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  • Forever 21's $10 club dresses, tank tops, glittery graphic tees and ripped

  • denim shorts have been closet staples for young women across the country

  • for years. The name is practically synonymous with fast fashion and

  • Forever 21's massive stores have become common fixtures in America

  • shopping malls. But the retailer is in trouble.

  • Forever 21 filed for bankruptcy in September 2019.

  • And now it's closing hundreds of stores as its clothes become more

  • interchangeable with cheap rather than trendy.

  • At its peak, Forever 21 was a household name in fast fashion, bringing in

  • more than $4 billion in annual sales and much of that thanks to a strong

  • business on its home turf, which was born out of the Los Angeles fashion

  • scene. The real problem is that Forever 21 just isn't all that popular

  • outside the U.S..

  • It failed to localize and understand fashion taste in other countries as

  • it built stores too big and too fast.

  • Forever 21's international business has been hemorrhaging cash, burning

  • through more than $100 million annually since 2014.

  • And it hasn't been making enough back in America to recuperate those

  • losses. Yet hungry for growth forever 21's owners, the Chang family, just

  • kept on expanding its international footprint.

  • Between 2005 and 2015, the company opened more than 200 stores globally as

  • part of its bankruptcy proceedings, Forever 21 says it plans to exit most

  • of its international locations in Asia and Europe closing dozens of shops

  • globally. The company hasn't pegged an exact number on those plans as

  • conversations with landlords remain ongoing and Forever 21 is still

  • fighting for rent reductions.

  • When it filed for bankruptcy, Forever 21 had 785 stores, and analysts

  • argue that was far too many.

  • Now, Forever 21 is the story of a failed global retailer that's still

  • trying to bounce back.

  • In 1981, 22 year old Jin Sook and Do Won Chang touched down in L.A.

  • from South Korea. In 1984, the couple opened a 900 square foot store

  • called Fashion 21 in Los Angeles.

  • It sold 700000 dollars worth of merchandise in its first year in business.

  • In 1987, the family renamed the business to Forever 21 and that's also

  • about the time the Chang started calling on their family members to help

  • them open additional stores outside of L.A..

  • They started in Houston and in Northern California, and it worked.

  • Soon they were opening a new Forever 21 store almost every six months.

  • By 2001, Forever 21 had 122 stores and it opened its first store outside

  • of the U.S. that year in Canada.

  • It had 370 by 2005 and seven of those were overseas.

  • International growth really picked up from there.

  • It entered China in 2012, Brazil came in 2014, by 2015, Forever 21 had 251

  • locations outside of the U.S.,

  • spanning 40 countries across five continents.

  • This was also about the time that fast fashion was really heating up.

  • Retailers were making clothes faster than ever at affordable prices, all

  • while offering mainstream consumers budget versions of runway looks.

  • Shoppers worldwide weren't buying clothes like they used to, and companies

  • weren't making them like they used to.

  • Clothing production globally doubled from 2000 to 2014.

  • The number of garments produced annually topped $100 billion for the first

  • time in 2014, and the number of garments bought by the average shopper

  • worldwide jumped by 60 percent from 2000 to 2014.

  • Meanwhile, across most categories of apparel, shoppers by 2014 were

  • keeping their close about half as long as they did at the turn of the 21st

  • century. The ability to now capture on the runway within seconds.

  • Take the picture, mock stuff up, duplicate, go back to the design team,

  • create a fabric that is reasonable that we we can afford to do price of

  • the X. Launch it.

  • And that's what happened.

  • So that the entire digital landscape has contributed because of the ease

  • of technology, the use of technology as fast fashion retailers expanded

  • their reach within the US.

  • They took bites out of Forever 21's business.

  • Forever 21 lost its share of the apparel and shoe market in the US in 2016

  • as Zara H&M.

  • slightly gained share.

  • Where as Zara and H&M being able to be successful is they create a

  • foothold here and then the scale of the market creates that chimney effect

  • where it really allows them to take off rather quickly.

