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  • » NEIL SMITH: What I remember from those days is how textual

  • the discussion was.

  • And my sense from talking with students here

  • is that while that's still a core of what you're trying to do with the book,

  • that the

  • way you're teaching it has really evolved

  • and changed in its own way.

  • And, in one sense it's a much larger, it's no longer just around a small seminar table

  • where you're having a reading group, it's a much larger group. You've certainly got a lot of the same mix of

  • academics, students, faculty, activists, and so on who are involved in it.

  • But at the same time my sense is that your approach to the

  • book has changed somewhat too. So I wonder if you might want to try and

  • spin that out a bit. » DAVID HARVEY: One of the great things about doing this all this time-

  • and when you think about it,

  • teaching the same book for nearly forty years sounds like an incredibly boring thing to do.

  • And most people, if they taught the same course for forty years,

  • would go nuts

  • just doing it. But

  • every time I go through it I find a fresh angle on it.

  • And the fresh angle is sometimes something I didn't see in the text before which now jumps out

  • at me as being very significant.

  • And the other thing that happens is that circumstances change,

  • people's interests change,

  • the intellectual background with which they come to

  • Capital changes, so

  • actually taking this text and sort of,

  • putting it with

  • the changing historical and geographical circumstances is actuallyactually in itself,

  • a very interesting exercise. I've always found a great deal of excitement about that.

  • But the other thing that happens is that,

  • there are many things I see in the book now which I didn't see before - in part

  • because I've gone through it with so many different people seeing it from different angles,

  • that I start to see it from their angle, and then and I see things that I didn't see before.

  • But partly also because I think my own intellectual interests have grown and shifted

  • and therefore,

  • in a sense I'm

  • changing the way in which I think about Capital and teach Capital, depending very much on

  • the kind of circumstances that I'm writing about today.

  • [Music]

  • I'm curious to know how many of you

  • actually read these two chapters?

  • Wow. How many didn't?

  • Don't do it again.

  • One of things I suggested last time was,

  • a good idea when you're looking at

  • a particular section, to

  • go over what the main idea is, because that way you can chart your way

  • through what's going on.

  • And last time we dealt with

  • section one

  • of Chapter One

  • and I suggested that you could decompose this into a very simple

  • sort of structure

  • which looks like this.

  • Marx starts with the commodity

  • as the foundation

  • for his investigation of a capitalist mode of production,

  • immediately suggests

  • it has a dual character: it has a use-value

  • and it has an exchange-value.

  • The mystery about the exchange-value was that the tremendous heterogeneity which existed

  • of use-values is somehow or other rendered

  • compatible, commensurable.

  • And so

  • Marx argues there must be something that lies behind

  • exchange-value which explains that commensurability.

  • And what it is that lies behind is the notion of value.

  • And he defines that as

  • socially necessary labour time.

  • In order to be socially necessary

  • the labour expended on something has to be a use-value for someone.

  • So Marx reconnects

  • to use-value and so you start to see value

  • as a coming together of both use-value and exchange-value in the concept of social necessary labour time.

  • Now if you ask yourself this question of what is the structure of the

  • next two sections,

  • they go something like this:

  • He concentrates on

  • labour time.

  • He's already

  • distinguished between

  • the tremendous variety of labour times that might be actually spent

  • and something which he calls abstract labour.

  • So here he takes a concept which was just simply

  • referred to in the first section

  • and splits it out and says, well, socially necessary labour time

  • has two aspects:

  • concrete labour

  • and abstract labour,

  • and he talks about the difference between the two.

  • But in the end there's only one labour process, it's not as if one labour process is doing the concrete

  • and one's doing the abstract.

  • No, there's one labour process and it has this dual character.

  • It is both concrete, and it is abstract.

  • The question is how do you find out

  • what the abstract value is in the commodities which you've produced?

  • And the answer to that can only be found at the moment when

  • abstract and concrete labour come together at the moment of exchange.

  • So we're now going to look at exchange and the way in which exchange generates a way

  • of expressing value,

  • representing value, because we know that value is a social relation,

  • therefore it's immaterial.

  • So what we got out of exchange, coming out of exchange, is

  • a duality again.

  • Relative and equivalent forms of value.

  • And these relative and equivalent forms of value eventually coalesce at the end of this

  • long, and in my opinion and somewhat turgid, third section

  • into the idea that there is

  • a way in which value gets expressed.

  • And it gets expressed

  • in the form of a money commodity.

  • You want to take this further into the next section, the money commodity conceals something,

  • it conceals the social relations.

  • So the next section is about

  • the way in which

  • there are social relations between things, and material

  • relations between people.

  • Now you can see a certain pattern

  • emerging here in the nature of the argument.

  • There is an unfolding going on.

  • There is an expansion of the argument going on.

  • And actually if you look at the logical structure

  • of the argument in Capital you see it is in continuous expansion of this kind.

  • Now the classic way of thinking of the Hegelian logic is of course

  • thesis-antithesis-synthesis.

  • But these are not synthetic points.

  • These are points which internalize a tension,

  • a contradiction

  • that needs to be

  • further expanded and looked at.

  • In this section, the first section,

  • we have the argument that there is a distinction between abstract and concrete labour, but now

  • we expand it.

  • And out of that comes an understanding of how

  • exchange processes produce a representation of value

  • in the money commodity,

  • the money form,

  • the universal equivalent, as he puts it.

  • So you see how this process

  • of representation unfolds in Capital.

  • But of course at each point

  • in this he's going to make many other observations.

  • This, if you like, is the sort of

  • skeletal structure of the argument. But as he built his argument he builds in

  • extra elements.

  • And as those extra elements are built in,

  • so what we see is a gradual

  • expansion not only in the terms of this kind of linear way that it sort of expands

  • in this way as well. It goes from

  • a very narrow conception of the commodity to a broader and broader and broader conception

  • as he works through these different elements.

  • So let's look very concretely then at

  • this section two.

  • He starts off on page hundred and thirty-two

  • where he makes the very modest claim that "I was the first

  • to point out and examine critically this twofold nature of the labour contained in commodities.

  • As this point is crucial to an understanding of political economy, it requires further elucidation."

  • This is a polite way of saying:

  • to the degree that classical political economy never made this distinction,

  • they got their political economy all wrong,

  • and I'm going to get it right because this distinction is fundamental.

  • Now the first part looks at concrete labour

  • and in much the same way that he's looking at the heterogeneity of use-values,

  • he's looking at the immense heterogeneities of

  • concrete labour processes,

  • producing different items- shirts and shoes and apples and pears

  • and all the rest of it,

  • different skills involved

  • different techniques involved, different raw materials involved,

  • and, therefore, the labour process is itself heterogeneous.

  • It is not simply that you're producing heterogeneous products

  • you're also witnessing a heterogeneity of labour processes,

  • spinning and weaving,

  • shoe making and bread baking and all the rest of it, call for different skills that

  • the heterogeneity of it is simply stunning.

  • So he goes over that heterogeneity.

  • In the process however

  • he makes one move to broaden the argument.

  • And that move is, I think, of singular importance

  • and this move occurs at the bottom of page hundred and thirty-three,

  • well about halfway down, he says:

  • "Labour, then, as the creator of use-values as useful labour

  • is a condition of human existence

  • which is independent of all forms of society."

  • Now, usually you don't

  • find Marx saying that in Capital, because he's interested only in how things work under

  • capitalism. But here he is saying

  • use-values have to be produced no matter what kind of society you're in.

  • He says "it is an eternal natural necessity

  • which mediates the metabolism between man and nature and, therefore, human life itself."

  • What we're doing here

  • is at this point, we're introducing

  • the whole idea of a metabolic relation to nature

  • as being something which has to be integrated into the argument,

  • integrated into the analysis.

  • He doesn't pay that much attention to this in Capital, but

  • the point of him making this statement here is to say:

  • there's no way which you can examine

  • this whole process without actually looking at this

  • metabolic relation to nature.

  • And he goes on to explain a little bit, "the physical bodies of commodities

  • are combinations of two elements: the material provided by nature

  • and labour.

  • If we subtract the total amount of useful labour of different kinds which is contained

  • in the coat, linen etc, a material substratum is always left.

  • This substratum is furnished by nature without human intervention.

  • When man engages in production he can only proceed

  • as nature does herself."

  • That is you have to proceed in accordance with natural law.

  • You "(…)can only change the form of materials. Furthermore,

  • even in this work of modification he is constantly helped by natural forces.

  • Labour is therefore not the only source of material wealth, i.e. of use-values(…).

  • As William Petty says, labour is the father of material wealth,

  • the earth is its mother."

