字幕表 動画を再生する 英語字幕をプリント [MUSIC PLAYING] [APPLAUSE] JOE HUSTON: Yes. So thank you, guys, so much for having me. In general, Google was super early in supporting GiveDirectly and the Google community broadly and in helping people out who are extremely poor by sending cash through our platform. And so we've always felt really close to the Google community. And it's nice to be able to come back and talk about what we're up to, some of the debates that are happening within the development and other sectors, and how cash, I think, is moving those forward. As Max said, I've worn a few different hats at GiveDirectly. When I first started at GiveDirectly, I was in Kenya on the operations side, managing our team, signing people up to receive cash. I spent a year and a half or so there, about a year and a half in Uganda, and just recently switched back over to the finance side in New York. And what GiveDirectly does is pretty straight forward. We send cash unconditionally to people living mostly in extreme poverty. That cash is a grant. It's not a loan. People can spend it however they want. In the most typical model, we will send about $1,000 in a couple of chunks over the course of a few months. And then people spend it on whatever they want. In total, we've raised almost $150 million to deliver as cash transfers. And we've enrolled over 80,000 households. Because our operations are fairly straightforward, we're able to stay remarkably lean. And so, on average, about 90% of what we raise for cash transfers gets delivered directly to people's hands at the end of the day. And then as we're doing all of this work, we're constantly running different types of research studies. And so when we first got started in Kenya, we ran a randomized controlled trial testing a bunch of different things about cash transfers-- comparing large lump sum cash transfers to recurring stream transfers, testing whether or not male recipients spend money differently from female recipients, as well as the effect of cash transfers on a ton of different outcome variables, earnings and assets, consumption, but also things like stress and depression and things like that. Since then, we've done a number of different research studies. We can talk about things like looking at the effects of cash transfers on macro-- the macro aspects of the economy-- behavioral aspects of cash transfers, how cash transfers affect coffee farmers, and how they invest in their farms and things like that. Operationally, the process looks a lot like a sales and customer service operations. We'll go door to door and collect data on the people who could potentially receive cash transfers, run a pretty simple logic to decide who is eligible, then go back and collect a little bit more data and inform them about the program. We'll then send the money, typically through Mobile Money. And so that looks like Venmo, but you're able to cash out basically anywhere around you. And we can send thousands of payments with a touch on a laptop. And then we have full time call centers in each of the countries where we work. And so after every time we send payments, we're able to call people up and confirm that they've received it, ask if they have any feedback for GiveDirectly, and understand if they've had any problems. Now that model of just giving unconditional cash is very different from how we're taught through aphorisms or parables about how we're supposed to approach giving. There's this idea that you're supposed to teach a man to fish or not give him a fish. Or that you should give a hand up but not a handout. And I think behind that, there's this idea that giving cash can't be sustainable. And there's also this idea that we should distrust the people we're trying to help somehow, that giving them money could be corrupting. Or if it's not corrupting, that we just can't trust from the outset that it could be spent well. Behind that basic debate, the stakes are actually remarkably high between how we should approach helping people. To give you a sense, this is one way of visualizing what's up for debate. The blue line is global official development assistance. It's one measure of this total amount that governments are spending in foreign aid. The line that's going down over time is the cost of closing the poverty gap. You can think of this as taking everyone who is below the global poverty line and visualizing how much in cash it would take to get them to the poverty line. Now, there's a lot of reasons why that's a simplistic picture of what's going on. But the basic synthesis is that we have incredible resources available to help the people we're trying to help, to help the people in extreme poverty. And a lot of the problem of aid and development is an allocation one-- that it's not so much that we need more resources, but we need to better allocate them. And so this debate about how best should we help people is actually extremely important. So luckily, we don't have to have this debate in this arena of dueling assertions. It doesn't have to be this theoretical or philosophical debate about what people are really like. We can test it. A development that's happened over this last couple of decades within development economics is moving a little bit away from theory towards actually putting things into experimental evaluations. And so the gold standard approach to this is what's called a randomized control trial. It's the same way that we test medicines-- by randomly assigning people to either receive or not receive a treatment and then using external evaluators to test the differences in the different outcome variables between those two groups. We've learned a lot of different things from that about different interventions