母の大まかな輪郭があった。

And before it was completely filled in with a full aircraft carrier that we can see now, the PLA had built two smaller aircraft carriers within the overall silhouette.

そして、私たちが今見ているような完全な空母で完全に埋め尽くされる前に、PLAは全体のシルエットの中に2隻の小型空母を建造していた。

And interestingly, this aircraft carrier is far from the only American ship that the Chinese have built a one-to-one replica of out here in the desert. In fact, the area is almost littered with them. Just four and a half kilometers away to the northwest is another full-scale replica of another US Ford Class aircraft carrier. And dotted all around nearby are multiple one-to-one mock-ups of what appear to be Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers.

興味深いことに、中国がこの砂漠に1対1のレプリカを建造したアメリカ艦船は、この空母だけではない。実際、この地域には空母のレプリカが散乱している。北西にわずか4.5キロ離れた場所にも、フォード級航空母艦の実物大レプリカがある。さらにその近くには、アーレイ・バーク級誘導ミサイル駆逐艦と思われる1対1のモックアップが複数点在している。

One of the US Navy's most modern and capable class of destroyers at the present that are typically used to escort carriers in a strike group formation. But most interestingly of all, is this line that snakes across the desert in between all of these mock-ups of US warships.

現在、米海軍で最も近代的で有能な駆逐艦クラスのひとつで、通常は打撃群編隊で空母を護衛するために使用される。しかし、何よりも興味深いのは、これらすべての米軍艦のモックアップの間に、砂漠を横切るように蛇行するこのラインである。

This line appears to be a very large railroad, roughly six meters in width, approaching four to five times as wide as a usual railroad is. Interestingly, this super wide railroad begins at what appears to be a storage facility of some sort, and then extends for several kilometers in a straight line before curving rapidly through the desert and then curving again to simply end in the middle of nowhere. The railroad doesn't curve to avoid any obstacles in the flat desert. And the reason why it curves this way starts to become apparent when you see other photos of the railroad and understand what its true purpose is.

この線路は非常に大きな鉄道のようで、幅はおよそ6メートル、通常の鉄道の4倍から5倍に近い。興味深いことに、この超幅広の鉄道は、ある種の貯蔵施設と思われる場所から始まり、直線で数キロ伸びた後、砂漠の中を急カーブし、またカーブして人里離れたところで終わっている。鉄道は平坦な砂漠で障害物を避けるためにカーブしているわけではない。そして、なぜこのようにカーブしているのかは、この鉄道の他の写真を見て、その真の目的が何なのかを理解したときに明らかになる。

Yeah, the PLA is using the railroad to load up one-to-one models of US warships like the Ford

PLAは鉄道を使って、フォードのような米国の軍艦の1対1の模型を積んでいる。

Class aircraft carrier, and then sends them down the railroad to simulate a moving target for the

クラス空母を、鉄道の下に送り込み、移動する標的をシミュレートする。

Air Force and Rocket Force to fire at. That curve through the desert appears designed to simulate the carrier's evasive maneuvers through the ocean that it would take to avoid an incoming missile.

空軍とロケット部隊の砲撃。この砂漠のカーブは、ミサイルを避けるために海を回避する空母の操縦をシミュレートするためにデザインされたようだ。

There's other satellite photos of mocked-up carriers on this exact railroad blown to bits after being targeted by missiles and rockets. And there are satellite photos of the stationary aircraft targets blown to pieces as well. It's pretty clear what the PLA is preparing for here, but if it wasn't any more clear, the location of all of these ship mock-ups in the

ミサイルやロケットの標的にされ、粉々に吹き飛ばされた模擬空母の衛星写真もある。静止した航空機の標的が粉々に吹き飛ばされている衛星写真もある。PLAがここで何を準備しているかは明らかである。

Taklamakan Desert isn't just for the remoteness and clear open skies. The location is also about 2,600 kilometers away from known People's Liberation Army Rocket Force launch sites that are located in China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Which is just about the same distance to simulate long-range missile strikes from the interior of Central China into the South China Sea. A region that China claims almost in its entirety against the competing claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Far away in the similarly remote deserts of Inner

