Placeholder Image

字幕表 動画を再生する

  • OK.

  • That was amazing, an incredible tour de force.

  • And really, as I said, nobody thinking

  • about how to protect our country and keep

  • it safe over the last 30 years than Tony Fauci--

  • so amazing way to begin.

  • What we're going to do next is I'm going

  • to bring the first panel up.

  • And we have a little video.

  • So let me line up the video while I ask

  • our first panelists to come up.

  • So if we could have Mike, Dennis, Hillary, and Mosoka

  • come on up, and join us.

  • And the first video--

  • so we had asked Larry Summers to come, and offer some remarks.

  • Larry is traveling.

  • For those of you who don't know, he's

  • the Eliot University Professor, a former president of Harvard,

  • former Treasury Secretary.

  • So then the question is, why Larry Summers?

  • He has been very deeply engaged in this,

  • and thinking about this, and cares a lot about this.

  • I was going say, I realize you guys

  • may not be able to see the video from sitting up there.

  • So it's up to you if you want to--

  • either way.

  • And so Larry was kind enough to record a video for us.

  • And it's about six minutes.

  • We're going to watch it.

  • And then I will introduce our panelists,

  • and we'll get started on our first panel.

  • [VIDEO PLAYBACK]

  • - I welcome the Harvard Global Health Initiative's review

  • of what happened a century ago with the flu pandemic

  • and its effort to look forward to mitigating the risks

  • and the consequences of future pandemics.

  • I am convinced that pandemic flu is the least focused on

  • of major global challenges.

  • Vast efforts and concern surround nuclear proliferation.

  • Vast efforts, appropriately, are directed to issues

  • around global climate change.

  • Taking the risks over time of pandemic,

  • I believe that the consequences are similar,

  • in terms of total economic impact,

  • in terms of lives lost, to the risks associated

  • with climate change and the risks associated

  • with nuclear proliferation.

  • And yet, pandemic risk is a obsession for specialists,

  • a preoccupation of those concerned with insurance

  • and reinsurance, but a much less-mainstream issue

  • than nuclear proliferation or global climate change.

  • And so, I believe that this initiative that reminds us

  • that more people died in the flu epidemic after World War I than

  • died as a consequence of World War I,

  • that reminds us of how profoundly society was changed

  • by a disease that took the strongest rather

  • than the weakest among us, those who

  • were young or of middle age, is something

  • that is very, very important.

  • We certainly have made immense progress

  • in the biomedical sciences over the last century.

  • And that is a positive development

  • with respect to pandemic risks.

  • On the other hand, we live in a much, much smaller and much,

  • much more interconnected world, which

  • means that disease vectors will be transmitted

  • that much more rapidly.

  • Full quarantines will be that much more difficult.

  • We live in a world that faces too much

  • superstition, propaganda--

  • dare I say it-- fake news, and confusion with respect

  • to vaccination, which has to be at the center of any effort

  • to control epidemics and pandemics.

  • And we live in a world where, too often, the preoccupation

  • is with the urgent rather than with the profoundly important.

  • And that diverts us, too, from preparing

  • for the next pandemic.

  • I believe that this is a central challenge

  • that deserves far more global attention than it is now

  • receiving.

  • And I am glad to see Harvard's Global Health Initiative do

  • its part to arouse concern, prompt study and reflection,

  • and drive preparation for the epidemics and pandemics that

  • are all too likely to come, albeit unpredictably,

  • at some point in the future.

  • [END PLAYBACK]

  • Great.

  • So as I said, most people in this room

  • have been thinking about and working on these issues.

  • But Larry Summers, who has thought broadly, has worked,

  • obviously, across a variety of sectors and is one

  • of the leading economists-- and I think, public intellectuals--

  • has glommed onto something that is really

  • a key issue, which is that this is not a specialized issue.

  • This is not a health care issue.

  • This is not an issue that specialists need to obsess on.

  • And the point he makes, that if you

  • think about the things that can cause catastrophic harm

  • to human society--

  • global climate change is more slow moving.

  • But if you think about things like a nuclear weapon going off

  • in a major city, terrorist threats,

  • we spend enormous amount of resources-- and rightly so--

  • on understanding those risks and mitigating those risks.

  • And then when we switch to something like pandemics,

  • it drops way down.

  • And we start thinking about, well,

  • do we really have the money to afford it?

  • Can we really make the investments?

  • So that's part of the challenge that we're dealing with.

  • And so our first panel for today is an extraordinary panel.

  • And I'm going to very quickly turn it over to them.

  • I'm going to do very quick introductions.

  • This is about understanding and mitigating risks.

  • And so the first panel--

  • for those of you who've been with us,

  • you've seen Mike Osterholm join us.

  • So thank you, again, for coming back, Mike.

  • He's the director of CIDRAP at the University of Minnesota.

  • And as I described him a couple of days

  • ago, when the country faces challenges

  • he's one on the shortlist of experts

  • we turn to, as he was after 2001.

  • Dennis Carroll, next to him, is the director of the USAID

  • Global Health Security and Development Unit

  • and has been deeply involved in these issues.

  • USAID-- when we talk about the importance of global health

  • security, we often talk about CDC,

  • and NIH, and the Global Health Security Agenda.

  • USAID has been a very central part of this.

  • And it's really been from Dennis' leadership.

  • Hillary Carter, next to him, is the director

  • for counterbiological threats at the National Security Council--

  • has been working on global issues--

  • not just global health issues, but global issues--

  • for quite a long time--

  • is a PhD from Georgetown.

  • And then next to her is Mosoka Fallah, whose official title

  • is deputy director of general and technical services

  • at the National Public Health Institute in Liberia.

  • What he really is--

  • he's been a close friend of the Institute for many years--

  • is one of the people who was central to turning around

  • the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.

  • And he did it through a combination

  • of both incredible intellect, but also personal integrity,

  • and trust, and working with the community quite directly

  • and has been a colleague, friend, and a hero of mine.

  • So I was thrilled to have Mosoka join us.

  • So why don't I turn it over to Mike.

  • I think everybody is just going to make some reflections--

  • up to you.

  • Do you want to come up here?

  • You tell me.

  • Why don't you come up?

  • I think people can see a little bit better if you're up there.

  • I'll sit.

  • And then we'll have a discussion.

  • Good morning, and thank you again for the invitation

  • to be here this week.

  • It has been really, truly a remarkable experience

  • over the course of the last four days.

  • And I just want to thank the organizers

  • for the vision to put this kind of a meeting on.

  • Let me begin by saying that I, as usual,

  • want to kind of send this meeting into a topsy-turvy

  • moment.

  • I would like to challenge the notion

  • of what we talk about when we talk

  • about pandemics and epidemics.

  • And there's a very real reason why.

  • It's not a semantic issue.

  • It's a actual response issue in a key way.

  • We often throw around the term pandemics and epidemics.

  • And we intermix them.

  • And I think that's at our own peril.

  • To my mind-- and I tried to discuss this in some length,

  • the justification and the background for it, in my book,

  • Deadliest Enemy, Our War Against Killer Germs, last year--

  • I believe that there really are only

  • two disease categories that rank in the category of pandemic.

  • Remember, a pandemic is a worldwide epidemic,

  • meaning every country, every region,

  • every continent has the chance to have the same problem happen

  • as does any other one.

  • Obviously, first and foremost is influenza.

  • Just to remind people-- and Tony showed a nice slide up here--

  • but our group went back and looked at this carefully.

  • And by the time that the first isolate of H1N1

  • was identified in California in April of 2009--

  • we now recognize that that virus was

  • in at least 27 countries for certain and maybe

  • as many as 43 countries.

  • It had moved that quickly around the world.

  • That's a pandemic.

  • The second category, I would say,

  • is an unusual one, in that it's not a disease in and of itself.

  • We are facing truly a pandemic of antimicrobial resistance,

  • which is a pan pandemic in the sense

  • that, on a worldwide basis, it's happening every day everywhere.

  • Some organisms may be more prominent in some areas

  • of the world.

  • But it's just a matter of time.

  • Beyond that, all these diseases we're talking about

  • are really what I call diseases of

  • critical regional importance.

  • Ebola is absolutely critical to Sub-Saharan Africa.

  • But will Ebola become a major disease problem

  • in the Americas?

  • No, not likely.

  • Now could we have cases--

  • as we talked about and I mentioned

  • in my previous presentation the other day--

  • that what kills us, versus what hurts us,

  • versus what concerns us, versus what scares

  • us can all be very different.

  • And we saw that with Ebola in the United States.

  • But from an impact statement that's very, very important

  • to distinguish.

  • Let me give you an example.

  • We live today in a global economy

  • that we are so dependent on others

  • out there to supply to us what we need every day.

  • As of this morning, pre-hospital drug shortages in this country,

  • meaning what's on the emergency room cart, what's

  • on the ambulance cart right now--

  • we have 189 drugs that are either absolutely not available

  • or in critical short supply.

  • Many of them are absolutely lifesaving drugs.

  • Why is that?

  • In part, because almost all of them are generic.

  • Almost all are made in China.

