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  • FITZGERALD: I'm Deborah Fitzgerald.

  • I'm the dean of the School of Humanities, Arts and Social

  • Sciences here at MIT.

  • And it is my pleasure to welcome you to the afternoon session.

  • I want to say how delighted I am that our school is

  • one of the co-hosts of this terrific event.

  • And before I say more, I want to just make

  • a couple of thank-yous, first of all to David Mindell

  • and to the 150th Committee, who have conceived

  • of the idea of having these six symposia to highlight

  • the scholarly and really practical

  • aspects of research and education

  • at MIT over the last 150 years.

  • They've done a fantastic job, and I thank them very much.

  • I want to thank also Jim Poterba for his remarkable

  • organizational skills, his sense of humor,

  • his powers of persuasion-- which many of you

  • have experienced-- his sense of humor, and his grace.

  • He has really been the mind behind this,

  • and he's just done a fabulous job as well.

  • Economics is one of 10 departments

  • in the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.

  • It is the largest department.

  • It has the most faculty.

  • It has the largest undergraduate majors.

  • And it has the largest number of graduate students.

  • It also has the most Nobel Prize winners

  • of all of the departments in my school, oddly enough.

  • All 10 departments in the School are

  • dedicated to the education of MIT students.

  • Each student at MIT-- each undergraduate--

  • is required to take eight classes in these fields,

  • humanities, arts, and social sciences,

  • which is quite high by peer standards.

  • And so we see a lot of undergraduates in our school.

  • From all fields across the board,

  • MIT undergraduates tend to gravitate

  • to the Economics Department, drawn

  • by its illustrious faculty as well

  • as by the rigor of the classes that they encounter.

  • MIT students, in my experience, tend

  • to scoff at material that is not very difficult.

  • And they find in economics a more than adequate challenge

  • to their considerable abilities.

  • I want to note too that there are a lot of MIT undergraduates

  • and graduate students in the audience today.

  • And I'm really delighted that you were able to join us.

  • Today we're honoring not only the economics

  • field and the Economics Department

  • but also, as this program indicates--

  • as you see the graduation dates of many of the speakers--

  • we're also honoring the extraordinary students who have

  • graduated from this department.

  • Like their faculty mentors, these graduates

  • have exerted an impact on the profession

  • and on the world that is really, I

  • think, unmatched, transforming the domains of scholarship,

  • of policy, and of business all over the world.

  • As this symposium makes clear, while there's

  • a lot to celebrate today in the world of economics,

  • there do remain many challenges in this sphere.

  • And these are challenges that I believe MIT intends to meet.

  • So again, I want to welcome you to the symposium.

  • And I will now turn things over to Ricardo Caballero.

  • Thank you.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • CABALLERO: Thank you, Deborah.

  • The afternoon is slightly different from the morning.

  • The idea is to discuss policy challenges.

  • And the first of the two panels will

  • be about macroeconomic policy.

  • The timing of this panel, weather aside,

  • couldn't be better, no?

  • The developed world is still struggling

  • with the aftershocks of an extremely severe

  • financial crisis.

  • In the US, the debate is whether stimulus is still needed

  • or whether the time has arrived to shift

  • the focus to long-term sustainability issues.

  • In Europe, the risks run deeper, and even the future

  • of the euro itself is sometimes doubted by markets--

  • not by the IMF, but by markets, certainly.

  • These realities of the developed world contrast sharply

  • with those of emerging markets in China and India

  • in particular, where output gaps have closed

  • and inflation and overheating concerns have reemerged.

  • To illuminate us on these decoupling

  • issues and other fascinating macroeconomic policy issues,

  • we have assembled a superb panel.

  • They have in common to be world-renowned academics

  • and policy makers, and to be also graduates

  • from the best economics PhD program in the world.

  • They need no introduction.

  • They'll speak in almost nearly alphabetical order.

  • Olivier Blanchard will first give us a global perspective.

  • And then we'll get into specific issues--

  • emerging markets-- by Pedro Aspe, PhD '68.

  • Do I have it right, Pedro?

  • ASPE: '78.

  • CABALLERO: '78.

  • Oops, sorry.

  • I knew something was wrong.

  • I knew something was wrong.

  • And Olivier was PhD '77.

  • Then Bob Gordon, who is replacing Alan Blinder,

  • is a PhD '67.

  • Paul Krugman, who is not here but should be online,

  • is a PhD '77.

  • Greg Mankiw, PhD '84, and Christina Romer, PhD '85.

  • So without further ado, Olivier, the world is yours.

  • BLANCHARD: I wish.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • Good.

  • Let me first say how happy I am to be back here,

  • if only for one day.

  • It's a very special feeling.

  • Given my current job, as most of you--

  • I've been the chief economist at the IMF

  • now for two years and a half.

  • I was asked to give you a sense of the global landscape.

  • And that's particularly easy for me to do at this point

  • because two days ago, we published the World Economic

  • Outlook update.

  • So I still remember the numbers, which

  • I will have forgotten probably by next week.

  • So the headline, if it has to be short,

  • is the global economic recovery continues.

  • And on the surface, the numbers actually look quite good.

  • For example, global growth, growth for the world economy,

  • is forecast to be at 4.5% this year,

  • 2011, which is a fairly high number.

  • But below the headline, the reality is quite different.

  • The global number is a bit misleading.

  • What we have is what we have called,

  • and many others as well, a two-speed recovery,

  • depending on where you are in the world.

  • If you look at emerging market countries,

  • and I'm sure Pedro will say much more about this,

  • then they are doing very well.

  • The growth rate that we forecast for 2011

  • is 6.5% for the group of emerging and developing

  • economies.

  • And as you know, if you go, for example, to China,

  • the forecast is now of 10%.

  • If you go to India, the forecast is of 9%.

  • Now, it's not only that.

  • It is that this is a statement about the growth

  • rate, the rate at which countries' GDP goes up.

  • But there's also the question of how close we are to potential

  • and why, in the crisis, they went away from potential.

  • Output was lower than potential.

  • They are now, for many of them, not all-- for example,

  • not Mexico yet.

  • But for many of them, they are basically

  • back very close to potential.

  • And some of them seem to be crossing the line

  • at fairly high speed, so that the challenge

  • for these countries is really just to limit overheating,

  • slow down so as to maintain growth

  • which is consistent with what they can do.

  • In the medium term, their challenges

  • are going to be how to limit inflation, asset price

  • bubbles, and so on.

  • Now, if you turn to the advanced countries,

  • there the picture is much worse.

  • The growth rate for the set of advanced countries for 2011

  • is 2.5%.

  • That was actually one of the themes in Davos yesterday.

  • I was not in Davos, but I read the newspaper.

  • It was that within that 2.5%, there are actually two numbers.

  • There's the US, which is growing at 3%.

  • And there's the Euro Zone, which is expected to grow at 1.5%.

  • These are very low numbers.

  • And again, these are not only low numbers.

  • They're basically more or less normal

  • growth rates for those countries in the sense of what

  • we had seen earlier.

  • But these countries have a very large output gap.

  • And they are operating very far below potential.

  • Unemployment is very high in some countries,

  • as you know, close to 10% in many countries.

  • And given the kind of forecast we have,

  • this implies that the unemployment rate

  • is going to remain very high for many, many years to come,

  • far beyond the technical horizon, for example,

  • of the World Economic Outlook, which is two or three years.

  • And that's going to be, I think, a very, very big issue.

  • So this is the general landscape.

  • And I thought I would pick a few issues which are both very

  • hot and very important.

  • And I've chosen two.

  • Another one, which I will not mention

  • but I suspect Pedro may, is that of capital flows.

  • But that I'll leave aside in the interest of time.

  • The two big issues I see-- the first one you're all aware of--

  • is what's happening in what's known

  • as periphery Europe, which is a set of countries typically

  • in the Euro.

  • And there, [INAUDIBLE] trouble.

  • I'll come back to it.

  • And then the other issue I want to take up

  • is not the fight, but the tensions between China

  • and the US, and see what it is based on and where it's going.

  • So on periphery Europe, I think an important point to make

  • is that the countries which are in trouble-- so just

  • to be explicit, surely Ireland and Greece,

  • and Portugal and Spain being not very far from it--

  • would have been in trouble had there been no global crisis.

  • Basically what happened is that when they got into the Euro,

  • and indeed in some cases before they got into the Euro,

  • they thought that their future was very, very bright.

  • First, these are countries which used

  • to be able to borrow at very high rates because

  • of a large risk premium.

  • The fact that now they were going to be members of the Euro

  • meant that they suddenly were able to borrow

  • from the rest of the world at a very low interest rate.

  • And then they had been told by economists

  • that when you join a common currency area,

  • your productivity growth just jumps up,

  • and the future is very bright.

  • And it turned out that was not true,

  • that basically they entered, and their productivity growth did

  • nothing.

  • In some cases, it actually decreased.

  • So in all of these countries, what happened is at some point,

  • they could continue to borrow.

  • But they realized that the assumptions

  • under which they had borrowed were no longer satisfied.

  • And there was a retrenchment of spending in some countries--

  • private spending-- in other countries, public spending.

  • But basically just a fairly major recession.

  • As a result of this recession, on top of a global crisis,

  • then there was a fiscal problem which basically appeared.

  • In most of these countries, the fiscal problem

  • is really the result of the macro adjustment

  • rather than something separate.

  • There is one country where clearly there

  • was fiscal misbehavior even before the crisis.

  • That's Greece.

  • So Greece is combining both a true fiscal problem

  • to start with and a macro problem,

  • which makes it much worse.

  • Now, this is history.

  • The question is, what happens now?

  • And it's clear that the markets are

  • worried about whether the governments of these countries

  • will be able to repay the debt, or repay the debt in time.

  • And by implication, they worry that the banks which

  • hold the stuff, which hold the sovereign debt,

  • may also have serious problems.

  • So we have the interaction between sovereign and banking

  • problems, and spreads basically are

  • very high on both in some of these countries.

  • And so the question is, what can be done?

  • Is it hopeless?

  • Is there some hope?

  • Let me describe what I think should be done.

  • And that's going to be normative.

  • Then I'll turn to the descriptive,

  • what's likely to be done.

  • And let me give you the answer to the second part, which

  • is, I think what will be done is what should

  • be done, except a bit late.

  • This is the way Europe operates.

  • So I think by giving you the normative--

  • CABALLERO: Is it the same?

  • BLANCHARD: Yeah, it's the same thing, just three months later.

  • We'll come to the debating part later, right?

  • So let me tell you.

  • Many, many people, and international organizations,

  • and the EU, and so on have said, well, Europe

  • has to have a comprehensive package.

  • But it's one of these magic words.

  • I mean, you say we need a comprehensive package,

  • but the question is, what is it?

  • I think it has three parts.

  • There are things which need to be done very urgently.

  • There is, on the part of investors, a lot of skepticism

  • that the banks have told the truth about their balance

  • sheet.

  • And many investors believe that in fact some of the real estate

  • loans that they have are really worse than they said,

  • that the proportion of sovereign debt that they hold

  • is off the books, and so on and so on.

  • So it is absolutely essential.

  • I think the investors are probably pessimistic,

  • but the only way to disprove their fears

  • or allay their fears is basically

  • to make these balance sheets more transparent.

  • This is known as the need for stress tests.

  • What's important is not really the stress test part.

  • It is really just the understanding of the balance

  • sheets of the banks.

  • And I think that's terribly urgent.

  • I think when this is done, the markets

  • will realize that the numbers needed

  • to recapitalize the banks are actually not enormous.

  • It has to come with plans to recapitalize them, if needed.

  • That's also not quite in place yet, and that's very urgent.

  • So I think this is what has to happen

  • over the next few months.

  • At this stage, in line with the remark I made earlier,

  • there is a plan to have stress tests done by June or July.

  • And I'm not sure that the time is there to do that.

