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  • Today, we turn

  • to the question of distributive justice.

  • How should income and wealth and power

  • and opportunities be distributed?

  • According to what principles?

  • John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question.

  • And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question today.

  • We put ourselves in a position to do so last time.

  • By trying to make sense of why he thinks. That principles of justice

  • are best derived from a hypothetical contract.

  • And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality

  • behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance.

  • So that much is clear?

  • Alright, then let's turn to the principles

  • that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

  • First, he considered some of the major alternatives.

  • What about utilitarianism?

  • Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives

  • utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number

  • No, they wouldn't, Rawls says.

  • And the reason is,

  • that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows

  • that once the veil goes up, and real life begins,

  • we will each want to be respected with dignity.

  • Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority.

  • We don't want to be oppressed.

  • And so we would agree

  • to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt

  • as our first principle, equal basic liberties.

  • Fundamental rights to freedom of speech,

  • freedom of assembly, religious liberty,

  • freedom of conscience and the like.

  • We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up

  • as members of an oppressed or a despised minority

  • with the majority tyrannizing over us.

  • And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected.

  • "Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes,

  • "of forgetting, or at least not taking seriously,the distinction between persons."

  • And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism.

  • We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.

  • That's the first principle.

  • Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities.

  • What would we agree to?

  • Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up rich or poor.

  • Healthy or unhealthy.

  • We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from.

  • Whether we're going to inherit millions

  • or whether we will come from an impoverished family.

  • So we might, at first thought,

  • say, "Well let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth."

  • Just to be on the safe side.

  • But then we would realize,

  • that we could do better than that.

  • Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom.

  • We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality.

  • Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle".

  • A principle that says, only those social and economic

  • inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off.

  • So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth.

  • We would allow some.

  • But the test would be,

  • do they work to the benefit of everyone including those,

  • or as he specifies, the principle,

  • especially those at the bottom.

  • Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance.

  • And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit

  • of the least well off, are just.

  • We talked about the examples of

  • Michael Jordan making 31 million dollars a year.

  • Of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions.

  • Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle?

  • Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials,

  • that actually work to the advantage of least well off.

  • Well, what would that system be?

  • Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter

  • you have to provide incentives

  • to attract the right people to certain jobs.

  • And when you do, having those people in those jobs

  • will actually help those at the bottom.

  • Strictly speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle

  • is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

  • Let me hear what you think about

  • Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen

  • behind the veil of ignorance.

  • Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen?

  • Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.

  • Go ahead.

  • OK, your argument depends upon us believing that

  • we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom.

  • For the disadvantaged.

  • And I just don't see from a proof standpoint,

  • where we've proven that.

  • Why not the top?

  • Right, and what's your name? - Mike.

  • Mike, alright, good question.

  • Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance.

  • Enter into the thought experiment.

  • What principles would you choose?

  • How would you think it through?

  • Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence

  • is an example of preaching toward the top.

  • Because Harvard takes the top academics.

  • And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be.

  • But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber.

  • Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people

  • of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying,

  • "There's not much to work for."

  • And so what principle would you choose?

  • In that situation I would say a merit based one.

  • One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that

  • rewards me based on my efforts.

  • So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance,

  • would choose a merit-based system,

  • where people are rewarded according to their efforts?

  • Alright, fair enough. What would you say?

  • Go ahead.

  • My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on

  • when everyone is at a level of equality?

  • Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get,

  • or is it regardless of what advantages you may have

  • when you began your education to get where you are here?

  • I think what the question you're asking is saying that

  • if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy,

  • do you want to maximize world wealth.

  • And I think a system that rewards merit

  • is the one that we've pretty much all established,

  • is what is best for all of us.

  • Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile

  • and some may be in the 98th percentile.

  • At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level,

  • a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.

  • But, I don't understand how you're rewards someone's efforts

  • who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself,

  • advantages throughout, to get where I am here.

  • I mean, I can't say that somebody else

  • who maybe worked as hard as I did

  • would have had the same opportunity to come

  • to a school like this.

  • Alright, let's look at that point. What's your name?

  • Kate. -Kate, you suspect that the ability

  • to get into top schools may largely depend

  • on coming from an affluent family.

  • Having a favorable family background,

  • social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?

  • I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural.

  • All of those advantages, for sure.

  • Someone did a study, of the 146 selective

  • colleges and universities in the United States.