  • And the business model has been set up to cover the mode,

  • cover the mean.

  • Don't try to cover shortages, et cetera.

  • It's too much money to have that much [? pan ?] capacity.

  • If you wanted, today, to go to war with China--

  • and for anyone who's in the room from China,

  • I hope that never happens.

  • They wouldn't need to fire one bullet

  • to put their drug supply hands around our neck

  • and strangle us.

  • Our military is totally dependent on these same drug

  • shortage drugs that we, as the public, are dependent on.

  • When the situation happened with the poor Hurricane Maria

  • in Puerto Rico, everybody seemed so surprised

  • that we had this big shortage of IV bags all of the sudden.

  • I gave a talk four years ago in which I predicted the next F4

  • or F5 hurricane to hit Puerto Rico was going to take down

  • our ability to supply IV bags because 80% of the world's

  • capacity to make them were all on that island.

  • Should we have been surprised?

  • The reason I bring this up is because,

  • from a pandemic standpoint, those diseases which impact

  • those kinds of critical supplies will

  • impact the rest of the world.

  • And from a health standpoint-- let me just say right now,

  • for the 690,000 Americans that have chronic renal problems

  • and are either on dialysis or drugs--

  • which are almost virtually all coming from China--

  • anything that shuts down certain parts of the world's ability

  • to move product, make product, distribute product

  • is going to have collateral damage second to none.

  • That's why we have to distinguish

  • between pandemics and epidemics of

  • critical regional importance.

  • And so I think, whether--

  • and last night, you heard me comment

  • on the issue around vaccines.

  • What we're talking about is a shortage

  • of epidemic vaccines, vaccines that

  • are going to handle those diseases

  • of critical regional importance, with the exception

  • of the issue of influenza.

  • Now let me just say one last thing for some

  • in the room sitting there saying, well, HIV and TB,

  • aren't they all pandemics?

  • Actually, by technical definition,

  • they're not anymore.

  • They were at one time, HIV in particular.

  • But now it's an endemic disease.

  • In some cases, it's hyper-endemic.

  • But it's not a new condition.

  • Suddenly, we're not going to see major social, political,

  • and economic implications because of HIV that

  • will disrupt that area of the world beyond what it's already

  • doing.

  • In some cases, it's a horrible situation

  • in parts of the world.

  • TB is a horrible situation.

  • But it's not going to change the political nature.

  • So I think today, as we talk about these,

  • it is important to distinguish about what really causes

  • a pandemic, a worldwide epidemic of a new disease,

  • versus those of critical original importance, which

  • can be very, very important.

  • But they have totally different implications.

  • We never worried about the impact on our US drug supply

  • or the European drug supply with Ebola in West Africa.

  • We worried about a lot of other things, but not that.

  • But a pandemic that shut down global trade and travel

  • would, in fact, be a very substantial problem.

  • Thank you.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • Great, thank you.

  • [INAUDIBLE] And Mike, thanks for those opening comments.

  • I'm going to talk about one of the maps that Tony just showed,

  • which was the second map that showed the enormous diversity

  • of emerging infectious diseases that

  • have come up over the course of his career

  • over the last 30 years.

  • And what we need to understand is that, virtually

  • all of those agents that showed up on those maps,

  • they preexisted in wildlife on this planet

  • before they made it in to us.

  • We live in an ecosystem where the interface between wildlife,

  • livestock, and people is such an incredibly dynamic process

  • that a deep reservoir of an extraordinarily diverse pool

  • of viruses that have been resident in wildlife

  • forever are now-- the dynamics are changing.

  • And what I'd like to do is talk a little bit

  • about that relationship between zoonotic diseases,

  • those diseases that have their genesis in wildlife spilling

  • over into people.

  • And I would also like just to pick up on AMR--

  • that it is not a zoonotic a disease.

  • But what we also know about AMR is that the drivers behind AMR

  • are not simply the events that occur

  • within prescriber user practices within clinical settings--

  • that 90% of all antibiotics consumed

  • within the United States by weight

  • are done within livestock.

  • So as we think about how we protect and preserve

  • the well-being of our population,

  • we need to understand that it's not just

  • about humans or homosapiens.

  • It's about how we sit within the larger ecology on this planet.

  • So there are five points I'd like to make.

  • First off, even as we talk about zoonosis,

  • all of those diseases that we see spilling out

  • over the last 30 years is not a new dynamic.

  • In fact, many of the infectious diseases

  • that are part of the global burden today

  • had their genesis in wildlife-- malaria, tuberculosis,

  • and as Mike just pointed out, HIV.

  • And it's worth noting that, while we are here remembering

  • the 100th anniversary of the great pandemic of 1918,

  • in another two to four years, it'll

  • be the 100th anniversary of the spillover of the progenitor

  • virus from Simian populations from people that

  • unleashed HIV in the world.

  • And so we live in a place where zoonosis

  • is very much part of our normal landscape-- point 1

  • But point 2 is that it's not a steady state.

  • The dynamics of emergent spillover,

  • spread within human populations today,

  • is radically different in the 21st century

  • than any other point.

  • Someone mentioned earlier today that, if we were here in Boston

  • 100 years ago, the world's population

  • was 1.5 billion people.

  • Think about it.

  • As a species, it took us 400,000 years-- plus or minus--

  • to get to that 1 billion mark.

  • In the space of 100 years, we've added another 6 billion people.

  • And by the time we get to the end of this century,

  • we'll add on another 5.

  • You can't have that kind of accelerated footprint

  • on this planet without having a hugely disruptive effect

  • on that ecosystem dynamic with wildlife, livestock,

  • and people.

  • So we live in a different space.

  • And as we think about the 21st century,

  • this is a period of great epidemiologic transition driven

  • by population pressures that will play themselves out

  • in ways both at the pandemic, but at the epidemic level,

  • as well.

  • That said, as we look to the 21st century

  • as a place of extraordinarily dynamic risk, it's safe to say,

  • we are not prepared.

  • We remain ill prepared.

  • Despite extraordinary efforts over the last decade

  • to build systems and capacities around the world

  • to deal with preventing, detecting, and responding,

  • the truth of the matter is, we're ultimately held hostage

  • to the fact that our toolbox of response

  • is an enormously inadequate one.

  • And Tony sort of touched upon it when he spoke to the challenges

  • we have in terms of developing countermeasures

  • in the midst of an event.

  • And while he talked about influenza in 2009,

  • it's worth noting that, by the end of 2009,

  • we may have had enough to provide maximum protection

  • for the American population.

  • But 12 months after the emergence of H1N1,

  • the total amount of vaccine that had been produced worldwide

  • would have protected 17% of the world's population.

  • 2 billion people, by that time, had been infected.

  • There's a dis-link between what we're

  • capable of doing, in terms of developing countermeasures

  • after emergence, towards having maximum impact not just

  • on the people within the United States,

  • but the global community, those 7.6 billion people

  • that live on this planet.

  • Why are we still so ill prepared?

  • Why is that toolbox so fragile?

  • And I'd go to the last point on--

  • again-- Tony's slide, where he talked about vaccine strategy.

  • And he talked about the prototype strategy,

  • which is not to simply look within the flaviviruses

  • at developing a vaccine against Zika,

  • or yellow fever, or Dengue--

  • which we know do not cross-react with each other--

  • it's beginning to rethink what we

  • know about the relationships within those viral families,

  • and use raw data analysis across families

  • to be able to think about broad-spectrum countermeasures

  • for the first time.

  • But the weak link in that strategy

  • is that, for the six or so examples that he put up there

  • for the flavivirus, we know that there

  • is somewhere on the order of 6,000 other flaviviruses

  • circulating in wildlife--

  • same thing for filoviruses, Ebolas--

  • same thing for retroviruses.

  • We live in a world where the pool

  • of viruses which are circulating that we will become

  • increasingly more acquainted with in the 21st century--

  • we've only seen 0.1% of all of those viruses.

  • So I will turn you to my last point.

  • The opportunity we have is to be transformative,

  • move beyond what are the agent-specific interventions--

  • going after Ebola, going after yellow fever--

  • and begin turning the sciences for emerging viral diseases

  • from what are really low-data sciences, almost

  • mom-and-pop sciences, into big data.

  • What would it take for us to, in fact,

  • go out and characterize those other 6,000 flaviviruses

  • that are out there that are currently

  • circulating in wildlife?

  • What would it take for us to be able to go out and characterize

  • the 6,000 filoviruses?

  • The opportunity is extraordinary.

  • We are not limited by technology.

  • What we are limited by is political will.

  • And we know, from work that we've done in partnership

  • with many in this room over the last decade, the feasibility

  • of actually going out into wildlife,

  • collecting those samples, and beginning

  • that characterization, both in terms of their genetic

  • and their ecologic profiles, allow us to transform

  • the science of the emerging viral diseases

  • from a small, agent-specific science

  • into broad-spectrum, family-level, virome-level

  • sciences.

  • Final point-- Albert Einstein famously

  • observed that doing the same thing over and over

  • again is the definition of madness.

  • We're not mad.

  • But we are simply--

  • when we think about, what's our plan B to plan A,

  • we usually say, we'll do plan A better.