  • That gendered metaphor is very common of course from

  • seventeenth-century onwards, and so Marx is simply repeating

  • something that had been there from the Enlightenment onwards.

  • But, notice something here:

  • material wealth is not the same as value.

  • Material wealth,

  • it's going to be the total quantity of use-values available to you.

  • The value of those use-values

  • can vary in all sorts of ways.

  • You can have a lot of use-values

  • and very little value because there's very little labour input,

  • or you can have

  • very few use-values and a lot of labour input, so the relationship between wealth

  • and value is not one-on-one at all.

  • So, Marx's conception of wealth

  • is about the material assemblage

  • of use-values which are available to us.

  • He then goes on to make some comments.

  • This heterogeneous labour contains a bit of a conundrum.

  • Different skills, different capacities for productivity

  • of different labourers,

  • and we have to look at that which he does over the next two pages.

  • And he says in order to really advance his analysis,

  • what he has to do is to create a simple standard of value.

  • And this standard is going to be called, as he says on hundred and thirty-five,

  • "simple average labour".

  • Now simple average labour,

  • is not constant, he points out: "(…)it is true it varies in character in different countries

  • and at different cultural epochs,

  • but in a particular society it is given."

  • This is a move that Marx will often make.

  • For purposes of analysis I'm going to assume it's given, even though I know it varies

  • all over the place.

  • But for purposes of analysis I'm going to assume there's something there

  • called simple average labour,

  • which is what the abstraction of value is about.

  • Furthermore, what I do is I take the issue of skills

  • and complex labour, and simply say:

  • "More complex labour counts only as intensified, or rather multiplied simple labour,

  • so that a smaller quantity of complex labour is considered equal to a larger quantity

  • of simple labour."

  • He then adds: "Experience shows that this reduction is constantly being made."

  • He doesn't tell us what experience it is that shows us this.

  • This is actually a rather problematic argument and it goes under the title of

  • 'the reduction of skill to simple labour problem' in a lot of marxian theorizing.

  • And it poses certain difficulties for the way in which certain people have used Marx's

  • value theory. I want to signal

  • the fact that this passage conceals

  • something which is a bit problematic

  • and which is being a matter of some controversy

  • in the field of Marxian studies.

  • What i'm going to do, therefore, is to

  • ask the question

  • which we have, I think, have to ask of this. What experience is it

  • that shows this reduction

  • is being made?, and how is that reduction being made?

  • And we will come across some examples where we will find

  • that argument laid out.

  • So on the bottom of that paragraph he says: "In the Interests of simplification, we shall henceforth

  • view every form of labour power directly as simple labour power;

  • by this wish shall simply be saving ourselves

  • the trouble of making the reduction."

  • As I've indicated, this is

  • a strategy that Marx sometimes uses. He hits a complication,

  • says: okay I recognize the complication, I going to simplify it away,

  • and for purposes of argument go on as if

  • this datum of simple average labour is adequate

  • to my argument.

  • On page hundred and thirty-six/ hundred and thirty-seven

  • he starts to talk more about the

  • abstract qualities of labour.

  • He shifts from the examination of the concrete,

  • both looking at the relation to nature and the problem of skills,

  • and goes to look more concretely,

  • if I can put it that way, at the abstract side of this argument.

  • And of course in the abstract side we´re dealing with a quantitative relation.

  • And he has to say certain things about the temporal duration of labour,

  • how the temporal duration of labour works.

  • And the first thing he notices on the top of hundred and thirty-seven

  • is that, right at the bottom hundred thirty six, is that "(…)an increase in the amount of material

  • wealth may correspond to a simultaneous fall in the magnitude of its value."

  • Value is dependent upon human productivity.

  • Highly productive people can produce a large amount of material wealth

  • very quickly.

  • And they can work less hours, so actually the amount of

  • value that they make can be very low but the amount of material wealth they generate can

  • be enormous.

  • So again, he's going to emphasize that distinction between material wealth

  • and value.

  • And he goes on to point out that while changes in productivity

  • affect material wealth, they don't necessarily have any effect at all

  • on value creation.

  • We will see instances where this is the case but,

  • nevertheless, the change in productivity

  • is itself not directly connected to transformations in value.

  • That leads into the bottom of hundred thirty-seven, to a definition:

  • "…all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power, in the physiological sense,

  • and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour that it forms the value

  • of commodities.

  • On the other hand all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power in a particular form

  • and with a definite aim,

  • and it is in this quality of being concrete useful labour that it reproduces use-values."

  • Just simply means that if it takes so many hours of

  • simple labour to produce a coat,

  • and you produce ten coats,

  • the amount of value is ten.

  • If you produce fifteen coats it's fifteen.

  • »STUDENT: But the value per coat remains the same. »HARVEY: The value per coat remains the same.

  • He then goes on to talk about what happens when the value per coat goes down

  • which is why the changing productivity then comes in.

  • Section three: the value form,

  • or exchange-value.

  • Again, what we see is

  • an opening argument which

  • specifies the nature of a problem.

  • And he begins with this discussion about the objectivity of commodities

  • and the fact that, even though they have objective qualities,

  • nevertheless, he says about the middle of page hundred and thirty-eight,

  • "Not an atom of matter

  • enters into the objectivity of commodities as values;

  • in this it is the direct opposite to the costly sensuous objectivity of commodities

  • as physical objects."

  • He then goes on to say: "(…)let us remember that commodities possess an objective character as values only

  • insofar as they are expressions of

  • an identical social substance, human labour,

  • that their objective character as values is therefore purely social.

  • From this it follows," he says,

  • "that it can only appear in the social relation between commodity and commodity."

  • Now, this is a little bit strange,

  • in the sense that Marx is saying

  • that the value of a commodity is immaterial.

  • Not an atom of matter enters into the value of a commodity.

  • Marx's foundational concept- value

  • is immaterial,

  • but objective.

  • This doesn't fit very well with the image of Marx, right, as someone who kind of is a

  • grubby materialist for who everything has to be sort of fixed and material and if it's not material

  • then it's nothing.

  • Here is his fundamental concept of value

  • which is immaterial but objective.

  • And it's immaterial because it's a social relation.

  • Can you see social relations?

  • Can you actually have iotas or atoms or molecules of social relationships?

  • You can't trace them that way,

  • yet we know that social relationships are objective.

  • There's a social relationship between you and I

  • and you could look at what's going on in the room and say: okay there's a social relationship

  • between teacher and taught.

  • And you can talk about it and it has objective consequences in the grade you get and all that

  • sort of stuff, but

  • you can't actually measure it in terms of atoms, and movement and you can't actually find the molecules

  • floating through the air, you know,

  • from my brain into your brain or from wherever you know.

  • It's not like that.

  • It's immaterial but objective.

  • So Marx is saying: value is immaterial and objective like that, it's a social relation which becomes

  • objectified in the commodity.

  • And that process of objectification

  • is of course also an objectification of a process

  • in a thing

  • because the process is socially necessary labour time.

  • So the process is objectified in the thing.

  • How it is objectified in the thing

  • is a matter of some considerable interest.

  • And furthermore: how the commodity expresses

  • that value relation objectively, as a thing.

  • And Marx's answer to that is:

  • you cannot go to a commodity

  • this table

  • and dissect it and get the chemical composition and everything else, you can't go to this table

  • and find out what its value is internal to the table.

  • You only find out what the value of this table is, when it is put in an exchange relation with

  • something else.

  • Later on he will actually use the notion of gravity

  • as a similar example.

  • it's very difficult, impossible in fact, to take a stone

  • and dissect it and find gravity inside of it.

  • You can only find gravity when you put the stone in relationship to another stone, it's

  • only a relationship between bodies.

  • So it's immaterial but objective.

  • So this is Marx's fundamental concept and it's very important that you

  • you recognize this at the outset.

  • So when somebody comes along and says: well, Marx is just one of those boring materialists who doesn't

  • have anywell, how come?

  • His foundational concept is immaterial but objective

  • and what is this about.

  • And the immateriality is of course

  • socially necessary labour time.

  • But in order to figure out what socially necessary labour time is you've got to have a

  • form of appearance.

  • So, on hundred and thirty-nine, again he makes the modest claim:

  • "Now, however, we have to perform a task never even attempted by bourgeois economics.

  • That is, we have to show the origin of this money-form, we have to trace the development

  • of the expression of value contained in the value relation of commodities

  • from its simplest almost imperceptible outline

  • to the dazzling money-form.

  • When this has been done, the mystery of money will immediately disappear."

  • What then follows is, I think,

  • a very boring exegesis of how this works.

  • And we can simply go over the general line of argument in order to

  • actually look at some very important, again,

  • seeming sidebars like the relation to nature which actually now going to become integrated

  • into the argument.

