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  • -Paul Dibb: When John Lee and I decided to get together

  • to write this 8000 word article, for security challenges,

  • we thought we'd do what in my experience academics rarely do,

  • and that is join with John together the disciplines of economics

  • and strategic studies into a one discipline approach.

  • We were, when I asked John to join me in this,

  • and I don't often do joint-authored articles.

  • It's generally a difficult process.

  • But in John's case it was seamless and painless,

  • as far as I'm concerned.

  • We talked about Paul Kennedy's seminal book,

  • "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers"

  • and Kennedy's clear conclusion

  • that there is a very strong connection in the long run

  • between an individual great power's economic rise and fall

  • and its growth and decline as an important military power.

  • But where we paused was that applying this important judgment

  • to Australia's foreign and defence policies

  • regarding the rise of China has led to strongly opposing views.

  • There are those, as you know, including in this university,

  • including some of our colleagues,

  • who consider that the inevitable rise of China

  • must result in that country

  • becoming the naturally dominant power

  • to which the United States must concede strategic space

  • and acknowledge China's so-called legitimate strategic interests.

  • There are others, including us two as authors,

  • who believe the China's endless, rapid rise economically

  • is far from inevitable and perhaps even unlikely.

  • And that its military power

  • will continue to lag seriously behind that of America.

  • The argument that China will emerge as Asia's preeminent power

  • is based on assumptions that its economic and military capacities

  • are expanding and improving at such a rate

  • that regional dominance is all but assured.

  • Yet the sustainability of China's rapid economic rise and capacity

  • to embark on the path towards becoming an advanced and resilient political economy

  • in addition to its ability to become a genuine military superpower,

  • wielding proportionate regional influence,

  • is widely assumed but in our experience,

  • rarely analysed in any depth at least in Australian literature.

  • In examining the factors that go towards the development of Chinese national power

  • and its ability to use it to achieve national objectives

  • predictions about a Chinese superpower

  • with the ability to dominate Asia would be premature,

  • if not improbable, in our view.

  • John, over to you.

  • -John Lee: Thank you Paul and thank you Andrew for your introduction.

  • As Andrew mentioned, I've come on as an adjunct at the centre.

  • So it's my privilege to give what I hope will be one of several lectures over time.

  • Thank you all as well for taking the time to be here.

  • I'll speak for about 20 minutes.

  • And then I'll hand over to Paul to speak about

  • some of the military and strategic aspects of this issue.

  • Now we obviously don't know the future.

  • And because we can't accurately forecast the future,

  • we tend to rely on extrapolations of trends,

  • or trend lines,

  • especially when it comes to predictions about material power,

  • that is economic power and military power in a main.

  • Now extrapolations of trend lines are not completely useless.

  • They can be useful,

  • but they are essentially a window into the past.

  • They do not tell you what will be.

  • They tell you what has been.

  • Trend lines also do not tell you much about causation.

  • In fact they don't really talk about causation.

  • They don't talk about or imply.

  • You cannot infer from them why something occurred

  • and whether something is likely to continue into the future,

  • or why something may change or why it may not.

  • Now, like all of you, I don't have a crystal ball in my lounge room.

  • So the approach I'm taking, and I think the approach we took in this article

  • was to basically analyse China in unexceptional terms.

  • And that is you analyse China in the way that you analyse the material power

  • in prospects of any other country.

  • We don't have any belief in things like cultural determinism.

  • We don't think anything is inevitable about a certain country

  • or a certain culture or a certain political system.

  • We merely look at China in the same way we look at any other country.

  • Now the title of our article

  • "Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia"

  • that's the title of that article.

  • Paul, when I hand over, will talk about the military and strategic

  • challenges and limitations faced by the Chinese.

  • I will begin with the economic basis for why we think that this is the case.

  • So let me begin with the widely accepted,

  • I wouldn't say overwhelmingly accepted,

  • but the widely accepted proposition

  • that when it comes to economic power

  • and the acquisition of national capability, at least, time is on China's side.

  • That all China really has to do is wait a couple of decades,

  • as long as it doesn't do anything stupid.

  • And the 1.37 billion people, in their eyes

  • will effectively determine the course of regional history.

  • Now in some respects the trend lines say that this is so,

  • but I will rely on economic reasoning to say why I don't think this is so.

  • And while I'm not predicting economic disaster for China

  • like some others might,

  • the assumption that China will acquire the economic base to dominate Asia,

  • short of American withdrawal

  • which I don't think is likely or conceivable,

  • is pretty unconvincing in my view.

  • So let me begin with the basics.

  • As any economist will tell you,

  • there's basically three ways you can grow your economy.

