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  • Today, we turn to John Locke.

  • On the face of it, Locke is a powerful ally of the libertarian.

  • First, he believes, as libertarians today maintain,

  • that there are certain fundamental individual rights that are so important

  • that no government, even a representative government,

  • even a democratically elected government, can override them.

  • Not only that, he believes that those fundamental rights include

  • a natural right to life, liberty, and property,

  • and furthermore he argues that the right to property

  • is not just the creation of government or of law.

  • The right to property is a natural right in the sense

  • that it is prepolitical.

  • It is a right that attaches to individuals as human beings,

  • even before government comes on the scene,

  • even before parliaments and legislatures

  • enact laws to define rights and to enforce them.

  • Locke says in order to think about what it means to have a natural right,

  • we have to imagine the way things are

  • before government, before law, and that's what Locke means

  • by the state of nature.

  • He says the state of nature is a state of liberty.

  • Human beings are free and equal beings.

  • There is no natural hierarchy.

  • It's not the case that some people are born to be kings

  • and others are born to be serfs.

  • We are free and equal in the state of nature and yet,

  • he makes the point that there is a difference between

  • a state of liberty and a state of license.

  • And the reason is that even in the state of nature,

  • there is a kind of law.

  • It's not the kind of law that legislatures enact.

  • It's a law of nature. And this law of nature constrains

  • what we can do even though we are free,

  • even though we are in the state of nature.

  • Well what are the constraints?

  • The only constraint given by the law of nature

  • is that the rights we have, the natural rights we have

  • we can't give up nor can we take them

  • from somebody else.

  • Under the law of nature, I'm not free to take somebody else's

  • life or liberty or property, nor am I free to take

  • my own life or liberty or property.

  • Even though I am free, I'm not free to violate the law of nature.

  • I'm not free to take my own life or to sell my self into slavery

  • or to give to somebody else arbitrary absolute power over me.

  • So where does this constraint, you may think it's a fairly

  • minimal constraint, but where does it come from?

  • Well, Locke tells us where it comes from

  • and he gives two answers. Here is the first answer.

  • "For men, being all the workmanship of one omnipotent,

  • and infinitely wise maker," namely God,

  • "they are His property, whose workmanship they are,

  • made to last during His, not one another's, pleasure."

  • So one answer to the question is why can't I give up

  • my natural rights to life, liberty, and property is well,

  • they're not, strictly speaking, yours.

  • After all, you are the creature of God. God has a bigger property right in us,

  • a prior property right.

  • Now, you might say that's an unsatisfying,

  • unconvincing answer, at least for those

  • who don't believe in God.

  • What did Locke have to say to them? Well, here is where Locke appeals

  • to the idea of reason and this is the idea,

  • that if we properly reflect on what it means to be free,

  • we will be led to the conclusion that freedom can't just be a matter

  • of doing whatever we want.

  • I think this is what Locke means when he says, "The state of nature

  • has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone: and reason,

  • which is that law, teaches mankind who will but consult it

  • that all being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another

  • in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."

  • This leads to a puzzling paradoxical feature of Locke's

  • account of rights.

  • It's the idea that our natural rights are unalienable.

  • What does "unalienable" mean? It's not for us to alienate them

  • or to give them up, to give them away, to trade them away, to sell them.

  • Consider an airline ticket. Airline tickets are nontransferable.

  • Or tickets to the Patriots or to the Red Sox.

  • Nontransferable tickets are unalienable.

  • I own them in the limited sense that I can use them for myself,

  • but I can't trade them away. So in one sense, an unalienable right,

  • a nontransferable right makes something I own less fully mine.

  • But in another sense of unalienable rights,

  • especially where we're thinking about life, liberty, and property,

  • or a right to be unalienable makes it more deeply,

  • more profoundly mine, and that's Locke's sense

  • of unalienable.

  • We see it in the American Declaration of Independence.

  • Thomas Jefferson drew on this idea of Locke.

  • Unalienable rights to life, liberty, and as Jefferson amended Locke,

  • to the pursuit of happiness. Unalienable rights.