タクラマカン砂漠の魅力は、人里離れた場所と澄み切った空だけではない。この場所は、中国内モンゴル自治区にある人民解放軍ロケット部隊の発射場から約2600キロ離れている。これは、中国中部から南シナ海への長距離ミサイル攻撃をシミュレートする距離とほぼ同じだ。フィリピン、ベトナム、マレーシアの領有権主張に対し、中国がほぼ全面的に領有権を主張している地域だ。同じように人里離れた内地の砂漠のはるか彼方にある

Mongolia near to those PLA rocket force launch sites is another curious creation that the PLA built here around the end of the year in 2022. Which might not look like very much at first until you see this other satellite image below it with the same roads highlighted in red. This is an almost exact one-to-one mock-up of the area around the presidential office in downtown Taipei. The capital city of Taiwan that is similar to the National Mall in Washington DC. That's the site of most of Taiwan's most critical and sensitive government offices and buildings. Conveniently located nearby to a PLA Air Force aerial bombing and gunnery practice range. This mock-up is likely being used by the PLA Air Force to simulate aerial strikes on the most sensitive part of the Taiwanese capital. China's testing of aerial attacks here and their testing of anti-ship missiles at the site in the Taklamakan desert on one-to-one mock-ups of US warships that sometime even move and take simulated evasive maneuvers is a clear indication of China's evolving military capabilities and their ability to target US warships and to attack the US's ability to project power into the western pacific. And they're clearly not even really trying to hide any of it. Like the Shuikou invasion barges, the targeting of one-to-one mock-ups of US warships in the Taklamakan desert sends a clear message from Beijing to Washington that America's warships will be vulnerable and potentially sunk if they choose to intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan the day the invasion eventually comes. And so they serve both a psychological as well as a real purpose. Over the past several years, China has embarked on the largest military build-up ever witnessed in human history. And it's been a build-up that has largely been designed to counter

PLAロケット部隊の発射場の近くにあるモンゴルには、PLAが2022年の年末頃に建設した、もうひとつの不思議な建物がある。同じ道路が赤くハイライトされたこの衛星画像を見るまでは、あまり大したものには見えないかもしれない。これは、台北市中心部にある総統府周辺のほぼ1対1のモックアップだ。ワシントンDCのナショナルモールに似ている台湾の首都。台湾で最も重要で機密性の高い政府機関や建物のほとんどがそこにある。近くにはPLA空軍の空爆と砲撃の練習場がある。このモックアップは、PLA空軍が台湾の首都の最も敏感な部分

US strengths in the pacific theater. China has poured resources into the People's Liberation

太平洋戦域における米国の強み。中国は人民解放軍に資源を投入している。

Army Rocket Force to make it the largest land-based missile force in the world today, giving them somewhere in the ballpark of 3,100 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles of all different kinds of ranges to work with during a conflict over Taiwan. These missiles give China the ability to launch enormous salvos of attacks against military targets on Taiwan before launching the main amphibious invasion. And they also give China the ability, if they so choose, to attack US and allied military targets throughout the western pacific from the relative safety of the Chinese mainland as well, with hundreds of their longer-range conventional missiles capable of striking targets accurately as far away as Guam. The fear on the American side is that China is equipped with enough of these anti-ship missiles to attack virtually every US warship in the South China Sea and nearby Taiwan with enough firepower to overwhelm each individual ship's own onboard missile defense systems. The US, of course, is well aware of the Chinese missile threat to their surface warships, which is a major part of why the US military has shifted so much to a strategy of countering China by positioning air, missile, and rapid amphibious response assets of their own nearby to Taiwan on land bases in Japan and the Philippines instead.