  • But that is clearly something which needs to be done.

  • The second is looking at the medium run, not just

  • the next few months but the next few years or beyond that.

  • There is an expression in French which I like very much, which

  • is, donner du temps au temps, which I translate

  • by "giving time to time."

  • Which I think is actually quite important in this context.

  • I mean, it is very clear that the adjustment process

  • that these countries will have to go through,

  • both on the macro and the fiscal side,

  • is not going to be over in three years, in five years.

  • It will probably take 10 years before these countries actually

  • get back to health.

  • I think we have to understand it,

  • and we have to understand that the initial period is

  • going to be a very tough one.

  • It's going to be one of fiscal consolidation

  • in an adverse environment, probably with negative growth,

  • which we're seeing.

  • And eventually things will turn around.

  • And eventually, we hope, things will get back

  • to some kind of normal.

  • Now, I think it's much too early to basically decide

  • that this has failed.

  • So far, for example, for the programs--

  • the IMF has two programs, one in Greece, and in Ireland.

  • So far, the numbers are turning out

  • as we forecast, and aren't great.

  • But things are not worse than we anticipated,

  • and the government is delivering on the fiscal actions

  • that it has to take, the structural reforms and so on.

  • So I think that's very important,

  • to have that time horizon in mind and not just to panic.

  • Now, you have to take out of the picture

  • the panic scenarios, which are always present.

  • This is an environment which is rife with multiple equilibria.

  • If the markets decide that you're not going to make it,

  • then they decide that they have to charge

  • a much higher interest rate.

  • And then the debt dynamics are such that you

  • have absolutely no way of paying back,

  • and therefore the markets were right to decide

  • that you could not.

  • So it's very important to eliminate, I think,

  • these multiple equilibria for the time being.

  • And what this means is that the countries have to know that

  • as long as they are taking the right measures,

  • they'll be able to borrow at an interest

  • rate which is not too high.

  • And that's exactly what the IMF programs do.

  • They say, you can basically borrow, in the case of the two

  • countries I mentioned, that you can

  • borrow at between 5% and 6%, for sure, for the next two years,

  • and then we'll see.

  • So this eliminates the possibility

  • that they have to pay much more, at least for the time being.

  • The other thing which has to be done-- and the ECB

  • is not eager to do it, but has done it

  • and has to continue to do it-- is once these programs are

  • in place, then the ECB has to provide liquidity to the banks.

  • Because again here, you have the possibility

  • of multiple equilibria, which is people

  • believing the banks are bad, taking their money out,

  • and making the banks collapse.

  • There, the ECB so far has been basically providing liquidity,

  • lending against collateral, and has to continue to do so.

  • The last point on this is that time to time is good,

  • but things have to happen meanwhile.

  • I've talked about the fiscal and structural measures,

  • but more has to be done.

  • And there has to be rules about what we call burden sharing.

  • Which is basically if somebody is not

  • going to be able to repay, who among the creditors

  • takes the hit?

  • And that's true both for sovereigns and for banks.

  • And at this stage in Europe, these rules are not ready.

  • They have to be put in place.

  • It's very delicate to do from a communications point of view

  • because every time you talk about it,

  • the markets get very edgy.

  • But it is essential to do it.

  • Under the scenario I've given, there is time to do it,

  • but it has to be done.

  • So is this going to happen?

  • Well, one can always think of other scenarios.

  • I think there's a good chance it happens.

  • I think that if, for example, just

  • to take an example, if Spain decided

  • that it needed a program, and there was not

  • enough money in the funds which had been put aside

  • by the European Union to help Spain,

  • then I'm quite sure that the Germans and the French

  • would discuss, and it would be messy,

  • but eventually the funds would come.

  • I think that basically India-- and that's what I said earlier.

  • India and, I think, Europe does what is needed.

  • It just doesn't do it as quick as one might dream.

  • So this was the first issue.

  • Let me turn to the second and last one, which

  • is the US and China.

  • Why is it that they seem to be unhappy with each other?

  • I think the way to start is to think about the US

  • and to think about what was driving growth

  • before the crisis in the US.

  • And what was driving growth before the crisis in the US

  • is so-called US consumers.

  • Basically, US consumption was the driving force

  • for-- the household saving rate had gone nearly to zero.

  • It was driving growth.

  • Crisis has come.

  • People have realized that it is unwise to save

  • on the assumption that asset prices will go up

  • by 20% a year.

  • So the US consumers, lo and behold,

  • have basically started acting reasonably, rationally.

  • And the saving rate has increased in the US

  • from very close to zero to something like 6%.

  • Now, that's a very good thing in the long run.

  • But in the short run, as we teach in 14.02,

  • that creates a problem of demand when people save more.

  • And so something has to come in in order to sustain growth

  • from the demand side.

  • If it's not consumers, who is it going to be?

  • Well, so far it has been fiscal policy, which basically

  • substituted higher private saving with larger

  • public dissaving, larger deficits.

  • But we all understand that that cannot go on forever.

  • So there is a limit to that.

  • What else can come?

  • Investment can come, but at this stage, it can help for a while.

  • It cannot help permanently.

  • We had a reasonable investment level.

  • It's hard to think it can be much higher for very long.

  • And so if you just take the identities, what has to happen

  • is that sustained growth in the US, looking forward, say,

  • five years or more, has to rely on an improvement

  • in net exports.

  • Or put another way, the US has to decrease its current account

  • deficit.

  • Now, identities are kind of useful

  • here because they tell you, well,

  • if the US must improve its net exports,

  • then some other countries, the rest of the world,

  • must actually do the reverse.

  • So net exports have to decrease somewhere in the world.

  • Or another way of saying this, current account surpluses

  • have to decrease somewhere else in the world.

  • And the question is, well, who?

  • Who does it?

  • And there, all eyes turn to China.

  • Why?

  • Because it has a very large current account surplus.

  • And it is not the only country to do so, but it is very large.

  • And so there is the notion that China

  • should, for the sake of the US and for the sake of world

  • growth, decrease its current account surplus.

  • Now, as luck would have it, that's

  • also something that China wants, for very different reasons--

  • not particularly to help the US but because they

  • think it's good for themselves.

  • Because at this stage, what the current account

  • surplus of China indicates is growth

  • which has been based very much on net exports

  • and not very much on domestic consumption.

  • And what's happening in China is that there's a feeling

  • that domestic consumption-- partly for social reasons,

  • partly for political reasons-- has to increase.

  • So China actually wants to change its growth path

  • from net exports towards domestic consumption.

  • And that would be good for them, and it

  • would be good for the US for the reasons I gave.

  • The problem is that they are not eager to do it very quickly.

  • Because for them, it's a very large economy.

  • It's a very large change in direction.

  • They don't know how it's going to work.

  • They know how to export.

  • They are not sure how to basically satisfy

  • the domestic market.

  • So their approach is to say, well,

  • let's increase domestic consumption.

  • Let's increase domestic demand.

  • And if the economy starts overheating because we're still

  • producing a lot of exports and now satisfying domestic demand,

  • then we'll do something.

  • And probably what we'll do in this case

  • is let the Yuan appreciate so as to basically shift production

  • towards domestic demand.

  • Now, what they have in mind here is for the end horizon

  • of many years.

  • They just don't want to do it quickly.

  • But the US needs it fairly urgently.

  • And so the tension at this point is really there,

  • which is the US would like China to appreciate now,

  • which would allow other countries which

  • worry about competitiveness with China to also appreciate.

  • This would start the process now.

  • And China would like to do it, but at their own pace, which

  • is probably a few years down the line.

  • So it's not as if the two players are totally at odds.

  • But there's this problem of timing, which is a serious one.

  • So just to end, what happens if this is not resolved?

  • If net exports do not improve in the US,

  • I assume that Greg and others on this side will talk about it.

  • And well, then the US is confronted

  • with a very difficult choice.

  • Either it does fiscal consolidation--

  • but there is a risk that this decreases demand and slows down

  • growth, which would be bad for the US,

  • probably bad for the world-- or it

  • continues to have very large deficits in order

  • to push demand in the absence of the improvement in net exports.

  • And then we get questions like the questions

  • that we're now getting for Europe, which is,

  • is the fiscal path sustainable?

  • And there are reasons to think that one might want to worry.

  • So there are other issues in the world,

  • but these are the two that I wanted to focus on.

  • And with this I shall stop.

  • CABALLERO: Thank you very much, Olivier.

  • Pedro?

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • ASPE: I am delighted to be back at MIT

  • and to see my professors again.

  • And I'd like to thank Jim Poterba and Ricardo

  • for the invitation.

  • Let me make three comments, one comment on emerging markets

  • that Olivier referred to, how they are recovering.

  • But then I will want to make a comment on the US

  • and a comment on the indebted countries.

  • So first, on the recovery, as Olivier was saying,

  • the emerging markets' recovery is here and is fast.

  • And especially they're basically two speeds,

  • as Olivier was saying.

  • At the fast speeds, of course, China and India.

  • But there are several Latin American countries,

  • for instance, that are growing up around 6% to 7%--

  • Peru, Brazil, Colombia, even Mexico.

  • We are lagging behind, but we're growing at 5%.

  • So that's the emerging markets.

  • There are some laggards there too.

  • In our continent, the emerging markets that are not growing

  • are very easy to find.

  • There's Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua.

  • And it's perfectly easy to find zero growth or, as two of them,

  • falling even in this year.

  • So let me talk a little bit about this growth of emerging

  • markets.

  • I think many emerging countries, we have learned the lessons

  • from the previous crises.

  • And I think there are some rules that

  • are more or less accepted-- not all of them, but most of them

  • will have.

  • On each part of the world, there's

  • one emerging market which is the role model.

  • In Latin America, it's Chile by far.

  • We all would look at them.

  • They were always ahead.

  • And certainly Chile fulfills all these points.

  • Let me go one by one.

  • One is the independent central bank.

  • That's something that we have learned the hard way.

  • Most of the emerging markets have gone that way.

  • It's tough to do it, but finally we have it.

  • And the reason is that you want to have

  • a sound monetary policy, and independent

  • from the government, and especially

  • to keep inflation low.

  • Why?

  • Because we learned the hard way that when

  • you have high inflation, to bring it down is too costly.

  • So that's the first point.

  • The second lesson is trade liberalization.

  • I think that's really, really, really important.

  • And that's something that we have learned.

  • It is a pain in the short term.

  • But once you do it, you have permanent jobs,

  • and you grow lots more, and you can grow faster

  • without inflation.

  • So I think trade liberalization is really one

  • of these key pieces of policy.

  • By the way, I concentrate on liberalization of trade

  • because the financial sector is a different thing.

  • I will come back to that later.

  • Third, extremely important for emerging markets,

  • the pension reforms.

  • That's something that again, it was created first in Chile.

  • Thanks god, I was minister when we copied that in Mexico.

  • And 15 years later, 20 years later, it is maturing now.

  • And so we have $180 billion of long-term financing

  • for the first time ever.

  • So the pension fund reforms a la Chilean is really important.

  • Brazil has done it.

  • Peru has done it.

  • Colombia has done it.

  • And this is really, really important.

  • The fourth, flexible or more flexible labor markets.

  • There, you can learn the easy way or the difficult way.

  • The easy way is that you convince everybody,

  • and you pass labor reforms to allow more flexibility.

  • The tough way is that you have so many crises domestically

  • that finally the markets learn how to have contracts

  • that are flexible.

  • But this is very, very important.

  • For instance, in 2009 in Mexico, we

  • lost, during the September 15, the Lehman,

  • and the following 12 months, September to September, 2008,

  • 2009, we lost almost a million jobs, 900,000.

  • And the good news is that we have recovered them completely.

  • But this flexibility is key.

  • Then another important thing is how

  • the emerging markets behaved last year

  • in terms of the stimulus.

  • I think that the stimulus was clearly--

  • we used monetary policy a lot.

