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  • [MUSIC PLAYING]

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • JOE HUSTON: Yes.

  • So thank you, guys, so much for having me.

  • In general, Google was super early

  • in supporting GiveDirectly and the Google community broadly

  • and in helping people out who are extremely poor by sending

  • cash through our platform.

  • And so we've always felt really close to the Google community.

  • And it's nice to be able to come back and talk about what we're

  • up to, some of the debates that are happening

  • within the development and other sectors, and how cash, I think,

  • is moving those forward.

  • As Max said, I've worn a few different hats at GiveDirectly.

  • When I first started at GiveDirectly,

  • I was in Kenya on the operations side,

  • managing our team, signing people up to receive cash.

  • I spent a year and a half or so there, about a year and a half

  • in Uganda, and just recently switched back

  • over to the finance side in New York.

  • And what GiveDirectly does is pretty straight forward.

  • We send cash unconditionally to people living mostly

  • in extreme poverty.

  • That cash is a grant.

  • It's not a loan.

  • People can spend it however they want.

  • In the most typical model, we will send about $1,000

  • in a couple of chunks over the course of a few months.

  • And then people spend it on whatever they want.

  • In total, we've raised almost $150 million

  • to deliver as cash transfers.

  • And we've enrolled over 80,000 households.

  • Because our operations are fairly straightforward,

  • we're able to stay remarkably lean.

  • And so, on average, about 90% of what

  • we raise for cash transfers gets delivered directly

  • to people's hands at the end of the day.

  • And then as we're doing all of this work,

  • we're constantly running different types

  • of research studies.

  • And so when we first got started in Kenya,

  • we ran a randomized controlled trial

  • testing a bunch of different things about cash transfers--

  • comparing large lump sum cash transfers to recurring stream

  • transfers, testing whether or not male recipients spend money

  • differently from female recipients,

  • as well as the effect of cash transfers

  • on a ton of different outcome variables, earnings

  • and assets, consumption, but also things

  • like stress and depression and things like that.

  • Since then, we've done a number of different research studies.

  • We can talk about things like looking at the effects of cash

  • transfers on macro--

  • the macro aspects of the economy--

  • behavioral aspects of cash transfers,

  • how cash transfers affect coffee farmers,

  • and how they invest in their farms and things like that.

  • Operationally, the process looks a lot like a sales and customer

  • service operations.

  • We'll go door to door and collect data

  • on the people who could potentially

  • receive cash transfers, run a pretty simple logic

  • to decide who is eligible, then go back

  • and collect a little bit more data

  • and inform them about the program.

  • We'll then send the money, typically through Mobile Money.

  • And so that looks like Venmo, but you're

  • able to cash out basically anywhere around you.

  • And we can send thousands of payments

  • with a touch on a laptop.

  • And then we have full time call centers

  • in each of the countries where we work.

  • And so after every time we send payments,

  • we're able to call people up and confirm that they've

  • received it, ask if they have any feedback for GiveDirectly,

  • and understand if they've had any problems.

  • Now that model of just giving unconditional cash

  • is very different from how we're taught through aphorisms

  • or parables about how we're supposed to approach giving.

  • There's this idea that you're supposed to teach a man to fish

  • or not give him a fish.

  • Or that you should give a hand up but not a handout.

  • And I think behind that, there's this idea that giving cash

  • can't be sustainable.

  • And there's also this idea that we should distrust

  • the people we're trying to help somehow, that giving them money

  • could be corrupting.

  • Or if it's not corrupting, that we just

  • can't trust from the outset that it could be spent well.

  • Behind that basic debate, the stakes

  • are actually remarkably high between how we

  • should approach helping people.

  • To give you a sense, this is one way

  • of visualizing what's up for debate.

  • The blue line is global official development assistance.

  • It's one measure of this total amount

  • that governments are spending in foreign aid.

  • The line that's going down over time

  • is the cost of closing the poverty gap.

  • You can think of this as taking everyone

  • who is below the global poverty line

  • and visualizing how much in cash it would take to get them

  • to the poverty line.

  • Now, there's a lot of reasons why

  • that's a simplistic picture of what's going on.

  • But the basic synthesis is that we have incredible resources

  • available to help the people we're trying to help,

  • to help the people in extreme poverty.

  • And a lot of the problem of aid and development

  • is an allocation one-- that it's not

  • so much that we need more resources,

  • but we need to better allocate them.

  • And so this debate about how best should we

  • help people is actually extremely important.

  • So luckily, we don't have to have

  • this debate in this arena of dueling assertions.

  • It doesn't have to be this theoretical or philosophical

  • debate about what people are really like.

  • We can test it.

  • A development that's happened over this last couple

  • of decades within development economics

  • is moving a little bit away from theory

  • towards actually putting things into experimental evaluations.

  • And so the gold standard approach to this

  • is what's called a randomized control trial.

  • It's the same way that we test medicines--

  • by randomly assigning people to either receive or not

  • receive a treatment and then using external evaluators

  • to test the differences in the different outcome variables

  • between those two groups.

  • We've learned a lot of different things

  • from that about different interventions we use.

  • We've learned that we're actually

  • pretty bad at training people or teaching people to fish.