陸軍ロケット部隊は、現在の世界最大の陸上ミサイル部隊となり、台湾をめぐる紛争で使用できるあらゆる種類の射程距離の通常弾道ミサイルや巡航ミサイルを3,100発ほど保有することになる。これらのミサイルは、中国が水陸両用侵攻作戦を開始する前に、台湾の軍事目標に対して大規模な攻撃を仕掛ける能力を与える。また、もし中国がその気になれば、中国本土の比較的安全な場所から、西太平洋全域のアメリカや同盟国の軍事目標を攻撃することも可能だ。アメリカ側が恐れているのは、中国がこれらの対艦ミサイルを十分に装備しており、南シナ海と

But China has been hard at work developing other counters as well. China has a vastly, vastly larger capacity to construct new ships than the US or any other country in the world has. The US currently only possesses four state-owned shipyards, while China possesses dozens of them. China possesses a whopping 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States right now. And to put it in a perspective for you, just one single state-owned shipbuilder in China built more vessels by tonnage last year in 2024 alone than the United States has collectively built since the end of World War II to the present. A fact that has helped China seize the title of the world's largest navy today.

しかし、中国は他のカウンターの開発にも力を入れている。中国は、アメリカや世界のどの国よりも、新造船を建造する能力が圧倒的に、圧倒的に大きい。アメリカは現在、4つの国営造船所しか保有していないが、中国は数十の造船所を保有している。中国は現在、アメリカのなんと230倍もの造船能力を有しているのだ。それを踏まえて考えてみると、中国のたったひとつの国有造船所が昨年2024年に建造したトン数だけでも、米国が第二次世界大戦後現在までに建造したトン数よりも多いのである。この事実は、中国が今日、世界最大の海軍の称号をつか

And the types of ships that China is building are not only designed to carry out an invasion of

中国が建造している艦船は、中国への侵攻を想定したものだけではない。

Taiwan, like the Shuikou barges and the countless dual-use civilian and military Rourou ferries, but some of them are also designed specifically to counter some of the US Navy's few remaining strengths in this theater. While the PLA rocket force has been carefully calibrated to counter

水口バージや無数の民生・軍用兼用フェリー「ルールー」のように、台湾の艦艇は、米海軍がこの戦域に残す数少ない強みに対抗するために特別に設計されたものもある。PLAのロケット戦力は、以下のようなものに対抗するために慎重に調整されている。

US surface warships, that still leaves behind the incredibly advanced and capable US nuclear submarine fleet that operates beneath the surface that the rocket force's missiles will not be able to reach. The US has by far the largest and the most competent nuclear submarine fleet in the world that could be brought to bear on China's Taiwan invasion fleet as it crosses the Taiwan

米軍の水上戦艦は、ロケット部隊のミサイルが届かない水面下で活動する、信じられないほど高度で有能な米軍の原子力潜水艦艦隊を残している。アメリカは世界最大かつ最も有能な原子力潜水艦艦隊を有しており、台湾海峡を横断する中国の台湾侵攻艦隊に対抗することができる。

Strait. But China is working on counters to this advantage as well. One of the ways that the geography of the Taiwan Strait actually benefits China in this way is how relatively shallow it is.

海峡だ。しかし、中国はこの利点に対する対抗策にも取り組んでいる。台湾海峡の地理的な利点のひとつは、海峡が比較的浅いことだ。

The average depth throughout it is only about 60 meters, making it much easier to find and attack submarines operating there than in deeper waters. China's newest class of guided missile stealth frigate, the Type 054B, was just recently commissioned into the People's Liberation Army

この海域の平均水深は約60メートルで、深い海域よりも潜水艦の発見や攻撃がはるかに容易なのだ。中国の最新クラスの誘導ミサイル・ステルスフリゲート、054B型は、つい最近、人民解放軍に就役した。

Navy in January of 2025, and it is purpose-built to be an anti-submarine warship. China has the huge shipbuilding capacity to begin rapidly churning out a ton of these anti-submarine stealth frigates over the coming years, and if they can concentrate enough of them in the Taiwan

2025年1月に海軍が建造を開始する対潜水艦用のフリゲート艦だ。中国は巨大な造船能力を持っており、今後数年間でこのような対潜ステルスフリゲートを大量に生産することができる。

Strait to escort the invasion fleet by the time it happens, they can pose a major threat to the operation of any U.S. nuclear submarine operating beneath the Taiwan Strait, while the rocket force on the Chinese mainland can pose a similarly major threat to the operation of any U.S. service warships operating nearby to Taiwan as well, greatly raising the stakes for the U.S. to decide on intervening or not. And China is attempting to use their massive military buildup to make the potential cost of intervention clear for other U.S. allies in the Pacific as well, most notably Australia. Earlier this year on the 11th of February of 2025, a Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy frigate appeared off of the northern coast of Australia, and then sailed through the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea.