  • Rights that are so essentially mine

  • that even I can't trade them away or give them up.

  • So these are the rights we have in the state of nature

  • before there is any government.

  • In the case of life and liberty, I can't take my own life.

  • I can't sell myself into slavery any more than I can take

  • somebody else's life or take someone else

  • as a slave by force.

  • But how does that work in the case of property?

  • Because it's essential to Locke's case that private property can arise

  • even before there is any government.

  • How can there be a right to private property

  • even before there is any government?

  • Locke's famous answer comes in Section 27.

  • "Every man has a property in his own person.

  • This nobody has any right to but himself."

  • "The labor of his body and the work of his hands,

  • we may say, are properly his."

  • So he moves, as the libertarians later would move,

  • from the idea that we own ourselves, that we have property in our persons

  • to the closely connected idea that we own our own labor.

  • And from that to the further claim that whatever we mix our labor with

  • that is un-owned becomes our property.

  • "Whatever he removes out of the state that nature has provided,

  • and left it in, he has mixed his labor with,

  • and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby

  • makes it his property."

  • Why? Because the labor is the unquestionable property

  • of the laborer and therefore, no one but the laborer

  • can have a right to what is joined to or mixed with his labor.

  • And then he adds this important provision,

  • "at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others."

  • But we not only acquire our property in the fruits of the earth,

  • in the deer that we hunt, in the fish that we catch

  • but also if we till and plow and enclose the land and grow potatoes,

  • we own not only the potatoes but the land, the earth.

  • "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates

  • and can use the product of, so much is his property.

  • He by his labor encloses it from the commons.

  • So the idea that rights are unalienable seems to distance

  • Locke from the libertarian.

  • Libertarian wants to say we have an absolute property right

  • in ourselves and therefore, we can do with ourselves

  • whatever we want.

  • Locke is not a sturdy ally for that view.

  • In fact, he says if you take natural rights seriously,

  • you'll be led to the idea that there are certain constraints

  • on what we can do with our natural rights,

  • constraints given either by God or by reason reflecting

  • on what it means really to be free, and really to be free

  • means recognizing that our rights are unalienable.

  • So here is the difference between Locke and the libertarians.

  • But when it comes to Locke's account of private property,

  • he begins to look again like a pretty good ally

  • because his argument for private property begins

  • with the idea that we are the proprietors of our own person

  • and therefore, of our labor, and therefore,

  • of the fruits of our labor, including not only

  • the things we gather and hunt in the state of nature

  • but also we acquire our property right in the land that we enclose

  • and cultivate and improve.

  • There are some examples that can bring out the moral intuition

  • that our labor can take something that is unowned and make it ours,

  • though sometimes, there are disputes about this.

  • There is a debate among rich countries and developing countries

  • about trade-related intellectual property rights.

  • It came to a head recently over drug patent laws.

  • Western countries, and especially the United States say,

  • "We have a big pharmaceutical industry

  • that develops new drugs.

  • We want all countries in the world to agree

  • to respect the patents."

  • Then, there came along the AIDS crisis in South Africa,

  • and the American AIDS drugs were hugely expensive,

  • far more than could be afforded by most Africans.

  • So the South African government said,

  • "We are going to begin to buy a generic version of the AIDS

  • antiretroviral drug at a tiny fraction of the cost

  • because we can find an Indian manufacturing company

  • that figures out how the thing is made and produces it,

  • and for a tiny fraction of the cost, we can save lives

  • if we don't respect that patent."

  • And then the American government said,

  • "No, here is a company that invested research

  • and created this drug.

  • You can't just start mass producing these drugs without paying

  • a licensing fee."

  • And so there was a dispute and the pharmaceutical company

  • sued the South African government to try to prevent their buying

  • the cheap generic, as they saw it, pirated version of an AIDS drug.

  • And eventually, the pharmaceutical industry gave in and said,

  • "All right, you can do that."

  • But this dispute about what the rules of property should be,

  • of intellectual property of drug patenting, in a way,

  • is the last frontier of the state of nature because among nations

  • where there is no uniform law of patent rights and property rights,

  • it's up for grabs until, by some act of consent,

  • some international agreement, people enter into some settled rules.

