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  • It's a good day to be a pirate.

  • Amaro and his four mateys,

  • Bart,

  • Charlotte,

  • Daniel,

  • and Eliza

  • have struck gold:

  • a chest with 100 coins.

  • But now, they must divvy up the booty according to the pirate code.

  • As captain, Amaro gets to propose how to distribute the coins.

  • Then, each pirate, including Amaro himself,

  • gets to vote either yarr or nay.

  • If the vote passes, or if there's a tie, the coins are divided according to plan.

  • But if the majority votes nay,

  • Amaro must walk the plank

  • and Bart becomes captain.

  • Then, Bart gets to propose a new distribution

  • and all remaining pirates vote again.

  • If his plan is rejected, he walks the plank, too,

  • and Charlotte takes his place.

  • This process repeats,

  • with the captain's hat moving to Daniel and then Eliza

  • until either a proposal is accepted or there's only one pirate left.

  • Naturally, each pirate wants to stay alive while getting as much gold as possible.

  • But being pirates, none of them trust each other,

  • so they can't collaborate in advance.

  • And being blood-thirsty pirates,

  • if anyone thinks they'll end up with the same amount of gold either way,

  • they'll vote to make the captain walk the plank just for fun.

  • Finally, each pirate is excellent at logical deduction

  • and knows that the others are, too.

  • What distribution should Amaro propose to make sure he lives?

  • Pause here if you want to figure it out for yourself!

  • Answer in: 3

  • Answer in: 2

  • Answer in: 1

  • If we follow our intuition,

  • it seems like Amaro should try to bribe the other pirates with most of the gold

  • to increase the chances of his plan being accepted.

  • But it turns out he can do much better than that. Why?

  • Like we said, the pirates all know each other to be top-notch logicians.

  • So when each votes, they won't just be thinking about the current proposal,

  • but about all possible outcomes down the line.

  • And because the rank order is known in advance,

  • each can accurately predict how the others would vote in any situation

  • and adjust their own votes accordingly.

  • Because Eliza's last, she has the most outcomes to consider,

  • so let's start by following her thought process.

  • She'd reason this out by working backwards from the last possible scenario

  • with only her and Daniel remaining.

  • Daniel would obviously propose to keep all the gold

  • and Eliza's one vote would not be enough to override him,

  • so Eliza wants to avoid this situation at all costs.

  • Now we move to the previous decision point

  • with three pirates left and Charlotte making the proposal.

  • Everyone knows that if she's outvoted, the decision moves to Daniel,

  • who will then get all the gold while Eliza gets nothing.

  • So to secure Eliza's vote,

  • Charlotte only needs to offer her slightly more than nothing, one coin.

  • Since this ensures her support,

  • Charlotte doesn't need to offer Daniel anything at all.

  • What if there are four pirates?

  • As captain, Bart would still only need one other vote for his plan to pass.

  • He knows that Daniel wouldn't want the decision to pass to Charlotte,

  • so he would offer Daniel one coin for his support

  • with nothing for Charlotte or Eliza.

  • Now we're back at the initial vote with all five pirates standing.

  • Having considered all the other scenarios,

  • Amaro knows that if he goes overboard,

  • the decision comes down to Bart,

  • which would be bad news for Charlotte and Eliza.

  • So he offers them one coin each, keeping 98 for himself.

  • Bart and Daniel vote nay,

  • but Charlotte and Eliza grudgingly vote yarr

  • knowing that the alternative would be worse for them.

  • The pirate game involves some interesting concepts from game theory.

  • One is the concept of common knowledge

  • where each person is aware of what the others know

  • and uses this to predict their reasoning.

  • And the final distribution is an example of a Nash equilibrium

  • where each player knows every other players' strategy

  • and chooses theirs accordingly.

  • Even though it may lead to a worse outcome for everyone

  • than cooperating would,

  • no individual player can benefit by changing their strategy.

  • So it looks like Amaro gets to keep most of the gold,

  • and the other pirates might need to find better ways

  • to use those impressive logic skills,

  • like revising this absurd pirate code.

It's a good day to be a pirate.

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B1 中級

TED-ED】海賊の謎が解ける?- アレックス・ゲンドラー (【TED-Ed】Can you solve the pirate riddle? - Alex Gendler)

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    Steven Wu に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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