  • And once they have established a foothold here and establish the logistics

  • and merchandising capability of the way that they're able to very quickly

  • start to add to that base of business without having to recreate a lot of

  • a lot of new infrastructure.

  • As of 2018, H&M and Zara are the top two apparel and footwear retailers

  • globally, while Forever 21 ranks 17th forever ended 2018 with a 0.3%

  • share of the clothing and footwear industry.

  • While Japan's Uniqlo, which entered the US in 2005, had 1.1

  • percent, xorra had one point two percent and H&M had 1.6

  • percent share. But while these rivals found fans in the US, Forever 21

  • wasn't as warmly embraced outside of its home country.

  • The Chang's probably didn't realize back in 2015 that their business was

  • about to go downhill fast.

  • At the time, Forever 21 had 43000 employees and was doing $4.1

  • billion in sales globally in 2014.

  • American Eagle, which Forever 21 calls a similarly inexpensive peer, did

  • 3.2 $8 billion that year.

  • Urban Outfitters, another so-called peer, did 3.32

  • billion that same year.

  • The Chang's were also crowned one of America's wealthiest couples with a

  • combined net worth reaching an estimated $5.9

  • billion. The couple had said it wanted to double its company sales by 2017

  • and open hundreds of new stores by then.

  • But those dreams would never be realized forever.

  • 21's international business was in shambles.

  • Its styles weren't resonating in markets where it failed to dig in and

  • understand the kinds of clothes local consumers wanted.

  • The sizing was off, too.

  • I think that's such a huge issue for all brands.

  • When when any brand, so many American brass items for anyone come overseas

  • and just say, well, hey, you know, it works at home or just plunk it down

  • or walk them to the consumer will call.

  • And that's just brought us safe from the truth in reality.

  • The company also appeared not to do enough market research into the

  • shopping habits of international consumers.

  • A 2019 report from The New York Times cited employees who told the paper

  • that Forever 21 sometimes didn't understand local labor laws.

  • One worker told the Times that Forever 21 moved into Germany without

  • realizing stores in the country were typically closed on Sundays.

  • Employees also told the paper that Forever 21 made mistakes, like not

  • recognizing that customers in some European countries shopped for winter

  • merchandise earlier in the year than American consumers.

  • Understanding the market share is probably the biggest challenge that

  • retailers over war.

  • The second one is just the complications of local rules and local legal

  • contracts involving products in our countries is is different even if your

  • insides might be free.

  • And lastly the labor markets in these in these countries are also very

  • different. In 2015, the company admitted the majority of the international

  • stores were unprofitable because of high labor costs and the fact that

  • it's close weren't resonating with customers in Europe and Asia.

  • It said sales back in the states were actually relatively strong, but its

  • global operations were becoming a huge drag and a bigger burden than a

  • blessing. Matters became worse when Word of Forever 21's poor financial

  • standing started to leak.

  • Factory operators in China were pressuring the clothing retailer for money

  • payments to subcontractors and stores where as much as 30 days late.

  • Forever 21 declined to give comment to CNBC about each of these reports.

  • Global sales would fall from $4.1

  • billion in 2014 to 3.1

  • billion in the 12 months into July 31, 2019.

  • The company said its stores in Canada, Europe and Asia have been losing

  • roughly $10 million per month on average over the 12 months from September

  • 2018 to September 2019.

  • Big stores, both overseas and in the U.S.

  • have become a burden for Forever 21.

  • It used to be the bigger the store, the more and all customers would be

  • when they walked in. Without the Internet, retailers needed aisles of

  • shelves, thousands of square feet to be able to showcase all their

  • merchandise. After the Great Recession rocked some American retailers in

  • 2008 and 2009, Forever 21 said it jumped at the chance to scoop up vacant

  • stores at cheaper prices.

  • It bought locations from some of America's largest retailers Forever 21

  • ahead by 2015, opened in 90000 square foot store in Times Square, New

  • York, a 94000 square foot store in San Bernardino, California, and a

  • 127,000 square foot store in Las Vegas to name a few examples.