we use. We've learned that we're actually pretty bad at training people or teaching people to fish. The effects of microfinance and things like that are actually pretty mixed. We've also learned that the effects of cash are remarkably consistent, that the exact impacts can vary a lot by the structure of the cash transfers or the people who are receiving them or the context. But you see a few consistent themes. First, people spend it pretty well. You see increases in earnings and consumption, decreases in food insecurity, improvements in nutrition, often increases an uptake on things like health services or actual improvements in health in terms of fewer accidents or better health. You see decreases in stress. To give you a sense of the variety of responses to cash or to security, one study in Malawi tested giving the families of young women a small recurring cash payments-- so just a little bit of security, not a total game changer. What they found is that those women whose families received got married later, pregnant later, and had lower rates of HIV relative to the control group. Because they had a little bit more security in society. On the other side of the spectrum, a study testing giving young people about $400 all at once, if they went back and compared that group of people to a control group, and found that their earnings were 40% higher. That basic result was mirrored in GiveDirectly study that found that a year after people received about $1,000, their earnings were 30% higher and their assets were 58% higher. The other things you don't see are the things people are often worried about. There is this sense that if you give people money, they might drink it. Or it will be corrupting, and they'll stop working. But all of the evidence we have from what's been 165 different studies of cash transfers, which suggest that that doesn't happen. The studies have found that this consumption of, quote, "temptation goods"-- things like alcohol or tobacco or gambling-- either has stayed the same for cash recipients or has gone down. And similarly, the work effort-- how much time people are spending working-- has either stayed the same or gone up in the different studies that have been done in the developing world. The other thing that's happened more recently over the last decade is an explosion in mobile money, which has made delivering cash transfers a lot easier. And so today, there are 93 countries with mobile money and over 400 million current mobile money users. That makes this job of getting cash into people's hands pretty easy. And the mobile money infrastructure doesn't have to be as robust as it is in Kenya, which has the best network in the world. It can actually be pretty lightweight. A study we did in Uganda tested the limits to say, how good does the payments infrastructure have to be for mobile payments to work? And so we found just about the most remote place you could go to in Uganda-- a place very, very North in the country, just on the border with South Sudan-- where people typically would walk something like four or five hours to get to the nearest town, which was also where the nearest paved road would be. We found that if you sent mobile money to a place that actually didn't have any mobile money providers there already, this market responded-- that the market incentives for cashing people out worked. And agents came to the village to cash people out. And so this technology exists to get cash into people's hands really, really cheaply. As a result of those, there are two trends. There's a ton of different applications where we can use cash transfers to solve or address a bunch of different types of problems. And so to give you a sense, these are some of the projects GiveDirectly is working on around the world. And so the first one is the thing we've done most often. It's these large one time cash grants of about $1,000. And I think these are best geared if you want to give people investment capital. And so you see bigger increases in earnings that expect large increases in assets and things like that. You can also use cash transfers to address humanitarian issues. And so we just started a project in Uganda, which has taken in a lot of different refugees from surrounding countries. The typical approach to these types of crises is to pay people who run settlement camps per head by this number of people they're supporting. And while that seems intuitive, the incentives are all off. Because the incentives are to keep people alive, but not support them to move on with their lives. And so the test we're doing in Uganda now is giving people about $750 and letting them to spend it however they want. You can also use cash for things like a universal basic income. And so I'm sure we'll talk about this more in Q and A. But the basic idea here is if you want to make sure that everybody is living up to a certain standard of living, one way to kind of mechanically insure that is to give everyone a cash transfer equal to the cost of that standard of living. And so GiveDirectly just launched to study in Kenya distributing different types of cash transfers to about 16,000 people, with some people receiving a universal basic income for up to 12 years. On the other side of the spectrum, you can use cash transfers for things like disaster relief. And so something GiveDirectly did this year is launch in Texas and Puerto Rico and hand people out debit cards for about $1,500. That's not a life changing amount of money in either of those places. But it does help sort of fill the gaps in terms of what people aren't receiving from the existing support network or the existing NGOs doing disaster relief. And it lets people buy whatever is their top priority