  • The argument goes like this:

  • I have a commodity,

  • I don't know what its abstract value is.

  • I'm desperate to know and have a measure of the abstract value

  • in my commodity.

  • You have a commodity.

  • So I say: Okay,

  • I'm going to measure the value,

  • abstract value of my commodity in terms of your commodity. You have the equivalent form,

  • I have the relative form.

  • If we were in a barter situation

  • you would have the relative form, relative to my equivalent.

  • There are as many equivalents as there are commodities, and as many relatives as

  • there are commodities as well.

  • So this is the simple version

  • that kind of says:

  • I only find out

  • what this table is worth when it's exchanged with something else,

  • and therefore it is your labour input which is going to be the measure

  • of abstract labour in mine.

  • He then expands it and he says: Well, what happens when, for example,

  • I have shoes and you don't want shoes, but on the other hand

  • I want the shirt you have. So I trade my shoes for your shirt, and then you take the shoes that you've traded

  • and trade them on, in other words, you can imagine

  • something going on and on and on and onlike that.

  • or you could also imagine somebody sitting there with

  • cans of tuna and they're the only person who've got cans of tuna.

  • And everybody wants to trade with cans of tuna, so suddenly cans of tuna turn out to

  • be very significant and therefore

  • multiple commodities are exchanging with the same thing.

  • So Marx goes through these various

  • forms of this

  • and at the end of the day we start to see crystallizing out

  • the idea that there is one commodity,

  • or a particular bundle of commodities which start, actually,

  • to be a stand-in

  • for the equivalent.

  • And out of that we see crystallizing the universal equivalent.

  • One commodity becomes

  • the central equivalent for all exchanges,

  • and that one commodity

  • we call the money commodity and the most obvious

  • one to look at would be gold.

  • So one commodity crystallizes out.

  • There are a number of points which have to be made about this and Marx is going to make

  • this point several times.

  • In order for this to happen,

  • exchange has to become generalized,

  • it has to become, what he calls, a 'normal social act'.

  • It can't be just an occasional exchange,

  • it has to be generalized and it has to be systematic.

  • If it's not generalized or systematic then

  • it's unlikely that

  • gold is going to emerge as the universal equivalent.

  • But what you can see him doing here

  • is very different from the argument

  • of classical political economy. He's saying that the money form

  • arises out off the exchange relation.

  • It's not superimposed from outside.

  • It's not that somebody had a good idea and said: oh let us have money.

  • Nothing of that kind,

  • no, it arises, in Marx's view, out of

  • simple acts of exchange which gradually expand

  • to the point where they become generalized

  • for the whole of society.

  • Now, there's an interesting question here:

  • Is this a historical argument or a logical argument?

  • Actually we're often going to find that arising in Capital, and it's something you

  • should think about.

  • In the nineteenth century there was a tendency sometimes to interpret Marx as making a historical argument

  • as well as a logical argument.

  • I think most people who are familiar with

  • works in archaeology and anthropology and history and all the rest of it would now kind of say

  • you can't really treat this as a historical argument.

  • There are too many

  • symbolic systems like coins and so on, floating around, of various kinds, historically and archeologically,

  • and all the rest of it,

  • in the absence of kind of clear exchange relations of this sort.

  • So, it's probably best not to treat this as a historical argument.

  • But what it does do, and I think

  • this is the way to look at it is:

  • It actually constructs a logical argument

  • about the relationship between the money form and commodity exchange

  • and what that would say historically would be this:

  • that while there may have been all kinds of different

  • systems, that you might call monetary systems

  • floating around, exchange of

  • cowry shells or stories or whatever,

  • while there may have been all kinds of systems of that kind

  • floating around to the degree that

  • capitalist commodity exchange becomes generalized so it disciplines all of those forms

  • to this singular relationship between

  • the money form

  • and the commodity form.

  • So in that sense you could kind of say: the logic of capitalism,

  • and a capitalist system, would say that, as

  • exchange proliferates and becomes a normal social act,

  • what this means is that

  • money and commodities will move into this kind of relation,

  • no matter what the original

  • foundation of the monetary form may have been.

  • But then there are some very specifics about this argument.

  • And I want to just pay attention to

  • occasional bits of language which I think are significant.

  • On hundred and forty-two for example,

  • in the middle there,

  • he's talking about human labour in general, however he goes on to say: "(…)it is not enough

  • to express the specific character of the labour which goes to make up the value of the linen.

  • Human labour-power in its fluid state(…)"

  • Now, I've often and will often

  • draw your attention to the way in which Marx concentrates on the fluidity of things.

  • "(…)human labour-power in its fluid state, or human labour, creates value, but is not itself value.

  • It becomes value in its coagulated state, in objective form", through objectification.

  • So again, there's this process-thing relationship.

  • And that is always kind of lurking

  • and you'll always find passages where Marx

  • will be re-emphasizing that.

  • But then there's something odd about

  • the way in which these

  • relative and equivalent forms of value work together.

  • And he identifies three peculiarities: the first is identified on page hundred and forty-eight:

  • "The first peculiarity which

  • strikes us when we reflect on the equivalent form is this:

  • that use-value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, value."

  • That relation is entailed in the very beginning of this argument.

  • It's the use-value you have which is the equivalent of

  • my relative.

  • And it's that use-value, it's not the generality, it's just that use-value,

  • and we can never going to escape from that

  • contradiction.

  • That a specific use-value,

  • in the end of the day it's going to be gold,

  • becomes a form of appearance of its opposite, value.

  • The result of that, on hundred and forty-nine.

  • is he starts to talk about the way in which

  • - and this is where you start to get a precursor of the fetishism argument -,

  • he says: "The relative [value-]form of a commodity, the linen for example, expresses its value existence

  • as something wholly different from its substance and properties,

  • as the quality of being comparable with a coat for example;

  • this expression itself therefore indicates

  • that it conceals a social relation."

  • Now in the fetishism section we're going to

  • be dealing a lot with the way in which things get concealed.

  • But here he is kind of saying: that concealing

  • goes on in this logical relationship which is being built up

  • between commodities

  • and their monetary expression, and he then goes on a bit further down that paragraph,

  • to say: "Hence the mysteriousness of the equivalent form,

  • which only impinges on the crude bourgeois vision of the political economist when it

  • confronts him in its fully developed shape, that of money."

  • He then goes on to sort of have a little

  • cut at the classical political economists for their failures.

  • So he says on hundred and fifty at the top:

  • "The body of the commodity, which serves as the equivalent, always figures as the embodiment

  • of abstract human labour and is always a product of some specific useful and concrete labour."

  • Specific concrete labour is what makes gold.

  • But gold is supposed to be an expression

  • of abstract human labour.

  • Second peculiarity at the bottom of that page:

  • "The equivalent form therefore possesses a second peculiarity: in it,

  • concrete labour,

  • becomes a form of manifestation of its opposite: abstract human labour."

  • Third peculiarity,

  • top of hundred and fifty-one: "(…)the equivalent form has a third peculiarity:

  • private labour takes the form of its opposite, namely labour in its

  • directly social form."

  • You can see all sorts of contradictions emerging out of this.

  • The expression of value is a particular commodity,

  • a particular use-value produced under particular concrete

  • conditions of labour, which is

  • in principle appropriable by any one individual,

  • and

  • at the same time, it's meant to be the general expression

  • of the whole world of commodity production.

  • Tension. Just to give you an example: you don't have to take

  • the private appropriation.

  • If gold is the money commodity, if gold is the one

  • commodity, which is the center of all of this,

  • then who are the producers of gold?

  • Now there was a very interesting moment towards the end of the nineteen sixties

  • when the two most important producers of gold in the world market were

  • the Soviet Union and South Africa.

  • Capitalism was not terribly happy.

  • I mean,

  • the Soviet Union and South Africa could actually mess up the whole gold supply system

  • by flooding the market or doing something or other, you know.

  • So, in a sense,

  • one of the reasons, one of the many reasons actually, that we went to a

  • de-metallic, a non-metallic

  • monetary base from the nineteen seventies onwards had everything to do with the fact

  • that the powers that be in Washington and London and Tokyo and all the rest of it, decided that,

  • hey, we can't keep gold as a base or other reasons why they couldn't keep gold as a base,

  • we can't keep gold as a base because

  • of the political liability that lies in. So these contradictions that he's talking about

  • here are likely to erupt,

  • in very specific ways,

  • who controls the money supply, who controls those use-values, what are the conditions

  • of labour?