  • The effects of microfinance and things

  • like that are actually pretty mixed.

  • We've also learned that the effects of cash

  • are remarkably consistent, that the exact impacts can vary

  • a lot by the structure of the cash transfers

  • or the people who are receiving them or the context.

  • But you see a few consistent themes.

  • First, people spend it pretty well.

  • You see increases in earnings and consumption,

  • decreases in food insecurity, improvements in nutrition,

  • often increases an uptake on things like health services

  • or actual improvements in health in terms of fewer accidents

  • or better health.

  • You see decreases in stress.

  • To give you a sense of the variety of responses

  • to cash or to security, one study in Malawi

  • tested giving the families of young women

  • a small recurring cash payments-- so just a little bit

  • of security, not a total game changer.

  • What they found is that those women whose families received

  • got married later, pregnant later,

  • and had lower rates of HIV relative to the control group.

  • Because they had a little bit more security in society.

  • On the other side of the spectrum,

  • a study testing giving young people about $400 all at once,

  • if they went back and compared that group of people

  • to a control group, and found that their earnings

  • were 40% higher.

  • That basic result was mirrored in GiveDirectly study that

  • found that a year after people received about $1,000,

  • their earnings were 30% higher and their assets

  • were 58% higher.

  • The other things you don't see are the things

  • people are often worried about.

  • There is this sense that if you give people money,

  • they might drink it.

  • Or it will be corrupting, and they'll stop working.

  • But all of the evidence we have from what's

  • been 165 different studies of cash transfers, which suggest

  • that that doesn't happen.

  • The studies have found that this consumption of, quote,

  • "temptation goods"-- things like alcohol or tobacco

  • or gambling-- either has stayed the same for cash recipients

  • or has gone down.

  • And similarly, the work effort-- how much time people are

  • spending working--

  • has either stayed the same or gone up

  • in the different studies that have been

  • done in the developing world.

  • The other thing that's happened more recently

  • over the last decade is an explosion

  • in mobile money, which has made delivering

  • cash transfers a lot easier.

  • And so today, there are 93 countries with mobile money

  • and over 400 million current mobile money users.

  • That makes this job of getting cash into people's hands pretty

  • easy.

  • And the mobile money infrastructure

  • doesn't have to be as robust as it

  • is in Kenya, which has the best network in the world.

  • It can actually be pretty lightweight.

  • A study we did in Uganda tested the limits

  • to say, how good does the payments infrastructure have

  • to be for mobile payments to work?

  • And so we found just about the most remote place

  • you could go to in Uganda--

  • a place very, very North in the country,

  • just on the border with South Sudan--

  • where people typically would walk something

  • like four or five hours to get to the nearest town,

  • which was also where the nearest paved road would be.

  • We found that if you sent mobile money to a place that actually

  • didn't have any mobile money providers there already,

  • this market responded-- that the market incentives for cashing

  • people out worked.

  • And agents came to the village to cash people out.

  • And so this technology exists to get cash into people's hands

  • really, really cheaply.

  • As a result of those, there are two trends.

  • There's a ton of different applications

  • where we can use cash transfers to solve or address

  • a bunch of different types of problems.

  • And so to give you a sense, these

  • are some of the projects GiveDirectly is working on

  • around the world.

  • And so the first one is the thing we've done most often.

  • It's these large one time cash grants of about $1,000.

  • And I think these are best geared

  • if you want to give people investment capital.

  • And so you see bigger increases in earnings

  • that expect large increases in assets and things like that.

  • You can also use cash transfers to address humanitarian issues.

  • And so we just started a project in Uganda,

  • which has taken in a lot of different refugees

  • from surrounding countries.

  • The typical approach to these types of crises

  • is to pay people who run settlement camps per head

  • by this number of people they're supporting.

  • And while that seems intuitive, the incentives are all off.

  • Because the incentives are to keep people alive,

  • but not support them to move on with their lives.

  • And so the test we're doing in Uganda

  • now is giving people about $750 and letting them

  • to spend it however they want.

  • You can also use cash for things like a universal basic income.

  • And so I'm sure we'll talk about this more in Q and A.

  • But the basic idea here is if you want to make sure

  • that everybody is living up to a certain standard of living,

  • one way to kind of mechanically insure

  • that is to give everyone a cash transfer equal to the cost

  • of that standard of living.

  • And so GiveDirectly just launched

  • to study in Kenya distributing different types of cash

  • transfers to about 16,000 people,

  • with some people receiving a universal basic income

  • for up to 12 years.

  • On the other side of the spectrum,

  • you can use cash transfers for things like disaster relief.

  • And so something GiveDirectly did

  • this year is launch in Texas and Puerto Rico

  • and hand people out debit cards for about $1,500.

  • That's not a life changing amount

  • of money in either of those places.

  • But it does help sort of fill the gaps

  • in terms of what people aren't receiving from the existing

  • support network or the existing NGOs doing disaster relief.

  • And it lets people buy whatever is their top priority

  • within that price range.

  • There's a big industry that exists

  • around things like fair trade or CSR for companies

  • to try to give back to the people they are working with.