within that price range. There's a big industry that exists around things like fair trade or CSR for companies to try to give back to the people they are working with. And so one thing we're testing with a sort of foundation arm of a coffee company is just giving cash transfers in a coffee growing area. And so we're working in eastern Uganda. Picked an area which is growing a lot of coffee and are giving people about the same $1,000 cash grants and seeing how it in general changes their lives, as well as how it changes their coffee growing practices, whether they start doing longer term practices and how they approach the plants and things like that. And this last thing is a project that I'm really excited about, which is something we're doing with USAID in Rwanda and potentially other countries, which is using cash as a literal benchmark for their existing programming. And so we're running side by side randomized controlled trials in Rwanda, testing for goals that they have. And so in one case, it's a nutrition program that has specific nutrition goals how we could structure a cash transfer program designed to meet those goals and basically produce a report card answering the question. Is the programming you're doing better than just giving the people you're trying to help the cash and letting them spend it? And so that provides a literal benchmark for us to say, are we allocating money correctly? And so something that's been happening in this sector as we've had this mountain of evidence build up and as the logistics of delivering cash has become a lot easier is that the rhetoric has changed dramatically. It's less so that the idea of giving cash is seen as crazy or nuts or corrupting. And instead, you see things like this from Ban-Ki Moon. He said that cash programming should be the preferred and default method of support. A different sort of summary of the evidence on cash called it perhaps the most thoroughly researched intervention out there. And so that's actually extremely exciting, except that the funding hasn't changed. If you look at the overall portfolio of how we're spending our money to help people, it's still spent mostly not by the recipients we're trying to help, and instead by policymakers and bureaucrats and donors in places like New York or D.C. or London. And so less than 1% of US aid funding is cash-based. Less than 2% funding of UK aid funding is cash-based. And the same is true in the humanitarian sectors as well. And I'll pause to note that the rest of the pie is not the give well top charities. That's not the kind of most evidence type interventions out there. There's a remarkable inertia in the sector that we're still trying to fight. And the consequence is that because we're not solving the allocation problem at the front, it gets solved on the back end a lot. And so you see things like this from one refugee camp where 70% of Syrian refugees were selling portions of food aid they were receiving to get what they actually wanted. And so the markets are still responding to try to correct the allocation but only further and further down the chain after we've shipped food from other places into the country. And so what can we do about it? We have these really effective tools. We have this evidence. As donors, how can we approach this basic problem? Well, part of this stagnation in the sector is that it doesn't respond how like consumer goods or, in general, a market economy respond. And so if you look at a phone like a product, we've had remarkable innovation. We've gone from this rotary dial landline phones to the iPhone X or something like that. And the reason is because there are market incentives to respond to the consumer. Well, the problem with the development sector is that the donor is the person who pays. But the recipient is the person who is affected. And so you don't see the same types of incentives exist to have the same type of innovation. And so you often see persistence in the same types of tools that we use again and again. And so somehow we have to become better donors. And so these are three questions you can use to force that and to force the organizations you're working with to be more and more responsive to the people you and they are trying to help. The first one is trying to understand what the end-to-end cost of the intervention is. How much of your donation actually ends up in value provided to the recipient at the end of the road? Now, there's lots of problems with overhead metrics and things like that. And this is not that. A problem with the sector is that it's heavily intermediated. And so one nonprofit will take your donation and give it to another nonprofit after sort of skimming a little bit off the top. They'll skim a little bit off the top for overhead and give it to another nonprofit. And even if the reported overhead is very low, each of those nonprofits only taking about 1%, the systemic overhead is extraordinarily high. If you have a chain of those nonprofits repeatedly subgranting to each other, the end value that's reaching the recipient is actually very, very low. And that's a practice that you see again and again and again in the sector. The next thing is evidence backing. Has there been an external randomized controlled trial of this sort of intervention the organization is implementing? How do we actually know that it works? And use the same standard you would want for a medicine you would take or a product that you would bet your life on. And lastly, there's this benchmark question. Is the funding you're providing to the organization and the program that they're implementing doing more good than the people you're actually trying to help could if you just gave them the cash? Now, there's