  • And they looked at the students

  • in those colleges and universities

  • to try to find out what their background was, their economic background.

  • What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter

  • of the income scale?

  • You know what the figure is?

  • Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities

  • come from poor backgrounds.

  • Over 70 percent come from affluent families.

  • Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge.

  • Rawls actually has two arguments, not one,

  • in favor of his principles of justice.

  • And in particular, of the difference principle.

  • One argument is the official argument,

  • what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

  • Some people challenge that argument, saying,

  • "Maybe people would want to take their chances.

  • Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance.

  • Hoping that they would wind up on top."

  • That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls.

  • But backing up the argument from the original position

  • is the second argument.

  • And that is the straightforwardly moral argument.

  • And it goes like this,

  • it says,

  • the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities

  • should not be based on factors

  • for which people can claim no credit.

  • It shouldn't be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

  • Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.

  • He begins with the theory of justice

  • that most everyone these days would reject.

  • A feudal aristocracy.

  • What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?

  • Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is

  • that people's life prospects are determined

  • by the accident of birth.

  • Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs?

  • And that's it. You can't rise.

  • It's not your doing where you wind up

  • or what opportunities you have.

  • But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view.

  • And so that objection to feudal aristocracy

  • leads, and historically has lead, people to say,

  • careers should be open to talents.

  • There should be formal equality of opportunity

  • regardless of the accident of birth.

  • Every person should be free to strive, to work,

  • to apply for any job in the society.

  • And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply,

  • and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.

  • So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed

  • in earlier weeks.

  • What does Rawls think about this?

  • He says it's an improvement.

  • It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed

  • the accident of birth.

  • But even with formal equality of opportunity

  • the libertarian conception doesn't extend that,

  • doesn't extend its insight far enough.

  • Because if you let everybody run the race,

  • everybody can enter the race, but some people start

  • at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair.

  • Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system

  • is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced

  • by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view.

  • Such as, whether you got a good education or not.

  • Whether you grew up in a family that support you

  • and developed in you a work ethic

  • and gave you the opportunities.

  • So that suggests moving to a system of fair

  • equality of opportunity.

  • And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on.

  • What we might call a merit-based system.

  • A meritocratic system.

  • In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions

  • to bring everyone to the same starting point

  • before the race begins.

  • Equal educational opportunities.

  • Head start programs, for example.

  • Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods.

  • So that everyone, regardless of their family background,

  • has a genuinely fair opportunity.

  • Everyone starts from the same starting line.

  • Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system?

  • Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough

  • in remedying, or addressing,

  • the moral arbitrariness

  • of the natural lottery.

  • Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point

  • and begin the race, who's going to win the race?

  • Who would win?

  • To use the runners example.

  • The fastest runners would win.

  • But is it their doing

  • that they happen to be blessed with athletic powers to run fast?

  • So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy,

  • where you bring everyone to the same starting point,

  • may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing,

  • ...but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined

  • by the natural distribution of abilities and talents."

  • And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating

  • morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth

  • requires going beyond

  • what Mike favors, the meritocratic system.

  • Now, how do you go beyond?

  • Do you bring everyone to the same starting point

  • and you're still bothered by the fact that

  • some are fast runners and some are not fast runners,

  • what can you do?

  • Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception

  • say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners.

  • Make them wear lead shoes.

  • But who wants to do that?

  • That would defeat the whole point of running the race.

  • But Rawls says, you don't have to have

  • a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go

  • beyond a meritocratic conception.

  • You permit, you even encourage,

  • those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents.

  • But what you do, is you change the terms

  • on which people are entitled to the fruits of

  • the exercise of those talents.

  • And that really is what the difference principle is.

  • You establish a principle that says,

  • people may benefit from their good fortune,

  • from their luck in the genetic lottery,

  • but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.

  • And so, for example,

  • Michael Jordan can make 31 million dollars but,

  • only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that

  • to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with.

  • Likewise, Bill Gates.

  • He can make his billions.

  • But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves

  • those billions.

  • "Those who have been favored by nature,

  • may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve

  • the situation of those who have lost out."

  • That's the difference principle.

  • And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists.

  • Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares

  • on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view,

  • you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market.

  • You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system

  • that brings everyone to the same starting point.

  • You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom,

  • benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those

  • who happen to be lucky.

  • What do you think? Is that persuasive?

  • Who finds that argument unpersuasive?