  • And we used fiscal policy somewhat, but not a lot.

  • It was lots more lower interest rates,

  • maintain lower interest rates during the crisis.

  • And that was, with some fiscal spending, very focused,

  • very focalized.

  • And I think it has come OK.

  • Now we're dismantling this stimulus.

  • Finally, two points.

  • Keep the public debt low because you need

  • to keep the public debt low.

  • In Latin America we have a rule of thumb,

  • which is once it reaches 80%, you don't grow.

  • And there are a lot of countries that are reaching 80%.

  • And that's dangerous.

  • Latin America, on average, it has 40.

  • Chile has only 10%.

  • Mexico has 30.

  • Brazil has 55, 60.

  • But that's really key.

  • Once you reach the 80s, 90s, then growth immediately

  • diminishes.

  • And finally, we have learned two things on the financial sector.

  • And we have learned the hard way.

  • One is, don't liberalize too fast.

  • Be extremely careful there.

  • And second, watch out with capital inflows.

  • You will have to have huge reserves to allow this thing.

  • And you have to be very, very careful.

  • Thanks god, the new inflows are different from the past.

  • They are more medium term than short term.

  • So we have learned the hard lessons because of mistakes

  • that we made or because big triumphs that others did.

  • But now it's a common culture that these things

  • have to be there.

  • Let me make a comment on the world adjustment

  • that Olivier referred to.

  • It's key that the US diminishes this current account deficit.

  • And it's key that China does the reverse adjustment that

  • reduces its surplus.

  • And I think here the inflation fears in China

  • will help because now that inflation starts

  • being an issue there, you have two choices, the good one

  • and the bad one.

  • The good one is to revalue, if you have space.

  • The bad one is to put the monetary and fiscal brakes

  • and to dampen growth.

  • So I think that the Chinese eventually-- at their pace--

  • but they will do the good one and revalue instead of putting

  • the monetary and fiscal brakes.

  • There are some emerging markets that are having inflation

  • problems, and they have used the exchange rate already so that

  • they cannot appreciate anymore.

  • And that's tough.

  • They will have to use the fiscal and monetary brakes,

  • and that's tough in the short term.

  • Finally, let me make a comment on those countries in Europe

  • the have a lot of debt.

  • I suffer.

  • When I was minister of finance in my country,

  • we were up the debt up to here.

  • And it was horrible-- horrible!

  • And it lasts forever.

  • I remember when I was coming to the US.

  • And I was listening to Olivier, so I have to tell this story.

  • We made a really good story and we said,

  • we cannot take more debt.

  • I mean, that's impossible that we take more debt.

  • It would be highly irresponsible.

  • So we come to Washington.

  • I remember Jim Baker was the secretary of the treasury.

  • So I arrived and I said to him, look,

  • I need you to listen to me for 20 minutes,

  • the 20 reasons why we have a debt overhang problem,

  • that we cannot ignore debt, et cetera, et cetera,

  • and that we will have to face a debt negotiation.

  • And I remember it as if it was yesterday, that Jim Baker said,

  • Pedro, come on, don't worry.

  • Don't worry.

  • You are our neighbor in the south and our friend,

  • and we are going to give you financing.

  • And I said, ay, ay, ay, ay, ay, ay, ay,

  • ay, that's the-- no, no, I said, financing is more than-- no,

  • no, no, financing is for growth.

  • And you know?

  • Okay.

  • I was reminded of that because Nicholas Brady,

  • the later secretary of the treasury with whom

  • we did finally the debt reduction--

  • and I was invited by the Greeks and the people

  • in Europe to talk a little bit about the Brady plan.

  • And of course, as Olivier was saying,

  • the problem is the banks, no?

  • It is not the US government problem.

  • It is the US banks' problem when we have the problem,

  • or the European problem.

  • And that takes time.

  • That takes time.

  • In the meantime, everybody is giving financing to them.

  • And you look at the numbers-- impossible.

  • Debt overhang-- horrible.

  • The more it takes time, the more costly it is.

  • Let me tell you what happens in the second phase.

  • So you take more financing, as we did for one additional year.

  • And then the private sector, of course,

  • knows very well this game and start saying,

  • we're not going to give you any financing.

  • So if you want to import anything, zero financing,

  • zero trade financing.

  • And then if you want to import, they say,

  • ah, first you have to give me the financing,

  • and then I will send you the goods.

  • So really the squeeze on the economies are terrible.

  • So it takes time, I know, but for this debt overhang,

  • the things we have learned is face them.

  • Face them fast.

  • Thank you.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • CABALLERO: So next is Robert Gordon,

  • who has kindly accepted to do this 10 minutes ago.

  • So thank you very much, Bob.

  • GORDON: I'm delighted to have the chance

  • to tell you much of what Alan Blinder would have told you

  • if he had been here.

  • And I know that because he and I have had active email exchanges

  • over the past few months, identifying

  • the small nuances in our generally overlapping views.

  • I try to think of two reasons why Jim Poterba might have

  • chosen me out of the audience.

  • I do have the requisite requirement of an MIT PhD,

  • from 1967, the same year as Bob Hall.

  • And probably just as important is

  • that given my last name, if you replace Blinder by Gordon,

  • the rest of the panel stays in the same alphabetical order.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • I wanted to take off from two remarks

  • I heard this morning, one by Bob Solow on macro in the 1970s

  • and one by Bob Hall-- several remarks

  • by Bob Hall-- on the causes of a long slump.

  • Bob Solow identified a vacuum that occurred in the mid-1970s

  • when Keynesian economics was confronted by an inflation the

  • did not originate in excess demand,

  • but rather from adverse supply shocks.

  • That vacuum was filled with amazing speed.

  • And the MIT connection here is not particularly the articles

  • that were written, promptly, to fill that vacuum but the fact

  • that in the spring of 1978, two textbooks appeared

  • that completely integrated supply

  • shocks into Keynesian aggregate demand

  • macro, complete with a formal dynamic supply-demand model,

  • a diagram with inflation plotted against the output gap,

  • with supply and demand curves in inflation space

  • with the usual slopes.

  • And those two textbooks were by two MIT professors, Rudi

  • Dornbusch and Stan Fischer, who also had an MIT PhD, and then

  • mine, also with the MIT pedigree.

  • Now turning to Bob Hall, I think it's

  • interesting to see how we can take the traditional macro, a

  • la those textbooks, and ask what sort of the minimum stuff we

  • have to add in order to understand

  • the crisis in the long slump.

  • Well, we already started with a consumption function that

  • depended on transitory and permanent income, a channel

  • from interest rates to consumer durables,

  • and a real net wealth effect a la Franco Modigliani.

  • The first thing I think we have to do

  • is to make it clear that real net wealth is

  • assets minus liabilities.

  • And both are a problem for households

  • and for consumer spending.

  • Of course, we had the assets dragged down

  • by the end of the housing bubble and the collapse of the stock

  • market after October 2007.

  • But we also had household liabilities rising from 90%

  • of disposable income in the mid-'90s to a peak of 135%

  • in 2007.

  • So the households are sagging under all this debt

  • while their assets are collapsing in value.

  • But we need a third channel besides interest rates

  • and real net wealth.

  • And that is something I would like to call credit conditions.

  • And I'd like to illustrate it with a startling story

  • from a mortgage broker friend who, believe it or not,

  • is still in business.

  • He puts together deals and then presents them

  • to banks, like Chase and other more obscure places,

  • to try to get them approved.

  • He reports that in 2005, only 5% of his proposed deals

  • were turned down.

  • And it's now 80%.

  • I checked his number with the chief economist

  • of Wells Fargo, who I happened to meet a couple of months ago.

  • He says for Wells Fargo, it's more like 50% to 60%

  • turned down.

  • So you have a quantitative credit constraint

  • on top of the voluntary response of households

  • to changes in real net wealth.

  • And I wanted to remind you that the Hall diagnosis is

  • absolutely correct.

  • You've got a demand side and a supply side.

  • You've got the overbuilding leading

  • to excess supply of houses, but you've also

  • got the debt, which doesn't go away just because the house

  • prices go down.

  • And remember that each foreclosure

  • raises the supply of houses by one

  • without raising the demand for houses by anything,

  • because the foreclosed household is not allowed

  • to borrow to buy a new house.

  • It's very instructive to compare the recent episode

  • with three earlier bubbles, the late '20s Japan

  • and the US in the late '90s.

  • There are a lot of similarities in the setup of the US housing

  • bubble and 1927 to '29 episode, which involved not only

  • the stock market.

  • It involved residential overbuilding

  • and a leverage-like phenomena of corporate holding companies,

  • which translates in today's language into excess leverage.

  • Now, we know that the aftermath of the late '20s

  • was a disaster, made worse by bad policy.

  • We had a near disaster this time,

  • with policy stepping into the breach in a very effective way.

  • We know that Japan has had virtually two lost decades.

  • Why was the stock market collapse

  • of the late '90s different?

  • Simple word, leverage.

  • The Fed had raised margin requirements

  • from the 10% of the late '20s to a stable 50%

  • during most of the post-war.

  • So most of those stocks that were being bought

  • in the late 1990s were not like the houses,

  • with minimal down payments.

  • People were putting up 100% when they were buying stocks

  • for their retirement accounts.

  • So to replace Bob Hall's word "overhang"

  • with the much more evocative word "hangover,"

  • here is our economy as I see it.

  • We've got the household liabilities

  • weighing down the consumer.

  • We've got the end of cash-out refinancing.

  • All this has led, as Olivier said,

  • to a jump in the household saving rate,

  • with more perhaps in line.

  • On the side of investment, we have the oversupply

  • of residential houses.

  • We have an oversupply people don't mention very often

  • of hotels, office buildings, and other non-residential

  • structures.

  • And we have the well-known problems

  • of the state and local governments,

  • which have shed 200,000 employees in the past year.

  • And they're just beginning.

  • Cook County has mandated a 20% cut

  • in budgets of every department.

  • And that's just a small slice of the country.

  • So what do we do?

  • Here we would turn to policy.

  • I agree with Bob Hall that monetary policy

  • has run out of tools.

  • And in Alan Blinder's evocative language, thinking of World War

  • I, we've run out of ammunition for the machine

  • guns and the howitzers.

  • We're in the trenches, and all we've

  • got left to fight with are swords and throwing stones.

  • So the Fed is pretty much out of the picture.

  • I might add, however, that the Fed failed in the housing

  • bubble period to realize that it's

  • got tools besides its blunt instrument of the Fed funds

  • rate.

  • The Fed controls marginal requirements

  • for the stock market.

  • It could very well have raised minimum down payment

  • requirements, and it didn't.

  • So Bob Hall's story, again, is lack of regulation,

  • or actually a movement toward less regulation.

  • So that leaves us with fiscal multipliers.

  • And I wanted to start with how do we estimate them.

  • How do we know what they are?

  • Robert Barro first brought my attention to a paradox,

  • that the three big movements in government spending

  • as a share of GDP that give us the potential

  • to measure the effects all were connected with wars, World War

  • II, Korea, and Vietnam.

  • And the problem is that while you

  • don't have interest rate crowding out in those episodes,

  • you do have capacity constraint crowding out.

  • The government is literally crowding out

  • industrial capacity and requiring

  • that some kinds of production come to a halt.

  • So what do we do?

  • Well, people for years have been looking at 1941

  • and seeing that the official unemployment rate was 10%

  • and saying, oh, that looks like a good episode.

  • There's excess capacity.

  • What are the fiscal multipliers?

  • And if you look at the annual data, they're very small.

  • Well, in recent research, and Bob Hall's student

  • Valerie Ramey has played a role in this,

  • it is possible to construct quarterly data

  • by two different methods for 1940 and '41.

  • And that is the classic period.

  • The share of total government spending in GDP

  • went up from 12% in June 1940 to 25% the day

  • before Pearl Harbor.