  • What happens

  • as happened in eighteen forty eight when suddenly gold was

  • discovered in California,

  • and there's a flood of gold into the world market? What happened when

  • the Spaniards went into

  • South America and stole all the gold from the Incas and all the rest of it

  • and flooded Europe with gold

  • in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries creating the grand inflation? You know, in other words,

  • the fact that a specific commodity

  • has this capacity to be the universal equivalent,

  • with all of those particularities about it,

  • creates a problem.

  • It is as it were a simple relationship between a particularity at an universal,

  • and the particularity

  • is standing in as a measure of the universal.

  • Tension, contradictions,

  • monetary contradictions fly all over the place later on in the analysis.

  • But what he's doing here is laying in

  • a little bit of a basis for that.

  • Also on hundred and fifty-one

  • he points out something else which is very important about exchange.

  • He is very fond of quoting Aristotle.

  • And he notices that Aristotle says:

  • well, if things exchange

  • there must be something equivalent

  • in the exchange.

  • So, that what Aristotle began to lay out was the notion that exchange implies equivalence.

  • But Aristotle couldn't have a labour theory of value.

  • Why not? Because of slavery.

  • No free market in labour, this kind of stuff.

  • So Aristotle saw something very significant about the nature of exchange

  • and about the nature of economies,

  • which is the equivalence principle.

  • It didn't necessarily mean there's equivalence between people but there's equivalence somewhere in the system

  • that says that is equivalent to that.

  • And that equivalence principle

  • is something which is going to be very significant in the way in which markets work.

  • So Aristotle,

  • on hundred and fifty-one, says: "There can be no exchange without equality (…) and no equality

  • without commensurability."

  • This is something

  • which is very important for how markets work.

  • Now, what happens

  • as this universal equivalent starts to become

  • more and more present in the argument is this:

  • and he points this out again on hundred and fifty-three towards the bottom,

  • he says: "The internal opposition between use-value and value, hidden within the commodity,

  • is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition, i.e. by a relation

  • between two commodities such that the one commodity,

  • whose own value is supposed to be expressed, counts directly only as a use-value, whereas

  • the other commodity,

  • in which that value is to be expressed, counts directly only as an exchange-value."

  • That is: what we begin to see, is

  • the beginnings of an emergence of something which is going to be

  • crucial to the argument.

  • An internal opposition

  • within the commodity between

  • use-value and value

  • is eventually going to be expressed as an external opposition between the world

  • of commodities

  • and the world of money.

  • Those two worlds

  • suddenly become separate from each other.

  • And as they become separate from each other they can be antagonistic to each other.

  • in other words: you go from an internal opposition to an external

  • opposition,

  • with the potentiality for an antagonism.

  • So, the end of the story then is about

  • how the expanded form of value

  • morphs into an universal equivalent.

  • And that therefore, what this means is that money becomes

  • the expression,

  • the money commodity becomes the expression of value.

  • He says on hundred and sixty, he says this, in the middle of the page:

  • "Finally,

  • a particular kind of commodity acquires the form of universal equivalent,

  • because all other commodities make it the material embodiment of their uniform and universal

  • form of value."

  • Then notice the next sentence: "But the antagonism between the relative form of value and the equivalent

  • form, the two poles of the value-form, also develops concomitantly

  • with the development of the value form itself."

  • And that takes us into the final section just on

  • the money-form.

  • What we've done here

  • is looked at the way in which

  • concrete and abstract come together in an exchange

  • how the relative and equivalent forms of value

  • build in certain ways,

  • generate this money commodity.

  • Then that leads us into fetishism, but

  • let's have any questions you have about this section and the preceding section.

  • »STUDENT: What's interesting, you asked about whether Marx is attempting,

  • or we can use this as either a logical or a historical argument, what's

  • interesting is that, people have come to apply this approach to a historical analysis

  • and they have this concept of, contingency and codification, so that capitalism develops as

  • a series of accidentsDAVID HARVEY: yes), which become codified, and then there's also the question of consciousness.

  • And then also brings to mind, I think, this notion of the true in the form of the true and how,

  • what can we say about the social relations in the capitalist society whenin capitalism you have

  • expressions embodied in things that are in contradiction to something else,

  • like, for…, the expression of value is in a contradictory form in the particular use-value

  • of something, and this idea that truth is when representation and the thing itself coincide,

  • and are these the only ways to have absurdities in a society?

  • »DAVID HARVEY: Well they're not absurdities so much as I think Marx is all the time talking

  • about the internalizations of contradictions.

  • And those internalizations of contradictions also become generative.

  • And it is the tensions there

  • And here we will get a kind of complicated

  • argument, which

  • I don't want to go into an any great depth but a complicated argument, which says:

  • you know, are we talking about Marx's mode

  • of representation here?

  • And his talking about contradictions? Or are we talking about real contradictions that exist?

  • Now, I've already indicated,

  • what I find fascinating about Marx is that he sets up,

  • just in this chapter, this notion of a contradiction within the money form.

  • And then when I'm looking at and kind of say: Well, why did they go off the gold standard

  • in the late nineteen sixties, you know, and then I kind of thought to myself:

  • Well, actually this helps me understand something about that.

  • And I think it was very real, and if you go to the literature you find: indeed it was real.

  • There was this nervousness about the empowerment of the

  • Soviet Union and South Africa.

  • So, you know,

  • the relationship between Marx's argument and the realities around us, and the tensions

  • we feel in our daily lives, is always a complicated one, and you have to

  • work that through for yourself,

  • and work it out for yourself. But what you have see in doing this: he is making

  • a logical argument here, where he's

  • talking about the way in which these contradictions get internalized.

  • In something like money, right, what _is_ money?

  • It's a very interesting kind of question, you know, I mean how many of you have thought about

  • what is money?, where did it come from?

  • And, if you go to Dickens' Dombey and Son, you know, there is this Mr. Dombey and

  • little Paul is dying and he kinda says:

  • Papa, what's money?

  • And Mr. Dombey, the great entrepreneur, can't give him an answer.

  • And little Paul's mother has died, so he says: Well, can money bring her back?

  • And Mr. Dombey doesn't know what to say.

  • What is money? What is it?

  • And we're with it all the time, we use it all the time, but it's deeply contradictory.

  • Also in terms of our relationship with it, in terms of the fetish.

  • I mean, even I wake up sometimes and sort of go and check what's happening to my

  • stocks in my pension fund, you know, sort of

  • So we get a fetish about it, you know, well, what is it?, you know. Oh it went up by two

  • percent, yeah!, you know.

  • Or: it went down by ten, you go: oh my god!, you know, so I have a contradictory relation

  • to collapses of the stock market. On the one hand I like it politically,

  • on the other hand I hate it personally,

  • because there goes my pension fund, you know.

  • So, so these kind of contradictions and tensions are there all the time in our daily lives.

  • And so I think we need to think about them.

  • One of the interesting things about this section is, that is written in a completely

  • different style.

  • I mean, the last section is Marx with his dull accounting hat on, you know,

  • this equals that and that equals that.

  • This is Marx kind of

  • going off with

  • mysteries and

  • werwolves and all the rest of it.

  • It's a very different writing style.

  • And one of the things that's happened as a result of that, is that

  • quite a lot of people actually regard this as some kind of extraneous piece of argument

  • in Capital, some sort of

  • thing, that's set off on the side.

  • And that therefore they don't take serious

  • note of it too much, when they're talking about the general theory

  • that Marx is laying out in Capital. The other

  • side kind of doesn't pay much mind to the general theory of Capital and treats the section on the

  • fetishism as the golden piece,

  • the golden nugget in Marx, and kind of

  • expands it into great social literary

  • theory and all the rest of it.

  • I think it's very important to recognize that

  • Marx imported this into the second edition from an appendix, as he did the third section.

  • He rewrote them and brought them into the second edition, and therefore it was a very conscious

  • move on his part

  • to do this. But it also says something about Marx's technique, that

  • he feels perfectly happy switching writing styles

  • as he moves from one kind of topic to another.

  • And he matches his writing style to what it is that he's really trying to convey.

  • So, I think one of the questions we have to

  • ask is: what is the

  • positionality of this

  • in Marx's general line of argument? And I think that the positionality

  • is already partially being revealed with

  • his talk of how things get concealed,

  • how things become mysterious, how

  • things get buried,

  • how we can't see quite what's going on, how

  • there is a complication of this contradiction between

  • the money form with its particularities and the universal equivalent, which it's

  • supposed to be functioning as.

  • So these kinds of relations

  • have already been set up in such a way that they start to become the focus, as happens

  • with all these other pieces of the argument. They become the focus.

  • Ideas which are being latent there, suddenly become the focus of general

  • kind of argument.

  • And what he's interested in here is really

  • two sets of things.

