Let's startwith a bigmovethisweekbecausetwoweeksaheadof a scheduledmeeting, just a coupleofhoursafter a G sevenannouncementfromthefinanceministersandcentralbankersweregoingtodowhat's appropriate.
Fedcomesbarrelingoutofthegate.
Emergencymeeting.
50 basispointcuthasn't happenedsince 2008.
Whytheurgency?
Whatshifted?
I thinkthat, youknow, J.
Pauldid a greatjobinhispressconferenceinhallucinatingthedetailsaroundthis, but, youknow, risksobviouslyarisingthatthisCoronaviruscouldbemoreseverethan, uh, whatwerepreviouslythinking.
I thinkthesentimentforme, anyway, wasthatwewereprobablygonnahavetomoveattheMarchmeetinganyway.
Mightaswellmovethatupanddoitsooner.
S o.
I thinkthatwasthebasicthinkinghere.
I alsothinkthatwegotthepolicyratetotherightplacefornow, Uh, giventheinformationthatwehavenow, andwetookoutsomeinsuranceagainstthepossibilitythatthiswillcausegrowthslowdownintheUSwell, youknow, that's interesting.
I'm notsureyoushouldput a lotofweightonthemarchmeetingrightnow.
Anyway, wecouldmeetintermeetinganyway, whichwe'vejustshownthatwecoulddososo I justwouldn't wanttoput a tremendousamountoffocusonthisonthisMarchmeeting.
Therewon't be a lotofnewinformationtherethatwedon't havetoday, exceptexcepthowthevirusisprogressingdaytoday.
Thatkindofinformationwillbe, uhwe'llhave a littlebitmoreonthat.
Sobecausewe'veseensomeprettywe'vehadquite a downdraftfromthehighs I knowthestockmarketisstillmaintainingsomegainsfromthebeginningoftherally.
Nevertheless, investorslikeyouand I havetalkedaboutthisovertheyears, butthethestockmarketistryingtolookaheadandseewhatthegrowthprospectsarefortheUSeconomy.
TheFedistryingtodothesamething.
Lookahead, seewhat?
Seewhattheprospectsarefortheeconomy.
Thestockmarkettradesminutebyminute.
Weonlymeeteverysooften, sosometimesitlookslikeoneisreactingtotheotherBut I don't reallythinkthatthat's true.
I thinkbotharetryingtoforecastthefuture, and I thinkthat's whatwasthatwasgoing, whatwasgoingonhere.
CanyouwalkusthroughJim?
How a ratecutissupposedtohelpdealwith a virusThisisnotlikelookingatemploymentreportsandretailsales.
A lotofprivateforecastershave, youknow, uh, we'reintheWe'reinthemiddleofworkingonthat.
Sowhatdoyouthink I shoulddo?
Uh, I thinkmybasscaseisstillthatwillwilldoquitewellinthe U.
S.
Economyforthisyear.
I thinkthefundamentalsaregood, and I thinkthebasecasesthatwecanbringthisvirusundercontrol.
Um, I understandthatthere's downsiderisktothat, andthat's why I'm willingtoadjustpolicy.
And I thinkalloptionsareonthetableasfarasthatgoes.
But, uh, butforthisyear, youknow, uhoh, a CDcameoutwithgrowthforecasts.
I thinktheyonlymarkedtheUSdown 1/10.
Uh, thatwas a groupthatwastryingtogetthewholeglobalimpactandmodelthewholethingandputitalltogether, andtheycameupwithonly 1/10 onUSgrowthas a basecase.
Theyalsounderstandthatthere's downsiderisk, butbut I thinkthat's probablythebestwaytothinkaboutitrightnow.
FirstquartertrackinggrowthHSmarketstill a 2.1% so I'm notquitesurewe'regoingtoseeasbiganeffectinthefirstquarter's maybewhatpeoplewerepreviouslythinking.
So I think a lotdependsonhowthevirusevolvesherein.
Becauseweknowthishasbeen a bigdealfortheFedandparticularlyforChairPowell.
Let's getfreshenuptotarget.
Hereallywanttodoitin 2020.
Isthisgoingtomakeit a lottougher, ifnotimpossible?
Forsomereason?
Yeah, well, forthosethatwanttointerpretthisas a puresupplyshock, they'vegotsomeexplainingtodo.
Unlesstheythey'realsowillingtosaythatinflationisgonnagoupbecausethat's what a supplyShockedhasconventionallydefinedwouldbedoing.
Itwouldbesendinginflationhigher.
Thatwouldactuallybe a welcomedevelopmentfromthepointofviewofthecommittee, becausewehavebeentryingtogetinflationuptowardtarget.
So I thinkififwegotthatkindof, um, development, I'm notreallyexpectingthat, Butlet's supposewegotsomebottlenecksandsomepricingthatdrovewasenoughtodriveinflationsomewhathigher.
I thinkwe'd welcomethatandacceptthataspartofthepartoftheshock.
At a timewhentheFedwantsprovidemorestimulusandmaybeyoudon't wanttorelysoheavilyonratecuts, youknow, there's there's beenforecastfromFedofficialsthat, um, theliquidityprovidedthroughrepooperationsisgoingtobegraduallytaperinginthefirsthalfoftheyear.
Wouldthisbe a timetogointheoppositedirectionAndtobemoregenerousandmakesurethere's lotsofliquidity, takesomeofthepressureoffratecutsand, uh, andanduse a mechanismthatistherewaitingtobeused?
Yeah, that's moreof a technicaldecisiononoperationalaspectsof, AH, monetarypolicythat's runbytheNewYorkdesk.