  • And so one thing we're testing with a sort of foundation

  • arm of a coffee company is just giving cash transfers

  • in a coffee growing area.

  • And so we're working in eastern Uganda.

  • Picked an area which is growing a lot of coffee and

  • are giving people about the same $1,000 cash grants

  • and seeing how it in general changes their lives,

  • as well as how it changes their coffee

  • growing practices, whether they start doing longer term

  • practices and how they approach the plants

  • and things like that.

  • And this last thing is a project that I'm really excited about,

  • which is something we're doing with USAID in Rwanda

  • and potentially other countries, which is using cash

  • as a literal benchmark for their existing programming.

  • And so we're running side by side randomized controlled

  • trials in Rwanda, testing for goals that they have.

  • And so in one case, it's a nutrition program

  • that has specific nutrition goals how we could structure

  • a cash transfer program designed to meet those goals

  • and basically produce a report card answering the question.

  • Is the programming you're doing better

  • than just giving the people you're trying to help the cash

  • and letting them spend it?

  • And so that provides a literal benchmark for us to say,

  • are we allocating money correctly?

  • And so something that's been happening in this sector

  • as we've had this mountain of evidence build up

  • and as the logistics of delivering cash

  • has become a lot easier is that the rhetoric

  • has changed dramatically.

  • It's less so that the idea of giving cash

  • is seen as crazy or nuts or corrupting.

  • And instead, you see things like this from Ban-Ki Moon.

  • He said that cash programming should

  • be the preferred and default method of support.

  • A different sort of summary of the evidence on cash

  • called it perhaps the most thoroughly researched

  • intervention out there.

  • And so that's actually extremely exciting,

  • except that the funding hasn't changed.

  • If you look at the overall portfolio of how we're

  • spending our money to help people,

  • it's still spent mostly not by the recipients

  • we're trying to help, and instead by policymakers

  • and bureaucrats and donors in places like New York

  • or D.C. or London.

  • And so less than 1% of US aid funding is cash-based.

  • Less than 2% funding of UK aid funding is cash-based.

  • And the same is true in the humanitarian sectors as well.

  • And I'll pause to note that the rest of the pie

  • is not the give well top charities.

  • That's not the kind of most evidence type interventions

  • out there.

  • There's a remarkable inertia in the sector

  • that we're still trying to fight.

  • And the consequence is that because we're not

  • solving the allocation problem at the front,

  • it gets solved on the back end a lot.

  • And so you see things like this from one refugee camp

  • where 70% of Syrian refugees were selling portions

  • of food aid they were receiving to get what they actually

  • wanted.

  • And so the markets are still responding

  • to try to correct the allocation but only further and further

  • down the chain after we've shipped food from other places

  • into the country.

  • And so what can we do about it?

  • We have these really effective tools.

  • We have this evidence.

  • As donors, how can we approach this basic problem?

  • Well, part of this stagnation in the sector

  • is that it doesn't respond how like consumer

  • goods or, in general, a market economy respond.

  • And so if you look at a phone like a product,

  • we've had remarkable innovation.

  • We've gone from this rotary dial landline phones to the iPhone X

  • or something like that.

  • And the reason is because there are market incentives

  • to respond to the consumer.

  • Well, the problem with the development sector

  • is that the donor is the person who pays.

  • But the recipient is the person who is affected.

  • And so you don't see the same types of incentives

  • exist to have the same type of innovation.

  • And so you often see persistence in the same types of tools

  • that we use again and again.

  • And so somehow we have to become better donors.

  • And so these are three questions you can use to force that

  • and to force the organizations you're

  • working with to be more and more responsive to the people you

  • and they are trying to help.

  • The first one is trying to understand

  • what the end-to-end cost of the intervention is.

  • How much of your donation actually ends up in value

  • provided to the recipient at the end of the road?

  • Now, there's lots of problems with overhead metrics

  • and things like that.

  • And this is not that.

  • A problem with the sector is that it's

  • heavily intermediated.

  • And so one nonprofit will take your donation

  • and give it to another nonprofit after sort of skimming

  • a little bit off the top.

  • They'll skim a little bit off the top for overhead

  • and give it to another nonprofit.

  • And even if the reported overhead is very low,

  • each of those nonprofits only taking about 1%,

  • the systemic overhead is extraordinarily high.

  • If you have a chain of those nonprofits repeatedly

  • subgranting to each other, the end value

  • that's reaching the recipient is actually very, very low.

  • And that's a practice that you see again and again and again

  • in the sector.

  • The next thing is evidence backing.

  • Has there been an external randomized controlled trial

  • of this sort of intervention the organization is implementing?

  • How do we actually know that it works?

  • And use the same standard you would

  • want for a medicine you would take

  • or a product that you would bet your life on.

  • And lastly, there's this benchmark question.

  • Is the funding you're providing to the organization

  • and the program that they're implementing

  • doing more good than the people you're actually trying to help

  • could if you just gave them the cash?

  • Now, there's plenty of interventions that might meet

  • that standard-- very specialized medical interventions,

  • for example, or cases where there's a public good problem--

  • infrastructure, or maybe rule of law.

  • There's a particularly good giving opportunity there.