  • You can add more labour inputs.

  • You can add more capital inputs.

  • Or you can use one or both of these imports more efficiently,

  • what economists refer to as total factor productivity.

  • Now can China add more labour inputs significantly drive rapid growth

  • or even moderate growth in the medium term?

  • Well, I think the simple answer is no

  • and I say that because of its aging demographics

  • which for a number of reasons

  • will be pretty much impossible for China to alter.

  • Now there is one thing we know for certain

  • and that is that China will be the first major country in history

  • to grow old before it grows rich

  • or before it grows even moderately rich.

  • Now in the 1980s during its first decade of reform,

  • the proportion of the working age population,

  • that is 15 to 64 years, was almost 75%.

  • It will decline to 65% in 2020 and 60% in 2035.

  • Now this may not sound significant or meaningful to you.

  • So let me put this another way.

  • When China began its reforms in 1979,

  • there was 7 working people to every 1 working retiree.

  • Today the ratio is about 5.5 to 1.

  • By 2035 there will be two working people for every retiree.

  • In fact 2015, this year is a significant year

  • because this year is the first year

  • that more people are leaving the workforce in China

  • than entering the workforce since the reform period began.

  • Now before I say what I'm about to say I have to apologize to Paul

  • who is an exception to the rule.

  • I'm about to articulate that the most productive years of a worker

  • is from their 20s to their late 50s.

  • That is in developing countries.

  • In advanced countries,

  • the older people tend to have it.

  • Now the problem for China is that by 2035 there'll be 1.5 older workers,

  • that is workers from 50 to 65 years

  • to every worker under the age of 55 years.

  • So by 2030 China will have the same demographics, roughly,

  • as a country like Norway or Amsterdam.

  • Incidentally, if you want a comparison,

  • America is the only great power

  • which has favourable demographics up to 2050.

  • India, if you want to include India as a potential great power.

  • Now bear in mind as well that only 1/3 of all urban residents,

  • which is about half the population,

  • urban residents are half the population

  • and less than 5% of rural residents

  • have some form of pension fund, central, provincial, or local pension fund.

  • And even then, the state's largely unfunded liability

  • is expected to be around 40% of the GDP by 2035.

  • And this assumes quite generously

  • that China will continue to grow at 6% up to 2035,

  • which I think is unlikely.

  • Now this will obviously increasingly compete with other budget items

  • such as national security and military spending.

  • Now even for those with a pension fund at least half their living expenses

  • will still be picked up by their family.

  • So whereas up to a quarter of the growth from 1980 to 2005

  • can be attributed in some way to this local demographic dividend,

  • that is a massive increase in productivity of young workers

  • coming into the cities with very little family responsibilities.

  • There will be no such prospect of a demographic dividend for China

  • from now on.

  • Now let's talk about adding capital inputs.

  • And this is the real problem for China's future economic resilience.

  • Now speaking in very generalised terms,

  • growth in the first decade of reform, 1979 to 1989,

  • was driven by genuine entrepreneurialism and dynamism.

  • Land reforms allowed not land owners but land occupiers

  • to use the land in any way they wanted.

  • They were allowed to sell surplus produce at market prices

  • and this gave birth to a wave of spontaneous and unplanned entrepreneurialism

  • and brought enough economic activity

  • and eventually arise to smaller scale industries

  • which was a real driver of early industrialisation in China.

  • Now by the mid-1990s this model was running out of steam

  • and what was emerging was China as a major export manufacturing country,

  • not just in Asia, but in the world.

  • So it was from the mid-1990s onwards that made in Korea,

  • or made in Japan, or made in America,

  • or made in Malaysia was replaced by made in China.

  • So prior to the global financial crisis or just a couple of years before that,

  • the major driver of Chinese growth was net exports.

  • Now there's nothing remarkable about this.

  • This was just a model that

  • Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore amongst others pursued.

  • But China took it to a much larger scale

  • because of the surplus pool of labour that they had.

  • Now export dependent models obviously need growing and consumer markets.

  • And this became a problem for China

  • when the global financial crisis hit the advanced economies

  • and consumption markets ground to a halt.

  • So China had to find a different way of generating growth

  • and this is what they did.

  • Now if you take the period from 2004 to 2014,

  • the Chinese economy expanded a pretty impressive 162%.

  • But labour inputs and additional labour inputs contributed around 6% of that,

  • but an enormous 136% can be attributed to capital inputs

  • mainly in the form of fixed investment which is basically building constructing things.

  • This means that only 20% of growth out of 162% over last decade

  • was due to using inputs more productively.

  • Now these are all economic numbers.