  • It more than doubled.

  • But the economy, the durable goods manufacturing sector,

  • had run out of capacity in the last half of 1941.

  • In quarterly data, both consumption and investment

  • fell in the second half of 1941.

  • But if you stop your study of the multiplier

  • in the middle of 1941, lo and behold,

  • you get multipliers of two, very much like those

  • that Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi found for the postwar economy.

  • And very close-- I think Christy Romer

  • will be glad to hear this because I think

  • that kind of multiplier, around two,

  • is what the administration was thinking about

  • in making its estimates of the effects of the Obama stimulus.

  • Problem was, the Obama stimulus did not

  • budge the share of government spending in potential output

  • at all.

  • It did not rise in quarterly data

  • at all from the end of 2008 until right now.

  • And that's because the very modest increases in spending

  • achieved by the federal government

  • was not enough to offset the decline at the state

  • and local government level.

  • Just about the same thing happened in the 1930s.

  • The share of government spending and GDP in early 1940

  • was about the same as it was in 1934,

  • a slide for state and local and a rise for federal.

  • So this leads to the question, what do we do?

  • And monetary policy is out of steam.

  • What do we do on fiscal policy?

  • We have to pretend we're a benevolent dictator

  • and ignore political paralysis.

  • So this is going to seem like a dream world

  • to even make some suggestions.

  • I would start with the Blinder-Zandi litany

  • of multipliers, where the very, very bottom, with the lowest

  • multiplier of all, is what President Obama was hinting

  • at in the State of the Union speech.

  • Cut the corporate income tax, a multiplier of about 0.4.

  • At the very top of the list, with multipliers of 2 and 1/2,

  • are extending unemployment compensation

  • and making food stamps more generous,

  • things that directly aim at the liquidity-constrained

  • households.

  • So in addition to doing things for people

  • who are living from hand to mouth,

  • I think the payroll tax cut would be dominated

  • by a new jobs tax credit.

  • It's very hard to design, but not impossible.

  • We did have one in the late 1970s.

  • And then we've got a problem about infrastructure.

  • The problem about infrastructure-- and I'm

  • an expert on this because the Recovery and Rehabilitation Act

  • that Christy helped to design tore up

  • the main street in front of Northwestern University

  • all last fall.

  • And I drove by every day.

  • And Bob Hall was in the car with me one day.

  • And I pointed this out to him, that there would typically

  • be 10 machines and 5 workers.

  • And God knows how much all this cost.

  • Much of the Obama stimulus went to renting construction

  • machinery rather into the wages of construction workers.

  • Well, that's enough provocation to get Christy and Greg going.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • CABALLERO: Thank you very much, Bob.

  • I have never heard you agreeing so much with Bob Hall, though.

  • I'm very--

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • Anyway, now we will try to connect with Paul Krugman.

  • Paul, are you there?

  • KRUGMAN: Hello?

  • I'm here.

  • CABALLERO: Okay.

  • We're all listening.

  • KRUGMAN: Okay.

  • So I guess the first thing I should say

  • is that clearly we have a major case for increased investment

  • in the intercity transportation infrastructure

  • because I am actually stranded in New York City at the moment.

  • So okay, let me actually weigh in here.

  • In a way, I want to follow on quite closely

  • on where Bob Gordon was.

  • So my view of where we are, of what

  • this depressed state of the advanced world is about,

  • is pretty much what previous speakers have been saying.

  • I think it's not deeply mysterious.

  • It is a problem of debt overhang.

  • It's a balance sheet crisis.

  • It's something that, if we didn't fully

  • anticipate-- certainly nobody can really

  • claim to have called this exactly

  • as it was going to happen-- nonetheless

  • isn't out of the realm of things that a number of economists

  • have thought about.

  • And the whole setup, the problem of monetary policy at the zero

  • lower bound, the problem of balance sheets constraining

  • spending, is something that particularly those

  • of us in the international macro area

  • and those of us who pay a lot of attention to both Japan

  • and to the Asian crisis countries in the '90s

  • had sort of been worrying about, having nightmares about,

  • for the United States for more than a decade before this thing

  • actually happened.

  • So we're in the universe, at least

  • a part of the universe, that was very

  • much a part of some of our imaginations

  • before we got there.

  • What's really striking, and I think

  • is worse than I anticipated, is the apparent inability

  • of policy to really come to grips with this.

  • And Bob Gordon said at the end about let's set

  • the politics on one side.

  • I'm going to not do that.

  • I'm going to try and talk at least a little bit about why

  • it is that we're in this state of paralysis.

  • And we are, as Bob Gordon said.

  • The stimulus in the United States in the end

  • didn't amount to any significant increase

  • in government spending.

  • At best, we were able to avoid a further cut

  • in government spending.

  • The transfer payments that were involved

  • were significant, but not huge.

  • And this does not come as a great surprise either.

  • If you looked at the numbers-- and I

  • wrote umpteen columns about.

  • In early 2009, it was clear that what was on the table

  • was radically short of being enough to fill

  • more than a small piece of the output gap

  • that we already saw looming.

  • So this is really not something that we

  • didn't have the numbers for.

  • And I think what's interesting also

  • is more broadly the hesitance of monetary policy as well.

  • I'm not sure I fully agree with the notion

  • that monetary policy is exhausted.

  • In a different world, there are things that could be done.

  • You could have quantitative easing on a much bigger scale

  • than is being contemplated.

  • We could have an increase in inflation targets, which

  • I know is controversial in its implications.

  • But at least basic economics suggests

  • that it ought to be helpful.

  • But none of these things are really in the realm,

  • apparently, of the politically possible.

  • So what I want to do is talk a little bit about why

  • I think we're in there.

  • And it's not really very much about

  • the contemporary politics, though that's obviously

  • a part of it.

  • I think actually we're talking much more fundamental.

  • And it's something that actually,

  • for an MIT-themed conference, seems particularly appropriate.

  • Which is, I think we've run into the limits of the Samuelsonian

  • synthesis.

  • I think since we've got all of these MIT-trained

  • macroeconomists here, you all know what I'm talking about.

  • But really, a long time ago, at the beginning

  • of modern economics education, which is Paul Samuelson's

  • '48 textbook, we had this really quite brilliant way

  • to reconcile the brave new world of Keynesian economics

  • with the microeconomics that had been the meat

  • and potatoes of economics for so many generations,

  • even at that time.

  • Namely that what we're going to have is

  • we're going to have an activist government.

  • We accept that the demand side of the economy

  • can go very badly wrong.

  • We accept that it's possible to get into depressions,

  • that there isn't any simple automatic mechanism

  • guaranteeing full employment.

  • But what we say is, okay, but we understand what to do.

  • We have that Keynesian cross.

  • We have monetary policy.

  • It wasn't that much emphasized in Samuelson '48,

  • but he took a bigger role later on.

  • We can use monetary and fiscal policy

  • to ensure more or less full employment.

  • And then, given that, we're back in the world

  • where markets work.

  • And we can talk about correcting minor market failures,

  • but by and large have a free-market approach

  • to the economy.

  • And all will be well with the world.

  • What has turned out, at least as the way I see it now,

  • is it turns out that that was a great place to be in,

  • but it was ultimately unstable.

  • And it was unstable in at least three different ways.

  • It was unstable intellectually.

  • It was unstable politically.

  • And it was unstable financially.

  • So the intellectual part first.

  • And being stranded in the wrong city,

  • I wasn't able to attend the sessions earlier,

  • but I assume there were some on this week.

  • There was always something a little bit

  • awkward about the Samuelson synthesis, which

  • was that you were going to continue to do micro

  • as we always had in terms of maximization and equilibrium,

  • but you're going to be somewhat ad hoc about the macro.

  • And inevitably and appropriately,

  • there was a lot of pushing at that boundary in an attempt

  • to put some micro foundations under the macro.

  • The trouble was that that effort did not go well,

  • that in the '70s it might have seemed for a while

  • that we were really on the verge of being able to have

  • a completely micro-founded macro,

  • but it turned out not to be something

  • that you could do very well.

  • And also probably inevitably, what

  • a good part of the economics profession did

  • was to say, well, if we can't find a good micro foundation

  • for these macroeconomic events and the way

  • that things seemed to work, then things must not actually

  • work that way.

  • And so we had a large part of the profession turning

  • to real business cycle theory, a large part of the profession

  • basically turning its back on all of the issues that are

  • being discussed in this panel.

  • And that left us-- I'd say myself,

  • what does it matter what professors think?

  • And the answer is, I think it does

  • matter, that if you have a large part of the inner sanctum

  • of academic economics that doesn't believe

  • in Keynesianism-- in fact, at this point by

  • and large-- and as people know, I've

  • written some fairly insulting things about this-- it really

  • doesn't understand it at all, doesn't even

  • understand the logic of monitoring

  • fiscal policy the way that somebody like me,

  • or somebody like Bob Gordon, et cetera, understands it.

  • Then you have a situation where you

  • don't have the kind of understanding and consensus

  • that would make it possible to push through the kind of really

  • strong policies that you really need at a time like this.

  • Then the political instability.

  • Again, we're in a kind of a funny place.

  • We were in a kind of a funny place for a couple generations

  • where activist government to stabilize

  • the economy was coupled with a generally free-market approach

  • to running the economy.

  • I think that's right.

  • That's actually the way it should be.

  • But it is always going to be a bit of a problem.

  • People who really, really believe

  • that the government should keep its hands off

  • are going to find it hard to accept the idea

  • to put a clause on there that says

  • "except when the unemployment rate is above x percent."

  • Even the attempt at halfway houses-- I think in retrospect,

  • monetarism was an attempt to preserve a basically

  • Keynesian view of the way the economy works,

  • but with a prescription for policy

  • that was as judgment-free and apolitical as possible.

  • It does turn out to be ultimately unsustainable

  • that if people are going to really believe that government

  • is the problem, not the solution,

  • then they're going to start believing

  • that the central bank is the problem and not the solution.

  • For a fairly long period of time,

  • as long as the shocks to the economy were not too big,

  • it was in fact possible for the central bankers

  • to do the job of stabilization and to stay largely

  • out of public view.

  • Not public view, obviously, for the business community

  • and so on, but not to be highly politicized figures.

  • But once you get into a crisis like the one we're in,

  • where fiscal policy would need to be very, very strong to be

  • effective, monetary policy is required to be adventurous,

  • nonconventional, just to avoid utter catastrophe.

  • You're in a world where the political basis,

  • since the intellectual underpinnings of all that

  • are not accepted by a large part of the political community,

  • the support is not there for doing what needs to be done.

  • A lot of people-- if you look at some

  • of what's been going on in the monetary discussion

  • and the monetary discussion in Washington,

  • where you have people demanding a return to the gold standard

  • in the midst of strong deflationary pressures, where

  • you would wonder, how on earth?

  • What on earth is going on there?

  • And I think if you try to think of it in terms

  • of a monetary framework, as most of the macroeconomists

  • at this conference see it, it makes no sense at all.

  • But if you think of it in terms of the political consistency,

  • think about it in terms of what you

  • think is the appropriate role of government,

  • then it makes a lot more sense.

  • Because if you have a large part of the political spectrum that

  • believes that government has no role, really taking

  • any kind of active role in the economy,

  • that includes printing money.

  • And so they're going to be very opposed to that.

  • And so we've lost the political consensus

  • behind not just activist fiscal policy

  • but even activist monetary policy, even activist

  • monetary policy just to stabilize

  • broad monetary aggregates.

  • It's going to be very, very difficult.

  • Basically, I think if you could roll out the arguments

  • that Milton Friedman was making about what the Fed should have

  • done during the Great Depression,

  • right now you would find that he would be considered

  • to be on the leftist side of the debate,

  • and it would be deeply controversial.

  • Last but not least, there's the financial instability.

  • And here I guess we've all rediscovered Hyman Minsky.

