Thegoodsaretradedmorethanserviceis, andthereis a manufacturingrecessioninthesense, saidmanufacturing.
ProductioniscontractinginEuropeintheUSnow.
Soforonepartoftheeconomy, thereis a contraction.
Andoverall, ofcourse, there's a slowdown.
Theworldeconomyandmostbigeconomieshavebeenscrollingdownforthelastyear, evenMaurandthequestionis, s loadandgoallthewaytozeroandbelow.
That's thebigquestion.
Whatdoyouthink?
Well, I mean, likeyou, I don't have a crystalball.
I don't knowthedefinitiveanswer, butit's certainly, ah, questionthatpeopleinmarketsareaskingincreasinglyoften, notleastbecausewe'vejustbeeninthisbullrunforsuch a longtime.
Buddywillbebacktosomethingmoreorlesssimilartowhatwehadbefore, But I thinkthere's anoutsidechanceoutsidechancethattherearebynowenoughprotectionistforcesinthe U.
S.
Thatreallywanttokindofrebringbacktheseglobalsupplychainsthathavedevelopedoverthelast 30 35 years.
The U.
S is a bigenougheconomythathecankindofgoitalone.
Illwillbelessrichas a result, butitcandoit.
It's a hugeeconomy, butthat's goingtobe a bigpoliticalfightthatisn't justaboutTrump, butalsoinsidetheDemocraticParty.
I thinktheprobabilityisthatatsomepointwhenit's politicallyconvenient, itwillquietdownandwe'llgetbacktoknowquitethestatusquoante, butsomethingthatlooksprettymuchsimilartowhatweusedto.
Itbasicallymeansthatpeoplearesodesperateforsafetythatthey'repreparedtotake a guaranteedlossonwhattheybindtobeabletojusthavesomesafekeepingoftheirfundson.
Thisis a featurenotaboutIt's a feature, not a bug.
Butitalsomeansthatyoucan't reallytakethedifferencebetweenshorttermratesandlongtermratesas a puremarketsignal.
It's a resultofpolicy.
TheBankofJapanexplicitlytargetsboththeshorttermandthelongtermrates, soit's just a functionofpolicy.
Theshorttermrateiswhatis.
Theshorttermisminus.
Oneofthelongtermisminuspoint.
Oneofthelongtermiszero, soit's justbuiltinas a resultofpolicy.
Sounlessyou'resayingthatthispolicywillleadto a recession, I don't thinkithasthesamepredictivepowerthatitusedtohavewhenitwasjusttheresultoffjudgmentsinthemarket.
And I'm goingbacktothisquestionthatwereceivedthewill.
As a resultofallthepolicythatwe'vebeenpouringintothesystemforthelastdecade, wehaveinflationmandates, whichmeansthatwehavetotarget a certainlevelofinflation.
Generallyspeaking, around 2% Andisowayhavetodowhatourmandatetellsustodo, whichisjustkeepon a zing.
Andwithinterestratesbasicallyzeroorevenlowerin a lotofplaces, thatmeansbuyingmorebonds.
Thereisthisideathatthebondmarketshavejust a littlebittoofarforward.
They'vepricedinenormousbondpartpurchases, inparticularfromtheEuropeanCentralBank, Butthat's kindoftricklethroughthroughoutthesystemandThereis a bitof a sensenowthatunlesscentralbanksreallydeliver, deliversomereallyheavyhandedextrabondpurchases, maybethebondmarkethaswon a littlebit, too, itfaraheadofitself.
Wouldyoubesurprisedtosee a bitofahpullbackfromthemarkets?
ButtheyhavesignaledveryheavilyMarioDraghi, thepresident, onsomeofhisalliesonontheGoverningCouncilthattheywillputtogether a prettybigpackageinthelastcoupleofweeks.
SomeofthehawksontheGoverningCouncilhasit.
Well, maybewedon't needto, andtheytrytodampdownexpectations a bit.
So I thinkmaybemarketsare a littlebitlesscertainthantheywere a coupleofweeksago, thatsomethingbigwascoming.
So I think, youknow, untilyouactuallyseeithappeninginthebankingsystem, I thinktheyshouldn't, youknow, lettheseworriesstopthemfromacting.