  • What about Locke's account of private property

  • and how it can arise before government and before law

  • comes on the scene? Is it successful?

  • How many think it's pretty persuasive?

  • Raise your hand.

  • How many don't find it persuasive?

  • All right, let's hear from some critics.

  • What is wrong with Locke's account of how private property can arise

  • without consent? Yes?

  • Yes, I think it justifies European cultural norms as far as

  • when you look at how Native Americans may not have cultivated American land,

  • but by their arrival in the Americas, that contributed

  • to the development of America, which wouldn't have otherwise

  • necessarily happened then or by that specific group.

  • So you think that this is a defense, this defense of private property in land...

  • Yes, because it complicates original acquisition

  • if you only cite the arrival of foreigners that cultivated the land.

  • - I see. And what's your name? - Rochelle.

  • - Rochelle? - Yes.

  • Rochelle says this account of how property arises

  • would fit what was going on in North America during the time

  • of the European settlement.

  • Do you think, Rochelle, that it's a way of defending

  • the appropriation of the land?

  • Indeed, because I mean, he is also justifying

  • the glorious revolutions.

  • I don't think it's inconceivable that he is also justifying

  • colonization as well.

  • Well, that's an interesting historical suggestion

  • and I think there is a lot to be said for it.

  • What do you think of the validity of his argument though?

  • Because if you are right that this would justify the taking

  • of land in North America from Native Americans

  • who didn't enclose it, if it's a good argument,

  • then Locke's given us a justification for that.

  • If it's a bad argument, then Locke's given us a mere

  • rationalization that isn't morally defensible.

  • - I'm leaning to the second one... - You're leaning toward the second one.

  • But that's my opinion as well.

  • All right, well, then, let's hear if there is

  • a defender of Locke's account of private property,

  • and it would be interesting if they could address Rochelle's worry

  • that this is just a way of defending the appropriation

  • of land by the American colonists from the Native Americans

  • who didn't enclose it.

  • Is there someone who will defend Locke on that point?

  • Are you going to defend Locke?

  • Like, you're accusing him of justifying the European

  • basically massacre the Native Americans.

  • But who says he is defending it?

  • Maybe the European colonization isn't right.

  • You know, maybe it's the state of war that he talked about

  • in his Second Treatise, you know.

  • So the wars between the Native Americans and the colonists,

  • the settlers, that might have been a state of war that

  • we can only emerge from by an agreement or an act of consent

  • and that's what would have been required fairly to resolve...

  • Yes, and both sides would have had to agree to it and carry it out

  • and everything.

  • - But what about when, what's your name? - Dan.

  • But Dan, what about Rochelle says this argument in Section 27

  • and then in 32 about appropriating land,

  • that argument, if it's valid, would justify the settlers' appropriating

  • that land and excluding others from it,

  • you think that argument is a good argument?

  • Well, doesn't it kind of imply that the Native Americans

  • hadn't already done that?

  • Well, the Native Americans, as hunter-gatherers,

  • didn't actually enclose land.

  • So I think Rochelle is onto something there.

  • - What I want to... - Go ahead, Dan.

  • At the same time, he is saying that just by picking

  • an acorn or taking an apple or maybe killing a buffalo

  • on a certain amount of land, that makes it yours

  • because it's your labor and your labor would enclose that land.

  • So by that definition, maybe they didn't have fences

  • around little plots of land but didn't...

  • They were using it.

  • Yes. By Locke's definition, you can say...

  • So maybe by Locke's definition, the Native Americans

  • could have claimed a property right in the land itself.

  • Right, but they just didn't have Locke on their side, as she points out.

  • All right, good. Okay, that's good. One more defender of Locke. Go ahead.

  • Well, I mean, just to defend Locke,

  • he does say that there are some times in which

  • you can't take another person's land.

  • For example, you can't acquire a land that is common property so people,

  • in terms of the American Indians, I feel like they already have

  • civilizations themselves and they were using land in common.

  • So it's kind of like what an analogy to what he was talking about

  • with like the common English property. You can't take land that

  • everybody is sharing in common.