  • And we discovered that a prolonged

  • period of relative financial stability

  • makes people careless.

  • So you have rising leverage ratios,

  • greater taking on of debt.

  • Which means that in some sense, the success

  • of technocratic policies sets the stage for a crisis that's

  • too big to be handled with narrow technocratic policies,

  • and can only be really effectively dealt

  • with by policies that are sufficiently aggressive,

  • probably mainly fiscal but also perhaps

  • monetary policies that are really aggressive, really

  • unconventional, and because of the other things that

  • have been going on, completely impossible.

  • And so if you'd asked me five years ago

  • what would happen if the United States had unemployment

  • in excess of 9% and every prospect of continuing

  • to have unemployment that was at incredibly

  • high levels for a number of years to come,

  • I would have said there would be overwhelming political demand

  • that we really do something.

  • In fact, there isn't.

  • In fact, what's happened is that we've

  • had a very near collapse of the idea

  • that the government can do anything about this,

  • As a number of people have noticed

  • in the State of the Union, the president

  • did not actually mention the word "unemployment," which is,

  • again, a pretty shocking thing.

  • What all this implies, I think, is not the end of the world,

  • but long, slow recovery.

  • If we believe that it's about balance sheets,

  • well, those balance sheets are gradually being repaired.

  • But it's a really slow process.

  • It can go on for a very long time.

  • Japan is the cautionary tale.

  • There are some arguments about how deeply depressed Japan is

  • now, or at least how deeply depressed it

  • was on the verge of the crisis.

  • And maybe in effect, Japan had done a fair bit of recovery,

  • but obviously it was a very, very protracted process.

  • And I don't see anything on the horizon

  • that's going to change that.

  • It's a remarkable thing.

  • We're not really suffering from lack of comprehension here,

  • but we're suffering from a complete collapse of clarity

  • in terms of the process, which has left us

  • with not much in the way of policy under discussion.

  • At this point, we can think of what we ought to be doing,

  • but the fact of the matter is, we're not going to do it.

  • I guess I'll end on that happy note.

  • CABALLERO: Okay.

  • Greg, your opportunity.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • MANKIW: When I look back on my education,

  • one of the books that I was assigned

  • as a freshman in college was a freshman Introduction

  • to Philosophy course that had a big impact on me.

  • It was called The Myth of Sisyphus, by Albert Camus.

  • And what Camus was addressing was the question

  • of how do you live your life once you've

  • acknowledged that life basically has no meaning?

  • The fundamental existential question.

  • And I've come to think about that book lately

  • as a macroeconomist.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • Camus' ideal man is Sisyphus, who

  • you may recall from Greek mythology was

  • destined to spend eternity pushing a rock up a hill.

  • As soon as the rock got up to the top of the hill,

  • it would immediately roll back down.

  • And Sisyphus would go back down and have to push it up again.

  • And this would happen over and over and over again, forever.

  • And what Camus admired about Sisyphus

  • was that he kept doing it with all the energy he could,

  • even though he knew it was fruitless.

  • Well, I was thinking about the history of macroeconomics

  • lately.

  • And I feel like we macroeconomists

  • spend a lot of our time pushing this rock up a hill.

  • If you think about the history of macroeconomics,

  • I think of modern macro starting, basically,

  • with John Maynard Keynes and the Great Depression.

  • The early Keynesians, many of which

  • were here, like people like Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow,

  • were basically helping push up the rock up the hill,

  • try to understand this thing called the business

  • cycle to develop tools to combat the business

  • cycle to lead to greater stability and greater

  • prosperity.

  • And sometime around the 1960s, a consensus emerged,

  • the sort of Samuelsonian synthesis that Paul Krugman

  • referred to a moment ago.

  • And it seemed like a very triumphant time.

  • And people wrote books with titles

  • like Is the Business Cycle Obsolete?

  • You probably remember that.

  • GORDON: That was a good book.

  • MANKIW: And I think the answer now is no.

  • But the fact that people even asked that question then

  • was really quite stunning.

  • And shortly after that, people were

  • triumphant in the development of a macroeconomic consensus.

  • Immediately things started falling apart

  • with the great inflation of the 1970s.

  • Milton Friedman came along with some pretty telling criticisms

  • of that consensus.

  • Robert Lucas followed in his footsteps.

  • And everything sort of broke apart.

  • That's roughly when I came here to grad school.

  • Things were basically breaking apart, which

  • is very exciting for a student.

  • There's nothing better for a student than

  • to have a field in disarray.

  • So a lot of my colleagues became macroeconomists

  • because of that.

  • And over a period of time, a new consensus

  • emerged, what is sometimes called

  • the new neoclassical synthesis or the new Keynesian consensus.

  • And it was a new class of models which, just a few years ago,

  • seemed to be a consensus view about how the macro

  • economy works.

  • It involved what's sometimes called

  • dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, basically

  • dynamic models with sticky prices.

  • It involved monetary policy governed by a Taylor rule.

  • And in particular, this new consensus

  • went hand in hand with what's called the Great Moderation.

  • The economy seemed to get really stable.

  • Policy seemed to be working really well.

  • And we macroeconomists loved patting ourselves on the back,

  • saying, gee, we really solved that problem.

  • Great, we can sort of move on to other things

  • like economic growth because we've

  • solved the problem of the business cycle.

  • And what I think we've seen over the past few years

  • is that rock has now rolled back to the bottom of the hill.

  • And we're starting to try to push it up again.

  • There's a lot of excitement among students.

  • I'm sure at MIT-- I know at Harvard, where I teach--

  • a lot of students are interested in macroeconomics

  • and in particular the role of financial institutions

  • in the economy.

  • And those old DSGE models, the consensus models,

  • look quaint and somewhat obsolete now.

  • Because if you look at those models,

  • they basically have no financial sector at all.

  • And you can't really talk very meaningfully about the business

  • cycle now without at least making some passing reference

  • to financial institutions.

  • So to me, I think the main takeaway from that story

  • is that we need to be very humble as macroeconomists

  • and realize there's a lot we don't know.

  • And even the things we think we know,

  • in a few years we'll probably figure out we

  • don't know because that rock will eventually

  • roll down the hill.

  • Now let me turn a little bit to policy.

  • The consensus a few years ago was

  • that monetary policy was the main tool

  • we used for stabilization.

  • When the economy goes into recession,

  • we cut interest rates.

  • That stimulates borrowing and investment,

  • and to some extent consumption.

  • And that increased aggregate demand.

  • Well, if you take that consensus view

  • and apply it today and sort of stick in the current numbers

  • into your favorite version of the Taylor rule,

  • you get a target interest rate for the Federal Reserve

  • of negative 3% or 4%, 300 or 400 basis points.

  • Now, it's kind of an interesting intellectual question

  • to say, okay, why don't we just do that?

  • Why doesn't the central bank just announce a negative 400

  • basis-point interest rate?

  • I mean, after all, the mathematics department

  • here at MIT doesn't have any trouble with negative numbers.

  • Why do central bankers?

  • And the basic answer is that there's

  • this other asset out there called currency, which

  • is usually dominated by bonds.

  • But if bonds earn a negative interest

  • rate of negative 400 basis points,

  • currency will start dominating money.

  • And you can't have negative interest rates in a world

  • where currency is floating around and widely available.

  • There have been ideas throughout history

  • to deal with that issue.

  • Silvio Gesell wrote about this 100 years ago,

  • and Keynes approvingly talked about taxes on currency

  • as a way to get effectively negative interest rates.

  • Several economists, including Olivier,

  • have talked about raising the inflation target.

  • Paul Krugman has a seminal paper on that topic.

  • And I agree with what he said earlier,

  • which is that I don't think it's true that monetary policy is,

  • as a theoretical matter, completely out of ammunition.

  • But I should note that as a practical matter,

  • it probably is.

  • I actually wrote a column for the New York Times.

  • Like Christy, I write once a month for the New York Times.

  • And about a year ago, I wrote a column

  • exploring these ideas of taxes on currency

  • and a little bit higher inflation as a way

  • to get real interest rates down.

  • And it was the only column I ever

  • wrote, if anything, that got people writing

  • to the president of Harvard University saying I

  • should be fired for suggesting such a thing.

  • Drew Faust, the president, very nicely wrote back to them.

  • She CCed me on her emails, explaining

  • that we don't fire Harvard faculty for having crazy ideas

  • and writing them down, that if we did,

  • we wouldn't have anybody to teach courses.

  • But the response to that made me realize

  • that it would be very hard for a central banker

  • to actually try to entertain things like a higher inflation

  • target.

  • I'm quite sure that if Chairman Ben Bernanke said

  • that he was going to target 5% inflation rather than 2%,

  • he would soon be Former Chairman Ben Bernanke.

  • So as a practical matter, I think

  • it's unlikely we're going to get anything along that line.

  • There have been proposals out there

  • for what's called a price level target, which I actually

  • have some sympathy for, the idea being that rather than having

  • a target for the inflation rate, you have a target for the price

  • level, perhaps even increasing it 2% per year.

  • But that means if you undershoot the target,

  • you can get a little bit higher inflation for a while

  • till the price level gets back on target.

  • You're basically correcting for your past mistakes

  • for the price level.

  • That, I think, could be politically saleable,

  • but even that might be difficult.

  • Now fiscal policy.

  • About 10 years ago, my colleague Ben Friedman

  • was trying to put together a conference.

  • We have a regular series at Harvard

  • where you get two prominent people outside of Harvard

  • to come and debate some policy issue.

  • And we try to get one person on each side.

  • And what Ben thought a good topic would be

  • was whether discretionary fiscal policy was a good way

  • to combat the business cycle.

  • And so he called around and he found

  • somebody who wanted to argue no, because we

  • should use monetary policy.

  • That was sort of a common view.

  • But he couldn't find any prominent economist

  • to argue in favor of discretionary fiscal policy--

  • none.

  • And that sort of reflected the state of the literature

  • about 10 years ago.

  • People really weren't thinking about discretionary fiscal

  • policy as a stabilization tool.

  • And as a result, when it came time

  • to actually start thinking about it,

  • we actually didn't know very much.

  • So the questions of, is it better

  • to do it on the spending side or on the tax side, which

  • tax instruments are most powerful,

  • payroll taxes or investment tax credits,

  • we really had a fairly small literature on that.

  • And it's something we're starting to see work on now,

  • but in some sense it's long overdue.

  • And I'm sure Christy, when she was in the White House,

  • would have loved to have had a more modern literature on that.

  • When the Obama administration came in,

  • what they did, which I think was very reasonable, was basically

  • simulate a standard off-the-shelf macroeconomic

  • model.

  • I'm guessing it was a Macro Advisers

  • model, although I don't know.

  • But I think a lot of these sort of traditional macroeconometric

  • models give you results that are sort of similar.

  • And they got a multiplier for government purchases of 1.57

  • and for taxes of 0.99.

  • And you really can't fault them for sort

  • of taking that off-the-shelf model, even though it

  • was the kind of model that people like Robert

  • Lucas and Milton Friedman and many others

  • have been criticizing for many years

  • as not being deeply structural.

  • Now, from my perspective, I think

  • the most important thing is to recognize there's

  • a case for humility here.

  • We really don't know the answer.

  • Those models could be right.

  • They could be completely wrong.

  • My own sense of things is that there's a growing literature,

  • a small literature, that suggests

  • that maybe this traditional story is not right.

  • I'm personally kind of skeptical of infrastructure projects

  • as a way for short-run stabilization.

  • Part of it is based on my own personal experiences.

  • I've been involved a little bit in the town of Wellesley, which

  • is building a new high school now.

  • I've been very much in favor of that,

  • so I'm not against all infrastructure projects per se.

  • But in watching that infrastructure project go

  • into effect, one thing you learn is

  • that it takes a very, very long time

  • to put a serious-sized infrastructure

  • project in place.

  • Wellesley took years to decide that they

  • wanted a new high school.