  • What we're arguing for is to transform

  • what we think about plan B, and open up the gauge.

  • Think about the role of this ecosystem we sit in--

  • wildlife, livestock, and people--

  • and use that understanding to begin

  • to transform the questions were asking

  • and the investments we're making.

  • Thank you.

  • That was terrific.

  • Thank you, Dennis.

  • And one quick correction before I go ask Hillary-- which is,

  • I got your alma mater wrong.

  • Your PhD is from Vanderbilt. And no offense meant.

  • But as soon as I said it, I said, I think that's wrong.

  • Yeah.

  • So, my apologies.

  • But I'm still completely thrilled

  • that you're here-- and your opening thoughts on where

  • you're sitting at the National Security Council

  • thinking about these issues.

  • Great.

  • Thank you very much.

  • And I was going to correct that, because I

  • can't discredit my alma mater Vanderbilt if there's

  • any donors in the room.

  • So thank you very much for the invitation and the opportunity

  • to be here.

  • It's a pleasure to be here with you all today.

  • And a big thanks to the Harvard Global Health Institute

  • for convening this Outbreak Week and convening

  • this symposium today.

  • This is an incredibly important opportunity

  • to come together and discuss options

  • that we have for the future to reduce these risks.

  • So today I've been asked to speak about the policy

  • and strategy development work that the US government has

  • done as it relates to biodefense and global health security.

  • So my comments will be mostly focused on that.

  • And I look forward to the discussion

  • if there's any further questions.

  • So first, let me start by saying that we believe that strategies

  • are important and that strategy should empower implementation.

  • Biological threats, whether they are deliberate, accidental,

  • or naturally occurring are among the most serious threats

  • to US national security.

  • And I don't need to tell this audience this.

  • This audience knows it very well.

  • Infectious disease threats do not respect borders

  • and in our interconnected world can spread rapidly independent

  • of origin.

  • Biological threats are a distinct aspect

  • of national security and require a focused and systematic

  • approach to reducing risks.

  • It's a vital interest of the United States government

  • to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover

  • from biological threats.

  • In December of 2017, the White House

  • released a National Security Strategy

  • which calls for combating biological threats

  • and pandemics.

  • There are three priority actions underneath this particular end

  • state.

  • And they are detecting and countering biological threats

  • at the source--

  • so global health security--

  • supporting biomedical innovation,

  • and improving emergency response,

  • which entails, domestically, understanding

  • and characterizing the outbreak to limit the spread of disease.

  • I highlight the National Security Strategy in this form

  • in particular for two reasons.

  • One, the National Security Strategy

  • articulates the US government view that health

  • security is national security.

  • And two, by including it in the National Security Strategy,

  • it indicates that protecting health security

  • is a national security priority.

  • I'll now turn to the most recently released strategy,

  • which is our National Biodefense Strategy.

  • On September 18, 2018-- so just last week--

  • the White House released the National Biodefense Strategy

  • and its implementation plan.

  • And the president signed a National Security Presidential

  • Memorandum-- which is a presidential directive--

  • on support for biodefense.

  • And biodefense in this context is defined very broadly--

  • that looks at actions to counter biological threats

  • and reduce risks and includes global health security

  • and domestic health security.

  • The Biodefense Strategy identifies five goals.

  • The first is to assess biological risks.

  • The second is to ensure capabilities to prevent

  • biological incidents.

  • The third is to prepare to reduce

  • the impacts of biological incidents,

  • and the fourth is to respond rapidly

  • to biological incidents.

  • And then the fifth and final goal

  • is recovering after biological incidents.

  • This strategy integrates the activities of more than 15

  • departments and agencies.

  • And it's comprehensive in four different ways.

  • The first is that, by threat, it, for the first time,

  • encompasses naturally-occurring, accidental, and deliberate

  • biological threats, bringing those into one

  • comprehensive strategy.

  • The second is by target.

  • It addresses threats to humans, to animals, to plants,

  • and to the environment.

  • The third is that, by geography, it

  • looks both here domestically in the United States

  • but also internationally.

  • As we know, biological threats are borderless threats.

  • Four, by discipline-- this strategy

  • takes a multi-sectoral approach and addresses

  • different sectors, including health, law enforcement,

  • defense and security, emergency response, science

  • and technology, and others.

  • Included in the annex of the National Biodefense Strategy

  • is its implementation plan, as I mentioned.

  • And the implementation plan provides granularity

  • for the objectives and the goals and describes in greater detail

  • the actions that the US government will take

  • to strengthen its biodefense.

  • And for this audience in particular,

  • I encourage you to look at the implementation plan

  • because that's where the meat of the descriptions

  • are on the different actions.

  • Also, I mentioned that the president

  • signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum.

  • And this presidential directive directs

  • the execution of the strategy and the execution

  • of the implementation plan.

  • And further, it lays out a framework

  • for coordinating the broader biodefense enterprise.

  • I'll go through the structure.

  • And I'll go through the annual process.

  • And then I'll get to the, so what?

  • What does it mean?

  • Because I think we are hoping to create something that's

  • responsive to some of the things that you heard Dennis raise,

  • that you heard Mike raise, and that you heard

  • Dr. Fauci raise this morning.

  • So the structure is as follows.

  • The Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary Azar,

  • is designated as the federal lead

  • for coordinating implementation of the strategy.

  • The Assistant to the President for National

  • Security Affairs, who is my boss, the National Security

  • Advisor, is the lead for coordination and integration

  • of policy for all biodefense efforts.

  • The presidential directive also creates a principal level--

  • so cabinet secretary level--

  • Biodefense Steering Committee, which includes eight cabinet

  • officials.

  • And then there's also a team created within the Department

  • of Health and Human Services to support those principals

  • and those cabinet officials.

  • The Biodefense Steering Committee and the Biodefense

  • Coordination Team have a mandate to reach

  • outside the federal government to non-governmental

  • stakeholders, including academia,

  • international organizations, international partners,

  • and to ensure their activities are

  • coordinated with the broader federal government activities.

  • There's also the annual process.

  • The annual process--

  • I won't describe it in detail, but it does a few things.

  • It's tailored to understand what the US government is doing

  • to counter biological risks, to assess if those activities are

  • meeting the goals as defined in the strategy,

  • and then to annually determine what our policy priorities are,

  • and link this policy prioritization

  • process to the annual budget.

  • And so, so what?

  • What's the significance of this strategy?

  • And why did we put this out and go to the trouble?

  • So first and foremost, I think what

  • you're seeing is an elevation of biodefense and priority.

  • You heard numerous panelists here today talk about,

  • why don't we give biological threats the same attention

  • that we give other actions?

  • I think what you're seeing here is an elevation

  • of this in priority.

  • Second, for the first time, we do have--

  • and we've established a federal lead-- which, again,

  • is the Secretary of Health and Human Services,

  • for a comprehensive strategy in coordinating these actions.

  • And then third, the strategy and the process

  • gets at, annually, analyzing the gaps in preparedness

  • across the US government and then developing policy

  • priorities to close those gaps.

  • And so you heard Dr. Fauci this morning

  • talk about biological threats or perpetual threats.

  • He said emerging infections, but I'll expand those

  • to all biological threats.

  • You heard Mike talk about distinguishing

  • between a pandemic and an epidemic.

  • You heard Dennis talk about our inadequate response toolbox.

  • What we're trying to do with this strategy

  • is create a structure to understand what we're doing,

  • understand what we're not doing, and then prioritize

  • our actions accordingly in the years to come.

  • Thank you.

  • Great.

  • Thank you so much, Hillary.

  • That's really helpful.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • Are you going to go up there?

  • Yeah.

  • Great.

  • That was great.

  • Thank you.

  • And sorry about the PhD.

  • I don't know where I got that.

  • Thank you very much.

  • I'm going to be speaking briefly about some of the--

  • Can you speak into the microphone?

  • OK, sorry.

  • No, it's fine.

  • I'm going to be speaking briefly about the trace of epidemics

  • that we've had since Ebola ended.

  • Two things I want to say--

  • infectious disease anywhere is infectious disease everywhere.

  • And we have to be cognizant of the fact.

  • Yellow fever in Angola spread to Europe--

  • less than a week ago, monkeypox from Nigeria into the UK,

  • and people got infected.

  • We face this issue every day.

  • Neglected spots of today are the hotspots of tomorrow.

  • So I have this map attempt to show

  • you the level of preparedness in the West African region

  • towards epidemics preparedness.

  • You see predominantly most of the countries in the West

  • African region are in red.

  • That's low level of preparedness.

  • And if you establish a mediated premise

  • I have learned that infectious disease anywhere is everywhere,

  • that the neglected spot of today are the hotspot of tomorrow.

  • You can see a set of Liberia and other countries in yellow

  • are making some progress due to the lesson learned from Ebola

  • and also want to recognize the [INAUDIBLE] effort

  • on the [INAUDIBLE] grant that is trying

  • to do regional surveillance.

  • There is so much investment into regional surveillance,

  • training epidemiologists of tomorrow,

  • building laboratory capacity-- it's a very

  • good step in the way forward.