  • The argument for moral arbitrarianists.

  • Yes.

  • I think that in the egalitarian proposition

  • the more talented people,

  • I think it's very optimistic to think that they

  • would still work really hard, even if they knew that

  • part of what they made would be given away.

  • So I think that the only way for the more talented people to

  • exercise their talents to the best of their ability

  • is in the meritocracy.

  • And in a meritocracy, what's your name?

  • Kate.

  • Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you,

  • that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity,

  • people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve

  • simply because they happen to be naturally gifted.

  • What about that?

  • I think that it is arbitrary.

  • Obviously it's arbitrary.

  • But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.

  • Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?

  • It would reduce incentives, yeah.

  • Mike, what do you say?

  • We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved,

  • we have undeserved glory of some sort.

  • So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life.

  • Because you have not created any of this.

  • And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset,

  • but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of

  • a gut reaction to that feeling.

  • The guy who runs the race, he doesn't...

  • He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last

  • ten yards faster.

  • And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster

  • and the guy behind him ten yards faster.

  • Alright, so Mike, let me ask you.

  • You talked about effort before. Effort.

  • Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed,

  • that they deserve the rewards that go with effort?

  • Isn't that the idea behind your defense?

  • I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here,

  • I'm sure you can get him, and have him come

  • and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars.

  • And I think what you're going to realize is

  • his life was a very, very tough one to get to the top.

  • And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light.

  • It's very easy to pick on him. Very easy.

  • Alright, effort.

  • You've got...

  • I've got a few. I've got a few. But that's about it.

  • Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is?

  • Even the effort that some people expend,

  • conscientious driving, the work ethic,

  • even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances.

  • For which you, we, can claim no credit.

  • Let's do the test. Let's do a test here.

  • Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant.

  • Put those aside.

  • Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference

  • in work ethic, striving, effort.

  • How many here, raise your hand,

  • those of you here, who are first in birth order.

  • I am too by the way.

  • Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.

  • If the case for the meritocratic conception

  • is that effort should be rewarded,

  • doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort

  • striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order?

  • Is it your doing?

  • Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order?

  • Then why, Rawls says, of course not.

  • So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life

  • be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view?

  • That's the challenge that he puts

  • to market societies, but also

  • to those of us at places like this.

  • A question to think about for next time.

  • A justice of the United States Supreme Court,

  • what do they make?

  • It's just under $200,000.

  • But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.

  • Do you know who it is? - Judge Judy?

  • Judge Judy. How did you know that?

  • Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?

  • $25 million.

  • Now, is that just? Is it fair?

  • We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember?

  • The poll about birth order.

  • What percentage of people

  • in this room raised their hands,

  • was it, to say that they were the first born?

  • 75, 80 percent?

  • And what was the significance of that?

  • If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice.

  • Remember, we were discussing

  • three different theories of distributive justice.

  • Three different ways of answering the question,

  • "How should income and wealth and opportunities

  • and the good things in life, be distributed?"

  • And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer.

  • That says, the just system of distribution

  • is a system of free exchange, a free market economy.

  • Against a background of formal equality.

  • Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone.

  • Rawls says that this represents an improvement

  • over aristocratic and caste systems,

  • because everyone can compete for every job.

  • Careers open to talents.

  • And beyond that, the just distribution is the one

  • that results from free exchange.

  • Voluntary transactions.

  • No more, no less.

  • Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality,

  • jobs open to everyone,

  • the result is not going to be fair.

  • It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born

  • to affluent families,

  • who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities.

  • And that accident of birth

  • is not a just basis for distributing life chances.

  • And so, many people who notice this unfairness,

  • Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.

  • That leads to the meritocratic system.

  • Fair equality of opportunity.

  • But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone

  • to the same starting point in the race,

  • what's going to happen? Who's going to win?

  • The fastest runners.

  • So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares

  • on morally arbitrary contingencies,

  • you should, if you reason it through,

  • be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception".

  • A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice

  • that he defines by the difference principle.

  • Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy

  • or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities

  • is to have a kind of, leveling equality.

  • A guaranteed equality of outcome.

  • But he does say

  • there's another way to deal with these contingencies.

  • People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune,

  • but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.

  • And so, we can test how this theory actually works

  • by thinking about some paid differentials that arise

  • in our society.

  • What does the average school teacher make

  • in the United States, do you suppose?