  • Should we renovate the old high school versus tear it down

  • and build a new one?

  • What should it look like?

  • How much should we spend?

  • How do we get state approval?

  • And it was literally years before the idea

  • first popped in somebody's head and they broke ground.

  • And when President Obama mentioned a few months ago

  • that he learned there's no such thing

  • as a shovel-ready project, I think

  • that was the thing that made me most

  • skeptical about infrastructure as a stabilization tool.

  • I mean, for long-run growth, we need infrastructure for sure.

  • And the question is, what's the right amount, and what kinds?

  • But as a short-run stabilization tool, I'm more skeptical.

  • There's also, as I mentioned earlier, a growing literature

  • suggesting that a variety of tax changes

  • might be more powerful than government purchases.

  • I mean, my colleagues Alberto Alesina

  • and Silvia Ardagna at Harvard have written several papers

  • on this topic, looking at OECD countries, where they find

  • that taxes are more powerful to stimulate an economy

  • than government purchases.

  • Andrew Mountford and Harald Uhlig

  • at the University of Chicago have also a paper

  • that says the same thing.

  • And interestingly, one of my favorite papers of Christy's is

  • a paper that finds very large tax multipliers, much larger

  • than the-- in fact, I think the tax multiplier is around 3,

  • which is much larger than the-- even Bob Gordon's government

  • purchase multiplier is at 2, which is much larger, I think,

  • than most of the literature on government purchasing

  • multipliers.

  • I should say, by the way, that we don't really

  • know which of those tax instruments

  • is most useful in terms of stimulating the economy.

  • Is it lump-sum credits, like handing out

  • checks like President Bush did?

  • Or is it the expensing for investment,

  • as the Obama administration has recently passed?

  • Which actually I think was a better idea.

  • I don't think we really know that,

  • but I think it's the kind of thing

  • that we should spend more time thinking about.

  • The last topic I want to go over sort of just

  • briefly is something nobody's really

  • talked about now, which is the long-term fiscal picture, which

  • I think is extremely worrisome.

  • I'm looking forward to seeing what

  • the next budget looks like, coming out

  • of the administration.

  • The last budget that came out from President Obama

  • has the debt-to-GDP ratio rising in each of the next 10 years

  • and for as far as the eye can see.

  • And to remind you what the president's budget

  • is, the president's budget is not what's under current law.

  • The president's budget is the president's proposals, who

  • says, this is what I propose.

  • And I'm going to assume everything

  • gets passed that I proposed.

  • And here's what will happen under my proposals.

  • So under the president's proposals,

  • he said we're going to have a debt crisis.

  • Under my proposals, the debt-to-GDP ratio

  • will rise forever, which obviously can't happen.

  • Of course, they knew that wasn't really a serious proposal,

  • so they proposed a deficit commission,

  • which came back with, from my perspective, extremely

  • reasonable recommendations.

  • I was actually very skeptical they would do this.

  • But the debt commission chaired by Alan Simpson

  • and Erskine Bowles came out with several very good ideas

  • from my perspective, progressive cuts in Social Security

  • benefits over time, raising the retirement age

  • by a small amount, a small gasoline tax-- although I'd

  • make it $2 rather than an extra $0.15, which I think

  • was what they proposed-- and tax reform that raised revenue

  • by broadening the base and lowering rates.

  • So I thought that was a really great idea,

  • and I'm sorry the president didn't give it

  • his more full-throated endorsement in the State

  • of the Union the other night.

  • Now, my fear as we go down this road

  • is the easiest thing to do, if we don't do some major reforms

  • on entitlements or the tax code, is

  • to add another revenue source.

  • And the one I've been expecting-- this

  • is not a normative conclusion.

  • It's the positive prediction.

  • What I've been expecting is at some point somebody

  • will propose a value-added tax.

  • Nancy Pelosi has said positive things about it in the past.

  • I don't think it's going to happen this Congress,

  • but it could happen in some future Congress.

  • The value-added tax has the advantage

  • of being a consumption tax, and therefore

  • is relatively efficient.

  • Now, it tends to be hated by conservatives

  • because they tend to think that that's why government

  • is so large in Europe-- they have this hidden VAT,

  • and that allows politicians to sneak in tax increases.

  • I suspect it's probably the other way around.

  • It's more that Europe has chosen to have a large government

  • and therefore needs a relatively efficient revenue source,

  • and that's why they've opted for a VAT.

  • Unless we rein in health care costs,

  • we're going to need a new revenue source,

  • and the VAT is a relatively efficient one.

  • On reining in health care, I should just

  • mention, by the way, the health care bill.

  • My own reading of it is it had two goals.

  • Goals was universal coverage and reducing

  • the growth rate of costs.

  • I think it succeeded quite well on the first

  • and failed miserably on the second.

  • And the claims that it reduces the deficit

  • are all because it included a bunch of tax increases

  • that are sort of independent of health care per se.

  • But the health care reforms were cost increasing, not

  • cost decreasing.

  • Now, the reason I worry about this idea of a VAT

  • is there's this whole debate.

  • This is my last thought.

  • There's a whole debate over, why is

  • the US different from Europe?

  • One thing we know for sure is that Europeans work less

  • than Americans.

  • That, I think, is uncontroversial.

  • What we don't know for sure is why do they

  • work less than Americans?

  • And I think there's basically three hypotheses out there.

  • There's Olivier's hypothesis, which

  • is they have more taste for leisure.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • GORDON: He's an expert.

  • MANKIW: So that must be why he moved to the United States,

  • because I know he's a hard worker.

  • There's Alberto Alesina and Glaeser, that

  • says it's the unions in Europe.

  • And there's Ed Prescott, that says

  • it's the high taxes in Europe.

  • Now, my fear is that we're going to have an experiment

  • and that if we actually do have a VAT,

  • and we move our tax code in the direction

  • of the European-like systems of much higher rates

  • than we have today, we're going to actually decide whether Ed

  • Prescott or Olivier's right.

  • And my fear is that Ed Prescott may

  • be more right on this than Olivier,

  • but maybe if we have this at the 200th-year anniversary for MIT,

  • we'll actually know the answer to that.

  • Thanks.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • CABALLERO: Christy Romer?

  • ROMER: Well, thank you.

  • And it is lovely to be here to celebrate

  • MIT's 150th anniversary, and particularly

  • to celebrate the proud history of economics

  • and finance at MIT.

  • I have to say it's also lovely to have made it here

  • despite the weather, especially for those of us who

  • were in on the last flight from California last night.

  • It was certainly more of an exciting ride than I like.

  • Poor Bob Hall, who had the misfortune

  • to be seated next to me, I believe

  • has the dents in his arm to prove it.

  • It's the only time in my life I've had a flight attendant beg

  • me to drink a glass of wine.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • Well, the topic of this panel is obviously fiscal policy

  • and macroeconomics.

  • And certainly in the last two years,

  • we have had unprecedented fiscal policy.

  • I think dire economic circumstances required

  • extreme policy actions.

  • And just to put things a little bit in perspective,

  • though, like Paul Krugman, it's well-known I would have

  • liked a bigger Recovery Act.

  • But at $787 billion, it is the largest

  • by far counter-cyclical fiscal measure the United

  • States has ever taken.

  • And it wasn't the only thing that was done.

  • There were numerous extensions of unemployment insurance

  • benefits, more aid to state and local governments.

  • We even had a version of a new jobs tax credit, the HIRE Act,

  • that was passed that gave firms a tax credit for hiring

  • unemployed workers.

  • And I certainly spent much of my time

  • in Washington helping to formulate those policies,

  • then helping to get them passed, and then a lot of time

  • trying to defend them.

  • And actually what I had planned to do today

  • is to say I don't want to talk about the past.

  • Let's talk about the future.

  • But coming sixth in the panel, I can't resist a little bit.

  • This issue of fiscal policy multipliers,

  • it is obviously important.

  • How effective is fiscal policy?

  • 20 years ago, we were having this same debate as how

  • effective is monetary policy?

  • Just to add to some of what Bob Gordon was saying,

  • when we look at wars and you say,

  • gee, you do all that spending, and output, it goes up a lot,

  • but maybe you don't see a huge multiplier.

  • One of the other things you have to think besides of capacity

  • constraints are tax increases.

  • So take your 1941 example.

  • We had three major tax increases in 1940 and 1941.

  • So before you say that fiscal policy doesn't matter

  • in wartime, think about, on net, what's happening to the budget.

  • The other thing, on what Greg said, I mean, yes, of course

  • we would have liked much more information on fiscal policy.

  • And certainly that information is coming out.

  • But I think there is actually a lot of evidence

  • on the effect of fiscal policy.

  • And I think it goes very strongly in the direction

  • not that the big macro models that,

  • say, we used in the administration

  • to get a kind of a baseline estimate of what it might do,

  • might have too big a role for policy.

  • If anything, I think the evidence

  • is saying it might be those numbers that

  • come out of that are smaller than what the truth is.

  • The whole idea is if you do the studies more carefully,

  • take into account when do you often

  • do fiscal changes-- perhaps you do a fiscal expansion when

  • the economy was tanking.

  • That's something that tends to lead you to understate

  • the size of fiscal multipliers.

  • And I also just have to correct.

  • Yes, David and I did write a paper

  • that said tax multipliers are really big.

  • We made it very clear we think that the same kind of issues

  • that make people underestimate a tax multiplier

  • make them underestimate a government spending multiplier.

  • It's the same issue of you're not

  • taking into account what other things might be going on.

  • So in my heart, I feel very deeply

  • that the actions that were taken in the last two years

  • were incredibly effective and played a role in the recovery

  • that we're seeing.

  • So now let me move on to what I thought would be helpful,

  • is to talk a little bit here at the end

  • of the panel of what I see as the future of fiscal policy.

  • And I guess the first issue to put on the table

  • has to do with the fact that the Recovery

  • Act is coming to an end.

  • So it was designed to provide support

  • to the economy for two years.

  • And at the end of the first quarter of 2011,

  • we will have spent about $700 of the $800 billion.

  • And so I think that's actually something that's

  • very important to understand.

  • We've been having fiscal stimulus

  • at a rate of about $300 to $350 billion a year.

  • When that ends, that is a substantial fiscal contraction.

  • And certainly for someone who believes

  • that the fiscal stimulus was effective when it was there,

  • I think one of the things we have to realize

  • is when it comes off, that is a contractionary impulse.

  • Fortunately, that's not the only thing

  • that's happening in the economy on the fiscal side.

  • Obviously in the lame duck session of Congress,

  • we passed a substantial additional fiscal stimulus.

  • It included more extensions of unemployment insurance,

  • substantial payroll tax cuts, and some extension of some

  • of the Recovery Act provisions, say for investment tax

  • credits for businesses.

  • And so all told, we have about $250 billion

  • of extra stimulus coming from those new actions.

  • Of course, you need to realize that's good,

  • but of course the main thing that it's doing

  • is cushioning the blow of the Recovery Act coming off.

  • So that we need to keep in mind as we think about where

  • the economy stands on fiscal policy,

  • that we're sort of at best breaking even

  • in terms of the amount of fiscal stimulus

  • the economy is having, that we haven't had

  • a net jolt of additional stimulus.

  • Well, this discussion of where we

  • are in terms of fiscal stimulus I think

  • brings up a more fundamental point, which is,

  • and it's something that Olivier and certainly Bob have alluded

  • to, which is, despite these fiscal actions,

  • the US economy is still suffering

  • from a tremendous shortfall of aggregate demand,

  • that unemployment remains high, primarily because there

  • isn't enough demand to keep our factories and workers fully

  • occupied.

  • I think there is very little evidence

  • that much of the elevated unemployment

  • is due to structural changes.

  • There has been perhaps a small rise

  • in the normal rate of unemployment because

  • of sectoral changes, and perhaps the scarring effects

  • of high unemployment.