  • Because if you understand infectious disease--

  • like, I monitor what's going on in the DROC.

  • It worries me every day watching the trend.

  • And I hate to say this, but I'm so convinced that there's

  • a bigger threat, that it will spill over into our country

  • for a potential situation.

  • Because we saw all the arrows that

  • happened in Liberia repeating, except in the DROC.

  • The resistance, the military [INAUDIBLE] someday.

  • So we want to acknowledge the investment.

  • But this can tell you the situation in West Africa.

  • I will now narrow it down to Liberia.

  • If you compare 2017 to 2018, you begin

  • to see that there are increasing cases of outbreaks

  • that includes Lassa.

  • As I speak to this very moment, yellow fever

  • had been in the news in the southeastern part

  • of my country.

  • Lassa-- we have had consistent spread

  • of measles in the country.

  • We have our reemerging of new diseases.

  • Are we seeing the increase in outbreaks because of Ebola,

  • and we have enhanced our surveillance capacity?

  • Richard Cash used to say to us, "When you look for it,

  • you will find it."

  • Are we finding it because you are looking for it?

  • Well, he showed you are increasing outbreak in Liberia.

  • I want you to watch carefully what's happening.

  • Over three years period, we see increasing cases of Lassa.

  • In Liberia we have, like Dr. Fauci said, Lassa [INAUDIBLE]

  • of the year.

  • And certain area, we call the Lassa belt.

  • But for the last couple of years,

  • there is [INAUDIBLE] for the Lassa belt to move countries.

  • Not only that, but we are also beginning to see

  • that it is lasting more longer.

  • And because it is lasting longer,

  • we are having more cases of Lassa.

  • I share this slide.

  • If you look across three years, you

  • watch the number of cases we've had,

  • the number of confirmed cases.

  • You'll will see that, in 2018, the case fatality rate

  • has increase as a function of the number of cases

  • the severity of the disease.

  • [INAUDIBLE] to tell you that we're

  • going to face greater threat every day.

  • Not only have we seen that epidemiology and the biology

  • of diseases that we knew are changing, and posing

  • more threats, and killing more people,

  • but we begin to see a re-emergence of new disease.

  • Yes, we begin to see monkeypox.

  • Since the '70s, monkeypox was essentially eliminated

  • from Liberia and West Africa.

  • Last year, we begin to see new cases of monkeypox spread

  • across the country.

  • Monkeypox is no more restricted to Liberia.

  • But we see cases in Sierra Leone.

  • We see cases in Liberia, Central African Republic,

  • and as I said to you, Nigeria, where two

  • cases got imported to the UK.

  • And someone in the UK got infected.

  • So the chances of--

  • I always say to people, I can have breakfast here today,

  • and I can have my dinner in Liberia with the global travel.

  • I can be incubating a disease this very moment from the US.

  • And I will be in Liberia, and spread it.

  • We saw that happening with Ebola.

  • OK, another care here--

  • for a long time, we're blessed.

  • Liberia was outside of the meningitis belt.

  • All of a sudden, we're in a conference with the US

  • Administer of Health.

  • We had a cluster of death.

  • A person died.

  • From symptom onset, to severity, to death--

  • 24 hours.

  • We're very confused.

  • All of a sudden, we thought it was Ebola.

  • We went around through metagenomic sequencing

  • at the CDC.

  • We realized that it was [INAUDIBLE] meningitis

  • serotype C.

  • This was now-- it's spreading in Liberia.

  • Liberia was not in the epidemic belt, the meningitis belt.

  • All of a sudden, it went back.

  • And the most important one that is

  • so critical from a global health perspective

  • was the one in the northwest.

  • This is the boundary between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra

  • Leone, the red circle where Ebola started from.

  • This is where we had a big outbreak.

  • And to make it more interesting, the outbreak

  • was ongoing during the inauguration

  • of our new president when international guests

  • were flying in.

  • Airplanes were coming into Liberia.

  • We had to do the issue of information management,

  • keeping the outbreak contained.

  • We had to move in massively with ciprofloxacin.

  • And we were able to treat over 1,000 people

  • to prevent a spillover into Sierra Leone and into Guinea

  • and to ensure that we kept the outbreak contained

  • so it wouldn't come to Monrovia, where

  • we had thousand of guest, presidents, and ministers

  • where they have a meeting.

  • So outbreak anywhere is everywhere.

  • What are some of the threats?

  • So I gave you the fact that we still have a threat.

  • The biology of the disease is changing.

  • The epidemiology is changing.

  • Global travel facilitate the disease.

  • But they are traced.

  • I tend to show this slide.

  • Ebola has helped us a lot.

  • We've built a resilient system.

  • We have a huge support where we have surveillance

  • system in the country.

  • But the two dips, I show you, was a point in time

  • where some of support we get from international donor

  • stopped coming.

  • And the workers went on strike.

  • So there's still a fragile system, the system that

  • is so heavily donor dependent.

  • That system gets so fragile that, whatever

  • happens to Monrovia in the midst of donor support, it drops.

  • How do we transition to develop sustainable

  • financing for health care is a critical issue.

  • The second threat is that we've done

  • an assessment of our emergency stock, PPEs and glove.

  • It we were to have an outbreak tomorrow,

  • you would be surprised to note, PPEs and glove

  • are now zero in country.

  • These are all fragile system that tell us,

  • in the midst of increasing outbreaks,

  • you begin to see the little logistics are

  • absent or at a stop.

  • What that simply means-- tomorrow,

  • if we had an outbreak of Ebola, say, in northwestern Liberia--

  • that it's impossible because of [INAUDIBLE]..

  • We don't even have PPE.

  • It's that we have to re-shape the model.

  • And so much has been invested in this country.

  • Liberia alone from Ebola got $1.5 billion investment.

  • How [INAUDIBLE] sustaining an investment in the country?

  • So I will shift gear.

  • One of the way we've done investment

  • now is to create these National Public Health Institutes.

  • I was one of those who have to form the Public Health

  • Institute of Liberia.

  • I went to Thailand.

  • I went to Norway to study that system.

  • And we build a public health institute from the lesson we

  • learn from Ebola, that a minister of health cannot be

  • focused on health care delivery and preventing threats.

  • So we developed this institute to narrowly focus on threats,

  • on surveillance, and diagnostics,

  • and building capacity.

  • This concept has now spread across Africa.

  • There is a African CDC and the [INAUDIBLE] CDCs

  • with a goal of building core public health capacity

  • for surveillance and response.

  • With funding from the World Bank and other institution,

  • we begin to make substantial progress.

  • And that's the only way we can save

  • infectious disease in these neglected spots

  • from coming into the developed spots.

  • Now to mitigate the risks is an investment in laboratory

  • system, diagnostic system.

  • I was involved in Ebola.

  • I was in Liberia at the time, having completed school in US.

  • When Ebola struck Liberia, we literally

  • had to take the samples to the border with Guinea,

  • cross them in a canoe, drive them to [INAUDIBLE],,

  • and bring the result back to Liberia on five to seven days.

  • There was absolutely no capacity to diagnose.

  • So those are the factor that spiral.

  • With support from [INAUDIBLE] and the CDC,

  • you see, now we are able to diagnose priority diseases--

  • Microphone.

  • --like Lassa.

  • Mic.

  • Priority disease like Lassa.

  • And so that gave us a complete speed in the management

  • of [INAUDIBLE].

  • I tell people every day, speed, speed, speed, and communication

  • are the two critical factors.

  • With the ability for diagnostic capacity in-country,

  • we can now diagnose and respond to outbreak immediately.

  • The second most important investment

  • is an investment in the civilian system, the public health

  • capacity.

  • If you look at the time, most of our outbreak now

  • we are responding with less than two days, which

  • is the standard set by the VHU.

  • You see, all in red, we have zero now.

  • Because we have built a human capacity.

  • There have been investment.

  • That's the way we need to get the [INAUDIBLE],,

  • finding the core human capacity, training them, and supporting

  • them to be in-country before you expect them flying.

  • [INAUDIBLE] that our turnaround time are quicker.

  • So we are able to continue outbreaks from spilling over.

  • Finally, I just have this point.

  • The international community have learned their lesson

  • from Ebola, I have to admit.

  • And some efforts have been made.

  • One has been the Joint External Evaluation,

  • where they expanded the panel evaluation of where we stand.

  • As a result of JEE, we now have the National Action Plan

  • for Health.

  • For Liberia alone, the Action Plan of Health

  • has been cost-checked.

  • It will take $150 million investment

  • to prepare Liberia for sustainable

  • financing for outbreaks, for preventing,

  • for vaccine over 5 years.

  • Of course, we've been part of the Global Health Security

  • Agenda [INAUDIBLE] to USAID in Liberia.

  • We've invested in the One Health approach.

  • My colleague, [INAUDIBLE],, will tell us,

  • we know One Health approach, you have a coordinating mechanism

  • with the highest political support with the vice

  • president of my country serving as a head of the One Health.

  • We are getting involved into integrated disease

  • surveillance and response.

  • Lack of time--

  • I can't go into that.