  • Roughly. -$35,000.

  • It's a little more, 40, $42,000.

  • What about David Letterman?

  • How much do you think David Letterman makes?

  • More than a school teacher?

  • $31 million. David Letterman.

  • Is that fair?

  • That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher?

  • Well, Rawls's answer would be,

  • it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way

  • that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation

  • so that some of those earnings are taken

  • to work for the advantage of the least well off.

  • One other example of a paid differential.

  • A justice of the United States Supreme Court.

  • What do they make?

  • It's just under $200,000.

  • Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is.

  • But there's another judge who makes a lot more

  • than Sandra Day O'Connor.

  • Do you know who it is? - Judge Judy.

  • Judge Judy. How did you know that?

  • You watch?

  • You're right.

  • Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?

  • There she is.

  • $25 million.

  • Now, is that just? Is it fair?

  • Well, the answer is, it depends on whether

  • this is against a background system

  • in line with the difference principle.

  • Where those who come out on top, in terms of

  • income and wealth are taxed in a way

  • that benefits the least well off members of society.

  • Now, we're going to come back

  • to these wage differentials, pay differentials,

  • between a real judge and a TV judge.

  • The one Marcus watches all the time.

  • What I want to do now, is return to these theories

  • and to examine the objections to

  • Rawls's more egalitarian theory.

  • The difference principle.

  • There are at least three objections

  • to Rawls's difference principle.

  • One of them came up last time in the discussion

  • and a number of you raised this worry.

  • What about incentives?

  • Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 70, 80, 90 percent marginal rate

  • that Michael Jordan won't play basketball?

  • That David Letterman won't do late night comedy?

  • Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work?

  • Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls

  • who has an answer to this objection about

  • the need for incentives?

  • Yes. Go ahead, stand up.

  • Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference

  • that it helps the least well off the most.

  • So if there's too much equality, then the least well off

  • might not be able to watch late night TV,

  • or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work.

  • So you need to find the correct balance where

  • taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit

  • from the talents. - Good.

  • And what's your name? - Tim.

  • Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect,

  • that Rawls is taking count of incentives.

  • And could allow for pay differentials and

  • for some adjustment in the tax rate

  • to take account of incentives.

  • But, Tim points out,

  • the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered

  • is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie.

  • But instead from the standpoint of the effect

  • of incentives, or disincentives,

  • on the well-being of those on the bottom.

  • Right?

  • Good. Thank you.

  • I think that is what Rawls would say.

  • In fact, if you look in section 17,

  • where he describes the difference principle,

  • he allows for incentives.

  • "The naturally advantaged are not gain

  • merely because they are more gifted,

  • but only to cover the costs of training and education

  • and for using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well."

  • So you can have incentives. You can adjust the tax rate.

  • If taking too much from David Letterman

  • or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates,

  • winds up actually hurting those at the bottom.

  • That's the test.

  • So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against

  • Rawls's difference principle.

  • But there are two weightier, more difficult objections.

  • One of them

  • comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception.

  • The argument that says, what about effort?

  • What about people working hard

  • having a right to what they earn

  • because they've deserved it.

  • They've worked hard for it.

  • That's the objection from effort and moral desert.

  • Then there's another objection.

  • That comes from libertarians.

  • And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea

  • of self-ownership.

  • Doesn't the difference principle, by treating

  • our natural talents and endowments as common assets,

  • doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?

  • Now, let me deal first,

  • with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction.

  • Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose,"

  • "Life is not fair.

  • And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify

  • what nature has spawned."

  • But his answer is,

  • "The only way to try to rectify that is to have

  • a leveling equality of outcome."

  • Everyone finishing the race at the same point.

  • And that would be a disaster.

  • This is an easy argument to answer.

  • And Rawls addresses it.

  • In one of the most powerful passages, I think,

  • of the theory of justice.

  • It's in Section 17.

  • "The natural distribution", and here he's talking about

  • the natural distribution talents and endowments.

  • "...is neither just nor unjust.

  • "Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.

  • These are simply natural facts.

  • What is just and unjust is the way that institutions

  • deal with these facts."

  • That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists

  • like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it."

  • Get over it and let's see if we can, at least,

  • maximize the benefits that flow from it.

  • But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls

  • is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman.

  • It's from the argument about self-ownership.

  • Developed as we saw, in Nozick.