  • But I think most experts, including the forecasters

  • surveyed by the Survey of Professional Forecasters,

  • puts the rise in the normal rate of unemployment

  • that we have experienced at maybe a percentage point, which

  • is obviously very small compared to the rise

  • that we've seen in the unemployment

  • rate relative to its pre-recession level.

  • Going forward, I think we need to keep in the forefront

  • the idea that we desperately need

  • more demand in the short run.

  • I think if we could find a way to do

  • what the president suggested in the State of the Union Address,

  • to increase government investment

  • spending substantially in the short run, that

  • would be very helpful.

  • It would be good for job creation

  • today and good for our productivity over the long run.

  • And in fact, I think one distressing feature

  • of the speech was that the concrete proposals were

  • so small.

  • We're talking $4 billion for clean energy investments,

  • or something similarly small for universal wireless access.

  • I think if policymakers fully recognized and fully

  • acknowledged the severe short-run demand shortfall,

  • they'd be looking for something far more aggressive.

  • And it probably wouldn't be just investments.

  • You might make the payroll tax cut bigger, perhaps putting it

  • on the employer side as well as the employee side.

  • You might provide additional help

  • to state and local governments.

  • And I'll discuss in a minute what

  • we could do about the deficit that

  • would make such an ambitious recovery program possible.

  • Before I talk about the deficit, I

  • do want to say a word about the interaction

  • of monetary and fiscal policy, something

  • that's come up a number of times this afternoon.

  • I think one of the things that I found distressing

  • in December were the number of people that started to say,

  • well, we just passed another fiscal stimulus.

  • Surely the Fed should stop its program of quantitative easing.

  • And here I do disagree with Bob, and I

  • think agree with Paul and perhaps Greg

  • that while quantitative easing, the Federal Reserve's

  • policy of, say, buying long-term government bonds in hopes

  • of pushing down an interest rate that isn't yet

  • zero, the long-term interest rate,

  • or to try to stimulate the economy in other ways,

  • it's something we don't have a lot of experience about.

  • We don't have strong estimates for how effective it is.

  • But the estimates that are out there

  • suggest it is doing something, and could be even more useful.

  • And so I think the idea that we should be dialing it back

  • I actually think is very bad.

  • I suppose it could make sense if one thought

  • that the degree of asset purchases that the Fed had

  • proposed was just exactly right to achieve reasonable output

  • and inflation goals.

  • But given that output is dramatically below trend,

  • and given that inflation is below the Fed's target

  • level, that strikes me as absurd,

  • and that the economy needs as much monetary help as possible,

  • given the deficiency of demand and the impediments

  • to more short-run fiscal expansion.

  • Well then, the main, I think, impediment

  • to doing what we really need to be doing

  • in the short run, which is more fiscal expansion,

  • is obviously the long-run budget deficit.

  • And here I find myself in wonderful agreement with Greg,

  • and even in wonderful agreement on how

  • you might go about doing it, including

  • endorsing the proposals of the bipartisan commission.

  • Because the deficit is unquestionably

  • a genuine political and economic problem.

  • The voters obviously hate it and are

  • skeptical about the value of more spending and tax cuts.

  • And the deficit truly is large, and more importantly,

  • growing over time.

  • Now, it's large today primarily because

  • of the recession and the measures

  • that had to be taken to fight it.

  • But it is growing over the next 25

  • years because of demographic changes

  • and rising health care costs.

  • And at some point, the deficit would get so large

  • that they would severely damage the economy and our ability

  • to pay our debts.

  • And what I find so incredibly frustrating is

  • that I think it's easy to say what good fiscal policy would

  • be at this point, and as Paul Krugman described,

  • incredibly hard to pass that.

  • Good policy, I think, would surely

  • include more fiscal stimulus now.

  • It should be high-quality stimulus.

  • I think as conditions have stabilized,

  • we can be fussier about what we do.

  • And actually one of the things I liked best

  • about the State of the Union Address

  • was the president's articulation of the appropriate role

  • of government in investment.

  • The government should support things that the free market

  • will tend not to do enough of, things where the returns cannot

  • be fully captured by the individual investor.

  • And the president singled out basic scientific research

  • as a classic example of an appropriate area

  • for government support.

  • But that high-quality additional fiscal stimulus

  • needs to be coupled with a signed,

  • sealed, and delivered agreement for deficit reduction,

  • starting in 2012 or 2013.

  • And this agreement is going to have

  • to tackle the true driver of our deficit-- long-run entitlement

  • and spending on Social Security and Medicare.

  • It's going to have to include significant cuts to the growth

  • rate of defense spending.

  • And it's surely going to have to raise additional revenue.

  • Now, many European policymakers these days

  • are saying that a deficit reduction

  • plan should be front-loaded.

  • And that is, they want that it should include drastic deficit

  • reductions immediately that convinces people

  • that the government really means business.

  • I think this is exactly the wrong policy

  • for a country like the United States

  • that's not in an immediate fiscal crisis

  • and is still struggling with very high unemployment.

  • The ideal plan, in fact, would be very back-loaded,

  • where the heaviest deficit reduction is put off

  • until the economy is stronger.

  • Indeed, it should be back-loaded to the point

  • where we have some additional spending in the short run

  • to aid the recovery.

  • I think the obvious time for serious deficit reduction

  • is when the economy has recovered enough

  • that the Federal Reserve is ready to start

  • raising interest rates.

  • At that point, monetary policy would be in a stronger position

  • to counteract any contractionary impact of a fiscal reform.

  • My fear is that we're likely to do exactly the wrong thing

  • on the deficit and fiscal policy,

  • that we're likely to cut short-run spending

  • but do little to deal with the long-run deficit.

  • I found the discussion after the State of the Union on Tuesday

  • night very distressing.

  • It was all talking about whether the president's proposal

  • to freeze non-defense discretionary spending for five

  • years was better or worse than the Republicans' proposal

  • to roll back non-defense discretionary spending to 2008

  • levels.

  • This is a fight about a small fraction of the federal budget.

  • And neither of the proposals could

  • have a meaningful impact on whether we go bankrupt

  • over the next 25 years.

  • This fight is at best a distraction

  • from what we actually need to do to solve our fiscal problem,

  • and at worst it could be counterproductive.

  • I think cutting spending in 2011 could slow the recovery,

  • and by doing so, actually make the short-run deficit worse.

  • And that's why the bipartisan fiscal commission

  • recommended that no serious deficit

  • reduction begin in 2011.

  • Well, I wish I could say that I'm

  • optimistic that we will do what needs

  • to be done with fiscal policy, going forward.

  • But despite having been described by the San Francisco

  • Chronicle as Obama's sunny economic forecaster, even

  • I can't sound too upbeat.

  • About the best I can say is that people

  • are at least talking about these issues in a serious way.

  • And that is, surprisingly, a step forward.

  • Our best hope, I think, is that policymakers

  • listen to the experts.

  • What is striking is the degree of agreement

  • about the sources of the problem among the people

  • who've actually studied the issues carefully.

  • And I think there's surprising agreement on some

  • of the changes necessary.

  • For example, I bet even Greg and I

  • could agree on some tax reforms that would improve incentives

  • while raising additional revenue.

  • We all need to hope that reasonable voices carry

  • the day in Washington and that MIT and other fine

  • universities keep generating the experts who

  • will help policymakers understand the issues

  • and make better choices.

  • Thanks.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • CABALLERO: So we still have 10 minutes.

  • And I think that I see you writing feverishly here,

  • and so is Olivier.

  • So why don't I give a round of a minute each?

  • And then we open it to the floor.

  • BLANCHARD: I'd rather--

  • CABALLERO: No, I'd rather here because they

  • have already listened to your--

  • BLANCHARD: I have no comments at this point.

  • I'd rather get questions from them.

  • GORDON: Yeah.

  • I agree with a lot of what Greg and Christy said

  • about the long run.

  • I wanted to add a couple of additional things.

  • Nobody has brought up yet the trade-off--

  • it's actually not a trade-off-- the additional choices we have

  • to make on energy independence.

  • Nobody's brought up the carbon tax.

  • Nobody's brought up the really massive increases

  • in federal gasoline taxes that over a 20-year period

  • could bring us closer to European levels of energy use.

  • If we recognize that we have a model of how

  • to become more energy-efficient, it's called Europe.

  • And they use half the BTUs per dollar of GDP that we do.

  • And they do it by all sorts of means, including

  • higher gasoline taxes.

  • When I put on my productivity hat and look into the long run,

  • we've got several big problems that have not come up yet.

  • First, we've got an increasing dependence ratio

  • as the Baby Boomers retire.

  • And we can deal with that in two ways.

  • One is to raise the retirement age gradually, index it

  • to life expectancy, more specifically

  • as the bipartisan commission recommended.

  • We also should, as the State of the Union Address

  • strongly recommended, lift all limits

  • on high-skill immigration and encourage

  • people who come to MIT from other countries

  • to stay in the United States once they have that MIT

  • pedigree.

  • And finally--

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • I sound like I'm running for office.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • And finally, the last thing is, let's recognize

  • that we have a cost inflation problem in higher education

  • that's almost as serious as cost inflation in the medical care

  • industry.

  • And our international leadership in the educational attainment

  • of our young people is slipping down the league tables,

  • in part because we have an ever more expensive relative price

  • of higher education without resources being devoted

  • either to capping those costs or to helping the students finance

  • it.

  • CABALLERO: So I'll open the floor for questions.

  • You have been very persuasive.

  • So let me ask one.

  • Olivier, your main scenario is one

  • in which Europe does the right thing, but it does it slowly.

  • We know that there are other scenarios, one in which

  • slowly is not good enough for the markets

  • and we get a crisis.

  • So what is the globalist scenario in such a context?

  • And can you do a bit more of positive economics?

  • BLANCHARD: Well, with care, for obvious reasons.

  • Yes, there are other scenarios.

  • There's a scenario in which the investors panic and countries

  • have to reschedule or restructure debt now.

  • I think if this were to happen, I

  • think Europe is not ready to handle it in the sense

  • that who bears the losses between the creditors,

  • between the national states, and between the EU

  • hasn't been worked out.

  • I think it would be a very, very messy scenario.

  • We've tried to think through it.

  • And clearly you can construct scenarios

  • where the effect on the banking system

  • would be such that Europe would actually

  • go through another recession.

  • So I think that's what really has to be avoided.

  • And as I argued, I think it can be avoided.

  • We have the means to avoid it if we're

  • ready to basically commit the funds so

  • that these programs can go on.

  • Maybe not forever, obviously if you're

  • pushing me, but at least for more years

  • to see whether they actually work out.

  • CABALLERO: Does it transfer to the US?

  • Or does this contain in Europe?

  • What is your view?

  • BLANCHARD: If Europe does badly, then there

  • are the usual trade effects.

  • Then there are the financial linkage effects.

  • But it would probably be mostly a core Europe

  • story, with clearly an effect on the world,

  • but not anything like what we've seen, I think.

  • CABALLERO: That's a relief.

  • Questions for them?

  • AUDIENCE: Yes, I thank you so much.

  • My name is Federico Caravaggio.

  • I am a graduate from 1989.

  • There's been a lot of talk about the business cycle

  • and how monetary policy has for many, many years

  • basically eliminated the business cycle.

  • We've been hearing the Greenspan board,

  • now the Bernanke board, where every time we

  • have a reaction in the markets, there

  • is a reduction in interest rates,

  • assuming that this will end up causing

  • some reduction in employment.

  • To what extent this contributed to create this Minsky moment,

  • it created a lot of complacency in the markets.

  • It created a lot of more speculation.

  • It probably contributed to reduce savings rates

  • because nobody's prepared for the business cycle anymore.

  • Even contributed to the deregulation of the banking

  • system, the reduction in the capital rates of banks.

  • And now we have this-- because we

  • eliminated all these mini business cycles,

  • now we have this big one.