  • First is the unraveling of the,

  • the notion of fetishism of the commodity,

  • in which

  • an ordinary sensuous thing

  • gets transformed into something, which he says on the bottom of one hundred sixty-three,

  • that "transcends sensuousness".

  • Something which,

  • on hundred and sixty-five, he says: "(…)sensuous things, which are the same time suprasensible or social."

  • Now, the enigmatic character of a commodity,

  • as he puts it,

  • arises out of it's social character.

  • He says at the bottom of hundred and sixty-four: "The mysterious character of the commodity form consists therefore

  • simply in the fact

  • that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour

  • as objective characteristics of the products themselves, as the socio-natural properties

  • of these things."

  • A bit further down:

  • "What we find", he says is,

  • but this "is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves

  • which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form

  • of a relation between things."

  • And he then makes a brief sidebar about religion,

  • but then goes on to say: "I call this the fetishism

  • which attaches itself to the products of labour

  • as soon as they're produced as commodities,

  • And is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities."

  • This inseparability from the production of commodities is extremely important.

  • It says that fetishism is not something that

  • you can sort of just brush away.

  • It's not a a matter of consciousness,

  • it's a matter of

  • something that's deeply embedded in the way in which

  • commodities get produced and exchanged.

  • As he goes on to say,

  • right at the bottom, which is the,

  • of hundred and sixty five, which is the key passage really:

  • "In other words, the labour of the private individual

  • manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society

  • only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and,

  • through their mediation, between the producers.

  • To the producers, therefore,

  • the social relations between their private labours

  • appear as what they are", note that, appear as what they are,

  • "i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work,

  • but rather as material relations between persons

  • and social relations between things".

  • Now, the argument in a way is simple enough.

  • People under capitalism do not relate to each other

  • directly as human beings.

  • They relate to each other through the myriad of products

  • which they encounter in the market.

  • But when we go into the market and we ask the question: Why does this cost twice as much as that?

  • What we're encountering is an expression of a social relation

  • which has something to do, in Marx's view,

  • with value, socially necessary labour time.

  • Now, what are the ramifications of this?

  • There are a number of ramifications.

  • First off,

  • we can't possibly know

  • about the conditions of labour

  • of all of the people who worked to put breakfast on our table.

  • We can't possibly know it.

  • It's so intricate, it's so far fetched, it's so far flung,

  • And when you take the inputs that are going into the inputs that are going to the inputs,

  • the coal that makes the steel that goes into the tractor that goes into

  • Millions and millions and millions of people are involved in putting breakfast upon our table.

  • And the big question then arises: Well,

  • where does our breakfast come from?

  • I used to like to start my

  • introductory geography classes with that question: Where does your breakfast come from?

  • Now,

  • go and think about it.

  • And the first answer was: Well, it came from the supermarket. Well no, come on, go back a bit further than that.

  • And what do you know about the people who produced it? And by the time we got into about the third

  • week, people would say things like: I didn't have breakfast this morning.

  • I think it was a kind of sense of guilt that was kind of bubbling up, you know, and the typical response

  • is kind of something like that.

  • So, the point here is that

  • the social relations

  • between things

  • mediate between us and everything that is going on out there.

  • Now, Marx doesn't make this argument, but,

  • you know, I've had this argument for instance with

  • religious folk who insist upon, you know, good moral behavior or something of that kind and,

  • and it's always about face-to-face relations, I'm good with my neighbor and good with the person

  • next door,

  • I help the person on the street I see, this kind of stuff.

  • And you kind of say, well what do you do about all those people who are putting breakfast on your table?

  • What's your moral responsibility to all those people? And the answer is: "Well, no, I am not

  • interested in that." Well, that is where our real

  • social connectivity to the world of labour lies.

  • And it becomes a very complicated to find out, so occasionally we do find out that,

  • you know, this

  • product has been produced under appalling conditions of labour somewhere, so we should boycott this

  • product or boycott that product.

  • But you can see how

  • incredibly complicated this world is.

  • And how the market system, and in particular the money commodity, conceals from us

  • so much of what's going on in the world around us.

  • And so Marx is starting out by kind of saying: we've got to

  • confront the way in which that world works.

  • and recognize that it is concealed from us

  • by virtue of the way the market is.

  • And in so doing,

  • he comes back to

  • going back over the idea that

  • commodities are objective,

  • they exist,

  • you can't go into the supermarket

  • and look at a lettuce and find out whether it has been produced under

  • conditions of exploitative labour or anything else, you can't do that.

  • So you have no means of knowing and if you do have a boycott of grapes from

  • this place

  • you find the grapes turn up as if they have been

  • produced in another place.

  • But then he goes on a bit further

  • and says this:

  • We have to understand, he says on the bottom of hundred and sixty-six, that "Men do not therefore bring

  • the products their labour into relation with each other as values

  • because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous human

  • labour.

  • The reverse is true:

  • by equating their different products to each other

  • in exchange as values,

  • they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour.

  • They do this without being aware of it. Value, therefore, does not have its description branded

  • on its forehead;

  • it rather transforms every product of labour

  • into a social hieroglyphic."

  • Later on, he says, we try to

  • decipher what this hieroglyphic was.

  • But: "The belated scientific discovery that the products of labour, insofar as they are values, are merely

  • the material expressions of the human labour expended to produce them,

  • marks an epoch in the history of mankind's development,

  • but by no means banishes the semblance of objectivity possessed by the social characteristics

  • of labour."

  • Now, again what he's talking about here is the generalization of the exchange process,

  • the global…,

  • the world of commodities, the global structure.

  • And again he's coming back to this idea that value does not walk around

  • saying what it is.

  • Value arises, the notion of value arises out of all of these processes.

  • It doesn't precede them, it arises out of them.

  • And the value relation is something which is produced

  • specifically within a capitalist society.

  • And it was a capitalist society that actually

  • unraveled the labour theory of value.

  • One of the first to actually

  • come up with some version of the labour theory of value was Hobbes.

  • And then we get a whole kind of line, of Locke and Hume and all these kinds of people talking about this,

  • and eventually

  • when you get to Adam Smith, you get a labour theory of value in Adam Smith and a labour theory of

  • value in Ricardo.

  • So the labour theory of value is not something that's been around forever, it is something which

  • essentially arose

  • with the rise of capitalism. But, as we've seen, the labour theory of value,

  • as classical political economy saw it, was

  • labour-time,

  • not socially necessary labour time, no distinction between concrete and abstract labour, all of

  • these things Marx has been talking about.

  • So the labour theory of value then, or the rise of the labour theory of value, was concomitant

  • with the rise of the bourgeois epoch.

  • And it follows from that,

  • that the destruction of a bourgeois

  • economy, the destruction of capitalism,

  • would require

  • the construction of an alternative value structure,

  • an alternative value system.

  • Or conversely, if you don't like the value system of capitalism and you want something

  • else, then you better become a revolutionary very fast

  • because, this is the dominant form of value which

  • operates in our society.

  • And it operates, as he says, behind our backs.

  • We don't see it, we don't understand its consequences.

  • We end up with schizophrenic forms of value,

  • like good face-to face relationships, but I don't give a hoot about what goes on through the

  • market.

  • Those kinds of divisions.

  • And then we get the introduction of something

  • which is also going to become

  • very significant

  • in the next chapter.

  • At the bottom of hundred and sixty-seven

  • he talks about the way in which

  • proportions of products get exchanged.

  • And clearly, these exchange relations vary a lot.

  • "These magnitudes", he says, "vary continually, independently of the will, foreknowledge and

  • actions of the exchangers.

  • Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement

  • made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them."

  • That is: the producers.

  • Who's in control of this system?

  • The producers?

  • Or does the system control them?

  • Now, of course, the argument that the system controlled them,

  • is not unique to Marx.

  • The person who pushed it

  • most strongly was Adam Smith,

  • in the terms of the 'hidden hand of the market'.

  • It is the hidden hand of the market that guided things.

  • Individuals, in a properly functioning,

  • perfectly functioning market society would not have any kind of control over the system.

  • The market would be the controlling mechanism.

  • And it would be the hidden hand of the market that guided us

  • to the grand capitalist utopia.

  • But, says Marx,

  • within this market system,

  • a bit down on hundred and sixty-eight,

  • is that,

  • "The reason for this reduction

  • (…) is in the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations between the products,"

  • you can treat that as

  • fluctuations of supply and demand,

  • "the labour-time socially necessary to produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature.

  • In the same way the law of gravity asserts itself when a person's house collapses on top of him.

  • The determination of the magnitude of value by labour time is therefore a secret

  • hidden under the apparent movements in the relative values of commodities."