  • But a lot of the things we're doing

  • are trying to outspend the poor about things

  • that they know far more about.

  • And so I think a lot of the spending we're doing

  • wouldn't meet this sort of basic test.

  • I think the last thing that's worth

  • pausing on before we go to Q and A

  • and dig into a bunch of other things

  • is why is it worth giving at all.

  • And here I would say the existence

  • of incredible opportunities to have impact.

  • I think cash is one of those.

  • But there's lots of other non-profits

  • that are actually doing good work.

  • Provides a pretty amazing opportunity

  • to do something great with your life

  • that almost as a side product of your day-to-day life

  • by donating a certain small percent.

  • Your life can be basically the same, except as a side product,

  • you can dramatically change and better lives of people who

  • are living in extreme poverty.

  • And that's a cool opportunity to do with your 80 years on earth.

  • And so I think despite the dark look on the sector,

  • I think there is this incredible opportunity out there provided

  • by good giving opportunities that make giving worth doing.

  • And so with that, I'll turn it over to questions

  • and looking forward to conversation.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • SPEAKER 1: I actually want to start with just

  • a question about your own role.

  • So this is amazing work.

  • I mean, for example, the Malawi thing,

  • I just learned about that yesterday about HIV.

  • So you keep learning new things about cash transfers, which

  • are amazing.

  • But I'm curious from the financial angle,

  • what kind of unique problems--

  • I imagine there are some-- that GiveDirectly deals

  • with that you're exposed to?

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • In a lot of ways, it's focusing to just

  • be able to spend most of your time on the cash pipeline.

  • And so on the finance side, my job

  • is to manage that entire pipeline from donor

  • to the first bank it hits in the US to the foreign exchange

  • transaction to get to Kenyan shillings or Rwandan francs,

  • the bank it sits there, and then the getting to the mobile money

  • provider and to the eventual recipient.

  • And so the problems there are to first,

  • make sure that that pipeline is as short as possible,

  • that money moves through the system incredibly quickly.

  • And so problems we're sort of working on

  • within that domain are things like how

  • do we project donations that we can keep field

  • operations running basically just behind them so

  • that the lag is very small?

  • Second, how do we manage that cash prudently,

  • make sure we're getting an interest where we should

  • and things like that?

  • And then third, making sure we're

  • managing fraud, on the internal side

  • with staff and things like that and externally

  • with mobile money providers, with local government

  • and things like that.

  • And so the integrity of the pipeline

  • is something I spend a lot of time on as well.

  • SPEAKER 1: Cool.

  • [INAUDIBLE] I'm actually going to set up the Dory.

  • Just one moment.

  • AUDIENCE: Yeah, I'll go.

  • Hey.

  • My question is about whether an organization like yours

  • pays a different amount than a giant multinational corporation

  • like Google does to change currencies?

  • It seems like something that's really important to the flow

  • of money in this organization.

  • And I wonder if there's an opportunity

  • for multinational corporations to help out

  • not just by matching employees donations,

  • but maybe to assist with currency exchange

  • in the currencies that they're already

  • exchanging in gigantic quantities on a very

  • frequent basis.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah, it's interesting.

  • The history of what we have paid has changed.

  • I think when we were first getting started,

  • we were pretty naive.

  • And so we were paying about a percent per transaction,

  • which would be extremely high for developed world currencies.

  • It's a little bit what you'd expect for the developing world

  • currencies we're trading in.

  • I think we've gotten better over time

  • at competing different banks against each other.

  • And so we have a US bank that quotes a rate.

  • But we also competed against certain different local banks.

  • And we've added different local banks over time

  • to impart offer competition there,

  • but also to offer credit risk hedges basically while we're

  • holding the cash there.

  • And so the total fees we're paying

  • have dropped a ton over time.

  • And so now we're only like a hair above 0%

  • or something like that.

  • That said, my guess is the Googles or something

  • like that are probably being a step more clever.

  • And so my guess is the same opportunities still

  • probably exist.

  • I don't know how the tool would work, the piggybacking

  • off the transfers.

  • But I bet there is something there in terms of, yeah,

  • trying to be more clever.

  • I think also as we've grown, we've become a bigger player.

  • And in these markets, it's certainly the day

  • we trade or something like that.

  • And so I think that's helped in us

  • getting better rates versus us getting first getting started.

  • AUDIENCE: Thank you.

  • SPEAKER 1: We can read from the first Dory question.

  • So what are the best reasons, in your view,

  • to be skeptical about basic income projects or policies?

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah, I think my biggest one, especially as it

  • applies to the US or other places

  • where basic income feels politically far,

  • is that a UBI doesn't feel like a particularly useful North

  • Star.

  • That there is this sort of sense of a UBI as this Utopic policy.

  • And because of its elegance or simplicity,

  • there's a very good sense of what it should look like--

  • that it should be universal.

  • It should be basic, which you could debate the exact number,

  • but it's supposed to meet the basic needs.

  • And so I think almost because it has this clear template

  • for what you should do, in places where

  • that template would be politically pretty

  • hard to implement soon, it doesn't tell you

  • what the incremental policy should be to get there.