  • So I don't know if there's any research done,

  • or anybody has analyzed or thought about this.

  • I know there's a discussion in Congress, which is probably

  • very politicized and not so much academic about this issue.

  • But I would love to hear your opinion.

  • Thank you.

  • ROMER: Yeah, I'll say one thing, which

  • is I think when Greg talked about the degree to which when

  • we were in graduate school, fiscal policy was something

  • you didn't talk about, and that monetary policy was

  • the main tool that we use for stabilizing the economy,

  • I think the history of the postwar period

  • is actually learning to use monetary policy well.

  • At least in one concrete way, that when

  • you talk about where did recessions come from in 1958

  • and in 1969 and 1974, a big part of that was the inflation rate

  • got high because of bad policy.

  • And the Fed then had to engineer a recession to get it down,

  • and that's the Volcker recession.

  • That shows up in a number of things.

  • And precisely what we did learn and showed in the Great

  • Moderation is how not to let policy get to the point

  • where it caused inflation.

  • And then we didn't need to create

  • recessions to bring it down.

  • So there has been a genuine improvement in monetary policy

  • that eliminates one source of business cycles.

  • And then I think what we're learning

  • from this recession is that there were other things that

  • were coming about.

  • And I think monetary policy at most played

  • a small role in the crisis.

  • But certainly other factors like financial innovation,

  • like deregulation, I think those may be much more important.

  • And what we're learning is we now

  • need to put in place the better policies that

  • deal with those issues.

  • MANKIW: I think It's also true, as you point out,

  • that people-- it's almost as if this crisis was

  • due to lack of imagination.

  • Not enough people asked the question,

  • what's going to happen if housing prices fall by 30%?

  • Wall Street didn't ask it.

  • Policymakers didn't ask it.

  • Homeowners didn't ask it.

  • Lots of folks didn't ask that question.

  • And we're just not used to thinking about contingencies

  • that aren't in our experience.

  • So my guess is you haven't spent a lot of time thinking,

  • what am I going to do if an asteroid lands in Central

  • Square?

  • Or you probably haven't, but it could happen.

  • And if it happens, everybody will say, why didn't we

  • think about that?

  • Why weren't we planning for that contingency?

  • And it just didn't enter our imagination.

  • And so I think these crises tend to happen when stuff happens,

  • with these events that didn't enter our crisis.

  • There's a great book called The Big Short.

  • And The Big Short is about these few hedge fund

  • managers who did anticipate something like this happening.

  • And they made lots and lots of money.

  • But what's fascinating about that, the story,

  • is how they were pilloried by their own investors

  • while they're making this bet.

  • All their investors thought they were nuts, making this big bet.

  • So imagine that a central banker had

  • said this where he didn't have just a few investors he

  • had to pacify but like the whole nation.

  • It would have been very hard to lean against the wind.

  • Like Bob Gordon mentioned earlier--

  • I agreed with most of what Bob Gordon said.

  • One thing he said was, well, why didn't we

  • raise down payment requirements while the housing prices were

  • going up?

  • Well, imagine you're a politician.

  • He said he sounded like a politician.

  • He didn't sound like a politician at all.

  • What politician would say, housing prices

  • are affordable, let's make them only for the rich?

  • But that's what his policy is.

  • I mean, a pundit would have made sense at the time,

  • but it was politically impossible

  • because people didn't envision the possibility

  • of a collapse of 30%.

  • GORDON: There's too much agreement here.

  • Let me disagree with Christy.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • I disagree completely with Christy's interpretation

  • of the Great Moderation.

  • I don't think better monetary policy had anything

  • to do with it.

  • We had big shocks in the 1970s and the early 1980s.

  • Then we had a 20-year blissful period

  • with hardly any shocks at all, including

  • what I call beneficial supply shocks that

  • allowed us to have a boom in the late '90s without inflation.

  • So we had an academic debate five years ago.

  • Was it less shocks?

  • Stock and Watson and I said that.

  • Or was it better monetary policy?

  • That debate was over the minute the big shock happened.

  • Because it was just luck, and we got unlucky,

  • and the business cycle was back.

  • ROMER: That debate was not over.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • Both those things can be true.

  • You can have monetary policy getting dramatically better,

  • and so not having the boom-bust.

  • And you can then get a big shock in 2008.

  • There's no logical thing that that shows you

  • that it was shocks that happened earlier.

  • GORDON: Let's have another question.

  • CABALLERO: Olivier will set her over.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • BLANCHARD: Yeah, it's good, but the disagreements

  • are coming after an hour and a half, right?

  • I disagree with Bob.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • I think complacency was partly justified.

  • I mean, if I look at the way we handled

  • oil price increases the second time around,

  • if I compare how we handled them in the '70s

  • and how we handled them in the 2000s,

  • we had much better policy, and the effects were much smaller.

  • So I think there's no question that with respect

  • to some shocks, many of the shocks we understood.

  • Then we did much better.

  • And that was part of why the economy did well.

  • What happened has been said by Christy and others, which is we

  • got a shock we had not anticipated.

  • I mean, it's the old form of the unknown unknowns.

  • And with respect to those, the first time around, we do badly.

  • Was it a lack of imagination?

  • Well, maybe more, because I think some of us

  • actually thought about what would happen

  • if housing prices went down by 30% and concluded,

  • well, it wouldn't be the end of the world.

  • And the reason is that there was a lack

  • of something else, namely knowledge

  • about the financial system.

  • Which is that unless you look in the right place,

  • you just don't see it.

  • So I remember that I finished the last edition of my textbook

  • in the summer of 2008.

  • And I said, housing prices are coming down.

  • This could be an issue, but the number is small

  • relative to what GDP is.

  • Not going to be a big deal.

  • I just didn't know enough about the financial system

  • to understand what would happen.

  • And trying to think about the unknown unknowns

  • is just so incredibly hard.

  • As a result of the crisis, we've set up

  • at the Fund something called the Early Warning Exercise where

  • basically we try to go through crazy scenarios

  • and try to think through them.

  • It's incredibly hard.

  • What happens?

  • I mean, take Tunisia.

  • If Tunisia leads to Egypt, and Egypt leads to something else,

  • what will be the effect on the price of oil?

  • What will be-- it's just very, very hard.

  • So I think it's a mix.

  • It was not just luck, is what I would say.

  • AUDIENCE: Thank you, and thanks for such a stimulating panel.

  • My name is Bernie Horn, Sloan 1980.

  • But an observation and then a question about deflation.

  • But fundamentally I guess I'm confused,

  • because I think that the Keynesian model, which

  • is you can deficit spend, was great for the yesteryear when

  • fundamentally the world was composed

  • of developed countries, that sort of one deficit-spent,

  • the other one lent.

  • Sort of minor adjustments to equilibrium, and everything

  • seemed to be okay.

  • These days, though, it seems like there's a much greater gap

  • in the equilibrium.

  • And that fundamentally the people in the developed world

  • say, our standard of living is great.

  • We like it here.

  • It's going to continue at this level.

  • And these people in the low-cost countries

  • will eventually catch up with us.

  • But I'm not sure that that thinking is entirely correct.

  • Because I would propose that why couldn't it

  • be that the standard of living in the developed countries

  • actually has to fall to meet the emerging standard of living

  • in the developed world?

  • And that the whole Keynesian idea

  • that one has to inflate, and constantly inflate,

  • is fundamentally wrong, I would propose.

  • And that maybe the leadership should

  • be that we should embrace deflation and try

  • to lower our costs as much as possible and as

  • fast as possible.

  • And that that would inherently stimulate job creation.

  • Our observation in investing in countries around the world

  • is that the companies that are actually growing the fastest

  • right now are those that are selling products that actually

  • lower the costs of their customers in some way,

  • and that that's the way they deal

  • with this kind of gap between the standards of living.

  • So again, I admit that I'm probably confused.

  • And I don't fully understand the macroeconomic stuff.

  • But that's my question.

  • ROMER: Can I try to start this, at least,

  • by saying, to draw the distinction between what, say,

  • I've been talking about about short-run fiscal stimulus

  • and standards of living?

  • Because absolutely, standards of living

  • are determined by fundamentals, by your technology,

  • by how educated your workers are,

  • by the amount of capital you have.

  • And that's the reason why standards

  • of living in the United States are not going to drop.

  • It's because what determines them fundamentally

  • is not some Ponzi scheme where we keep doing deficit spending.

  • It's the economic fundamentals.

  • And the reason you'd expect the rest of the world

  • to eventually catch up is that you want them to also

  • be coming up with new innovations,

  • or taking the state of the art innovations,

  • improving their capital stocks, and educating

  • their workers better.

  • And then in terms of the-- so all of that Keynesian-- and I

  • spent my whole entire time in Washington

  • trying to tell Larry Summers not to call

  • it Keynesian policy because I think that made

  • it sound old-fashioned.

  • It's good short-run fiscal policy,

  • is that when you have a demand shortfall, which

  • for some reason is having incomes being temporarily low,

  • that is something that can get you through that time

  • and can try to get you back to your more

  • long-run standard of living.

  • It's never designed to be something

  • that you do year after year.

  • And that's why I think you'd get incredible agreement

  • on this panel that while it might have been a good thing

  • to be doing, it might still be a very good thing to be doing,

  • it can only be part of a plan where you actually are not

  • trying to do it year after year, but are balancing the budget

  • eventually.

  • GORDON: I wanted to take up the previous questioner using

  • the phrase, expansionary fiscal policy inflating.

  • There is a distinction between expansionary fiscal policy

  • and the outcome for inflation.

  • Which is, if anything, going to be

  • slower as a result of excess capacity

  • that motivated the fiscal policy in the first place.

  • There is no connection between either government deficits,

  • growth rate of the money supply, and inflation.

  • It depends on whether the economy is

  • underutilized or overutilized.

  • And that's extremely relevant to the widespread critiques

  • of quantitative easing, which I'm not against, by the way.

  • One critique was, oh, it's inflationary

  • because it will raise the money supply.

  • The reason the money supply isn't going up

  • is because we have over a trillion dollars

  • of excess reserves that the banks have decided

  • they don't want to loan out.

  • I think it's his turn, isn't it?

  • CABALLERO: Where?

  • Wait.

  • It can be only if it's very, very short

  • and requires a very short answer, because we're over--

  • AUDIENCE: I'll make this very short.

  • In the current situation, where the incremental dollar

  • of federal borrowing is coming from overseas,

  • could we be in a situation where the international accounts

  • are offsetting what we're hoping to get on the domestic side?

  • If we, on a bipartisan basis, increased spending and cut

  • taxes $0.50 each, we borrow $1 from the Chinese,

  • who sell us $1 of toys, which ends up netting out to no

  • stimulus.

  • Could some effect like that be going on,

  • which would explain both why we might

  • have had a little bit of disappointment

  • with the effect of the stimulus?

  • And that might indicate that cutting

  • the budget in a more drastic way might not

  • be as serious a problem as we would otherwise believe.

  • GORDON: Excellent macro.

  • If you have some fraction of your GDP that is imported,

  • that reduces fiscal multipliers.

  • That's something I think we would all agree on.

  • It's certainly in all of our textbooks.

  • AUDIENCE: Is it aggravated where we're borrowing money?

  • GORDON: We're not going to buy everything from China.

  • We don't have a marginal propensity

  • to import from China of 1.

  • It's some fraction.

  • It makes fiscal stimulus weaker than if we

  • didn't import anything at all.

  • But let's not go there because then I'm

  • going to sound like a protectionist.

  • CABALLERO: Thank you guys very much.

  • It was a very distinguished panel.

  • It was a very exciting panel.

  • [APPLAUSE]

FITZGERALD: I'm Deborah Fitzgerald.

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経済学と金融。マクロ経済学と財政政策 (Economics and Finance: Macroeconomics and Fiscal Policy)

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    哈維 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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