中国本土のロケット部隊は、台湾の近くで活動する米国の軍艦の活動にも同様に大きな脅威を与えることができる。そして中国は、その大規模な軍備増強を利用して、太平洋にある他の同盟国、特にオーストラリアに対しても、介入の潜在的な代償を明確にしようとしている。今年2月11日、中国人民解放軍海軍のフリゲート艦がオーストラリア北部沖に現れ、オーストラリアとパプアニューギニアの間のトレス海峡を航行した。

This attracted only minor attention until later on while off of Australia's east coast, the initial frigate was joined by two additional PLAN warships, a cruiser and a replenishment tanker, as they collectively transited through the Coral Sea and continued moving further south before briefly entering into Australia's exclusive economic zone near Sydney.

その後、オーストラリア東海岸の沖合で、最初のフリゲート艦にPLANの追加戦艦2隻、巡洋艦1隻、補給タンカー1隻が加わり、珊瑚海を通過してさらに南下を続け、一時的にシドニー近郊のオーストラリアの排他的経済水域に入った。

But the attention the PLAN ships were receiving in the Australian media reached an almost full-on panic only a few days later, when the vessels began issuing radio broadcasts to airlines warning them that they were conducting a series of live fire exercises in between Australia and New

その数日後、PLANの艦船がオーストラリアとニュージーランドの間で一連の実弾射撃演習を行っていることを航空会社に警告するラジオ放送を開始したのだ。

Zealand. The Australian Civil Aviation Service was forced into issuing an emergency alert that caused almost 50 planes to divert their course to avoid the area. From there, the PLAN ships continued travelling south of Tasmania, entering into and out of Australia's exclusive economic zone again, then travelled west to within only 170 nautical miles of Perth, just days after a

ニュージーランドオーストラリア民間航空局は緊急警報の発令を余儀なくされ、50機近くの飛行機がこの海域を避けるために航路を変更した。そこからPLAN船はタスマニアの南を航行し続け、オーストラリアの排他的経済水域に再び出入りした。

U.S. nuclear submarine had visited a nearby base, before then heading up north back towards China again after having nearly spent a month completely circumnavigating Australia, in a new and never before seen show of force that has left the Australians feeling particularly vulnerable ever since. The PLAN's trip around Australia came at a rather unique time in Australia's history, when the country's own navy has been languishing away for years, and as Australia's traditional alliance with the United States is coming under increasing strain, with Donald Trump back in the

米原子力潜水艦は近くの基地を訪れた後、オーストラリアをほぼ1カ月かけて完全周回した後、再び中国に向けて北上した。PLANのオーストラリア周航は、オーストラリアの歴史上、かなり特異な時期に行われた。自国の海軍が何年も停滞しており、ドナルド・トランプがオーストラリアに復帰したことで、オーストラリアと米国との伝統的な同盟関係がますます緊張しているときだ。

White House again. Australia's modern navy is currently in a dismal state, and it's the smallest and most outdated it's been since the Second World War. The PLAN frigate and cruiser that circumnavigated the Australian continent carried with them a combined total of 144 vertical launch missile cells, interestingly pretty close to the entire Australian Navy's 10 warships combined total of just 200 vertical launch missile cells. It was also the furthest south that the PLAN has so far ever sailed, and the message it sent to Australia was crystal clear. Even though Beijing said that the warships were constantly operating within international waters, and they had every legal right to do so as every other navy does all the time, the message that the Australian homeland was vulnerable to Chinese military action in the event of Australia or U.S. military bases in

ホワイトハウス再びオーストラリアの近代海軍は現在、悲惨な状態に陥っており、第二次世界大戦以降で最も規模が小さく、時代遅れの状態だ。オーストラリア大陸を周回したPLANのフリゲート艦と巡洋艦は、合計144基の垂直発射ミサイルセルを搭載しており、興味深いことに、オーストラリア海軍の10隻の軍艦を合わせた垂直発射ミサイルセル合計がわずか200基であるのにかなり近い。それはまた、PLANがこれまでで最も南を航行したことでもあり、オーストラリアに送ったメッセージは明確だった。たとえ北京が、軍艦は常に国際水域内で行動