  • Oh, that's interesting. That's interesting.

  • And also, you can't take land unless you make sure

  • that there is as much land as possible left for other people to take as well.

  • So if you're taking common, so you have to make sure

  • that whenever you take land that there is enough left

  • - for other people to use... - Right.

  • That's just as good as the land that you took, so...

  • That's true. Locke says there has to be this right

  • to private property in the earth is subject to the provision

  • that there be as much and as good left for others.

  • - What's your name? - Right. I'm Feng.

  • So Feng, in a way, agrees with Dan that maybe there is

  • a claim within Locke's framework that could be developed on behalf

  • of the Native Americans. Here is the further question.

  • If the right to private property is natural, not conventional,

  • if it's something that we acquire even before we agree to government,

  • how does that right constrain what a legitimate government can do?

  • In order, finally, to see whether Locke is an ally

  • or potentially a critic of the libertarian idea of the state,

  • we have to ask what becomes of our natural rights

  • once we enter into society.

  • We know that the way we enter into society is by consent, by agreement

  • to leave the state of nature and to be governed by the majority

  • and by a system of laws, human laws.

  • But those human laws are only legitimate

  • if they respect our natural rights, if they respect our unalienable rights

  • to life, liberty, and property. No parliament, no legislature,

  • however democratic its credentials, can legitimately violate

  • our natural rights.

  • This idea that no law can violate our right to life, liberty, and property

  • would seem to support the idea of a government so limited

  • that it would gladden the heart of the libertarian after all.

  • But those hearts should not be so quickly gladdened because

  • even though for Locke, the law of nature persists

  • once government arrives, even though Locke insists

  • on limited government, government limited by the end

  • for which it was created, namely the preservation of property,

  • even so, there is an important sense in which what counts as my property,

  • what counts as respecting my life and liberty

  • are for the government to define.

  • That there be property, that there be respect

  • for life and liberty is what limits government.

  • But what counts as respecting my life and respecting my property,

  • that is for governments to decide and to define.

  • How can that be?

  • Is Locke contradicting himself or

  • is there an important distinction here?

  • In order to answer that question, which will decide Locke's fit

  • with the libertarian view, we need to look closely

  • at what legitimate government looks like for Locke,

  • and we turn to that next time.

  • Nicola, if you didn't think you'd get caught,

  • would you pay your taxes?

  • I don't think so. I would rather have a system

  • personally that I could give money to exactly those sections

  • of the government that I support and not just blanket support of it.

  • You'd rather be in the state of nature,

  • at least on April 15th.

  • Last time, we began to discuss Locke's state of nature,

  • his account of private property, his theory of legitimate government,

  • which is government based on consent and also limited government.

  • Locke believes in certain fundamental rights that constrain

  • what government can do, and he believes that those rights

  • are natural rights, not rights that flow from law

  • or from government.

  • And so Locke's great philosophical experiment

  • is to see if he can give an account of how there could be a right

  • to private property without consent before government and legislators

  • arrive on the scene to define property.

  • That's his question. That's his claim.

  • There is a way Locke argues to create property,

  • not just in the things we gather and hunt,

  • but in the land itself, provided there is enough

  • and as good left for others.

  • Today, I want to turn to the question of consent,

  • which is Locke's second big idea.

  • Private property is one; consent is the other.

  • What is the work of consent?

  • People here have been invoking the idea of consent

  • since we began since the first week.

  • Do you remember when we were talking about

  • pushing the fat man off the bridge, someone said,

  • "But he didn't agree to sacrifice himself.

  • It would be different if he consented."

  • Or when we were talking about the cabin boy,

  • killing and eating the cabin boy.

  • Some people said, "Well, if they had consented

  • to a lottery, it would be different.

  • Then it would be all right."

  • So consent has come up a lot and here in John Locke,

  • we have one of the great philosophers of consent.

  • Consent is an obvious familiar idea in moral

  • and political philosophy.

  • Locke says that legitimate government is government founded

  • on consent and who, nowadays, would disagree with him?