  • By the ups and downs of the market.

  • "Its discovery destroys the semblance of the merely accidental determination of the magnitude

  • of the value

  • of the products of labour, but by no means abolishes that determination's material form."

  • So within all of these market fluctuations, and the hidden hand of the market, there is a

  • regulative principle which emerges,

  • and the regulative principle

  • is going to be that of socially necessary labour time,

  • embodied in commodities,

  • which establishes

  • the average exchange ratio with other commodities.

  • And this is going to be the regulative principle.

  • So this is, if you like, the first part

  • of the fetishism argument.

  • The second part begins immediately after,

  • when Marx takes it into the realm of thought.

  • How do we think about the world,

  • when the physical indicators

  • say: it looks like this,

  • when we understand it to be like that.

  • The notion of fetishism

  • suggests that there is

  • a deep way of looking at something,

  • which is other than it appears upon the surface.

  • And Marx somewhere else kind of made the comment:

  • that if everything were as it appears to be on the surface, there would be no need for science.

  • And he's trying to construct the science of political economy.

  • He's very serious about that science.

  • So he's trying to construct an apparatus

  • which is going to get behind

  • the fetishism, get behind the surface appearance. How do you do that?

  • And how have other people approached that question?

  • And what he finds, of course, is that many people have not approached that question, they've

  • been deluded by the surface appearances.

  • But, go back to that very crucial thing: they appear as they really are, the surface appearances

  • are not simply illusions.

  • Indeed we do go into a market/supermarket, indeed we do shop, we do put down money,

  • indeed we do all of those things.

  • That is what we do.

  • And we watch ourselves doing it, they're actions, it is real.

  • And you have to take account of that reality. In other words:

  • you have to deal with the reality at the same time as you're dealing with the underlying structure.

  • Now this is a familiar

  • way of proceeding in a lot of scientific endeavors.

  • What does psychoanalysis do if it's not about saying: Well look,

  • the surface appearance of behavior conceals something else.

  • Then a psychoanalyst wouldn't say:

  • Well, that person who is aggressive and wields a knife like that, he's just feeling insecure,

  • so don't worry about them wielding the knife.

  • You get out of the way.

  • You don't say this is an illusion,

  • no it's real.

  • But you do know that there's something going on behind it which is other than what it

  • appears to be on the surface. So Marx is making a similar kind of argument,

  • in fact he is a pioneer

  • of that mode of argumentation in social science.

  • And many people, I think, have taken

  • that ability from him.

  • But he then is interested in how

  • the surface appearances have been interpreted

  • in classical political economy.

  • And, as he says

  • on hundred and sixty-eight: "Reflection on the forms of human life,

  • hence also scientific analysis of those forms, takes a course directly opposite to their

  • real development.

  • Reflection begins post festum and therefore with the results of the process of development

  • ready to hand." That is:

  • we've got to understand the world we're now in and we have to work backwards to where it

  • all came from.

  • "Consequently," he says, "it was solely the analysis of the prices of commodities

  • which led to the determination of the magnitude of value…"

  • We started in the supermarket,

  • said, well, what's a common value?

  • "It isprecisely this finished form of the world of commodities - the money form - which conceals the

  • social character of private labour

  • and the social relations between the individual workers,

  • by making those relations appear as relations between material objects,

  • instead of revealing them plainly."

  • He then goes on to talk about the categories of bourgeois economics.

  • He says they "…consist precisely of forms of this kind. They are forms of thought

  • which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging

  • to this historically determined mode of social production.

  • The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of

  • labour on the basis of commodity production,

  • vanishes therefore as soon as we come

  • to other forms of production."

  • And he then has a great deal of fun with the Robinson Crusoe myth.

  • Robinson Crusoe myth was used

  • by the political economists of the time to fantasize about how somebody

  • operating in a state of nature would

  • decide on how to regulate their lives, how to regulate their relation to nature,

  • what to do, how to do it, all this kind of thing.

  • And Defoe had produced this kind of myth,

  • and actually the Crusoe-economy has been a very important aspect of the whole

  • of politically economic theorizing.

  • But what Marx does is have some fun with it and point out that

  • "Our friend Robinson Crusoe learns (…) by experience,

  • and having saved a watch, ledger, ink and pen from the shipwreck, he soon begins, like a

  • good Englishmen, to keep a set of books."

  • In other words, the fantasy was based on English political economic life,

  • and then what the economists did was to fantasize that this is how

  • a rational being in a state of nature would actually regulate

  • their lives. So, Marx is having kind of fun with this.

  • And he says, well let's go away from Robinson's island.

  • By the way, I think that the economists got the wrong Defoe novel, they should have

  • taken Moll Flanders,

  • it's much better, I mean, Moll is a classic kind of commodity character.

  • She actually moves around and speculates on the passions of everybody else,

  • and has everybody else speculate on her passions.

  • And there's this wonderful moment in Moll Flanders where

  • she spends all her last money and everything she's got to sort of hire a carriage and dress

  • very elegantly to go this ball, and she goes to this ball and she meets this guy,

  • and they both dance together and they decide to elope and get married, and they elope and get married,

  • and in a local inn they wake up the next morning and he says:

  • I hope you got some money because I'm dead broke.

  • And she says: I'm dead broke, too, and they both laugh and kind of leave, you know, it's

  • kind of a wonderful, kind of

  • moment of how, you know, commodity collisions can take place. And she goes to the colonies,

  • she goes to Virginia, she's in debtor's jail

  • It would be a much better

  • metaphor for what capitalism is really about than Robinson Crusoe.

  • But anyway, we go from Robinson's island

  • and we go and we look at

  • a situation which is pre-capitalist.

  • The world of personal dependance in medieval europe.

  • He talks about the corvée,

  • and in which "…social relations", he says, "between individuals in the performance of their labour

  • appear at all events as their own personal relations,

  • and are not disguised as social relations between things,

  • between the products of labour."

  • If you're working for the lord, you know, you're working so many hours for the lord on

  • the estate.

  • That's it, I mean, there's a personal relationship of dependency.

  • So, there's nothing

  • obscure about that, nothing opaque about that, and he says the same thing about a

  • patriarchal rule, industry, a peasant family.

  • And he even then goes on and at the

  • bottom of the page hundred and seventy-one to talk about:

  • "Let us finally imagine,

  • for a change, an association of free men working with the means of production held in common,

  • and expanding their many different forms of labour power in full self-awareness

  • as one single social labour force."

  • This is one of the rare passages where Marx actually talks about some sort of fantasy

  • of socialism and what socialism would be about. And again,

  • he says: "All the characteristics of Robinson's labour are repeated here, but with the difference

  • that they are social instead of individual."

  • And he goes on to talk about

  • the way in which the social relations in a society of that kind

  • would, on hundred and seventy-two, be "…transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in distribution."

  • So, he's talking about the very specific

  • quality, the opaque quality of social relations

  • as they emerge under capitalism, and contrasting them with alternative modes

  • of production, in order to highlight the specificity

  • of the world in which we have our being.

  • He then goes on to

  • make some comments which

  • are kind of interesting and controversial:

  • "For a society of commodity producers, whose general social relation of production consists

  • in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, hence as values,

  • and in this material form bring their individual private labours into relation with each other

  • as homogeneous human labour,

  • Christianity with its religious cult of man in the abstract,

  • more particularly in its bourgeois development, i.e. Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting

  • form of religion."

  • Now as you know, Max Weber reversed that thesis

  • much later, to say that capitalism was actually an expression of that religious belief, while

  • Marx is kind of saying:

  • actually that religious transformation was

  • a refraction, a reflection, if you like,

  • of these rising commodity relations, and the rise of the value theory

  • and the value of

  • human labour in the abstract, and all those kind of things.

  • And that the specific form of religious beliefs,

  • at some point or other, moves in parallel

  • with the transformations of the economic and political structure.

  • And he goes on to kind of comment: "In the ancient Asiatic, Classical-Antique, and other such modes

  • of production, the transformation of the product into a commodity,

  • and therefore men's existence as producers of commodities plays a subordinate role…"

  • And he talks about the impacts of

  • market exchange upon patterns of belief.

  • And those patterns of belief of course also

  • affect, what he calls on hundred and seventy three, "the umbilical cord of his natural

  • species-connection with other men, or on direct relations of dominance in servitude.

  • They are conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of labour

  • and corresponding

  • limited relations between men within the process of creating in reproducing their

  • material life,

  • hence also limited relations between man and nature.

  • These real limitations are reflected in the ancient worship of nature…".

  • And he then goes on to talk, a bit further down, "The veil is not removed from the countenance

  • of the social life-process,…

  • until it becomes production by freely associated men,

  • and stands under their conscious and planned control.