Australia intervening to defend Taiwan during an invasion scenario was clear as day. And it came as

台湾侵攻のシナリオの中で、オーストラリアが台湾防衛のために介入することは、火を見るより明らかだった。そしてそれは

China's navy has continued expanding its reach in other areas as well. The same month as the PLAN flotilla was busy circumnavigating Australia, the Japanese defense minister stated that PLAN warships had passed through the waters around the country's southern Ryukyu islands between the

中国海軍は他の地域でもその勢力を拡大し続けている。PLANの船団がオーストラリアを周回するのに忙しかった同じ月、日本の防衛大臣は、PLANの軍艦が南琉球諸島の間の海域を通過したと述べた。

Japanese mainland and Taiwan a total of 68 times throughout 2024, a massive increase in frequency from the only 21 reported times that they did so back in 2021. A few months later in June of 2025, the same Japanese defense minister said that one of the PLAN's aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, was spawned out in waters to the east of the island of Iwo Jima, marking the first known time that a

2024年を通じて、日本本土と台湾は合計68回、2021年に報告されたわずか21回から大幅に回数を増やした。数カ月後の2025年6月、同じ日本の防衛大臣が、PLANの空母のひとつである「遼寧」が硫黄島の東の海域に出現したと発表した。

Chinese aircraft carrier has ever sailed beyond the so-called second island chain. The rear line of defense the U.S. employs against China that is centered on Guam, and perhaps most notably of all, there's the enormous construction project that satellites have recently captured going on just to the southwest of China's capital city, Beijing. Taking a closer look at the site, this was what it looked like when taken by satellite imagery on the 5th of February 2022, just a little over three years ago before this video's production. It doesn't really look like very much of notice happening yet, but then simply fast forward the clock by a year to the 25th of February of 2023, and you'll see that the entire area has been completely cleared out of everything that used to exist there, with all of the previously existing residential buildings flattened and erased.

中国の空母は、いわゆる第二列島線を越えて航行したことがある。グアムを中心とするアメリカが中国に対して採用している防衛の後方線、そしておそらく最も注目すべきは、中国の首都北京の南西で最近衛星が捉えた巨大な建設プロジェクトだ。この動画が制作される3年ちょっと前、2022年2月5日に衛星写真で撮影された現場はこんな感じだった。まだあまり何も起こっていないように見えるが、時計の針を1年進めて2023年2月25日になると、この地域一帯は、以前そこに存在していたすべてのものが完全に撤去され、それまであった住居用の建物

Then fast forward the clock by a little over another year to the 26th of June of 2024, and you'll see another huge change with a massive new monumental construction project taking shape in the area, with the whole place now looking basically nothing like it used to back in early 2022. Fast forward just about another year later to March of 2025, and you'll notice a complex of buildings taking shape in the center, and with dozens of construction cranes still active, making this appear to be a truly enormous construction effort. Chinese government websites have not publicly commented on any of this construction to date, and the Chinese government has refused to answer any questions pertaining to the construction site by journalists.

2024年6月26日、時計の針をさらに1年ちょっと進めると、このエリアでは大規模な新しい記念碑的建設プロジェクトが姿を現し、全体が2022年初めの頃とはまったく違う様相を呈している。さらに1年後の2025年3月になると、中心部には複合ビルが建ち並び、何十台もの建設用クレーンが稼働している。中国政府のウェブサイトは今日に至るまで、この建設について公にコメントしておらず、中国政府は建設現場に関する記者の質問には一切答えることを拒否している。

That has left a lot of speculation online as to what exactly this huge construction project going on actually is, and to most outsiders it certainly appears to be something military related.

ネット上では、この巨大な建設プロジェクトがいったい何なのか、多くの憶測を呼んでいる。

The final image of the construction site taken in March of 2025 appears to show around a hundred construction cranes active at the site that are busy building deep subterranean tunnels, facilities, and passageways that all seem to be being reinforced by thick layers of concrete, making whatever is going on here appearing to be an extremely sensitive military PLA site.