  • Sometimes, when the ideas of political philosophers

  • are as familiar as Locke's ideas about consent,

  • it's hard to make sense of them or at least to find them very interesting.

  • But there are some puzzles, some strange features

  • of Locke's account of consent

  • as the basis of legitimate government

  • and that's what I'd like to take up today.

  • One way of testing the plausibility of Locke's idea

  • of consent and also of probing some of its perplexities

  • is to ask just what a legitimate government

  • founded on consent can do, what are its powers

  • according to Locke.

  • Well, in order to answer that question,

  • it helps to remember what the state of nature is like.

  • Remember, the state of nature is the condition that

  • we decide to leave, and that's what gives rise to consent.

  • Why not stay there? Why bother with government at all?

  • Well, what is Locke's answer to that question?

  • He says there are some inconveniences in the state of nature

  • but what are those inconveniences?

  • The main inconvenience is that everyone can enforce

  • the law of nature.

  • Everyone is an enforcer, or what Locke calls

  • "the executor" of the state of nature, and he means executor literally.

  • If someone violates the law of nature,

  • he is an aggressor. He is beyond reason

  • and you can punish him.

  • And you don't have to be too careful or fine about

  • gradations of punishment in the state of nature.

  • You can kill him. You can certainly kill

  • someone who comes after you, who tries to murder you.

  • That's self defense.

  • But the enforcement power, the right to punish,

  • everyone can do the punishing in the state of nature.

  • And not only can you punish with death people

  • who come after you seeking to take your life,

  • you can also punish a thief who tries to steal your goods

  • because that also counts as aggression against

  • the law of nature.

  • If someone has stolen from a third party,

  • you can go after him. Why is this?

  • Well, violations of the law of nature are an act of aggression.

  • There is no police force. There are no judges, no juries,

  • so everyone is the judge in his or her own case.

  • And Locke observes that when people are the judges

  • of their own cases, they tend to get carried away,

  • and this gives rise to the inconvenience

  • in the state of nature.

  • People overshoot the mark. There is aggression.

  • There is punishment and before you know it,

  • everybody is insecure in the enjoyment of his or her

  • unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property.

  • Now, he describes in pretty harsh and even grim terms

  • what you can do to people who violate the law of nature.

  • "One may destroy a man who makes war upon him ...

  • for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion.

  • Such men have no other rule, but that of force and violence,"

  • listen to this, "and so may be treated as beasts of prey,

  • those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to

  • destroy to you if you fall into their power", so kill them first.

  • So, what starts out as a seemingly benign state of nature

  • where everyone is free and yet where there is a law

  • and the law respects people's rights, and those rights are so powerful

  • that they're unalienable.

  • What starts out looking very benign, once you look closer,

  • is pretty fierce and filled with violence,

  • and that's why people want to leave.

  • How do they leave? Well, here is where consent comes in.

  • The only way to escape from the state of nature

  • is to undertake an act of consent where you agree to give up

  • the enforcement power and to create a government

  • or a community where there will be a legislature to make law

  • and where everyone agrees in advance, everyone who enters,

  • agrees in advance to abide by whatever the majority decides.

  • But then the question, and this is our question

  • and here is where I want to get your views,

  • then the question is what powers, what can the majority decide?

  • Now, here, it gets tricky for Locke because you remember

  • alongside the whole story about consent and majority rule,

  • there are these natural rights, the law of nature,

  • these unalienable rights, and you remember,

  • they don't disappear when people join together to create a civil society.

  • So even once the majority is in charge,

  • the majority can't violate your inalienable rights,

  • can't violate your fundamental right to life,

  • liberty, and property.

  • So here is the puzzle.

  • How much power does the majority have?

  • How limited is the government created by consent?

  • It's limited by the obligation on the part of the majority to respect

  • and to enforce the fundamental natural rights of the citizens.

  • They don't give those up. We don't give those up

  • when we enter government.

  • That's this powerful idea taken over from Locke

  • by Jefferson in the Declaration. Unalienable rights.

  • So, let's go to our two cases. Remember Michael Jordan, Bill Gates,

  • the libertarian objection to taxation for redistribution?