  • This, however, requires that society possess

  • a material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence,

  • which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tormented historical development."

  • This is Marx in his speculative mode,

  • talking about how ideas and beliefs

  • are not immune,

  • and that, of course, is something that carries over into the next two or three pages.

  • And, of course there's a lot of debate on

  • the degree to which we can

  • put credence upon this.

  • But it's very clear,

  • as he says at the bottom of hundred and seventy-five,

  • that he is reiterating

  • a reductionist argument, in effect,

  • when he says, in the footnote:

  • "My view is that each particular mode of production,

  • and the relations of production corresponding to it at each given moment, in short 'the

  • economic structure of society',

  • is 'the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure

  • and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness',

  • and that 'the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political

  • and intellectual life."

  • Now this is the argument he laid out in

  • the introduction to

  • the Critique of Political Economy,

  • and he's sticking to it in Capital.

  • It's a reductionist argument

  • that says that

  • beginning with an understanding of the labour process

  • and the nature of the labour process, and what the labour process is about,

  • how human beings are organizing their production,

  • on that basis

  • you can say a great deal about

  • politics, about legal structures

  • patterns of belief and the like.

  • You may not like

  • the reductionist argument and you can disagree with it, but I think you should be very clear that

  • Marx is saying that,

  • that is what he believes, that's what he

  • thinks is significant.

  • My own view of it is that

  • it's an inspired idea,

  • but, like most reductionist arguments, ultimately it fails.

  • But by taking that reductionist position you start to see all kinds of things that you

  • wouldn't otherwise see.

  • And without that reductionist impulse, Marx would never

  • have understood all manner of things.

  • You'll find analogous kind of reductionism, by the way, going on in biological sciences,

  • where evolution gets reduced to, you know,

  • micro-physics and all the rest of it.

  • And again,

  • you could argue, well ultimately the attempt fails, but the fact is that, you know, evolution

  • and genetic histories and so on, are now sort of embedded in each other, and

  • the very search for the reductionism has actually produced incredibly important insights

  • in the biological field, in exactly the same way, that I would argue

  • that Marx's

  • holding to principles of reductionism here, plays a

  • very significant role in his

  • method of inquiry and his impulsion to inquire,

  • and one of the things that I get annoyed at, I have to say, is that people who kind of say: oh it's reductionist

  • therefore don't believe it.

  • If people were not prepared to be reductionist about things we wouldn't know, we would hardly

  • know anything about anything.

  • And in fact, a lot of the time we're constantly trying to reduce complexities

  • to simplicities.

  • And that has been a lot of what understanding and knowledge constructions have been about.

  • And ok, we understand the world's a very complicated place, on the other hand,

  • once you've got some of the simplicities,

  • there you can understand the complexities in a different kind of way, and that's what

  • Marx, I think, does for us. But he is

  • very up front here about, this is what he's doing, and in these passages

  • he's being very explicit

  • about how these belief patterns cannot be isolated

  • from the nature of the political economic process

  • which is being engaged.

  • But again, I want to emphasize,

  • the footnote on hundred and seventy-four,

  • towards the bottom, footnote thirty four,

  • is a very important footnote because there he goes over what he calls the chief failings of

  • classical political economy.

  • And, what he's pointing about here is

  • that we should not make the same mistake of treating

  • the value theory, the labour theory of value

  • as the eternal natural form of social production.

  • It is a historical construct,

  • and as such it can be historically deconstructed.

  • But the classical political economists treated

  • the labour theory of value as natural.

  • As something that was, and that's why you go back to sort of Robinson Crusoe.

  • What would a natural person do in a natural environment? Well, it would do what Robinson

  • Crusoe did. Which is what bourgeois

  • thought should be done, in the seventeenth century.

  • And as he says on hundred and seventy four:

  • Bourgeois political economy, he says, "…has never once asked the question

  • why this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed

  • in value,

  • and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value

  • of the product.

  • These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp

  • of belonging to a social formation

  • in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite,

  • appear to the political economists' bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-evident

  • and nature imposed necessity as productive labour itself."

  • This is a pretty devastating critic of classical political economy.

  • And in a sense it was so devastating that,

  • with all the fussing that went on after Marx,

  • economics had to find…,

  • had to abandon the labour theory of value.

  • So what the marginalist economists did in the middle of the nineteenth century was, faced with

  • this kind of criticism, they kind of said: the only way we can deal with this is

  • junk the whole labour theory of value.

  • And so we end up with a marginalist theory of value, which is, you know, a completely different

  • value structure.

  • And economics is reconstructed as a neoclassical economics, rather than classical

  • political economy.

  • But with this kind of thing going on, it's very hard to hang on to a labour theory of value.

  • And it had to be junked, or else, you know, you would end up being a Marxist,

  • and nobody wanted to be that, so, you know, classical political economists kind of

  • were thrown, were pushed aside, largely because Marx

  • produced the kind of critique that made it impossible to hold that positionality anymore,

  • without actually acknowledging the power of what Marx is saying.

  • And he goes on hundred and seventy-six to say this: "The degree to which some economists

  • are misled by the fetishism attached to the world of commodities,

  • or by the objective appearance of the social characteristics of labour, is shown, among other things,

  • by the dull and tedious dispute over the part played by nature in the formation of exchange-value."

  • This still goes on, of course.

  • "Since exchange-value is a definite social manner of expressing the labour bestowed on a thing,

  • it can have no more natural content than has, for example,

  • the rate of exchange."

  • And he goes on to talk about

  • the physiocratic illusion that ground rent grows out of the soil, not out of society.

  • And then some amusing ends

  • where he talks about

  • the way in which, if commodities could speak, what would they say. In fact, that

  • language of commodities has been

  • here and I haven't commented on it, but it's something which is a bit intriguing.

  • Ok, so that's the fetishism of commodities, has anybody got any

  • observations?, I mean, I don't want to debate too much Marx's major thesis, that we can do some other

  • time. I wanna get through chapter two,

  • so let's zip into chapter two.

  • Chapter two is, I hope, not too difficult.

  • What Marx is doing here is simply setting out

  • the conditions of exchange.

  • And he starts

  • by showing that, well, of course

  • commodities don't go to market on their own, they have owners.

  • So we have to say something, not about commodities, but about the relationship between commodities and their owners.

  • And what he does is to imagine

  • a society in which,

  • on the first page there, on hundred and seventy-eight, he says, "The guardians must therefore recognize

  • each other as owners of private property.

  • This juridical relation,

  • whose form is the contract,

  • whether as part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills which

  • mirrors the economic relation.

  • The content of this juridical relation (…) is itself determined by the economic relation.

  • (…) persons exist for one another merely as representatives"

  • and as he says, we're now going to look at "(…) characters who appear on the economic stage (…)" as

  • "personifications of economic relations."

  • Let's take the last bit first.

  • He's going to look right throughout Capital in terms of personifications

  • of social relations.

  • He's not going to be talking about individuals.

  • He's going to be talking about buyers and sellers,

  • capitalists and labourers.

  • He's going to be talking about people

  • in roles.

  • So the analysis is going to be

  • about what people do in those roles.

  • Individuals may adopt many different roles,

  • but it's a very familiar trope to

  • actually say, well, we're going to look at

  • roles rather than people.

  • And you wouldn't make the argument

  • that a discussion of the relationship between

  • drivers and pedestrians in the

  • streets of manhattan

  • is illegitimate because

  • people are both drivers and pedestrians.

  • And you're not talking about individuals.

  • You say, well, no it's still worth talking about relationships which are between

  • pedestrians and drivers

  • because there's something important going on there, and what you find of course is that,

  • on a given day, when you're the driver you cuss the pedestrians and when you're a

  • pedestrian, you cuss the driver, you know, so, this kind of,

  • so Marx is going to be talking about roles, he's going to be talking about that

  • all the time.

  • And he's not going to be talking so much about individuals, I mean,

  • occasionally he will, but, by and large, he's just going to be talking about roles.

  • And the roles, in this case, are strictly defined.

  • That he's recognizing individuals

  • who have private property relation over

  • the commodity they command,

  • and they trade it under non coercive conditions.

  • That is, there's a reciprocity of

  • respect for juridical rights of individuals.

  • And this is, actually, a description of the kind of legal and

  • political framework for properly functioning markets.

  • And in that context he points out:

  • The commodities are, as he says on hundred and seventy-nine,

  • "…born leveller(s) and cynic(s),

  • it is always ready to exchange not only soul but body with each and every other commodity…"

  • The owner is willing to dispose of it,

  • the buyer is willing to take it.