  • But it's this framework developed for the AFRO region

  • to support IHRO.

  • And the last point I want to speak to

  • is the fact that we now have documented

  • that clinical research can be used as a response.

  • [INAUDIBLE] as example that clinical research

  • can be a component part of a response.

  • And we see these very same thing is

  • going be happening in the DROC, where they're trying to do

  • this three-arm therapeutics.

  • The work of [INAUDIBLE] NIH in Liberia

  • is a [INAUDIBLE] example that there

  • can be connection between developing

  • and developed country to build sustainable capacity.

  • We are running over nine clinical trials in Liberia.

  • I'm the PR on three of those trials.

  • We are published.

  • We are in [INAUDIBLE] journal.

  • It can be done.

  • And to close, I will say that infectious disease anywhere is

  • infectious disease everywhere.

  • And in the neglected spot of today

  • are the hotspot of tomorrow.

  • Thank you very much.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • Thank you.

  • Thank you, Mosoka.

  • And a reminder of just how much progress Liberia

  • has made just in a couple of very short years--

  • but as you said, still remains a very fragile system that

  • can be quickly put at risk.

  • So I'm going ask a couple quick questions.

  • Then we'll open it up to the audience.

  • And my first question is a point that several of you

  • hit on but we have spent very little time talking

  • about this week, which is antimicrobial resistance.

  • It, as an issue, comes right up to the issues

  • that we have been talking about around outbreaks.

  • I would argue that it sort of belongs inside the tent

  • of this conversation.

  • But reasonable people can disagree.

  • Given the focus on pandemic influenza that we've had--

  • but really just as a model for threats

  • that can quickly harm human health--

  • I'd love it if we could all just comment

  • on antimicrobial resistance, how big a threat it is,

  • and how big of a challenge it is, and whether the tools

  • that we are thinking about from surveillance systems,

  • building better vaccines, all of the stuff we've

  • been talking about--

  • to what extent is that helpful in this conversation?

  • Or does AMR need a different set of strategies?

  • And I know several of you touched on it.

  • And Hillary, as you've thought about the national global

  • health security strategy, biosecurity strategy,

  • to what extent has AMR played into that conversation?

  • And then, Mosoka, when we get to you, as you guys have thought

  • about your surveillance systems for these very classic

  • diseases, what about AMR as a threat

  • to the population of Liberia?

  • So I won't ask any more.

  • I think I've laid out the question.

  • I'll start with Mike-- and then if we can just go down the row.

  • Well, first of all, I think we have to just really come

  • to grips with reality that, like earthquakes, hurricanes,

  • and tsunamis, antimicrobial resistance occurs.

  • A very fascinating study that was done a few years ago when

  • a group of researchers went back into one of the most

  • distant areas of Carlsbad Caverns, an area that

  • had not ever seen human contact before--

  • 400 million years back in time.

  • And when they sampled the walls aseptically,

  • they not only recovered a whole number of bacteria,

  • but they found that the bacteria are

  • resistant to 14 of our current leading

  • antibiotics we have today.

  • And you say, well, how did that happen?

  • Well, they were, all along, competing for space and food

  • as bacteria.

  • And they had their own evolutionary pressure

  • that brought them to develop similar resistance

  • issues to what we, today, capture

  • relative to our modern antibiotics.

  • So this has been happening.

  • What we've done is we've put it on steroids

  • in a sense by the dumping of the amount of antibiotic

  • into the environment that we have,

  • whether it's through humans, or whether it's

  • through animals, whatever.

  • And so what we have to understand is,

  • from an evolutionary standpoint, this is going to happen.

  • It is happening.

  • And it's only going to get worse.

  • It's accelerating.

  • And I think that, to the extent that we, for a long time,

  • have predicted severe challenges around antimicrobial

  • resistance, we're now just really beginning to realize,

  • in depth, the extent to which it's impacting treatment

  • of disease, clinical outcome, how it's being used to cover

  • for poor sanitation, et cetera-- which then

  • just accelerates the problem--

  • and the role that the food supply plays.

  • I just would add one last piece.

  • I think one of the areas that's going

  • to come back and be a real challenge for us, also, is--

  • and I think this clearly has been well-described recently

  • in the microbiome studies, antimicrobials

  • have a lot of downsides to humans

  • that we never appreciated.

  • Clearly, they've had a lot of upsides.

  • They have been lifesaving in so many ways.

  • But the relationship between those gut bacteria

  • or those skin bacteria that we've

  • evolved with over the last hundreds of thousands of years

  • were very critical in terms of the human physiologic response

  • and the signaling that goes on between them.

  • And when we came in and started altering that

  • with antimicrobials, we've actually

  • created a whole other set of health problems.

  • And I think that we are going to learn one day that how

  • we use antimicrobials to reduce the risk of infectious diseases

  • is going to be critical.

  • To just very briefly say to your question-- yes,

  • we need whole new strategies.

  • And when I say we, it's the world.

  • If we don't take this on globally-- and to follow-up

  • on the point just made-- if there's a disease anywhere it

  • will be everywhere-- we're seeing it

  • without antimicrobial resistance.

  • The Chinese introduced colistin to the hog

  • population four years ago.

  • And before we knew it, overnight,

  • colistin-resistant bacteria were around the world.

  • And so I think that, to the extent

  • that we also deal with this, it can't

  • be a coalition of the willing.

  • It has to be a complete, worldwide effort.

  • Because otherwise, we'll just continue to accelerate it.

  • Great.

  • And Dennis, as you answer this, I'm

  • going to put one more little spin on,

  • which is-- so as a practicing physician,

  • I feel like I get bombarded with antibiotics stewardship.

  • And yet, I hear 90% of antibiotics by weight

  • is in the farming sector.

  • And so whose fault is it?

  • Is it mine, or is theirs?

  • How do we apportion blame between me

  • versus our food supply, and our food industry,

  • and our farming industry?

  • And I'm not really trying to apportion blame.

  • But I'm trying to get a sense of, from your perspective,

  • as you think about zoonoses, as you think about AMR, where

  • are the major sources of that evolutionary stress that

  • are creating these problems?

  • Well, it's unfortunately in both categories.

  • And they do accelerate different kinds of problems.

  • The animal husbandry industry clearly

  • has contributed a substantial amount.

  • And there has been a defensive posture

  • there that has made it very difficult for us

  • to try to deal with that issue.

  • But humans have contributed their own.

  • I would also add, though, that what we don't understand

  • is on the global level, whether it's animals or humans,

  • antibiotics are like candy.

  • They are basically the first, second,

  • and third line of medical care-- is

  • to go to your local, quote unquote, "store."

  • Because frankly, they don't have access to health care.

  • And because of the diseases, particularly

  • of low- and middle-income countries,

  • this becomes, by default, what you do.

  • So that has to also be added.

  • Let me just add one last piece, because I

  • was involved with this, and some of the people know about this.

  • Just last week, we made an announcement.

  • There turns out that there is a very major trade

  • in dogs being sold in pet stores throughout the United States.

  • And as result of the exchange that

  • goes on between these animal breeders and so forth,

  • we now have bred a strain of campylobacter

  • that we have no antibiotics for.

  • If you get infected with this thing, good luck.

  • And we have seen numerous infections, particularly

  • in young children, that have been

  • very severe and acute that we don't

  • have anything to treat it with.

  • And it's now part of the dog breeding

  • industry in the United States.

  • So there's an example where it wasn't even livestock.

  • It was pets-- and the concern that we have with it.

  • Let me first bring the discussion back to 1918.

  • Because what's the difference between 1918

  • and if a similar virus were to emerge in 2018

  • or this upcoming spring of 2019?

  • And in 1918, what didn't we have?

  • We didn't have antibiotics.

  • We didn't have antivirals.

  • We didn't have vaccines.

  • If we were to have a similar event, for as long as it takes

  • to get the vaccine, we would still have

  • antivirals and antibiotics.

  • And that's significant.

  • Because when you look at retrospectively at 1918,

  • half or so of the deaths were due to the virus.

  • Half were secondary bacterial infections.

  • So antivirals and antibiotics will be a very fast

  • front-line response.

  • It's important.

  • If we move into a post-antibiotic world,

  • we're moving back to 1918.

  • And so just to tie the circle back,

  • the vulnerabilities are extraordinary.

  • The other about what's the relative balance of influence

  • at livestock, aquaculture, human, environmental,

  • we don't know--

  • and largely because we've spent a lot of our effort

  • over the last two decades really zeroing

  • in on clinical practice, prescriber users.

  • There's a big black hole out there

  • in terms of, what's the contributing

  • factors around animal husbandry, aquaculture,

  • and environmental contamination in an environment where,

  • as Mike said, you already have just a natural dynamic

  • of evolution within bacteria?

  • We don't know.

  • And that's one of the really important One Health agendas--

  • which is to bring a much deeper evidence base to understanding,

  • what are the relative contributions?

  • Because it talks about risk mitigation.

  • And you really need to be smart about that

  • because Mother Nature is doing her own--

  • independent of us-- evolution, as well.

  • Great.