2025年3月に撮影された建設現場の最後の画像では、約100台の建設用クレーンが活躍し、地下深くのトンネル、施設、通路の建設に忙しく、そのすべてが厚いコンクリート層で補強されているように見える。

The area is truly huge, coming in at around 1,500 acres or 5 square kilometers in total, or in other words roughly 10 times the size of the pentagon near Washington DC.

その面積は実に広大で、全部で約1500エーカー（5平方キロメートル）、言い換えればワシントンDCに近いペンタゴンの約10倍にもなる。

The building that is usually regarded as the world's largest office building currently. Some high-ranking U.S. defense officials have voiced their belief that the site is being constructed to offer greater security for high-level Chinese officials from advanced U.S. bunker buster munitions during a time of war, or even from U.S. nuclear weapons, as evidenced by all of the extensive and deep subterranean construction going on at the site and all of the secrecy surrounding it. It's probable that with the site being built so close by to Beijing, this new complex captured in satellite imagery could become the PLA's new top military headquarters and serve as China's wartime command center during an invasion of

現在、世界最大のオフィスビルとされるこのビル。米国防当局の高官の中には、戦争時に米国の高性能バンカーバスター弾、あるいは米国の核兵器から中国高官を守るため、より安全な場所を提供するために建設されているとの見方を示す者もいる。北京のすぐ近くに建設されていることから、衛星写真に写っているこの新しい複合施設は、PLAの新しい最高軍事司令部となり、中国への侵攻時に中国の戦時司令部として機能する可能性がある。

Taiwan scenario, serving a highly similar role as the pentagon does for the United States military, but on a vastly larger physical scale. As often concerns the People's Republic of China, however, matters of such importance as massive subterranean military fortresses, barges designed for huge armored amphibious invasions, and remote airfields designed for target practicing of U.S. warships in the Taiwanese capital are rarely ever mentioned or discussed publicly by the country's government.

台湾のシナリオは、米軍にとってのペンタゴンと非常によく似た役割を果たすが、物理的な規模ははるかに大きい。しかし、中華人民共和国がしばしば懸念するように、巨大な地下軍事要塞、巨大な装甲水陸両用侵攻のために設計されたはしけ、台湾の首都で米軍艦船を射撃訓練するために設計された遠隔飛行場といった重要な事柄について、同国政府が公に言及したり議論したりすることはほとんどない。

While China has spent the past several decades gradually opening itself up to the world,

中国は過去数十年間、徐々に自国を世界に開放してきた、

China has also continued growing even more authoritarian and centralized around the leadership and vision of Xi Jinping. China is currently ranked as the third least free country in the world in terms of freedom of the press, just barely behind the blatantly totalitarian states of North Korea and Eritrea. There are still many elements about China that remain closely guarded and highly sensitive subjects of the state, and perhaps none of them are as controversial, muddied by propaganda, and misunderstood as the events that took place 36 years ago at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June of 1989. You're probably already pretty familiar with this event, and you've probably heard of it by any number of different names that people with all kinds of different agendas have attempted to label it as. The Tiananmen Square Massacre, as it is often referred to in the West, the June 4th incident, as it is usually referred to in China, or the more vague Tiananmen Square Incident or Uprising. Many of the images taken from the events that took place around Tiananmen Square in 1989 have become some of the most famous photographs ever taken in history. Like the tank man photo that shows a lone, never identified, unknown man standing in front of a column of People's Liberation Army tanks leaving from the square, merely hours after the army had just violently cleared the square out of tens of thousands of student-led protesters. The details of what exactly happened over the 48 hours before this photograph was taken, while the PLA cleared Tiananmen Square out, is one of the most contentious subjects of the entire 21st century. The official Chinese government story is that only 241 people were killed during the army's two-day operation to clear out the square of protesters. But multiple outside Western sources at the time reported much higher figures. The U.S. ambassador to China at the time who was present in Beijing reported that a minimum of several hundred people had been killed.