  • And so in the US, things that feel more tractable and maybe

  • then more exciting are things like expand the ITC

  • or have a child grant or something like that.

  • And I worry a little bit that the UBI and UBI pilots that,

  • including the directives that are

  • sort of testing the Utopic version

  • or the template version, aren't providing a lot of light

  • on how to get there or on the pilots that

  • should happen in the near-term on policies

  • that are more likely in the US.

  • I think for a lot of countries, a UBI

  • could feel closer politically--

  • India might be one example--

  • for which the conversation and the pilots focusing

  • on that template are actually pretty useful.

  • But in the US, I worry a lot about the distraction factor--

  • that we've cut away the wonk class who

  • care about poverty in the US and focus them

  • on a policy that feels far.

  • SPEAKER 1: Yeah.

  • And EITC is their earned income tax credit.

  • It's a very large cash transfer in the US.

  • Also note in the comments of this question,

  • there was a lot of discussion on inflation.

  • So there was a study that was recently

  • pursued from the Mexican cash transfer program.

  • I don't know if you want to talk about that.

  • But it seemed to find that there was not inflation.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yes.

  • SPEAKER 1: Or if you're familiar.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah, yeah.

  • And so Mexico was in that chart of the different cash transfer

  • programs.

  • They were one of the leading innovators

  • both in implementing a cash transfer

  • program in the developing world and in actually testing it.

  • And so the US had different types of cash support

  • before then.

  • But they were really forward thinking as a government

  • and working with academics to test

  • the effects of cash transfers.

  • And so they produced some of the early results

  • on just how cash transfers work on the individual level.

  • But then also a recent analysis of those programs

  • found that you don't see the kind of doomsday things

  • people are worried about in terms of a basic income

  • or in general expanding cash transfer programs in terms

  • of prices just going up a ton to totally offset

  • the value of the cash.

  • That's something that we've seen in a couple of other studies

  • done evaluating that question.

  • GiveDirectly's first study looked

  • at a kind of village level and didn't see any effect

  • on prices.

  • A thing we have in works that we don't have results

  • out is a study specifically designed to stress test that.

  • And so we used our one time grants

  • and randomized the concentration of GiveDirectly's enrollment

  • within a large region.

  • And so there were high concentration areas

  • and very low concentration areas.

  • And then as we delivered what was massive amounts of cash

  • in the region, researchers looked

  • at prices in local markets as well as

  • quantity of goods supplied, local taxes, and school fee

  • payments, these sorts of different kind of macro

  • or community level effects.

  • And so those are results I think we'll have out early next year

  • or so that I hope can contribute to that debate as well.

  • I think on the theory of it, a lot of the ways people

  • talk about inflation, the Econ model is too simple.

  • That they're sort of holding constant

  • how much can be supplied.

  • That a lot of times either big companies

  • can respond to increases in demand

  • by supplying more of the good.

  • Or oftentimes in the developing world, something you see

  • is the cash given increases the supply.

  • And so an example could be you would be worried

  • that you gave cash to an area.

  • And the area in general likes consuming fish.

  • And so the price of fish will go up.

  • But the piece that you're missing

  • is that often when people receive the cash,

  • they buy boats or fishing nets or coolers to be middlemen

  • between fishermen and markets.

  • And so actually this quantity of supply of fish

  • goes up as much or more.

  • And so I think the model people use to answer and think

  • about the inflation question has to not keep supply

  • fixed when debating that part.

  • AUDIENCE: Hello?

  • Can I ask a question?

  • AUDIENCE: Yes.

  • OK, sorry.

  • I would like to learn a little bit more about your UBI pilot

  • in Kenya, you said.

  • And I know we have already talked about UBI a little bit,

  • but I guess there's a reason behind GiveDirectly jumping

  • into basic income and you providing the service

  • to 12,000 people, I think.

  • And I'm always wondering how can you

  • get from those results you're getting from the UBI, which

  • is only paid to a fraction of people in the country,

  • then to a more universal aspect where all people would receive

  • it?

  • And what are you hoping to learn?

  • And do you have any results as of far?

  • JOE HUSTON: Yes.

  • And so when GiveDirectly was seeing the debate on UBI spike

  • up again over the last couple of years, the thing we saw it was

  • was a debate about how a particular type of cash

  • transfer works.

  • There is these questions on the pro side

  • that it would enable different types of risk taking

  • or entrepreneurship, help people live their lives better.

  • On the con side, people were worried

  • that people would stop working or spend it badly

  • or things like that.

  • And those questions are testable.

  • And so like other people's launching pilots,

  • we saw this was very much within our sweet spot

  • to implement a cash transfer program

  • and then work with researchers to test the results.

  • The basic structure we used was to design

  • to test what's unique about a UBI versus other cash transfer

  • programs.

  • And so in part to get at your--

  • a big piece of a UBI is that it's universal.

  • And so we randomized at the village level

  • with whole villages randomly assigned to receive cash

  • or not.

  • And then we also randomly assigned

  • some villages to receive cash for 12 years and some villages

  • to receive cash for two.

  • Because a scaled up version of a UBI

  • would be for your whole life.

  • But a lot of the pilots that have been done

  • and that are coming online are shorter term.