  • Okay. Why do they matter?

  • Well the enormous level of capital inputs needs to generate the growth

  • that China has achieved in the last 10 years

  • has meant that national corporate debt levels have risen from 147% of GDP

  • from the end of 2008 to over 250% of GDP at the end of 2014.

  • Now to put these numbers in context,

  • it increased by 9, from 9 to 10 trillion dollars US in 2008

  • to 20 to 25 trillion dollars US in 2014.

  • Now this increase represents an amount larger than the entire size

  • of the American commercial banking system.

  • Now this increase happened because in the government's determination

  • or some people would say, in the government's desperation

  • to achieve rapid growth,

  • the Chinese government ordered state owned banks

  • to lend predominately to state owned enterprises

  • even when there was no commercial justification for doing so.

  • So from 2008 to 2009, for example,

  • bank loans almost doubled from 750 billion dollars US

  • to 1.4 trillion dollars US.

  • The outstanding bank loan books of China's banks

  • expanded almost 60% in two years.

  • So this clearly is not due to natural economic demand.

  • It's the result of government driven policy

  • despite what Australian minds in the treasury at the time were actually telling us.

  • So the result is what China's own state backed economists

  • refer to as not just the largest building program,

  • largest national building program in world history,

  • but also the most wasteful in economic history.

  • Underutilized roads,

  • underutilized airports,

  • bridges that go nowhere,

  • wholly abandoned newly built cities,

  • and critically, enough housing

  • to fulfil the urbanization requirements of the country

  • for the next 20 years at least.

  • That's enough empty housing to fulfil the urbanization requirements of the next 20 years.

  • So if you look at just the biggest four provinces in China,

  • there are wholly unoccupied dwellings that could house 200 million people.

  • Now the result if you ask an independent analyst in international banks

  • and accounting firms operating in China,

  • is that the concealed bad debt amounts to about 70 to 140% of GDP.

  • As state owned banks and local government financial entities

  • are ultimately government liabilities,

  • ultimately central government liabilities,

  • these will have to be dealt with by the central government.

  • And once again,

  • consider what this means for the competing demands

  • on the public purse in the next 10 to 20 years.

  • So basically China doubled down on Japanese errors and then some.

  • China may still avoid two decades of virtually zero growth,

  • which is what Japan suffered,

  • but China's capital output ratio,

  • the ratio of what you get for each additional input of capital

  • is about three times worse than what it was 10 years ago.

  • Incidentally, it's about 50 times worse than in India

  • which is generally seen as an extremely inefficient economy

  • in terms of use of capital.

  • Now finally, can China * inputs more efficiently or productively?

  • And clearly, this is the only way here for China to grow its economic base

  • that would be necessary for it to become the dominate power in the region.

  • Now this is often expressed in different terms;

  • "Can China become a much more innovative economy?

  • Can it move to a market responsive economy

  • rather than a hybrid planned economy?

  • Can it increase consumption which would drive services and increase productivity?"

  • Essentially all of these characterisations of what China needs to do,

  • is to say, "Can China escape the so-called middle income trap?"

  • Which if you look around only around 30 economies in the world,

  • have done that.

  • Now basically, the future of China being the dominant power in Asia

  • depends on it escaping the middle income trap.

  • It can't do so,

  • it can't become a dominant power if it doesn't achieve that.

  • And so, the last question I want to pose is

  • "What would China have to do in broad terms to escape the middle income trap?"

  • Now take innovation,

  • China would have to dismantle its state dominated political economy.

  • It would have to remove privilege from the 150, 000 SOEs,

  • state owned enterprises

  • in favour of the millions of private domestic firms.

  • The SOEs, the 150,000 of them,

  • currently receive around 70 to 80% of all formal finance in the country.

  • With five or six million firms left to fight for the scraps.

  • To give an example of the state dominated nature of the Chinese economy,

  • the top three largest SOEs in China,

  • their revenues exceed the combined revenues

  • of the largest 500 private firms in the country.

  • Now if you dismantle this system,

  • you remove the capacity of the Chinese Communist Party

  • to use SOEs for the advancement of national power

  • and achievement of national goals,

  • which they are useful periodically.

  • It will also disrupt a key strategy for the Chinese Communist Party

  • to remain in power

  • and that is by becoming the primary of dispenser

  • of business, careers, professional, individual,

  • institutional opportunity in the country.

  • You essentially keeps the elites on the side,

  • dismantle such a political economy

  • and suddenly you have some potential existential political problems

  • for the Chinese Communist Party.

  • Now, to move to the next stage, China needs to build institutions.