plenty of interventions that might meet that standard-- very specialized medical interventions, for example, or cases where there's a public good problem-- infrastructure, or maybe rule of law. There's a particularly good giving opportunity there. But a lot of the things we're doing are trying to outspend the poor about things that they know far more about. And so I think a lot of the spending we're doing wouldn't meet this sort of basic test. I think the last thing that's worth pausing on before we go to Q and A and dig into a bunch of other things is why is it worth giving at all. And here I would say the existence of incredible opportunities to have impact. I think cash is one of those. But there's lots of other non-profits that are actually doing good work. Provides a pretty amazing opportunity to do something great with your life that almost as a side product of your day-to-day life by donating a certain small percent. Your life can be basically the same, except as a side product, you can dramatically change and better lives of people who are living in extreme poverty. And that's a cool opportunity to do with your 80 years on earth. And so I think despite the dark look on the sector, I think there is this incredible opportunity out there provided by good giving opportunities that make giving worth doing. And so with that, I'll turn it over to questions and looking forward to conversation. [APPLAUSE] SPEAKER 1: I actually want to start with just a question about your own role. So this is amazing work. I mean, for example, the Malawi thing, I just learned about that yesterday about HIV. So you keep learning new things about cash transfers, which are amazing. But I'm curious from the financial angle, what kind of unique problems-- I imagine there are some-- that GiveDirectly deals with that you're exposed to? JOE HUSTON: Yeah. In a lot of ways, it's focusing to just be able to spend most of your time on the cash pipeline. And so on the finance side, my job is to manage that entire pipeline from donor to the first bank it hits in the US to the foreign exchange transaction to get to Kenyan shillings or Rwandan francs, the bank it sits there, and then the getting to the mobile money provider and to the eventual recipient. And so the problems there are to first, make sure that that pipeline is as short as possible, that money moves through the system incredibly quickly. And so problems we're sort of working on within that domain are things like how do we project donations that we can keep field operations running basically just behind them so that the lag is very small? Second, how do we manage that cash prudently, make sure we're getting an interest where we should and things like that? And then third, making sure we're managing fraud, on the internal side with staff and things like that and externally with mobile money providers, with local government and things like that. And so the integrity of the pipeline is something I spend a lot of time on as well. SPEAKER 1: Cool. [INAUDIBLE] I'm actually going to set up the Dory. Just one moment. AUDIENCE: Yeah, I'll go. Hey. My question is about whether an organization like yours pays a different amount than a giant multinational corporation like Google does to change currencies? It seems like something that's really important to the flow of money in this organization. And I wonder if there's an opportunity for multinational corporations to help out not just by matching employees donations, but maybe to assist with currency exchange in the currencies that they're already exchanging in gigantic quantities on a very frequent basis. JOE HUSTON: Yeah, it's interesting. The history of what we have paid has changed. I think when we were first getting started, we were pretty naive. And so we were paying about a percent per transaction, which would be extremely high for developed world currencies. It's a little bit what you'd expect for the developing world currencies we're trading in. I think we've gotten better over time at competing different banks against each other. And so we have a US bank that quotes a rate. But we also competed against certain different local banks. And we've added different local banks over time to impart offer competition there, but also to offer credit risk hedges basically while we're holding the cash there. And so the total fees we're paying have dropped a ton over time. And so now we're only like a hair above 0% or something like that. That said, my guess is the Googles or something like that are probably being a step more clever. And so my guess is the same opportunities still probably exist. I don't know how the tool would work, the piggybacking off the transfers. But I bet there is something there in terms of, yeah, trying to be more clever. I think also as we've grown, we've become a bigger player. And in these markets, it's certainly the day we trade or something like that. And so I think that's helped in us getting better rates versus us getting first getting started. AUDIENCE: Thank you. SPEAKER 1: We can read from the first Dory question. So what are the best reasons, in your view, to be skeptical about basic income projects or policies? JOE HUSTON: Yeah, I think my biggest one, especially as it applies to the US or other places where basic income feels politically far, is that a UBI doesn't feel like a particularly useful North Star. That there is this sort of sense of a UBI as this Utopic policy. And because of its elegance or simplicity, there's a very good sense of what it should look like-- that it should be universal. It should be basic, which you could debate the exact number, but it's supposed to meet the basic needs. And so I think almost because it has