  • And so potential research question

  • you might have is can you extrapolate

  • to how the incentives would actually be for people if they

  • had that longer term security?

  • Again, on the pro side and the con side.

  • And so that full study just kicked off

  • a couple of weeks ago.

  • And so it'll be a little bit aways before we have results.

  • The first end lines and things like

  • that will be within the next year or so.

  • So it won't be 12 years.

  • But it will be a little bit of time.

  • That said, about a year ago, we started providing payments

  • in one kind of pilot village.

  • And so it got to sort of ask people what it's

  • like to receive a basic income.

  • And obviously that's totally anecdotal.

  • It shouldn't be confused with the RCT evidence.

  • But even that was pretty interesting.

  • I think if you ask people what it's

  • like, you see the things that are consistent with the broader

  • evidence.

  • People spend it in a ton of different ways

  • because they have different priorities.

  • You saw a lot of spending on food, especially elderly people

  • who couldn't work.

  • Different types of investments in people's job or businesses,

  • whether that's buying small amounts of capital for a shoe

  • business I saw.

  • People actually buying fishing nets.

  • It's an area right on the edge of Lake Victoria.

  • People investing in school fees.

  • Secondary school isn't free in Kenya.

  • Health and things like that.

  • Some of the unique things were--

  • we were worried on the operational perspective,

  • how people would perceive a UBI, a few different aspects

  • of that.

  • One of them is universality.

  • Even though the village we're working in

  • and the groups of villages we're working in

  • are in absolute terms all very, very poor,

  • there's still a different decent amount of income variation

  • within those villages.

  • And so in this particular one, the poorest people

  • had walls you could essentially see through.

  • And the whole house was made from organic materials-- mud

  • and thatch and things like that.

  • And the richest couple had a tractor.

  • And so that's a remarkable distance

  • in wealth and in income and things like that.

  • And so one thing we asked people was just how

  • do you feel that everyone's getting the same amount of cash

  • support?

  • Does it seem fair?

  • Should GiveDirectly, as we often do,

  • try to pick the poorest people in this village?

  • And people responded pretty uniformly

  • that they were like, we were glad you didn't try to meddle,

  • that you didn't try to pick who should receive.

  • And so was pretty interesting from a perceived fairness

  • perspective about a UBI and connects

  • to some of the debate people have about the stigmatization

  • of receiving benefits or things like that.

  • Another, again, qualitative thing we asked people about

  • was whether individually targeted payments were OK.

  • A kind of potential benefit of a UBI

  • is that it frees people in relationships

  • because each person has their own individual security.

  • And so if a relationship is abusive

  • or there's a bad power dynamic, somebody

  • could leave or at least be on a more level playing field.

  • The flip side, if you're a foreign organization,

  • is that it could look like you're

  • trying to break up families by insisting that each person has

  • their own cell phone and their own stream of payments.

  • And so we were worried that that would be perceived badly.

  • Again, the surprise was that basically everyone

  • said just the opposite, that individually targeted payments

  • let people prioritize whatever was their top priority

  • and made debates easier.

  • There was this sense of he has his money, and I have my money.

  • And we get to spend it on what we want.

  • And so there's not as much of a--

  • for the UBI payments, a shared pool that has to be

  • fought over.

  • And so that was pretty interesting as well.

  • AUDIENCE: Thank you.

  • SPEAKER 1: And yeah, some of the negative income tax experiments

  • in the 70s seemed at first to suggest

  • that divorce rates went up.

  • But subsequent analysis found that it didn't.

  • So it's interesting how this individually versus family

  • orientation isn't everything.

  • AUDIENCE: I wanted to learn a little bit more

  • about the evaluation of the cash transfer program.

  • So firstly, I wanted to know how long you

  • track people for after they've received the cash payment?

  • And then in terms of logistics and scaling

  • up, do you think that the evaluation model you have right

  • now could be then used by, say, a USAID or one

  • of the other big donors for evaluating?

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • So it varies a lot by study.

  • And so different studies are targeted

  • towards different questions, which require a different time

  • horizon.

  • The basic template structure is first, external researchers.

  • And so academics at places like MIT or Harvard who are helping

  • design the study with us and external research surveying

  • organization.

  • And so it's not GiveDirectly staff

  • asking people about their consumption patterns.

  • It's different people from a different organization

  • who don't have a relationship with us.

  • It's important to pre-register the study.

  • Basically say, we're going to do this study.

  • Provide a pre-analysis plan, which says,

  • we're going to answer these questions that

  • help solve for cherry picking on the studies,

  • as in not holding back studies that

  • have bad results or no results, as well as cherry picking

  • on the analysis, not redoing the analysis again

  • and again until you get the results you want.

  • After that, in terms of the horizon,

  • again, that's varied a lot for us.

  • We have one study that is going to have something like 18 month

  • results out some early next year.

  • But it's sort of queued up to track people for a decade or so

  • in terms of the sample size and things like that.

  • Because GiveDirectly is younger, our ability

  • to have a super long horizon already done is harder.

  • In the existing literature, the longest follow up

  • is a paper in Uganda.

  • That was that $400 cash grant I mentioned to use.