  • And from that point of view,

  • yes, it might be a good thing,

  • to create head start programs and public schools

  • so that everyone can go to a decent school

  • and start the race at the same starting line.

  • That might be good.

  • But if you tax people to create public schools,

  • if you tax people against their will,

  • you coerce them.

  • It's a form of theft.

  • If you take some of Letterman's $31 million,

  • tax it away to support public schools, against his will,

  • the state is really doing no better than stealing from him.

  • It's coercion.

  • And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves

  • as owning our talents and endowments.

  • Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people.

  • That's the libertarian reply.

  • What's Rawls's answer to that objection?

  • He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly.

  • But the effect, the moral weight of his argument

  • for the difference principle is,

  • maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all.

  • Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state

  • is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply

  • commandeer my life.

  • Because remember, the first principle

  • we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance,

  • is the principle of equal basic liberties.

  • Freedom of speech, religious liberty,

  • freedom of conscience and the like.

  • So the only respect

  • in which the idea of self-ownership must give way,

  • comes when we're thinking about whether

  • I own myself in the sense that

  • I have a privileged claim

  • on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents

  • in a market economy.

  • And Rawls says, on reflection, we don't.

  • We can defend rights.

  • We can respect the individual.

  • We can uphold human dignity.

  • Without embracing the idea of self-possession.

  • That, in effect, is his reply to the libertarian.

  • I want to turn now, to his reply to

  • the defender of a meritocratic conception.

  • Who invokes effort as the basis of moral desert.

  • People who work hard to develop their talents

  • deserve the benefits that come from the exercise of their talents.

  • Well, we've already seen the beginning of Rawls's answer

  • to that question.

  • And it goes back to that poll we took about birth order.

  • His first answer is

  • even the work ethic, even the willingness to strive conscientiously,

  • depends on all sorts of family circumstances and

  • social and cultural contingencies for which we can claim no credit.

  • You can't claim credit for the fact that you,

  • most of you, most of us, happen to be first in birth order.

  • And that for some complex psychological and social reasons

  • that seems to be associated with striving,

  • with achieving, with effort.

  • That's one answer.

  • There's a second answer.

  • Those of you who invoke effort,

  • you don't really believe that moral desert attaches to effort.

  • Take two construction workers.

  • One is strong and can raise four walls in an hour

  • without even breaking a sweat.

  • And another construction worker is small and scrawny.

  • And has to spend three days

  • to do the same amount of work.

  • No defender of meritocracy is going to look at the effort

  • of that weak an scrawny construction worker and say

  • "Therefore he deserves to make more".

  • So it isn't really effort.

  • This is the second reply

  • to the meritocratic claim.

  • It isn't really effort

  • that the defender of meritocracy believes is the moral basis

  • of distributive shares.

  • It's contribution.

  • How much do you contribute?

  • But contribution takes us right back to

  • our natural talents and abilities. Not just effort.

  • And it's not our doing, how we came into the possession

  • of those talents in the first place.

  • Alright, suppose you accepted these arguments,

  • that effort isn't everything, that contribution matters,

  • from the standpoint of the meritocratic conception.

  • That effort, even, isn't our own doing.

  • Does that mean, the objection continues,

  • does that mean that according to Rawls,

  • moral desert has nothing to do with distributive justice?

  • Well, yes.

  • Distributive justice is not about moral desert.

  • Now, here, Rawls introduces an important

  • and a tricky distinction.

  • It's between moral desert, on the one hand,

  • and entitlements to legitimate expectations, on the other.

  • What is the difference between moral deserts and entitlements?

  • Consider two different games.

  • A game of chance and a game of skill.

  • Take a game of pure chance.

  • Say, I play the Massachusetts state lottery.

  • And my number comes up.

  • I'm entitled to my winnings.

  • But even though I'm entitled to my winnings,

  • there's no sense in which, because it's just a game of luck,

  • no sense in which, I morally deserve to win in the first place.

  • That's an entitlement.

  • Now contrast the lottery with a different kind of game.

  • A game of skill.

  • Now, imagine the Boston Red Sox winning the World Series.

  • When they win, they're entitled to the trophy.

  • But it can be always asked of a game of skill

  • did they deserve to win?

  • It's always possible, in principle,

  • to distinguish what someone's entitled to,

  • under the rules,

  • and whether they deserve to win in the first place.

  • That's an antecedent standard. Moral desert.