this clear template for what you should do, in places where that template would be politically pretty hard to implement soon, it doesn't tell you what the incremental policy should be to get there. And so in the US, things that feel more tractable and maybe then more exciting are things like expand the ITC or have a child grant or something like that. And I worry a little bit that the UBI and UBI pilots that, including the directives that are sort of testing the Utopic version or the template version, aren't providing a lot of light on how to get there or on the pilots that should happen in the near-term on policies that are more likely in the US. I think for a lot of countries, a UBI could feel closer politically-- India might be one example-- for which the conversation and the pilots focusing on that template are actually pretty useful. But in the US, I worry a lot about the distraction factor-- that we've cut away the wonk class who care about poverty in the US and focus them on a policy that feels far. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. And EITC is their earned income tax credit. It's a very large cash transfer in the US. Also note in the comments of this question, there was a lot of discussion on inflation. So there was a study that was recently pursued from the Mexican cash transfer program. I don't know if you want to talk about that. But it seemed to find that there was not inflation. JOE HUSTON: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Or if you're familiar. JOE HUSTON: Yeah, yeah. And so Mexico was in that chart of the different cash transfer programs. They were one of the leading innovators both in implementing a cash transfer program in the developing world and in actually testing it. And so the US had different types of cash support before then. But they were really forward thinking as a government and working with academics to test the effects of cash transfers. And so they produced some of the early results on just how cash transfers work on the individual level. But then also a recent analysis of those programs found that you don't see the kind of doomsday things people are worried about in terms of a basic income or in general expanding cash transfer programs in terms of prices just going up a ton to totally offset the value of the cash. That's something that we've seen in a couple of other studies done evaluating that question. GiveDirectly's first study looked at a kind of village level and didn't see any effect on prices. A thing we have in works that we don't have results out is a study specifically designed to stress test that. And so we used our one time grants and randomized the concentration of GiveDirectly's enrollment within a large region. And so there were high concentration areas and very low concentration areas. And then as we delivered what was massive amounts of cash in the region, researchers looked at prices in local markets as well as quantity of goods supplied, local taxes, and school fee payments, these sorts of different kind of macro or community level effects. And so those are results I think we'll have out early next year or so that I hope can contribute to that debate as well. I think on the theory of it, a lot of the ways people talk about inflation, the Econ model is too simple. That they're sort of holding constant how much can be supplied. That a lot of times either big companies can respond to increases in demand by supplying more of the good. Or oftentimes in the developing world, something you see is the cash given increases the supply. And so an example could be you would be worried that you gave cash to an area. And the area in general likes consuming fish. And so the price of fish will go up. But the piece that you're missing is that often when people receive the cash, they buy boats or fishing nets or coolers to be middlemen between fishermen and markets. And so actually this quantity of supply of fish goes up as much or more. And so I think the model people use to answer and think about the inflation question has to not keep supply fixed when debating that part. AUDIENCE: Hello? Can I ask a question? AUDIENCE: Yes. OK, sorry. I would like to learn a little bit more about your UBI pilot in Kenya, you said. And I know we have already talked about UBI a little bit, but I guess there's a reason behind GiveDirectly jumping into basic income and you providing the service to 12,000 people, I think. And I'm always wondering how can you get from those results you're getting from the UBI, which is only paid to a fraction of people in the country, then to a more universal aspect where all people would receive it? And what are you hoping to learn? And do you have any results as of far? JOE HUSTON: Yes. And so when GiveDirectly was seeing the debate on UBI spike up again over the last couple of years, the thing we saw it was was a debate about how a particular type of cash transfer works. There is these questions on the pro side that it would enable different types of risk taking or entrepreneurship, help people live their lives better. On the con side, people were worried that people would stop working or spend it badly or things like that. And those questions are testable. And so like other people's launching pilots, we saw this was very much within our sweet spot to implement a cash transfer program and then work with researchers to test the results. The basic structure we used was to design to test what's unique about a UBI versus other cash transfer programs. And so in part to get at your-- a big piece of a UBI is that it's universal. And so we randomized at the village level with whole villages randomly assigned to receive cash or not. And then we also randomly assigned some