move into the twentieth century.

And there is a lot of similarity between the three

authors we will be discussing: Nietzsche, Freud and Max Weber.

You know, Durkheim will be a somewhat different kind of

story.

But all--I mean, Nietzsche, of course,

died in 1900, but he was out of action for

ten years because of mental illness, rather severe mental

illness.

He published all of his work in the nineteenth century.

Freud and Weber started to publish in the nineteenth

century.

But these three characters, in many ways,

are very important bridges towards twentieth century social

theory.

In a way they did foreshadow a great deal of theorizing,

particularly during the second half of the twentieth century,

especially in the last thirty or forty years.

I think it's also very easy to see the point of departure from

Marx-- some continuity,

but the basic point of department from Marx in the work

of Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber.

If I can put it very simply, the major departure is that

they all depart from Marx's economic reductionism--

right?--the emphasis on economic interest,

which is actually not only Marx.

Right?

It was common in Adam Smith, and Marx as well.

They depart from this and they emphasize that the problem in

modernity is not so much in the economic system;

it is much more in terms of power and consciousness.

The problem of modernity is repression, in one way or

another.

The problem of modern life is that we internalize the reasons

for our own subjugation, as such, and somehow we have to

figure out how to liberate ourselves from this internalized

subjugation.

Why do we obey orders?

Why do we actually accept that we are subjugated?

This is the central question, I think, Nietzsche,

Freud, and Weber are posing.

It's again a question which has not been really asked by the

other theorists we discussed so far.

They just had civil society as a point of reference for the

good society.

Now the problem for Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber is in us,

internally--in us, how we solve the problem within

ourselves.

So this is a kind of introducing the three authors.

In some ways one can say Nietzsche,

Freud, and Weber not only foreshadows twentieth century

social theory, but in some ways they are the

first of post-modern theorists-- right?--the theorists which are

beginning to come to terms with the oppressive nature of

modernity, and try to figure out how to

transcend that.

Now I think what I asked you to read for today is probably the

most difficult text for the semester,

The Genealogy of Morals, and you may have been greatly

frustrated by it, and probably also irritated by

it, because he's a very provocative mind.

I hope you did what I suggested; namely, you had a cursory

reading of the text before today,

and now you can go back to the text,

after my lecture notes, and I think that should help

you to find your way out and to see what he is really up to.

Now what is he up to?

Let me just foreshadow, before I get into his life and

work, and particularly in Genealogy of Morals.

There is another point in which Nietzsche, Freud,

and Weber can be understood in relationship to Marx.

In my very introductory comments, I emphasized the

difference--right?--the shift away from the economy to the

question of power and domination.

But there is a point at which there is a continuity between

them and Marx--Nietzsche, Freud and too mainly Weber;

I mean, Weber is a somewhat more complicated story.

But certainly Nietzsche and Freud are critical theorists;

critical theorists in the sense as we defined this earlier.

Right?

Critical theorists, that they are offering a

criticism of human consciousness.

What is in our mind and how did it get into our mind,

and how-- and the problem of our consciousness in

relationship to our existence.

And this is very much critical theory as it was defined by

Hegel and then the young Marx, the Hegelian Marx,

the Marx of Paris Manuscripts.

Right?

The Marx of alienation. Right?

This is very much coming from this tradition,

and the central issue is how can we subject this to critical

scrutiny?

And in Nietzsche's case, there is an incredible attempt

being made here to try to offer a critical theory which does not

really have a critical vantage point.

Right?

All critical theories of Hegel and Marx and twentieth century

critical theory do have an idea of a good society,

of an emancipated human existence, and they criticize

the reality, the society what they are

analyzing, from the point of view of this

critical vantage point.

Nietzsche is different.

He is really the most radical of critical theorists.

And in the twentieth century the theorist which builds the

most consistently on it is Michel Foucault--

right?--who tried to create a theory which is critical of

existence and our consciousness, but critical without telling

you what is good, what you should be aspiring for.

And that's exactly what Nietzsche is trying to do.

It is sort of the squaring of the circle.

Can you be critical of a situation if you cannot tell

what is the good outcome?

Right?

Can you actually subject the very notion of the good society,

the good, to critical scrutiny?

This is what he's trying to do.

Right?