ThatwasWallStreetstoryThenThen I thinkWallStreetgot a lotmorepessimisticandmaybepolicymakerstoandwegotnewsfromaroundtheworldaboutthespreadofthevirus, butit's worthrememberingthatthatwastheoriginalstory.
I knowit's probablyreallytooearlytothinkaboutthatseriously, butitcoulditover.
Thelongertermprovedtobelikethat.
Yeah, the 87 situationwas, ah, beautifulexampleof, ah, a majormoveandequitypricingthatdidn't resultin a downturnandmaybepartlybecauseoftheFed's responseatthetime, butalsokeepinmind, itwasmuchmoresevere.
If I recallcorrectly, you'retalkingabout 22% ontheday.
Yeah, 22% ofourlooklikenothing.
That's anissue.
So I think, uh, uh, youknow, we'renotinthatsituation, butthat's anexampleof, ah, dramaticrepricingthatactuallydidnotresultininanythingbadhappeningfortheeconomynearterm.
So I think, uh, youknow, anotherthingtokeepinmindhereonequitypricingisobviouslythere's a bigrunupfromaboutOctober 1storsolastyear, upuntilmaybemidFebruary.
Soithadgoneup a lot.
A lotofcommentaryonWallStreetandonBloomberghasbeenthat, uh, well, maybethiswasCorona.
Virusiskindof a catalystforpeopletakingprofitsonthatonthatbigrunupanyway, so, youknow, I don't know.
Butagain, I thinktotheextentChina's recoveringandtheyhave a goodpublichealthresponseinJapan, I don't seeanyreasonwhytheycan't dobetterinthesecondquarterandthirdquarterofthisyear.
So I thinkthoseweresomeoftheconsiderationsaroundlumpingeverythingintofiscalaction.
I thinkthenumberonethingwecandohereishavingoutstandingpublichealthresponseinallcountries.
But, youknow, we'remostconcernedhereaboutthe U.
S.
Andas I saidbefore, I thinkthatpublichealthresponseisn't alwaysasvisibleaswe'd likeittobe, becauseit's there's manydifferentlayers.
There's a federallayerin a statelevellayerin a locallayerandindividualthere, and I thinkbecausewe'vebeenabletocommunicate, wegotsomeknowledgeaboutthevirusfromChinaandhowitbehaves.
You'regoingtowatchjobsyou'regoingtowatchRetailsalesaregonnapaymoreattentiontothingslike, although I knowyouguystalktobusinesspeopleallthetime, butcorporationsairsayingabouthowthisisgoingtoaffecttheirsalesaffecttheiroutlookaswell.
I thinkit's ah, greattimetohave, ah, bigwebofcontactsthattheFedhasinthe U.
S.
Andaroundtheworld.
Aboutwhat?
Theeffectsofthisfiresogonnabeoneconomicoutcomes.
Weunderstandit's a humantragedy, and I thinkwealwayshavetokeepthatinmind.
Wouldwe'reinfinancialmarkets, though.
We'retalkingaboutthefinancialmarketeffectsand, uh, youknow, I thinkyougetgreatpiecesofinformationaboutsomeindustries, youknow, reallyhithard.
Somedon't seemuchoffact.
Othersmightevendobetterdependingonwheretheyare.
And I thinktobeabletoabsorbthatandpiecethattogether.
Excessis, umandinfact, thatwhatwe'reseeingnow, to a certainextent, iskeepingemergencypoliciesinplacefortoolong.
Ultralowinterestratesandbondpurchases.
Whatdoyoumakeofthat?
Thatcriticismthatthought, youknow, onethingisthatHomerJoneswas a professorduringthe 19 thirtiesandFriedmanwas a studentduringtheduringthethirties, andtheywouldsay I thinkthatzerointerestratesare a signoftightmonetarypolicy, not a signofeasymonetarypolicy.
Andtheywouldemphasizequalitymeasuresofmoney.
Andthere's a longliteratureaboutthat, Uh, youknow, stemmingfromthat.
We'vehadquite a longmanagementcommitteemeeting, I guessthedaybeforeyesterdayonthis, andwe'reverymuchintunewithtrackingthevirusdaytodayandthinkingabouttheappropriatepolicyresponseatthebanklevelandhandlingupspecialsituationsthatmightcomeupandandsortofah, ah, veryawareattitudeamongthemanagementteamaboutwhat's goingon.
Andwedon't wanttosleep.
Asasthisdevelops, I wonderifweshouldexpectsomekindofsystemwide, like a FederalReservesortofpolicyon, uh, howtodealwiththeworkplace, howtodealwithworkingathomeandallthosekindsofthings.
Yeah, I thinkonesizefitsalloftendoesn't workthatwhileyou'vegotdifferentpartsoftheFedindifferentcities, they'vehaddifferentchallengesindifferentplaces.
So I thinkyoudowanttocoordinate, butyoualsowanttotailorthedecisionstotheparticularareathatthatyou'reinonthethreatlevelontherisksthatyou'retakinginthatparticularareaat a time.
A lotofthebanks, youknow, especiallybusinesswisethebank's airspecializedincertainareasandsodifferentbankshavedifferentbusinessesthattheythey'rehandlingandrunningfortheFederalReserve.
Andsothosehavedifferentrequirementsaboutfrom a managementperspective, butthat I just I wouldappreciatecorporatecethataregoingthroughthisandotherentitiesthataregoingthroughthis.
I mean, youreallyhavetobeonyourtoesthatyouhavetomanageverycarefullybecausethereare a lotofconsiderationsaboutexactlyhowtohandlethingsandrisksareevolving.
Let's startwith a bigmovethisweekbecausetwoweeksaheadof a scheduledmeeting, just a coupleofhoursafter a G sevenannouncementfromthefinanceministersandcentralbankersweregoingtodowhat's appropriate.