  • Hillary, how have you guys thought about this

  • in the national strategies?

  • Yeah, so I will add just a few things

  • to the comments my colleagues made.

  • And that is, from my perspective,

  • we think of things in terms of policy.

  • How do we put in place policies?

  • How do we mobilize either the US government

  • or the global community toward specific actions?

  • And AMR will certainly continue to be

  • a critically important issue.

  • And so from the vantage point of organizing actions,

  • one of the effective ones has been the Global Health Security

  • Agenda, which you heard Mosoka mention

  • in terms of a group of over 60 countries

  • working together towards specific technical actions

  • as defined in the Joint External Evaluation.

  • And AMR is one of the action packages under GHSA.

  • There is a working group that is--

  • it's a global working group--

  • that is very active.

  • And they're trying to identify new solutions

  • and trying to put in place actions

  • to counter this problem.

  • But it certainly will continue to be a critical issue.

  • And I'll just take a moment-- since you

  • asked about the Global Health Security Strategy,

  • which I didn't have time to mention in my previous remarks.

  • The National Security Council, in particular,

  • has been tasked with coordinating

  • the development of a global health security strategy.

  • This was an FY18 omnibus.

  • And so we are working on that.

  • There are specific things that it

  • asks the US government to do.

  • But we're taking a comprehensive approach--

  • similar to what we did with biodefense--

  • to look at, how do we define global health security?

  • What does it include?

  • And does it go beyond some of the things

  • that we've traditionally thought of?

  • So that's all I can say at this point.

  • But it's a really great opportunity

  • to think through these issues and specific

  • to global health security.

  • Great.

  • Thank you.

  • With respect to surveillance for antimicrobial resistance,

  • we did a rough analysis of the total number

  • of acute fever illnesses in Liberia for one year.

  • We found out there were about 2.5 million cases of fever.

  • Of the 2.5 million cases, 1 million of those cases

  • were confirmed to be malaria and were treated accordingly.

  • The rest of the 1.5 million were treated with antibiotics

  • presumptuously.

  • So basically, there were no causative agent discover.

  • But they were giving antibiotics.

  • So that's tell you the level of the lack of stewardship

  • for antibiotics in the country.

  • The second challenge is that there is a lack of data.

  • And so because we lack data, it's

  • hard to convince the stakeholders.

  • I think just about a week ago, I sent an email back,

  • because I'm trying to commission a research

  • to look at antibiotics susceptibilities

  • and [INAUDIBLE] with diarrheal diseases.

  • It hasn't even gained traction.

  • We have advanced some initial discussion with GLASS in Sweden

  • to begin traction.

  • So basically, this is Liberia going

  • many of the African country's antibiotic stewardship.

  • And the treatment presumptously by doctors--

  • our teaching hospital does not have

  • a microbiology lab for now.

  • But we are all trained doctors.

  • So it's not taken as serious as it should be taken.

  • And so that's a big threat that is going all across Africa.

  • If I'll add lastly is the issue of [INAUDIBLE]

  • with lack of active substance that comes into this country

  • and needs to be control and regulated.

  • And so we're just starting.

  • We know the drugs are there.

  • We know that there is abuse of antibiotics

  • and no prescription.

  • Anyone can walk to any drug store

  • and just pick up antibiotics of your own choice.

  • And so the last one is that we have

  • a test in Liberia that is a water test, a test for typhoid.

  • I think the sensitivity should be around 40% or 30%.

  • But that's not what you're seeing right now in Liberia.

  • And everybody gets typhoid.

  • And everybody is put on IV ciprofloxacin.

  • Until we can deal with the issue of viral-sensitive diagnostics,

  • we are going to be abusing antibiotics in Liberia

  • or the rest of Africa.

  • Mike, were you going to--

  • Yeah, I just had a question-- a point you had asked us.

  • And none of us really addressed it head on-- is the tools

  • for dealing with the AMR.

  • Let me just say right now that I think

  • that the future for antimicrobial research,

  • and development, and bringing products to the market

  • is going to be very challenging.

  • And the reason is, again, the business model.

  • We keep talking about that.

  • Think about the car salesman who has the best damn car

  • that anyone could ever want.

  • But you've got to tell the people who

  • buy it they can only drive it from 10:00 to 11:00

  • on Sunday mornings.

  • That's it.

  • Who's going to buy that car?

  • Well, part of the problem is we're

  • trying to get new antimicrobial agents for very serious issues

  • around drug-resistant infections.

  • We want you to hardly ever use it.

  • And so trying to incorporate that into the business model

  • is a challenge to get people to want to get into that business.

  • So it's going to happen, but it's going to be challenging.

  • But the second piece of this is--

  • I, last night, laid out categories of vaccines we have.

  • I'm predicting that, in the next five years,

  • we're going to see a new category of vaccines.

  • It's called vaccines for preventing

  • antimicrobial-resistant infections,

  • meaning that we're going to actually start targeting

  • diseases for which we don't have any other really good

  • antimicrobial treatment options--

  • or at least they're very limited.

  • And we are going to make these high priority.

  • Staph aureus is one, as an example.

  • The second thing is we're going to see

  • unconventional treatments.

  • I predict that, within five to 10 years,

  • we will see major emphasis on phage treatment

  • for antibiotic-resistant infections,

  • which is going to be a whole new area that--

  • the Russians are way ahead of us on this one

  • and have been working on it for some time.

  • But I think we're also going to see that as a new--

  • Do want to give a one-liner on the phage treatment stuff?

  • Because I think it's really interesting.

  • Because I'm assuming most people don't know.

  • Phage, as I think you know, is viruses that infect bacteria.

  • And we've already had some wonderful clinical successes

  • with very, very serious resistant infections,

  • where we can match up a virus.

  • And actually, you treat the patient

  • with the virus that is very specific

  • to that infectious agent.

  • And the Russians did it for a long time

  • before we had heard about it or got into it.

  • And there's been several really highly-noted treatment

  • successes, where people literally

  • were on their last leg with a total resistant infection.

  • And the phages actually-- and the work that was being done

  • saved them.

  • It's really a arms race between us and the bacteria.

  • And we're actually playing on both sides

  • of the battlefield, which makes it a bit more challenging.

  • If people have questions, please come on up.

  • I'm going to ask one more question of the panel--

  • and then, again, there is a microphone up there.

  • So please come on up, and ask questions.

  • The last question I want to ask before we open it up

  • is something Mosoka just mentioned at the end.

  • So we spend-- and when we think about our response tools,

  • we talk about vaccines, antimicrobials, antibiotics,

  • antivirals, surveillance.

  • One of things we talk a little less about is diagnostics.

  • And diagnostics become a really critical part of this.

  • And I remember thinking in the early days of the Ebola

  • outbreak--

  • people got fever.

  • Well, we knew most of them did not have Ebola.

  • They often came into centers where they then

  • sat next to somebody else who probably did have Ebola

  • or might have had Ebola until the test became

  • positive or negative 48 hours later.

  • This is the wrong way to do this.

  • But we didn't have any alternative.

  • And so are we prioritizing and investing

  • enough in diagnostics as part of our strategy

  • for keeping the population safe-- really

  • front-line diagnostics?

  • Well, you guys know the story.

  • So anybody-- if somebody wants to take on--

  • how do we think about diagnostics

  • as part of this conversation?

  • And you're not allowed to have nobody take this on.

  • Well, I'll [INAUDIBLE].

  • Because, again, having just done the R&D roadmaps for Ebola,

  • Lassa, and Nipah, where we did vaccines,

  • diagnostics, and therapeutics-- so diagnostics

  • was a very key piece.

  • In the middle to high-income countries,

  • the private sector is doing very fine with this.

  • And in fact, it's exciting as hell

  • to see some of these graphing-based procedures,

  • where we can delineate a number of agents right down

  • to genetic sequencing within minutes.

  • And it's going to get more cost effective.

  • The challenge is bringing highly-usable diagnostics--

  • because of the standpoint of whether electricity based,

  • or not, et cetera, sensitivity, specificity, ease of use--

  • to the low- and middle-income countries overall for this.

  • But as you'll see with Ebola, that's happening.

  • There's been some major advances made in the last several years

  • on just the Ebola.

  • So I think, actually, the diagnostic area--

  • surely, the low-income countries need assistance and support.

  • But it's actually pretty healthy.

  • And we found that within our work with these diseases

  • that there is a lot of good new technology coming forward.

  • Great.

  • Anybody else want to take this on?

  • Mosoka and then Dennis.

  • I want to speak.

  • Because we publish a paper called "Free Blood Draw."

  • And anyone can read it.

  • Basically, in the subsequent resurgence,

  • with the deployment of the GeneXpert diagnostic

  • that could run for two hours, basically if someone

  • got infected or had a fever, we would isolate the person

  • at home, draw blood, take it to the center that

  • determined the results, and got back to the person within three

  • hours.

  • And that changed the dynamic of the transmission.

  • Because then we kept people at home.

  • They trusted us.

  • We do the test.

  • And it made such a very big difference

  • when the GeneXpert was introduced,

  • the speed, the turnaround time.

  • Now we face a challenge.