  • Well, what about Locke's limited government?

  • Is there anyone who thinks that Locke does give grounds

  • for opposing taxation for redistribution?

  • Anybody? Go ahead.

  • If the majority rules that there should be taxation,

  • even if the minority should still not have to be taxed

  • because that's taking away property, which is one of the rights of nature.

  • - All right so, and what's your name? - Ben.

  • Ben. So if the majority taxes the minority

  • without the consent of the minority

  • to that particular tax law, it does amount to a taking

  • of their property without their consent

  • and it would seem that Locke should object to that.

  • You want some textual support for your view,

  • for your reading of Locke, Ben?

  • Sure.

  • All right. I brought some along just in case you raised it.

  • If you have your texts, look at 138, passage 138.

  • "The supreme power," by which Locke means the legislature,

  • "cannot take from any man any part of his property

  • without his own consent, for the preservation of property

  • being the end of government and that for which men

  • enter into society, it necessarily supposes

  • and requires that people should have property."

  • That was the whole reason for entering society

  • in the first place, to protect the right to property.

  • And when Locke speaks about the right to property,

  • he often uses that as a kind of global term for the whole category,

  • the right to life, liberty, and property.

  • So that part of Locke, that beginning of 138,

  • seems to support Ben's reading. But what about the part of 138,

  • if you keep reading, "Men, therefore, in society

  • having property, they have such a right to the goods,

  • which by the law of the community are theirs."

  • Look at this.

  • "And that no one can take from them without their consent."

  • And then at the end of this passage, he says,

  • "So it's a mistake to think that the legislative power can do

  • what it will and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily

  • or take any part of them at pleasure."

  • Here's what's elusive.

  • On the one hand, he says the government

  • can't take your property without your consent.

  • He is clear about that. But then he goes on to say,

  • and that's the natural right to property.

  • But then, it seems that property, what counts as property

  • is not natural but conventional

  • defined by the government.

  • "The goods of which by the law of the community are theirs."

  • And the plot thickens if you look ahead to Section 140.

  • In 140, he says, "Governments can't be supported

  • without great charge.

  • Government is expensive and it's fit that everyone

  • who enjoys his share of the protection

  • should pay out of his estate."

  • And then here is the crucial line. "But still, it must be

  • with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority,

  • giving it either by themselves,

  • or through their representatives." So what is Locke actually saying?

  • Property is natural in one sense but conventional in another.

  • It's natural in the sense that we have a fundamental

  • unalienable right that there be property,

  • that the institution of property exist and be respected

  • by the government.

  • So an arbitrary taking of property would be a violation

  • of the law of nature and would be illegitimate.

  • But it's a further question, here is the conventional

  • aspect of property, it's a further question

  • what counts as property, how it's defined and what counts

  • as taking property, and that's up to the government.

  • So the consent, here, we're coming back

  • to our question, what is the work of consent?

  • What it takes for taxation to be legitimate

  • is that it be by consent, not the consent of Bill Gates himself

  • if he is the one who has to pay the tax,

  • but by the consent that he and we,

  • all of us within the society, gave when we emerged

  • from the state of nature and created the government

  • in the first place. It's the collective consent.

  • And by that reading, it looks like consent is doing

  • a whole lot and the limited government consent creates

  • isn't all that limited.

  • Does anyone want to respond to that or have a question about that?

  • Go ahead. Stand up.

  • Well, I'm just wondering what Locke's view is on

  • once you have a government that's already in place,

  • whether it is possible for people who are born

  • into that government to then leave and return

  • to the state of nature? I mean, I don't think

  • that Locke mentioned that at all in the...

  • What do you think?

  • Well, I think, as the convention, it would be very difficult to leave

  • the government because you are no longer,

  • because nobody else is just living in the state of nature.

  • Everybody else is now governed by this legislature.

  • What would it mean today, you're asking.

  • - And what's your name? - Nicola.

  • Nicola, to leave the state. Supposed you wanted to leave

  • civil society today. You want to withdraw your consent

  • and return to the state of nature.