中国はまた、習近平のリーダーシップとビジョンを中心に、さらに権威主義的で中央集権的な成長を続けている。中国は現在、報道の自由度において世界で3番目に自由度の低い国にランクされており、露骨な全体主義国家である北朝鮮やエリトリアにわずかに及ばない。中国については、国家が厳重に保護し、非常に敏感なテーマであり続けている要素がまだたくさんあり、おそらく、36年前の1989年6月に北京の天安門広場で起こった出来事ほど、物議を醸し、プロパガンダによって泥沼化し、誤解されているものはないだろう。おそらく、この出来事につ

Hospital records from Beijing that were compiled shortly afterwards recorded at least 478 deaths that were likely caused by the events. Amnesty International initially put their estimate for the dead at between several hundred and close to a thousand, while the Chinese Red Cross initially gave a figure for around 2,600 deaths during the incident before withdrawing their claim under

事件直後にまとめられた北京の病院の記録では、少なくとも478人が死亡している。アムネスティ・インターナショナルは当初、死者数を数百人から1,000人近くと推定し、中国赤十字は当初、事件中の死者数を約2,600人としていたが、その後、その主張を撤回した。

Chinese government pressure. And the Swiss ambassador to China at the time gave a similar figure of around 2,700 deaths, while there were also less credible estimates from the British ambassador to China at the time who initially gave a dramatically higher minimum figure of 10,000 deaths, but who then later revised his estimate down to between 2,700 and 3,400 deaths instead.

中国政府の圧力また、当時の駐中国スイス大使も同様の死者数を約2,700人と発表している。さらに、当初は死者数を最低でも10,000人と劇的に多く見積もったが、後に2,700～3,400人に修正した駐中国英国大使の見積もりも信憑性に欠ける。

Finding out the true scale of the violence that happened at Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 is difficult, if not even outright impossible, because A. China goes to extreme lengths to enormously censor the event in an attempt to bury any memory and discussion about it, and B. Western sources were and still are heavily incentivized to embellish or over-exaggerate the brutality of it. Searches for Tiananmen Square massacre, June 4th, Tank Man, and sensitive numbers like 6-4 for June 4th or 89-6-4 are all blocked or returned no results on Chinese search engines like Baidu to this day, while posts about the events on Chinese social media apps like

1989年6月に天安門広場で起こった暴力の本当の規模を知ることは、完全に不可能とまでは言わないまでも、難しいことだ。天安門事件、6月4日、戦車男、6月4日の6-4や89-6-4のような微妙な数字を検索しても、百度のような中国の検索エンジンでは、今日に至るまですべてブロックされるか、検索結果が返されない。

WeChat and Douyin, China's native version of TikTok, remain auto-deleted by algorithms or shadow-banned. The events are entirely omitted from all history textbooks in mainland China, and even foreign scholars who have published work about the Tiananmen Square events will often be denied visas or access to the Chinese archives, collectively making the Tiananmen Square events the most heavily censored event in modern history, and probably the most difficult modern historical subject to properly research. Nonetheless, I still made an entire video about my own investigation into the Tiananmen Square June 1989 events in my Modern Conflict series, which I create new videos in every single month, taking deeper dives into more recent, controversial, and darker subject material surrounding modern wars, operations, and conflicts. Over the past four years of doing this,

WeChatやDouyin（中国版TikTok）はアルゴリズムによって自動削除されたり、シャドーバンされたままだ。天安門事件は、中国本土のすべての歴史教科書から完全に省かれ、天安門事件に関する著作を発表した外国人学者でさえ、しばしばビザや中国文書館へのアクセスを拒否される。それにもかかわらず、私は1989年6月の天安門事件に関する私自身の調査について、私の「現代の紛争」シリーズでビデオ全体を作成した。このシリーズでは、毎月新しいビデオを作成し、現代の戦争、作戦、紛争を取り巻く、より最近の、物議を醸す、より

I've created around 50 total episodes in Modern Conflicts covering other topics as diverse as the undeclared war and skirmishes between North and South Korea since 2000, China's policies of repression against its Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang, the Myanmar civil war and that regime's modern genocide against its minority Rohingya people, the border fights between China and