  • The company that making the GeneXpert

  • has increased the price of the cartridges

  • and reduced the shelf life of the cartridges.

  • So essentially, the GeneXpert were made and deployed.

  • But we can no more use it because of cost.

  • Yeah.

  • Dennis?

  • And I think it's also important to realize that we're

  • in the midst of a technological revolution-- and to the extent

  • that we're not necessarily exploiting

  • that for field applications.

  • And I'll give you an example.

  • We have been supporting, up on the China-Vietnam border,

  • the use of what are called pocket PCRs.

  • They're a little larger than an iPhone.

  • But the big question about-- and a virus coming--

  • H7N9 coming across in the markets into, say, Vietnam--

  • how do you pick that up?

  • The current protocols are you collect samples.

  • You send them back down to Hanoi.

  • They run them through a PCR.

  • They then make a determination, and send the information

  • back up-- maybe.

  • You're talking about a week.

  • Whatever it is that trafficked across that border

  • has been consumed in Hanoi already.

  • It's gone.

  • The pocket PCR is this extraordinary tool,

  • which is rapidly evolving.

  • But it's basically-- you can collect samples in a market.

  • And as long as you have a primer,

  • you can do it against anything.

  • You can do influenzas.

  • You can do coronaviruses.

  • It doesn't matter.

  • And in two hours, in that market,

  • you can have a positive or negative.

  • You can know exactly what's there.

  • And you can link it to action.

  • So the Vietnamese government has revised their protocols now.

  • It does not need to go back to Hanoi.

  • They are able to stop, and quarantine, and take actions

  • on the basis of this protocol.

  • And their ability now-- the next generation of these

  • is that they immediately move the information into the cloud

  • so that it's immediately available for access.

  • So how can the global community, working

  • with the national authorities, really move these technologies

  • into the field-- point-of-capture diagnosis?

  • And that's against the known.

  • I'll come back to the fact that we were flummoxed.

  • As Tony was talking about SARS--

  • there was a period of time they did you not know what it is.

  • The issue was when something new comes out,

  • we're even more challenged.

  • And I would go back to this issue

  • about developing a deep, rich database about all

  • of the virome to be able to have a diagnostic platform that

  • allows you to rapidly--

  • and so for those that would be interested, I am part--

  • along with a larger community-- around the Global Virome

  • Project, which is about a 10-year effort to document 70%

  • of the virome within mammal and waterfall populations--

  • big implications for diagnostics,

  • big amplification for countermeasures

  • across the board.

  • But it's moving from small to big data, technology

  • into the field.

  • That's amazing.

  • All right, let's open it up.

  • We have about 10 to 15 minutes.

  • So if we could do two things, which is--

  • I'll take two questions at a time,

  • have whoever on the panel who wants to respond.

  • Then we'll do the next two.

  • Please quickly introduce yourself,

  • and ask your question.

  • Thank you.

  • [INAUDIBLE] my corporation was privileged to lead

  • a team at HHS in 2006 that wrote the requirements for an Ebola

  • vaccine, put it in priority document

  • for our medical countermeasure strategy and implementation

  • plan with Dr. Parker.

  • I'm a scientist and a big fan of transformative science--

  • but also, realistic expectations.

  • So the de-prioritization of one bug one drug solutions arguably

  • led to the consequence of us not have an Ebola vaccine when

  • we needed one, despite the fact that it was a priority in 2006.

  • So I want to talk about realistic expectations

  • about transformative science and broad-spectrum solutions, one.

  • Two is the business model.

  • And Hillary, thank you to you and your team

  • for getting the National Biodefense Strategy--

  • long awaited--

  • out.

  • I wonder if you have the sense for where we're starting?

  • You talk about-- one of the important deliverables

  • from the federal group is the assessment.

  • Do you have any sense, walking into this now

  • with the first National Biodefense Strategy,

  • are we at 5%, 10%, 50%, 90%?

  • How do you approach this first assessment of the National

  • Biodefense Strategy?

  • And where are we after billions of dollars

  • and arguably at least 17 years of effort?

  • OK.

  • And let's-- next question.

  • Thank you for both of those.

  • Yeah?

  • Sure, thank you.

  • My name's [INAUDIBLE].

  • I'm a doctoral student in the School

  • of Public Health in Infectious Disease Epidemiology.

  • And there's been a lot of talk this week about vaccines,

  • other medical countermeasures, some talk

  • about contact tracing.

  • But one topic that has rarely, if at all, come up

  • is questions and controversies about general restrictions

  • on movement, on closing borders either at a sub-national scale,

  • like between different districts or counties

  • in an Ebola-type situation, or between countries, potentially.

  • We see, often in various kinds of public health emergencies,

  • political and other public leaders

  • suggesting that keeping people who

  • might have a disease from traveling is an intervention.

  • And I think, in the public health community,

  • there's a fairly strong consensus

  • that, for most diseases, that's not a good idea.

  • So my question is sort of twofold.

  • First of all, it is, how do you communicate

  • in those situations where that's probably not a good idea

  • why something that--

  • there might be some intuition to why

  • people think it's a good idea.

  • How do you communicate that that's not generally the case?

  • And then the second part of the question,

  • are there situations where the potential for other control

  • measures is so low and the risks are so large

  • that movement restrictions actually would make sense,

  • even acknowledging that they have

  • severe economic consequences?

  • Great.

  • So a series of questions across both of those--

  • one bug one drug, being more realistic

  • about these transformative technologies,

  • one question very specifically to you, Hillary, about--

  • is this a great strategy?

  • Where are we on this, 1% or 99%?

  • And then this issue of restricting movement-- it does

  • feel very intuitive to people.

  • I cringe when I hear that, because I

  • think it's a bad idea.

  • It won't work.

  • It will make people turn away from the system,

  • all the things that we lay out.

  • And so the question for the panel is,

  • are there times when we may actually

  • need to resort to that?

  • So whoever wants to start us off.

  • Well, let me start with realistic expectations.

  • Because realistic expectations have embedded in it a time

  • frame.

  • And what is it we expect today?

  • And what is it that we're trying to build for tomorrow?

  • And the older I get, the more I realize

  • tomorrow isn't that far away.

  • Because yesterday seems just like a moment ago.

  • And part of what we need to be thinking about

  • is where are we going to be in 2028?

  • 2008 is literally not that far in the back.

  • And what are the steps that we need to take?

  • Either we begin to ask a different set of questions,

  • and figure out what a different paradigm for problem solving

  • might be--

  • and take those investments.

  • And there's risk embedded in that.

  • Like, when I began my career, I was a researcher at one point.

  • And I was at Cold Spring Harbor at the moment

  • when the Human Genome Project was first

  • being put on the table.

  • And Jim Watson, who was my boss, he was the first lead on that.

  • And it was an enormously controversial discussion.

  • Go after the entirety of the human genome.

  • What are you going to get from that, as opposed

  • to focusing on very specific domains

  • within the human genome?

  • There were wild expectations, lots of promises.

  • The world we got is very different

  • after we've sequenced the human genome.

  • We wouldn't have CRISPR-Cas today

  • if it wasn't for the Human Genome

  • Project having been done.

  • Now I think part of this is that, when you try and make

  • a different way of thinking about problems and using data--

  • we live in a data-rich world now.

  • But the computing power to analyze data

  • allows us to think fundamentally differently.

  • Emerging viral diseases has not kept up.

  • And the transformative issue is, in

  • that massive data set are new insights, new opportunities.

  • We're not quite sure what they are.

  • So expectations-- be realistic.

  • But the world is a far more complex environment

  • than Ebola or Marburg.

  • It is a hugely complex issue.

  • And how do we open up the entirety

  • of that window for filoviruses, flaviviruses, et cetera,

  • and then see what the power of big data

  • allows us to understand.

  • So this is not a trade off between making decisions today

  • at the expense of something today.

  • It's about making new decisions to open up

  • new doors for tomorrow.

  • In some ways, I'm reminded of an old line that

  • has been attributed to Bill Gates, which is,

  • "We overestimate what technology can do in the short run

  • and underestimate what it can do in the long run."

  • Hillary, on the biosecurity, where are we on the pathway?

  • What is your sense?

  • Yeah, so I think where we are is we'll

  • know a lot more in 120 days.

  • If you look at the NSPM, it has some very specific tasks,

  • what I'm calling the 120-day sprint, where

  • we have to define roles, responsibilities, milestones,

  • metrics, and end states for the implementation plan.

  • So there's analysis that's associated with defining

  • those specific things.

  • And I think that will give us a really good sense of where

  • we are relative to the goals, the objectives,

  • and the sub-objectives.

  • I also want to highlight that there is a mandate to release

  • a public report in one year.

  • So there is transparency built into this process

  • so that, in one year, we'll be able to comprehensively answer

  • that question of where we are relative to the strategy.

  • I think, right now, if you ask individual departments

  • or agencies, they can tell you for their line of effort.

  • But there has not been a comprehensive assessment

  • across the US government.

  • And that is what we are attempting to do.

  • Anybody want to take on the movement question?

  • Yeah, so we did restriction.