  • Now, Rawls says distributive justice is not a matter of

  • moral desert though it is a matter of

  • entitlements to legitimate expectations.

  • Here's where he explains it.

  • "A just scheme answers to what men are entitles to.

  • It satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon

  • social institutions.

  • But what they are entitled to is not proportional to

  • nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth."

  • "The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure

  • do not mention moral desert and there is no tendency

  • for distributive shares to correspond to it."

  • Why does Rawls make this distinction?

  • What, morally, is at stake?

  • One thing morally at stake is the whole question of effort

  • that we've already discussed.

  • But there's a second contingency, a second source of

  • moral arbitrariness that goes beyond

  • the question of whether it's to my credit

  • that I have the talents that enable me to get ahead.

  • And that has to do with the contingency

  • that I live in an society that happens to prize

  • my talents.

  • The fact that David Letterman

  • lives in a society that puts a great premium,

  • puts a great value, on a certain type of smirky joke,

  • that's not his doing.

  • He's lucky that he happens to live in such a society.

  • But this is a second contingency.

  • This isn't something that we can claim credit for.

  • Even if I had sole, unproblematic, claim

  • to my talents and to my effort.

  • It would still be the case, that the benefits I get

  • from exercising those talents,

  • depend on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

  • What my talents will reap in a market economy.

  • What does that depend on?

  • What other people happen to want or like in this society.

  • It depends on the law of supply and demand.

  • That's not my doing.

  • It's certainly not the basis for moral desert.

  • What counts as contributing

  • depends on the qualities that this or that society happens to prize.

  • Most of us are fortunate to possess, in large measure,

  • for whatever reason,

  • the qualities that our society happens to prize.

  • The qualities that enable us to provide

  • what society wants.

  • In a capitalist society it helps to have entrepreneurial drive.

  • In bureaucratic society it helps to get on easily and smoothly

  • with superiors.

  • In a mass democratic society

  • it helps to look good on television

  • and to speak in short, superficial sound bites.

  • In a litigious society,

  • it helps to go to law school and have the talents to do well on LSATs.

  • But none of this is our doing.

  • Suppose that we, with our talents,

  • inhabited not our society, technologically advanced,

  • highly litigious, but a hunting society,

  • or a warrior society.

  • What would become of our talents then?

  • They wouldn't get us very far.

  • No doubt some of us would develop others.

  • But would we be less worthy?

  • Would we be less virtuous?

  • Would we be less meritorious if we lived in that kind of society

  • rather than in ours.

  • Rawls's answer is, no.

  • We might make less money and properly so.

  • But while we would be entitled to less,

  • we would be no less worthy.

  • No less deserving than we are now.

  • And here's the point.

  • The same could be said of those in our society

  • who happen to hold less prestigious positions,

  • who happen to have fewer of the talents that our society

  • happens to reward.

  • So here's the moral import of the distinction between

  • moral desert and entitlements to legitimate expectations.

  • We are entitled to the benefits

  • that the rules of the game promise

  • for the exercise of our talents.

  • But it's a mistake and a conceit to suppose

  • that we deserve, in the first place,

  • a society that values the qualities we happen to have in abundance.

  • Now we've been talking here about income and wealth,

  • what about opportunities and honors?

  • What about the distribution of access of seats in elite colleges and universities?

  • It's true,

  • all of you

  • most of you first born, worked hard, strived,

  • developed your talents, to get here.

  • But Rawls asks, in effect,

  • what is the moral status of your claim

  • to the benefits that attach

  • to the opportunities that you have?

  • Are seats in colleges and universities

  • a matter, a kind of reward, an honor

  • for those who deserve them,

  • because they've worked so hard?

  • Or, are those seats, those opportunities and honors

  • entitlements to legitimate expectations

  • that depend for their justification

  • on those of us who enjoy them

  • doing so in a way that works to the benefit

  • of those at the bottom of society?

  • That's the question that Rawls's difference principle poses.

  • It's a question that can be asked

  • of the earnings of Michael Jordan and David Letterman

  • and Judge Judy.

  • But it's also a question that can be asked

  • of opportunities to go to

  • the top colleges and universities.

  • And that's a debate that comes out

  • when we turn to the question of affirmative action next time.

Today, we turn

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マイケル・サンデル正義:何をするのが正しいのか (Michael Sandel Justice:What's The Right Thing To Do)

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    Jane Wang に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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