villages to receive cash for 12 years and some villages to receive cash for two. Because a scaled up version of a UBI would be for your whole life. But a lot of the pilots that have been done and that are coming online are shorter term. And so potential research question you might have is can you extrapolate to how the incentives would actually be for people if they had that longer term security? Again, on the pro side and the con side. And so that full study just kicked off a couple of weeks ago. And so it'll be a little bit aways before we have results. The first end lines and things like that will be within the next year or so. So it won't be 12 years. But it will be a little bit of time. That said, about a year ago, we started providing payments in one kind of pilot village. And so it got to sort of ask people what it's like to receive a basic income. And obviously that's totally anecdotal. It shouldn't be confused with the RCT evidence. But even that was pretty interesting. I think if you ask people what it's like, you see the things that are consistent with the broader evidence. People spend it in a ton of different ways because they have different priorities. You saw a lot of spending on food, especially elderly people who couldn't work. Different types of investments in people's job or businesses, whether that's buying small amounts of capital for a shoe business I saw. People actually buying fishing nets. It's an area right on the edge of Lake Victoria. People investing in school fees. Secondary school isn't free in Kenya. Health and things like that. Some of the unique things were-- we were worried on the operational perspective, how people would perceive a UBI, a few different aspects of that. One of them is universality. Even though the village we're working in and the groups of villages we're working in are in absolute terms all very, very poor, there's still a different decent amount of income variation within those villages. And so in this particular one, the poorest people had walls you could essentially see through. And the whole house was made from organic materials-- mud and thatch and things like that. And the richest couple had a tractor. And so that's a remarkable distance in wealth and in income and things like that. And so one thing we asked people was just how do you feel that everyone's getting the same amount of cash support? Does it seem fair? Should GiveDirectly, as we often do, try to pick the poorest people in this village? And people responded pretty uniformly that they were like, we were glad you didn't try to meddle, that you didn't try to pick who should receive. And so was pretty interesting from a perceived fairness perspective about a UBI and connects to some of the debate people have about the stigmatization of receiving benefits or things like that. Another, again, qualitative thing we asked people about was whether individually targeted payments were OK. A kind of potential benefit of a UBI is that it frees people in relationships because each person has their own individual security. And so if a relationship is abusive or there's a bad power dynamic, somebody could leave or at least be on a more level playing field. The flip side, if you're a foreign organization, is that it could look like you're trying to break up families by insisting that each person has their own cell phone and their own stream of payments. And so we were worried that that would be perceived badly. Again, the surprise was that basically everyone said just the opposite, that individually targeted payments let people prioritize whatever was their top priority and made debates easier. There was this sense of he has his money, and I have my money. And we get to spend it on what we want. And so there's not as much of a-- for the UBI payments, a shared pool that has to be fought over. And so that was pretty interesting as well. AUDIENCE: Thank you. SPEAKER 1: And yeah, some of the negative income tax experiments in the 70s seemed at first to suggest that divorce rates went up. But subsequent analysis found that it didn't. So it's interesting how this individually versus family orientation isn't everything. AUDIENCE: I wanted to learn a little bit more about the evaluation of the cash transfer program. So firstly, I wanted to know how long you track people for after they've received the cash payment? And then in terms of logistics and scaling up, do you think that the evaluation model you have right now could be then used by, say, a USAID or one of the other big donors for evaluating? JOE HUSTON: Yeah. So it varies a lot by study. And so different studies are targeted towards different questions, which require a different time horizon. The basic template structure is first, external researchers. And so academics at places like MIT or Harvard who are helping design the study with us and external research surveying organization. And so it's not GiveDirectly staff asking people about their consumption patterns. It's different people from a different organization who don't have a relationship with us. It's important to pre-register the study. Basically say, we're going to do this study. Provide a pre-analysis plan, which says, we're going to answer these questions that help solve for cherry picking on the studies, as in not holding back studies that have bad results or no results, as well as cherry picking on the analysis, not redoing the analysis again and again until you get the results you want. After that, in terms of the horizon, again, that's varied a lot for us. We have one study that is going to have something like 18 month results out some early next year. But it's sort of queued up to track people for a decade or so in terms of the