  • Like Tony said, it's a message and a messenger.

  • The first time that we attempted restricting a whole population,

  • it resulted in the riot, the military moving, and two person

  • were shot, and one died.

  • We learned an important lesson from it.

  • The lesson was that a restriction cannot be external.

  • It has to be negotiated.

  • It has to be discussed.

  • And so we developed a concept called

  • precautionary observation.

  • We did not go call it quarantine.

  • So whenever there was an outbreak,

  • we approached the group and discussed with them

  • that, for the good of the public,

  • are you willing to stay home?

  • We made the agreements.

  • And on our part, we'll supply you food.

  • We'll give you water.

  • There were a time we provide television for people.

  • They said, we want to watch movies.

  • We will give them movies.

  • And we ensured that their jobs get protected.

  • And through what we call negotiator quarantine,

  • we succeeded in doing that.

  • The last [INAUDIBLE] I can tell [INAUDIBLE]

  • a lot of American institution was involved

  • was the time we talked to the two drug

  • addicts who were exposed and moved

  • into a center for quarantine.

  • And literally, to keep them happy,

  • we supplied them drug for 21 day.

  • We supplied them cocaine for 21 days.

  • Because they were homeless.

  • They were drug addicts.

  • They couldn't live outside.

  • We weighed the risk of spreading the disease.

  • And so we negotiate that.

  • And they said to us, we are drug addicts.

  • If you guys are going to keep us quarantined,

  • will you provide the drug?

  • And it's an ethical dilemma that I still struggle with.

  • But I literally went and bought drugs

  • and brought it for them-- so the message and the messenger.

  • The way you do, it's possible it can be done.

  • OK.

  • So Richard, Mark, let's go ahead--

  • Richard.

  • And then we'll take final comments.

  • And then we'll wrap up, please.

  • I'm Richard Cash from the Harvard

  • School of Public Health.

  • I think Mosoka's comments were absolutely critical.

  • Because what he was demonstrating

  • is that the actual epidemiology and the value

  • was coming from the country itself

  • from somebody who's from that country.

  • And what concerns me is we're talking about global.

  • But the fact is that money that goes

  • into training of people locally and in this country is really--

  • compared to the rest-- in really short supply.

  • I believe very strongly that you develop local institutions.

  • And the number in West Africa and throughout the world

  • is pathetically small.

  • I was in Liberia 50 years ago for a cholera outbreak.

  • And the amount of capacity building

  • since that time, until the Ebola epidemic,

  • was not what it should be.

  • So what I'm interested in is, what of all of this money

  • spent and so on should we put into the development

  • of local capacity building?

  • I'm not sure we can trust the United States much more.

  • We almost zeroed out the Fogarty.

  • CDC people can't go out into the field

  • because of travel restrictions.

  • So what are we doing?

  • What should we be doing in terms of national security

  • in developing local capacity to really deal with these issues?

  • Because that's where the answer's going to come from.

  • Great.

  • So we're a little short on time--

  • if everybody can just make a comment.

  • And if you don't mind working--

  • not everybody has to deal with this--

  • but on the issue of trust.

  • Because one of things that Mosoka did brilliantly

  • in the outbreak in Liberia--

  • but even brings up his latest example--

  • is that trust becomes such an incredible force--

  • glue for being effective in these things.

  • But really, I'll leave it open to you.

  • Mike, your thoughts?

  • Thank you.

  • Quickly, let me just say we're schizophrenic.

  • We talk all the time about the threat

  • that infectious diseases play to global security,

  • our economic security, et cetera.

  • This year, we'll spend about $750 billion in defense.

  • And we'll spend maybe $14 billion

  • on all areas of infectious disease and public health

  • control of infectious diseases.

  • I don't know enough about battleships.

  • So I can't say what we need or don't need.

  • But I have a relative sense that, if it really it's

  • that big of a risk, we have to rethink the actual magnitude of

  • how we respond, and why, and what we invest in.

  • The second thing-- I just have to add this piece.

  • My dear friend, Dennis Carroll, I

  • would love to believe in what you're suggesting

  • with all this additional data.

  • But I think that the Virome Project is one of the most

  • misspent monies we spend today.

  • I think that it's really--

  • provides us really nothing that will

  • prepare us for public health.

  • If we can't get vaccines for what

  • we know now, Ebola, [INAUDIBLE],, MERS, et cetera,

  • knowing about 5,000 new viruses is

  • like identifying 1,000 new stars and think

  • we're going to have a lower risk of an asteroid hitting

  • the Earth.

  • It just isn't going to happen.

  • And I think that we can't sell that any longer

  • as pandemic preparedness.

  • It's not.

  • I'd love to know the information.

  • I'm curious, too.

  • But until we can get a system to making the current vaccines

  • that we already know we have a risk for,

  • I don't need to know about 1,000 new filoviruses.

  • We can't have a panel without a little bit of tension.

  • Dennis, any thoughts?

  • Is this just a pie in the sky, wonderful thing

  • that we'd all love to know, but we have to make priorities?

  • Look, this is not much of a different discussion

  • than, again, when I was in Cold Spring Harbor in 1986, '87.

  • And the point is well taken.

  • But it's also-- look, vaccines may inherently not

  • ultimately allow themselves to be broad spectrum

  • in a consistent way.

  • It may be that vaccines are inherently

  • a 19th-century technology that will always

  • be somewhat limited.

  • But the issue fundamentally is, by opening

  • up this insight into the data-- also

  • allows you to think about what might be new ways of even

  • asking the question.

  • So the whole world of gene editing coming out

  • of CRISPR-Cas allows us to think fundamentally differently

  • about different countermeasures.

  • How do we think about application

  • of those technologies, those approaches

  • once you begin enrichening the data field?

  • So I'm not putting everything on the back of vaccines.

  • I'm not personally convinced vaccines

  • do have that big potential in a consistent way.

  • But Mother Nature is an extraordinarily intricate

  • thing.

  • And getting insight into that requires opening up the data,

  • getting insight.

  • And I think that's what we're going to learn.

  • Your viruses-- we know about a handful of viruses.

  • You're saying the Russians are showing--

  • can be enormously impactful on bacterial infections.

  • What other viruses out there might

  • be able to provide an even more robust--

  • that we don't know about?

  • So it's not just about one approach or another approach.

  • It's really just trying to rethink the entirety.

  • And smart people can get smarter.

  • Hillary, any closing remarks on any of this?

  • Sure.

  • I'll just briefly respond to the last question

  • that was addressed.

  • And thank you for that.

  • I think there is certainly agreement within the US

  • government that responding at the local level

  • and working with our partners to build local capacity

  • is critically important.

  • Right now, the US government has 17 partner countries.

  • We're proud to say Liberia is one of our partner countries

  • under the Global Health Security Agenda,

  • where we have CDC field offices that work closely

  • with our partners to build that local capacity

  • and have a mutually-learning relationship.

  • And so I think when it comes down to it--

  • and again, coming back to the strategy

  • and what we're trying to do is, broadly speaking,

  • stepping back.

  • What are the risks?

  • What risk can you accept, and what risk

  • can you not accept-- and then prioritizing your actions

  • accordingly.

  • Great.

  • Mosoka, any final thoughts on the--

  • Yes, I'll speak to what Dr. Cash have said.

  • And the timing in Liberia for me was I

  • had opportunity to have a US education.

  • And so I knew what to do.

  • And it made such a substantial difference.

  • But we need to produce many other young people [INAUDIBLE]..

  • And education is going to be very critical.

  • Unfortunately, sometimes, some of our donors

  • don't see that as a long-term investment

  • because it does not have quick returns.

  • After Ebola ended, I sat down with a group of guys.

  • And we wrote a curriculum for an MPH program

  • for the next generation of leaders, applied epidemiology,

  • health system management, environmental health,

  • and laboratory science.

  • We have taken this proposal to multiple international donors

  • and say to them, this is the way you prevent less outbreak.

  • Nobody is paying attention.

  • We have this proposal.

  • We took it to the university.

  • The faculty [INAUDIBLE] as a program.

  • We couldn't start this year.

  • We're trying to see 2019 if we can start it.

  • Because we cannot have a single donor saying,

  • I will put money here, because this is the way I'm going

  • to protect the world by treating people locally.

  • So sometimes, there's a big challenge with us.

  • They will come in all the money.

  • But the long-term sustainability is sometimes

  • [INAUDIBLE] but I would tell anyone

  • that the human capacity is the most critical investment.

  • Because at the end of day, we'll still

  • come back to fundamental public health intervention, isolation,

  • contact tracing, the cases.

  • Human capacity is the most important area for investment.

  • That's a very good line to end it on.

  • This has been an extraordinary panel.

  • Let's give them a big round of applause.

  • Thank you, everybody.

  • [APPLAUSE]

OK.

字幕と単語

ワンタップで英和辞典検索 単語をクリックすると、意味が表示されます

B1 中級

アウトブレイク・ウィーク疫病の予防 リスクの理解と軽減 (Outbreak Week: Preventing Epidemics: Understanding and Mitigating Risks)

  • 4 0
    林宜悉 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
動画の中の単語