To offer such a theory.

Well Freud is different. Right?

Freud is a critical theorist beyond Hegel and beyond Marx.

He does agree with Marx that we have to find some critical

analysis which is rooted in our sensuous experiences,

and somehow we have to relate the problems of our

consciousness to our sensuous experiences.

Right?

In this respect, Freud is very much in the line

of Marx's critique of Hegel.

This is not simply radicalizing your consciousness;

you have to confront your consciousness with your sensuous

experiences.

But he is different from Marx because--

I pointed this out earlier very briefly--

because in Marx, this sensuous activity is

production, it is economic activity.

For Freud it is our sexual experiences--

right?-and he offers a criticism of our consciousness

by confronting us with our repressed sexual experiences in

our earlier life.

Right?

So this is a critical theory.

Right?

He said, "What you think is in your mind is right.

No, no, no, it isn't."

Right?

You have to think about all of your experiences of your earlier

sexual life, and then when you figure out

what you repressed as bad memories,

that's when you will actually will be able to have a healthier

psychic life.

Right?

Well Weber is more complicated, and we will come back to this,

Weber's critical theory, when we get to Weber,

and to the question whether he's a critical theorist at all,

that has been highly debated.

Okay, I think now we are ready for Friedrich Nietzsche.

And I hope this makes more sense now for you--right?--what

you were reading.

Right?

And let me just emphasize one more time--

right?--the big project in Nietzsche is to offer a critical

scrutiny of human mind, but not to have any critical

vantage point.

Right?

To criticize the very principles of good society and

good, to critical scrutiny.

Where does it come from when we have the conception of good and

good society?

That is his project.

It's an incredible intellectual venture.

Right?

As I said, it is this kind of squaring of the circle,

what he does; what he does with a great deal

of power.

And he does it extremely provocatively.

I will put up a couple of quotations for it,

which are outrageous.

Don't walk out on it. Right?

Wait a little.

Hold your breath, listen.

This is outrageous what he's saying.

He's a provocateur.

He is like Rousseau; he is only worse than Rousseau.

Right?

He provokes us even more than Rousseau.

But, you know, deep down he's a very

sensitive--you know?--very humanistic human being.

Right?

He provokes you.

But if you listen carefully, you figure out there is

something what you actually can relate to it,

when you think what he's actually trying to get at.

All right, here is Nietzsche.

And let me just very briefly rush through his life.

He was born in 1844, in the small city of

Röcken in Germany, near Leipzig.

And this is very important: his father was a Lutheran

minister, and the family was all clergy, Lutheran clergy.

And he's bringing up, in a very religious sentiments,

very religious family.

And in many ways his work is a reaction against the father,

and it is a reaction against the kind of Lutheran

Christianity he was deeply internalized into.

I think this is very important to understand.

I mean, I know that most of the people in this room have strong

feelings in Judeo-Christian tradition, and he attacks also

Judeo-Christian tradition.

This is a revolt against the father.

This is a revolt against what he was brought up to.

It is an attempt to find himself.

Right?

That's what he's trying to get at.

And you have to be a little tolerant about him,

you know, and his attempt.

You did that as well.

You were revolting against your parents, and you were revolting

against some of the fundamental principles you were born into.

He actually enrolls to the University of Bonn to become a

Lutheran minister himself.

He studied theology.

As it happens to many people actually who enroll into a

seminary, doesn't take him too long to become an atheist.

Very often the seminaries are the best training grounds for

atheists.

Right?

You're beginning to see somehow the complexity of theological

thought.

This is what he experienced.

So he quits after a year.

He realizes he is on his way to become an atheist--right?--and

he will not become a minister.

Actually this happened to my brother as well.

He actually did not quit, he did finish;

he was also trained as a Lutheran minister.

But by the end of his theological training he was--I

don't think he ever confessed--but he was actually

an atheist.

So I have personal experiences--right?--what

theology can do to you.

Right?

Okay, then '68, there is a very important event

in his life.

He meets the greatest composer of his time, Richard Wagner,

and they become great friends for a time, and they become

bitter enemies later on; and it is very important why

this happened.

He is appointed as Professor of Classical Philosophy at the

University of Basel, before he got actually his

degree.

But he doesn't do it for too long.