私は『現代の紛争』で、2000年以降の南北朝鮮間の未宣言の戦争や小競り合い、新疆ウイグル自治区のイスラム教徒ウイグル人に対する中国の弾圧政策、ミャンマー内戦と同政権による少数民族ロヒンギャに対する現代の大量虐殺、中国と韓国の国境紛争など、さまざまなトピックを扱った合計50ほどのエピソードを作ってきた。

India across 2020 and 2021, and dozens of other episodes with brand new ones like this Tiananmen

2020年と2021年にかけてのインド、そしてこの天安門のような真新しいエピソードを含む数十のエピソードがある。

Square 1989 episode coming out every single month, all exclusively on Nebula. Because of the inherently violent and controversial details surrounding the discussion of all of this, my episode investigating what actually took place around Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 would never work on YouTube, because it would instantly become demonetized and age-restricted, which means the

スクエア1989」のエピソードは毎月、ネビュラで独占配信される。1989年6月、天安門広場で実際に起こったことを調査する私のエピソードは、本質的に暴力的で物議を醸す内容であるため、YouTubeでは決してうまくいかない。

YouTube's algorithm, which is based around showing you ads, would never be incentivized to actually show the video to you or to promote it. I deal with very large numbers of my videos on YouTube getting demonetized and age-restricted as they are, and that's why I upload all of my episodes in Modern Conflicts exclusively to Nebula, and why signing up to Nebula is the absolute best thing that you can do to support me and my channel, and you'll also get access to way more content than just my own exclusive Modern Conflicts series there as well. Because the best part about

YouTubeのアルゴリズムは広告を見せることを基本としており、実際に動画を見せたり、宣伝したりするインセンティブはないだろう。私はYouTubeで非常に多くの私の動画が削除され、そのまま年齢制限を受けることに対処しています。だからこそ、私は『Modern Conflicts』の全エピソードをNebulaに独占的にアップロードしているのです。Nebulaに登録することが、私と私のチャンネルをサポートするためにできる絶対的な最善のことである理由です。なぜなら

Nebula is that it's jointly co-owned by myself and hundreds of other independent creators to make the projects that we're all actually deeply excited about without any fear of being censored or demonetized like we are on YouTube. And that's why there's tons of other new unique content on Nebula that's coming up all the time too that you'll also love, like Neo's Under Exposure series,

Nebulaは、YouTubeのように検閲を受けたり、悪者扱いされたりする心配がなく、私や何百人もの独立系クリエイターが共同所有しているため、私たち全員が実際に深く興奮しているプロジェクトを作ることができる。だからこそ、NebulaにはNeoの『Under Exposure』シリーズのように、あなたが気に入るようなユニークなコンテンツが次々と登場しているのです、

Wendover Productions' The Logistics of X series, TLDR News' What to Follow USA series, and so, so many others. I also know that there's a lot of streaming platforms out there right now and you don't really want to get stuck with another monthly cost to keep track of, but I also know that if you've watched this all the way through to the end, there is so much content on Nebula that you'll love as well, and so much more coming out with every new month that you could consider a lifetime membership to Nebula as well. You just pay once and then you'll get lifetime access to everything that I and hundreds of other creators will ever produce on Nebula for as long as we both last. And then you'll never have to worry about a recurring subscription or ads ever again. That's the best way possible to support what I'm doing here on Real Life Lore. But even if you'd rather not make that large of an upfront commitment, you can still greatly help support me by signing up for a yearly or a monthly subscription to Nebula as well, which you can get for a fantastic deal with 40% off by scanning the QR code or clicking the button here on your screen right now, or by following the link that's down below in the description. Any of which will also give you access to everything that's on Nebula for the very low price of just $3 a month or $36 a year. I hope that you'll consider signing up. And as always, thank you so much for watching!

Wendover Productionsの『The Logistics of X』シリーズ、TLDR Newsの『What to Follow USA』シリーズなどなど。しかし、もしあなたがこれを最後まで見てくれたなら、Nebulaにはあなたが気に入るようなコンテンツがたくさんあるし、新しい月が来るたびにもっとたくさんのコンテンツが出てくる。一度だけお金を払えば、私や何百人ものクリエイターがNebulaで制作するすべてのコンテンツに、私たち2人が存続する限り、生涯アクセスできる。そして二度と定期購読や広告