  • And that's gone out to, I think, the eight year

  • mark and found persistent results.

  • And there's been a study in Sri Lanka that went out

  • to five years and found--

  • it was cash transfers to small business people--

  • and found at the five year mark markedly different earnings

  • even persisting to that level.

  • On terms of scale, in part, the program

  • we were doing with USAID is a good example of large funders

  • are still able to run those types

  • of randomized controlled trials.

  • In many ways, the big con about RCTs is that they're expensive.

  • You have to have giant samples.

  • You have to be able to fund things like research costs

  • and things like that.

  • And so in many ways, large funders

  • are best equipped to help implement them.

  • SPEAKER 1: A quick follow up on that.

  • So it seems like there have been some long term evaluations.

  • Have there been long term treatments in the same way

  • as that?

  • I mean, certainly not in the cash transfer spaces is

  • my understanding.

  • But are you aware of others?

  • JOE HUSTON: Right.

  • SPEAKER 1: The 12 years is pretty remarkable.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • And so I think the examples--

  • what I haven't seen as much of is long term evaluation paired

  • with long term treatment.

  • The long term treatments I've seen

  • are in places like Brazil and Mexico

  • that have been targeted towards families with young children

  • and provided conditional cash transfers to send

  • their children to school and followed families

  • for a long period as a result. And so getting

  • into that decade-long type time period.

  • And so I think we have seen examples of that.

  • I haven't seen the, personally, the evaluation

  • paired to check what is it like to receive cash for 12 years.

  • But I do think we have seen examples of that long term

  • treatment.

  • SPEAKER 1: I think we had a question on the [? EPC ?]

  • real quick.

  • Are you still there?

  • AUDIENCE: Yeah.

  • I'm still here.

  • I'm Krisna.

  • I was just wondering how does GiveDirectly

  • compare with basic education?

  • The only other thing that I found

  • having extraordinary effect is basic education.

  • And, of course, [INAUDIBLE] high school.

  • But how does it compare?

  • How should I think of giving to GiveDirectly

  • as giving for basic education?

  • JOE HUSTON: This is GiveDirectly versus a basic education.

  • Is that right?

  • AUDIENCE: Yeah, exactly.

  • Do any education charities working

  • for getting girls in school or things like that?

  • In developing countries, of course.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • And so I think the case for a basic education

  • in a country or something like that is very good.

  • And I think it's a good example of the type of public

  • good or public infrastructure that is hard for cash

  • to just replace.

  • And so in many ways, I think they're not competitive

  • and, in fact, are often complementary,

  • that a big thing we see people consume when we give people

  • cash are school fees to be able to go to school or school

  • uniforms or school supplies or solar lights

  • to light a home to do homework and things like that.

  • And so I think there's a lot of complements in this ecosystem.

  • That said, it's a giving opportunity.

  • I think, especially for nonprofits,

  • it's hard to be helpful providing a basic education.

  • And so I think it's a hard thing to do.

  • And so I don't know of a lot of really good

  • giving opportunities to directly support basic education,

  • even though I think it's a useful thing for our country

  • to provide and it's an important thing for a country to have.

  • It's similar to I think it's hard for nonprofits

  • to build bridges or to build hospitals.

  • That I think that those sorts of big lasting institutions you

  • want to exist in societies are hard to provide

  • through donated dollars.

  • And so as concepts, I think they're complementary

  • and both important.

  • And I think as giving opportunities,

  • the case for cash is a little bit better.

  • AUDIENCE: Thank you.

  • AUDIENCE: Hi.

  • So I'm curious how you guys think

  • about balancing your portfolio.

  • So both geographically, how do you

  • choose the locations you're going

  • to deploy the programs to, and then how

  • do you split between research programs and just funding

  • the programs you already know work pretty well?

  • I guess I'm also especially interested in the decision

  • to start the program in Houston, which

  • seems like an outlier in terms of how much money you

  • gave per person and also how much that money can buy.

  • So yeah, just how do you think about balancing

  • your overall portfolio?

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • And so in general, our mission is not to--

  • we don't have an expand mission.

  • We don't have the goal of be in every country on Earth

  • or provide every structure of cash transfer.

  • We're pretty focused-- well, I'll

  • talk about this Houston and Puerto Rico thing.

  • But in general, we're pretty focused within East Africa.

  • And each addition of a country is targeted

  • towards a particular goal--

  • a research program that we think is

  • especially valuable or important for policy impact.

  • Against that kind of baseline, the way

  • we evaluate new projects is I think

  • a big potential value of cash transfers

  • is the indirect effects on the sector.

  • And there's a few different sectors,

  • whether it's providing research that's

  • especially useful for developing world governments in designing

  • their own cash transfer programs,

  • providing cash transfer structures that provide

  • benchmarks for aid programs that exist around the world,

  • or in general pushing on the debate

  • about how we should help people.

  • The Houston and Puerto Rico examples,

  • we debated a lot internally.

  • What we saw was basically an opportunity

  • to connect different conversations.

  • A weird thing that happens in conversations about giving

  • and especially about cash is they

  • can stay pretty disjointed.

  • And so the basic income conversation

  • can happen without referencing any of the papers

  • within the developing world about a lot of what we already

  • know about how cash transfers work.