  • Well, because you didn't actually consent to it.

  • You were just born into it. It was your ancestors who joined.

  • Right. You didn't sign the social contract. I didn't sign it.

  • Exactly.

  • All right, so what does Locke say there? Yes?

  • I don't think Locke says you have to sign anything.

  • I think that he says that it's kind of implied consent.

  • Implied?

  • Taking government's services, you are implying that

  • you are consenting to the government

  • taking things from you.

  • All right, so implied consent. That's a partial answer

  • to this challenge. Now, you may not think

  • that implied consent is as good as the real thing.

  • Is that what you're shaking your head about, Nicola?

  • Speak up. Stand up and speak up.

  • I don't think that necessarily just by utilizing the government's

  • various resources that we are necessarily implying that

  • we agree with the way that this government was formed

  • or that we have consented to actually join into the social contract.

  • So you don't think the idea of implied consent

  • is strong enough to generate any obligation at all to obey

  • the government?

  • Not necessarily, no.

  • Nicola, if you didn't think you'd get caught,

  • would you pay your taxes?

  • I don't think so. I would rather have a system, personally,

  • that I could give money to exactly those sections

  • of the government that I support

  • and not just blanket support of it.

  • You'd rather be in the state of nature,

  • at least on April 15th.

  • But what I'm trying to get at is do you consider that

  • you are under no obligation, since you haven't actually entered

  • into any act of consent, but for prudential reasons,

  • you do what you're supposed o do according to the law?

  • Exactly.

  • If you look at it that way, then you're violating another one

  • of Locke's treatises, which is that you can't take

  • anything from anyone else. Like, you can't take the government's

  • services and then not give them anything in return.

  • If you want to go live in the state of nature, that's fine,

  • but you can't take anything from the government

  • because by the government's terms, which are the only terms

  • under which you can enter the agreement,

  • say that you have to pay taxes to take those things.

  • So you are saying that Nicola can go back into the state of nature

  • if she wants to but she can't drive on Mass. Ave.?

  • Exactly.

  • I want to raise the stakes beyond using Mass. Ave.

  • and even beyond taxation.

  • What about life? What about military conscription?

  • Yes, what do you say? Stand up.

  • First of all, we have to remember that sending people to war

  • is not necessarily implying that they'll die.

  • I mean, obviously, you're not raising their chances here

  • but it's not a death penalty.

  • So if you're going to discuss whether or not

  • military conscription is equivalent to suppressing

  • people's right to life, you shouldn't approach it that way.

  • Secondly, the real problem here is Locke has this view

  • about consent and natural rights. But you're not allowed to give up

  • your natural rights either. So the real question is

  • how does he himself figure it out between

  • "I agree to give up my life, give up my property"

  • when he talks about taxes or military conscription for the fact.

  • But I guess Locke would be against suicide,

  • and that's still my own consent. I agree by taking my life.

  • - All right, good. All right, what's your name? - Eric.

  • So Eric brings us back to the puzzle we've been

  • wrestling with since we started reading Locke.

  • On the one hand, we have these unalienable rights

  • to life, liberty, and property, which means that even we

  • don't have the power to give them up,

  • and that's what creates the limits on legitimate government.

  • It's not what we consent to that limits government.

  • It's what we lack the power to give away

  • when we consent, that limits government.

  • That's the point at the heart of Locke's whole account

  • of legitimate government.

  • But now, you say, "well, if we can't give up our own life,

  • if we can't commit suicide, if we can't give up our right

  • to property, how can we then agree

  • to be bound by a majority that will force us to sacrifice

  • our lives or give up our property"?

  • Does Locke have a way out of this or is he basically

  • sanctioning an all-powerful government,

  • despite everything he says about unalienable rights?

  • Does he have a way out of it? Who would speak here

  • in defense of Locke or make sense, find a way out of this predicament?

  • - Yes. - All right, go ahead.

  • I feel like there is a general distinction we made between

  • the right to life that individuals possess

  • and the fact that the government cannot take away

  • a single individual's right to life.