We'veWe'vehadaninterestingquestionhere.
Isit a dangerthatwe'rerelyingonChinaforeconomicsecurityNow?
I thinkagainwegotsomecharts, thecondemningstraightthattherehasbeen a slowdowninIndiaandinChina, andit's interestingalsowhenyouspeaktofundmanagersoverhereinLondon, alone, especiallylookonthecontinentinEurope, theysay, Youknow, Brexitdoesn't evenreallygetthroughtothemintermsoftheriskthattheUKcouldcrashoutwithout a deal.
Forexample, thisisgoingtobe a UKproblemfortheUK, thecountrythatthey'vegoteyesonreally, IsChinatothinkcantryingtokeeptheshowontheroad?
ButtheeurozoneandEuropeinparticular, wheretheeurozoneandthecoreeconomyGermany, havebeenveryhappytojustridethiswaveofexportingmoanedeurozoneisveryimbalanceinthesensethatithas a largeexternalsurplus.
Ititexports, isproducesmorethanitconsumes.
Buthecouldstimulateconsumptionathomeoron D justproduceforitself.
That's something I coulddowouldtakepoliticalchange.
I mean, that's, umthatsortoflinkstooneofthethingsthatagain, youknow, I keephearing, whichisthatsomeofthebigingredientsfor a recessionarejustnottherefor a globalrecession, isjustnotthere.
So, yes, thebondmarketisdoingfunnythings, butquitehonestly, thebondmarket's beendoingfunnythingsformostthelastdecadeisjustdoingthemin a slightlymorefunnyfashion.
Now, yes, thereis a tradewar.
Thisis a chroniclongtermissuethat's goingtorunandrununtiliteitherfizzlesoutorgoeshorriblywrong.
Butsomeofthebigingredients, like a massivebankfailure, lookatLeonBrothers.
It's notobviouswherethatwouldnecessarilycomefrom, or a hugemarketdislocation, a massivelymissvaluedthingsomewherethatcouldjustblowupthatnobodyhashaspredictedyet, whichagainseemsunlikely, giventheamountoftimeandeffortthatpeoplehavedone, scouringmarketsthesizeofsomethingthat's goingtogowrong.
Oh, a massiverunupininterestratesfromcentralbankshavealreadydemonstratedthatthey'redeterminedtodotheopposite, or a hugeburstoffiscaltighteningfromgovernmentsaroundtheworld.
Actually a burstoffiscalspendingaroundtheworldmightbejustwhatweneed, andyou'restartingtohearthatconversationcomethroughintheStates, forexample, Youknow, a lotofthecandidatesthatarelookingtochallengeDonaldTrumpissaying, Whatifweactuallyspentloadsofmoneyon a greenagendathatcouldbeeconomicallybeneficialaswellasenvironmentally?
Burtonbeneficial?
Hehimselfdidit, ofcoursenot.
IntheGreenagenda.
Taxcuts.
Well, exactreasonthe U.
S.
Hasdonesowelloverthelastcoupleofyearsisbecause a lotofyouknowthedeficitisgrowing.
Theyjustput a lotoffgovernmentmoneyintotheeconomyortakenlessoutinTexasisyoursensethatthishasbeengoingtobecomemoreprevalent, particularlyinEurope.
I thinkitcould.
I agreewithyouthatthenormalcausesofrecessionsarenotsoeasytosee.
It's either a financialcollapse, butagain, it's not.
It's notasbubbly.
Eventhepricesarehighisnotasbubblyasitwasin 7 4008 Theonethingpeopleworryaboutcorporatedebtisjustnotthemagnitudenowthatseemstotriggersomethingoffthatorderandtheothermainreasonisthateithercentralbanksorgovernmentshavecaused a recessionbystoppingtheflow.
TheeurozonedidthiswheneveryoneelsewasrecoveringAftertheglobalfinancialcrisis, theeurozonetightenedmonetarypolicy, increasedinterestratesincounty 11 andhad a hugeswinginthegovernmentbudgets, fromexpansionarytocontractionarytotheausterityprograms.
There's a lotoftalkabouthowdowegetaroundthesefiscalruleswillplacedonourselvessothatifthere's a recession, wecanactuallystick a littlebitifGermanyistalkingaboutthat.