  • The average H&M. store is closer to just 20000 square feet,.

  • Forever 21 setup shops overseas in prime retail destinations like on

  • London's Oxford Street.

  • That store was closer to 30000 square feet in China along Shanghai's east

  • Nanjing Road. The city's bustling commercial district, Forever 21, had a

  • roughly 75000 square foot flagship shop.

  • Now e-commerce has changed the need for such great size and scale.

  • Clothing is moving online, but Forever 21 admits compared to its peers,

  • Forever 21's online sales as a proportion of its overall sales are low.

  • Forever 21 launched its Web site in 2005 and has said only about 16

  • percent of its total sales come from the Web today.

  • Analysts would argue the same.

  • They've been focused on their stores and late to the online game.

  • In 2017, only adding to its glut of real estate, Forever 21 launched a

  • standalone beauty concept store called Riley Rose to rival Ulta and

  • Sephora. But that could be written off as just another distraction in

  • bankruptcy proceedings all stand alone, Riley Rose stores are set to

  • close. Another issue has been the overall strain that such rabid real

  • estate expansion put on Forever 21's supply chain.

  • Bankruptcy documents say the large format stores forced Forever 21 to

  • create complicated assortment strategies and triggered inventory

  • management challenges.

  • It became more difficult for the company to get close quickly to stores,

  • something known as speed to market.

  • The company said its European and Asian stores undermined Forever 21's

  • ability to nimbly bring inventory to market and by extension hurt its

  • worldwide profitability while distracting the management team.

  • Forever 21 admitted, it ended up not buying enough inventory in twenty

  • seventeen and then bought too much in 2018.

  • It would end up with duplicates of the same styles when it didn't need

  • them. That led to another big problem, Forever 21 stores across the world

  • felt too cluttered.

  • With the physical presence, when you got to a Forever

  • 21, whether it's in Jakarta, whether it's in Shanghai or whether it's New

  • York, the stores look to disheveled.

  • Shoppers also increasingly started calling out Frevert 21's clothing as

  • cheap, and Zora's was seen as a higher end, but still affordable option.

  • The Chang's finally fell from Forbes billionaire ranks in July of 2019, a

  • final prelude to Forever 21 heading to bankruptcy court.

  • The bankruptcy shows just how difficult it can be to go global.

  • The failures often come when companies aren't prepared to invest in the

  • local markets, to build out a local supply chain and to understand what

  • shoppers there are looking for.

  • One bright spot has been Latin America, which Forever 21 says is its

  • strongest outside of North America, with roughly 96 percent of its stores

  • there generating positive cash contribution from September 2018 to

  • September 2019.

  • Analysts say for average 21's clothing has resonated more in that market

  • from a style and price perspective.

  • The Latin American market also has seen less of an influx of competitive

  • fashion players compared with parts of Europe and Asia.

  • You know, the question is not so much going watch what you

  • saw, but what you get along with customers.

  • Certainly we already knows that they really care.

  • They care when you go into your store and it's not merchandise.

  • I that just going back to a rational watch because the customer

  • can be very unforgiving.

  • Forever 21 has said in bankruptcy documents about its future: "In an ever

  • shifting retail landscape that has seen dozens of casualties over the last

  • several years. The traits that initially led to the success of Forever 21

  • collaboration, grit and creativity are the same traits that will propel

  • Forever 21 through these Chapter 11 cases successfully..."

  • Forever 21 declined to participate in this video when asked by CNBC.

  • Now, as it looks to right, the ship Forever 21 says it will try to refocus

  • its product assortment, streamline its supply chain and grow sales online.

  • It says it will try to get better at being trend right.

  • It learned what didn't work in Asia and Europe, and it will try to apply

  • those lessons as it fights to win back American shoppers.

Forever 21's $10 club dresses, tank tops, glittery graphic tees and ripped

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なぜフォーエバー21は破産を申請したのか? (Why Did Forever 21 File For Bankruptcy?)

  • 227 5
    黃耀霆 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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