  • "All", as he says, "All commodities are non-use-values for their owners, and use-values for their non-owners.

  • Consequently they must all change hands."

  • Now again, his argument here is historically specific.

  • So he has a good ol' crack at Proudhon, in the footnote,

  • and the anarchist kind of vision,

  • because, basically he says, well what Proudhon did was to take the

  • notion of justice, the bourgeois notion of justice,

  • and the bourgeois notion of labour,

  • and labour input, as the basis

  • of the construction of an alternative society, which is, as far as Marx was concerned, was ridiculous,

  • because all you're doing was: taking

  • the pure form of bourgeois consciousness and

  • saying, this is the way in which to escape from

  • bourgeois society, and Marx kind of says: that's nonsense.

  • So, what we then go through, to some degree in here,

  • is a recapitulation of the way in which money crystallizes out.

  • As he says on hundred and eighty-one: "Money necessarily crystallizes out of the process of exchange(…)",

  • and "The historical broadening and deepening of the phenomenon of exchange develops the opposition

  • between use-value and value which is latent in the nature of the commodity." We've come

  • across this idea, this opposition, before.

  • He's now coming back to it, expanding it a bit.

  • "The need to give an external expression of this opposition for the purposes of commercial

  • intercourse produces the drive

  • towards an independent form of value, which finds neither rest nor peace

  • until an independent form has been achieved by the differentiation of commodities

  • into commodities and money."

  • In other words,

  • this, again is about the process of exchange

  • proliferating, generating, making that separation.

  • This separation, however, presumes,

  • he says on top of hundred and eighty-two, that we're dealing with individuals and

  • private owners,

  • and that "Things are in themselves external to man, and therefore alienable."

  • Alienable in this case means:

  • they're not part of my being, I can freely dispose of them.

  • And you can freely dispose of what you have. If you have some deep

  • attachment to something, you're not going to be able to dispose of it but, the assumption is that

  • all commodities are alienable in this way.

  • And he says in the middle of that page: we're talking here about "the constant repetition of exchange

  • [which] makes it a normal social process."

  • And this universal and social equivalent

  • starts to work its way through different social orders.

  • And on a hundred and eighty-three he talks about the way in which

  • "In the same proportion as exchange bursts its local bonds,

  • and the value of commodities accordingly expands more and more into the material embodiment of human

  • labour as such,

  • in that proportion does the money-form become transformed to commodities

  • which are by nature fitted to perform the social function of a universal equivalent.

  • Those commodities are the precious metals.

  • Gold and silver."

  • This then leads him, however, into some important reflection on hundred and eighty-one,

  • hundred and eighty-three.

  • Bottom of hundred and eighty four, sorry,

  • and hundred and eighty-five:

  • "We have seen that the money-form is merely the reflection thrown upon a single commodity

  • by the relations between all other commodities. That money is a commodity

  • is therefore only a discovery

  • for those who proceed from its

  • finished shape in order to analyze it afterwards."

  • This then leads him to talk a little bit about the way in which money can take on symbolic

  • forms. But he then goes on to say:

  • in a sense "…every commodity is a symbol…"

  • A symbol of what?, well, a symbol of value.

  • "…it is only the material shell of the human labour expended on it."

  • Now, frequently you find people talking about, you know, well, what do we do about symbolic

  • aspects of economies, how do symbolic economies work?

  • But what Marx's opening up here is a possibility to absorb that kind of analysis, and it would take

  • adjustments and all the rest of it, but you can absorb that kind of question into his analysis,

  • because he's very, very well aware

  • that from the very get-go

  • all commodities are symbolic,

  • symbolic of labour content.

  • Therefore, in a sense, we're dealing with symbolic economies all along.

  • The nature of those symbolic economies, however,

  • can be transformed and shifted.

  • And we could look at that in terms of our contemporary society.

  • But what we have to do,

  • however, is to be careful of

  • detaching the symbolic qualities from

  • its rootedness in the value theory.

  • And we always have to bring those symbolic qualities back to

  • this rootedness. And as he says,

  • at the bottom of hundred and eighty-six,

  • "The difficulty lies not in comprehending that money is a commodity,

  • but in discovering how, why and by what means

  • a commodity becomes money."

  • That's the conundrum he's been playing with right away throughout of these last

  • few sections.

  • So this leads into talk, hundred and eighty-seven, about the magic of money,

  • towards the bottom.

  • Then comes a very, very important sentence:

  • "Men are henceforth related to each other in their social process of production in a purely

  • atomistic way.

  • Their own relations of production therefore assume a material shape which is independent

  • of their control and their conscious individual action.

  • This situation is manifested first by the fact

  • that the products of men's labour universally take on the form of commodities.

  • The riddle of the money fetish

  • is therefore the riddle of

  • the commodity fetish, now becomes visible

  • and dazzling to our eyes."

  • What Marx is doing here

  • is accepting Adam Smith's vision

  • of a perfectly functioning market economy

  • in which the hidden hand guides decisions.

  • No one person is in charge,

  • no one person can command,

  • everybody has to function according to,

  • what Marx will later call, the coercive laws of competition in the market.

  • Now, Adam Smith's thesis was

  • that actually individual motivations of entrepreneurs and

  • autonomous individuals acting in the market

  • didn't matter, they could be greedy, they could be selfless, they could be whatever.

  • They could be nice, they could be horrible,

  • but at the end of the day, Adam Smith argued,

  • autonomous individuals, acting freely in the market,

  • following their own wants, needs and desires in whatever way they wanted,

  • would be led to produce a social result,

  • when mediated through the hidden hand of the market, that would redound to the benefit of all.

  • Marx is accepting that vision.

  • And I think it's very important to understand why.

  • Marx's Capital is a critique of classical political economy.

  • Classical political economy held

  • that if only you would let the market do its work,

  • everything would be great.

  • If only you would get the state out of the picture, if only you would eradicate monopoly control,

  • if only you would do all of those things, you would end up with a social order that would be

  • incredibly dynamic and socially just.

  • That was Adam Smith's utopian dream.

  • That was Ricardo's utopian dream.

  • That was the utopian dream of liberal theory.

  • Continues to be the utopian dream of neoliberal theory.

  • Only let the market do its work and everything will be okay.

  • Now, Marx, at this point, has a choice.

  • He could say either markets don't work.

  • We all know there is monopoly, there is powerand all the rest of it,

  • messing around and destroying everything, so,

  • I'm not even going to accept that utopian project as being ever possible.

  • Or he can, as he does here,

  • accept the conditions of that utopian dream,

  • and then ask the question:

  • is it really going to benefit everybody?

  • And the big thesis that is going to come out in Capital is: No!

  • It's just going to benefit the bourgeoisie,

  • It's just going to benefit the haute bourgeoisie,

  • and it's going to screw the workers,

  • left, right and center.

  • The closer you come

  • to implementing this utopian project of liberal theory, neoliberal theory,

  • the greater the levels of social inequality,

  • the greater the degrees of injustice in society,

  • and the greater the destruction

  • of both environmental qualities and labour qualities will ensue.

  • So Marx is accepting the terms of classical political economic debate

  • in order to show that, in their own terms, they are wrong about the outcome.

  • And he's going to prove it step by step by step.

  • But in so doing, he's going to confine himself

  • to the argument that the classical

  • conditions, which are laid out in Adam Smith's hidden hand,

  • are actually there, and have actually been achieved.

  • When we know, they've not been achieved and they never were achieved.

  • But we have gone through certain historical periods where people have tried to achieve them,

  • as over the last thirty years for example.

  • So what Marx is doing

  • is really trying to deconstruct

  • the classical political economic vision of the liberal bourgeoisie

  • in order to show that it's self-serving.

  • But, it puts him in a problem and it puts us in a problem.

  • When we're reading his analysis, we have to be very careful in saying: is he talking about a real

  • capitalist society, or this theoretical society

  • which Adam Smith dreamed of,

  • and the classical political economists dreamed of.

  • And sometimes those two things run interference with each other,

  • sometimes they mess each other up.

  • And we have to watch out for that. Sometimes he ends up saying things which are not unrealistic

  • precisely because of that presumption.

  • So that's where we are.

  • We're out of time.

  • Next week I want you to read the chapter on money,

  • the whole of the chapter on money.

  • Think about the structure.

  • It's a very difficult chapter,

  • it's the chapter that nearly everybody gives up on.

  • If you get through it,

  • you'll be

  • you'll be okay.

  • So, we'll go through it next time, thanks.

» NEIL SMITH: What I remember from those days is how textual

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Class 02 マルクスの資本第一巻をデイヴィッド・ハーヴェイと読む (Class 02 Reading Marx's Capital Vol I with David Harvey)

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