sample size and things like that. Because GiveDirectly is younger, our ability to have a super long horizon already done is harder. In the existing literature, the longest follow up is a paper in Uganda. That was that $400 cash grant I mentioned to use. And that's gone out to, I think, the eight year mark and found persistent results. And there's been a study in Sri Lanka that went out to five years and found-- it was cash transfers to small business people-- and found at the five year mark markedly different earnings even persisting to that level. On terms of scale, in part, the program we were doing with USAID is a good example of large funders are still able to run those types of randomized controlled trials. In many ways, the big con about RCTs is that they're expensive. You have to have giant samples. You have to be able to fund things like research costs and things like that. And so in many ways, large funders are best equipped to help implement them. SPEAKER 1: A quick follow up on that. So it seems like there have been some long term evaluations. Have there been long term treatments in the same way as that? I mean, certainly not in the cash transfer spaces is my understanding. But are you aware of others? JOE HUSTON: Right. SPEAKER 1: The 12 years is pretty remarkable. JOE HUSTON: Yeah. And so I think the examples-- what I haven't seen as much of is long term evaluation paired with long term treatment. The long term treatments I've seen are in places like Brazil and Mexico that have been targeted towards families with young children and provided conditional cash transfers to send their children to school and followed families for a long period as a result. And so getting into that decade-long type time period. And so I think we have seen examples of that. I haven't seen the, personally, the evaluation paired to check what is it like to receive cash for 12 years. But I do think we have seen examples of that long term treatment. SPEAKER 1: I think we had a question on the [? EPC ?] real quick. Are you still there? AUDIENCE: Yeah. I'm still here. I'm Krisna. I was just wondering how does GiveDirectly compare with basic education? The only other thing that I found having extraordinary effect is basic education. And, of course, [INAUDIBLE] high school. But how does it compare? How should I think of giving to GiveDirectly as giving for basic education? JOE HUSTON: This is GiveDirectly versus a basic education. Is that right? AUDIENCE: Yeah, exactly. Do any education charities working for getting girls in school or things like that? In developing countries, of course. JOE HUSTON: Yeah. And so I think the case for a basic education in a country or something like that is very good. And I think it's a good example of the type of public good or public infrastructure that is hard for cash to just replace. And so in many ways, I think they're not competitive and, in fact, are often complementary, that a big thing we see people consume when we give people cash are school fees to be able to go to school or school uniforms or school supplies or solar lights to light a home to do homework and things like that. And so I think there's a lot of complements in this ecosystem. That said, it's a giving opportunity. I think, especially for nonprofits, it's hard to be helpful providing a basic education. And so I think it's a hard thing to do. And so I don't know of a lot of really good giving opportunities to directly support basic education, even though I think it's a useful thing for our country to provide and it's an important thing for a country to have. It's similar to I think it's hard for nonprofits to build bridges or to build hospitals. That I think that those sorts of big lasting institutions you want to exist in societies are hard to provide through donated dollars. And so as concepts, I think they're complementary and both important. And I think as giving opportunities, the case for cash is a little bit better. AUDIENCE: Thank you. AUDIENCE: Hi. So I'm curious how you guys think about balancing your portfolio. So both geographically, how do you choose the locations you're going to deploy the programs to, and then how do you split between research programs and just funding the programs you already know work pretty well? I guess I'm also especially interested in the decision to start the program in Houston, which seems like an outlier in terms of how much money you gave per person and also how much that money can buy. So yeah, just how do you think about balancing your overall portfolio? JOE HUSTON: Yeah. And so in general, our mission is not to-- we don't have an expand mission. We don't have the goal of be in every country on Earth or provide every structure of cash transfer. We're pretty focused-- well, I'll talk about this Houston and Puerto Rico thing. But in general, we're pretty focused within East Africa. And each addition of a country is targeted towards a particular goal-- a research program that we think is especially valuable or important for policy impact. Against that kind of baseline, the way we evaluate new projects is I think a big potential value of cash transfers is the indirect effects on the sector. And there's a few different sectors, whether it's providing research that's especially useful for developing world governments in designing their own cash transfer programs, providing cash transfer structures that provide benchmarks for aid programs that exist around the world, or in general pushing on the debate about how we should help people. The Houston and Puerto Rico examples, we debated a lot internally. What we saw was basically an opportunity to connect different conversations. A weird thing that happens in conversations about