  • I think if you look at conscription as the government picking out

  • certain individuals to go fight in war, then that would be a violation

  • of their natural right to life. On the other hand,

  • if you have conscription, let's say a lottery for example,

  • then in that case I would view that as the population picking

  • their representatives to defend them in the case of war,

  • the idea being that since the whole population

  • cannot go out there to defend its own right to property,

  • it picks its own representatives through a process that's essentially

  • random and then these sort of elected representatives

  • go out and fight for the rights of the people.

  • It works very similar, it works just like

  • an elected government, in my opinion.

  • All right, so an elected government can conscript citizens

  • to go out and defend the way of life,

  • the community that makes the enjoyment of rights possible?

  • I think it can. Because to me, it seems that it's very similar

  • to the process of electing representatives for legislature.

  • Although here, it's as if the government

  • is electing by conscription certain citizens to go die

  • for the sake of the whole. Is that consistent with respect

  • for a natural right to liberty?

  • Well, what I would say there is there is a distinction

  • between picking out individuals and having a random

  • choice of individuals. Like...

  • Between picking out... let me make sure,

  • between picking out individuals, let me... what's your name?

  • Gokul.

  • Gokul says there's a difference between picking out individuals

  • to lay down their lives and having a general law.

  • I think this is the answer Locke would give, actually, Gokul.

  • Locke is against arbitrary government.

  • He is against the arbitrary taking, the singling out of Bill Gates

  • to finance the war in Iraq. He is against singling out

  • a particular citizen or group of people

  • to go off and fight. But if there is a general law

  • such that the government's choice,

  • the majority's action is non-arbitrary,

  • it doesn't really amount to a violation of people's basic rights.

  • What does count as a violation is an arbitrary taking

  • because that would essentially say, not only to Bill Gates,

  • but to everyone, there is no rule of law.

  • There is no institution of property. Because at the whim of the king,

  • or for that matter, of the parliament,

  • we can name you or you to give up your property

  • or to give up your life. But so long as there is

  • a non-arbitrary rule of law, then it's permissible.

  • Now, you may say this doesn't amount to a very limited government,

  • and the libertarian may complain that Locke is not

  • such a terrific ally after all.

  • The libertarian has two grounds for disappointment in Locke.

  • First, that the rights are unalienable and therefore,

  • I don't really own myself after all.

  • I can't dispose of my life or my liberty or my property

  • in a way that violates my rights. That's disappointment number one.

  • Disappointment number two, once there is a legitimate government

  • based on consent, the only limits for Locke

  • are limits on arbitrary takings of life or of liberty or of property.

  • But if the majority decides, if the majority promulgates

  • a generally applicable law and if it votes duly according

  • to fair procedures, then there is no violation,

  • whether it's a system of taxation or a system of conscription.

  • So it's clear that Locke is worried

  • about the absolute arbitrary power of kings,

  • but it's also true, and here is the

  • darker side of Locke, that this great theorist of consent

  • came up with a theory of private property

  • that didn't require consent that may,

  • and this goes back to the point Rochelle made last time,

  • may have had something to do with Locke's second concern,

  • which was America.

  • You remember, when he talks about

  • the state of nature, he is not talking about

  • an imaginary place. "In the beginning," he says,

  • "All the world was America." And what was going on in America?

  • The settlers were enclosing land and engaged in wars

  • with the Native Americans.

  • Locke, who was an administrator of one of the colonies,

  • may have been as interested in providing a justification

  • for private property through enclosure without consent

  • through enclosure and cultivation, as he was with developing a theory

  • of government based on consent that would rein in kings

  • and arbitrary rulers.

  • The question we're left with, the fundamental question

  • we still haven't answered is what then becomes of consent?

  • What work can it do? What is its moral force?

  • What are the limits of consent? Consent matters not only

  • for governments, but also for markets.

  • And beginning next time, we're going to take up questions

  • of the limits of consent in the buying and selling of goods.

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Today, we turn to John Locke.

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正義を貫くためにはどうすればいいのか 第4話:自分のテリトリーにある法定年齢の大人たち (公正 该如何做是好 第四集 我的地盘我做主 满合法年龄的成年人)

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