  • And so there can be remarkable ignorance

  • about all of the things that have already been studied.

  • We can sort of throw up our hands

  • in Texas about how do we help people

  • without any of this sort of sense

  • of how helpful cash transfers can

  • be in that type of situation.

  • And so we sort of saw it as an opportunity to one, in part

  • provide a set of pipes to deliver cash

  • for donors who probably weren't going to give to East Africa

  • otherwise.

  • There were people who specifically wanted to give it

  • to Texas or to Puerto Rico.

  • And so we could provide that utility to enable that.

  • And then two, provide the cash alternative

  • in a new conversation that we hope will sort of carry over

  • into the broader conversation in aid

  • and in basic income or something like that.

  • And so the bet here, I think, is that we can sort of connect

  • conversations that are staying disparate

  • and that there isn't otherwise an allocation

  • from East Africa to Texas-- that there

  • are different giving pools.

  • And if that's the case, then it's

  • absolutely the case that there should

  • be some type of utility for people to give to Texas

  • and to help those people better than existing

  • opportunities had.

  • SPEAKER 1: We'll move back to the Dory.

  • This is a question I had, actually,

  • which was about the savings compacts that were reported

  • in this Fox article on the basic income experiment where people

  • pool up their payments and give it to a single person

  • so that they can engage in more capital intensive investments

  • or things like that.

  • It seems like that presents an opportunity

  • for financial institutions or other changes.

  • So curious to your thoughts on that.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • And so the quick slightly long explanation of what this is

  • is in this UBI pilot village where people were receiving

  • basic income payments, a thing people wanted to do

  • was purchase big things, bigger than what

  • their monthly check was.

  • And so they formed different types of groups

  • within the village and basically made a ledger of each person

  • every month contributes some portion

  • of their basic income payment.

  • And one person every month receives all of those payments.

  • And so it's a way to convert those stream

  • payments into semi-recurring lump sum ones instead.

  • In terms of financial institutions,

  • I think people do have access.

  • And so I think maybe the opportunity

  • is like a sales one.

  • And so M-Pesa is the mobile money provider in Kenya.

  • And it has a ton of different savings and loan

  • products built in.

  • You can have basically a savings account

  • on these feature phones, the same ones that have

  • Snake and things like that.

  • You can have a savings account.

  • You can draw a loan through your M-Pesa account.

  • Recently, they added the ability to buy government bonds, again,

  • through these mobile money accounts, which is pretty neat.

  • And so a question I have is whether or not

  • you'll start to see a take up of that

  • as the need or demand for these types of services persists.

  • And maybe he'll build comfort.

  • And then on the other side, there's

  • a sort of potential for better outreach and things like that

  • from financial institutions.

  • There are also small banks and micro-finance companies

  • in Kenya that I could see potentially moving in.

  • I haven't seen that happen much yet,

  • but I can totally buy that it could.

  • Yep.

  • SPEAKER 1: Would you guys be willing to,

  • I mean, you're sort of underwriting these things

  • at that point.

  • Is there a written guarantee of the stream?

  • JOE HUSTON: Right.

  • Yeah, it's interesting.

  • I don't know how to turn the GiveDirectly

  • promise into something you could lend off of

  • or something like that.

  • It's a verbal guarantee.

  • But maybe the sort of track record-- by year three

  • or something like that-- enables that.

  • I don't know.

  • SPEAKER 1: So I think we're just about out of time,

  • but one last question on the transfer efficiency

  • of the basic income experiment relative to cash transfers

  • and maybe long run expectations there.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah.

  • And so the different trade offs for the basic income experiment

  • are there are more payments.

  • And mobile money providers have a per payment fee.

  • And so there is more payments per value distributed.

  • And so mobile money fees are a little bit higher.

  • We have to have our call center running longer per recipient

  • because people are getting paid for two years.

  • And so there's higher follow up costs.

  • That said, the total value distributed

  • is higher per recipient than our typical $1,000 payments.

  • And the way that all nets is that the two-year arm

  • is much less efficient.

  • It's something like 75% or 80%.

  • The 12-year arm is much more efficient.

  • And the combination of those two, the weighted average

  • across those different arms is about in that 88%, 90% range.

  • The next question on efficiency was actually [? Harvey, ?]

  • which is pretty interesting.

  • And so we found the balance of costs are very different.

  • Labor is a lot more expensive to sign people up for cash

  • here than in East Africa.

  • But there is zero effects for us and payments are cheaper.

  • We're at the debit cards are basically

  • zero fees for us and for the recipients.

  • And so efficiency at the scale we'll be able to operate at

  • is a little bit higher than our typical program.

  • SPEAKER 1: Interesting.

  • Great.

  • Well, thank you so much for coming to Google.

  • JOE HUSTON: Yeah, thank you so much for having me.

  • [APPLAUSE]

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ジョー・ヒューストン"GiveDirectly.現金給付、ベーシックインカム、ハリケーン救済」|Googleで講演 (Joe Huston: "GiveDirectly: Cash Transfers, Basic Income, and Hurricane Relief" | Talks at Google)

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    王惟惟 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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