giving and especially about cash is they can stay pretty disjointed. And so the basic income conversation can happen without referencing any of the papers within the developing world about a lot of what we already know about how cash transfers work. And so there can be remarkable ignorance about all of the things that have already been studied. We can sort of throw up our hands in Texas about how do we help people without any of this sort of sense of how helpful cash transfers can be in that type of situation. And so we sort of saw it as an opportunity to one, in part provide a set of pipes to deliver cash for donors who probably weren't going to give to East Africa otherwise. There were people who specifically wanted to give it to Texas or to Puerto Rico. And so we could provide that utility to enable that. And then two, provide the cash alternative in a new conversation that we hope will sort of carry over into the broader conversation in aid and in basic income or something like that. And so the bet here, I think, is that we can sort of connect conversations that are staying disparate and that there isn't otherwise an allocation from East Africa to Texas-- that there are different giving pools. And if that's the case, then it's absolutely the case that there should be some type of utility for people to give to Texas and to help those people better than existing opportunities had. SPEAKER 1: We'll move back to the Dory. This is a question I had, actually, which was about the savings compacts that were reported in this Fox article on the basic income experiment where people pool up their payments and give it to a single person so that they can engage in more capital intensive investments or things like that. It seems like that presents an opportunity for financial institutions or other changes. So curious to your thoughts on that. JOE HUSTON: Yeah. And so the quick slightly long explanation of what this is is in this UBI pilot village where people were receiving basic income payments, a thing people wanted to do was purchase big things, bigger than what their monthly check was. And so they formed different types of groups within the village and basically made a ledger of each person every month contributes some portion of their basic income payment. And one person every month receives all of those payments. And so it's a way to convert those stream payments into semi-recurring lump sum ones instead. In terms of financial institutions, I think people do have access. And so I think maybe the opportunity is like a sales one. And so M-Pesa is the mobile money provider in Kenya. And it has a ton of different savings and loan products built in. You can have basically a savings account on these feature phones, the same ones that have Snake and things like that. You can have a savings account. You can draw a loan through your M-Pesa account. Recently, they added the ability to buy government bonds, again, through these mobile money accounts, which is pretty neat. And so a question I have is whether or not you'll start to see a take up of that as the need or demand for these types of services persists. And maybe he'll build comfort. And then on the other side, there's a sort of potential for better outreach and things like that from financial institutions. There are also small banks and micro-finance companies in Kenya that I could see potentially moving in. I haven't seen that happen much yet, but I can totally buy that it could. Yep. SPEAKER 1: Would you guys be willing to, I mean, you're sort of underwriting these things at that point. Is there a written guarantee of the stream? JOE HUSTON: Right. Yeah, it's interesting. I don't know how to turn the GiveDirectly promise into something you could lend off of or something like that. It's a verbal guarantee. But maybe the sort of track record-- by year three or something like that-- enables that. I don't know. SPEAKER 1: So I think we're just about out of time, but one last question on the transfer efficiency of the basic income experiment relative to cash transfers and maybe long run expectations there. JOE HUSTON: Yeah. And so the different trade offs for the basic income experiment are there are more payments. And mobile money providers have a per payment fee. And so there is more payments per value distributed. And so mobile money fees are a little bit higher. We have to have our call center running longer per recipient because people are getting paid for two years. And so there's higher follow up costs. That said, the total value distributed is higher per recipient than our typical $1,000 payments. And the way that all nets is that the two-year arm is much less efficient. It's something like 75% or 80%. The 12-year arm is much more efficient. And the combination of those two, the weighted average across those different arms is about in that 88%, 90% range. The next question on efficiency was actually [? Harvey, ?] which is pretty interesting. And so we found the balance of costs are very different. Labor is a lot more expensive to sign people up for cash here than in East Africa. But there is zero effects for us and payments are cheaper. We're at the debit cards are basically zero fees for us and for the recipients. And so efficiency at the scale we'll be able to operate at is a little bit higher than our typical program. SPEAKER 1: Interesting. Great. Well, thank you so much for coming to Google. JOE HUSTON: Yeah, thank you so much for having me. [APPLAUSE]
A2 初級 米 ジョー・ヒューストン"GiveDirectly.現金給付、ベーシックインカム、ハリケーン救済」|Googleで講演 (Joe Huston: "GiveDirectly: Cash Transfers, Basic Income, and Hurricane Relief" | Talks at Google) 15 1 王惟惟 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日 シェア シェア 保存 報告 動画の中の単語