  • If you look at all of the 30 or so countries

  • with the exception of a couple of oil rich Middle East countries,

  • look at all of the 30 countries that have escaped the middle income trap,

  • they have some common institutions.

  • They have rule of law, not rule of party or rule of government.

  • They have intellectual property rights and property rights.

  • They have independent courts and mechanisms for resolving disputes

  • and they have very low levels of corruption.

  • The bottom line is that for China to escape the middle income trap,

  • it would need to fundamentally reorganize its political economy

  • and this is extremely hard to do.

  • And very few countries have done it.

  • Now even if China succeeds in doing all this to go to the next level,

  • it would then be a very different China to what we see today.

  • It will be very difficult for the Chinese Communist Party,

  • for example, to harness major aspects of national resources

  • to advance national power

  • or to advance the power of the party.

  • Civil society will have its own goals

  • and it will be hard to harness national tools to achieve national objectives.

  • Now I'll very shortly hand over to Paul to make some comments

  • about China's strategic and military position.

  • But let me just conclude on a couple of points.

  • Now first, China currently spends around 15% of its budget

  • on national security.

  • That is on the People's Liberation Army, the external army,

  • and the People's Armed police,

  • which is the military trained internal army.

  • Now these budgets have been rising.

  • The budgets of these two organisations have been rising

  • at a level that's about 50% higher than the increase in GDP growth.

  • Now this can't happen forever for reasons that I gave.

  • Now second, on all key indices of non-military power,

  • America, China's primary competitor,

  • is well ahead and will remain so.

  • So think about innovation, age demographics,

  • education and science, industrial capability,

  • emerging technologies, social stability,

  • resource security, food security,

  • territorial security, regime or government security, and so on.

  • America is ahead on all of these indices

  • and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

  • And third, China might, in many respects, be a strong state.

  • But it is a strong state overseeing a weak and fragile country.

  • The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party

  • and its capacity to remain in power

  • ultimately depends on improving the lives of its citizens.

  • It can't just use more and more of national resources

  • for national power without political domestic consequences.

  • Now already, the CCP's managing a country with,

  • by its own official numbers,

  • 180, 000 instances of mass unrest,

  • mass unrest being defined as 50 or more people

  • protesting against government entities or government officials.

  • It simply cannot pour more and more national resources

  • into the advancement of national goals

  • without focusing somewhat internally.

  • Now finally, China's internal fragility means that

  • it cannot afford a major foreign policy disaster or economic disaster

  • for the CCP to remain in power.

  • The CCP has one million military trained People's Armed Police,

  • units solely devoted to control in domestic unrest.

  • Now this is a sign of a country that may appear strong on the outside,

  • but is significantly vulnerable from the inside.

  • Now a foreign policy or economic disaster may bring down an American government.

  • That's true.

  • It may bring down an administration.

  • But it won't bring down a whole political economy.

  • Such a disaster will bring down the whole Chinese political economy

  • if the CCP fails.

  • Now if you look at all of these factors,

  • all things considered,

  • this to me does not seem like a power with the economic base,

  • with the domestic base,

  • to become the dominate power in a region.

  • Now I'm now going to hand over to Paul

  • to talk about some of the military and strategic aspects

  • and then I think we'll make some concluding remarks.

  • Thank you.

  • [applause]

  • -Paul Dibb: And you can see now why I was attracted to the different approach

  • that John Lee takes to most so-called Chinese experts

  • in this country on the Chinese economy,

  • who seem to bend over backwards John,

  • to excuse all sorts of problems that you've identified.

  • I will now turn to the situation

  • with regard to foreign policy and also the military.

  • And I'd like to begin,

  • and I'm turning to, referencing now, our document.

  • In my view, China has very few powerful or influential friends in Asia.

  • For a country with such a large population

  • and the world's second largest economy

  • it does not have many close bilateral relationships.

  • In her book, China: Fragile Superpower,

  • Susan Shirk *

  • describes China as strong abroad but fragile at home.

  • This strikes both John and I as being incorrect:

  • in our view, China is certainly fragile domestically

  • but it is also a lonely power when it comes to acquiring real influence in Asia.

  • A listing of China's friendships

  • in the region reveals that only North Korea and Pakistan

  • can be counted as countries with which it has a strong relationship.

  • But what sort of trust can Beijing have in Pyongyang

  • not dragging it into an unwanted war with South Korea?

  • And in any case we've witnessed of late Beijing cozying up more to South Korea

  • than its traditional ally North Korea.

  • As for Pakistan,

  • it is constantly teetering on the edge of becoming a failed state,

  • nuclear armed,

  • and risks a conflict with India

  • that certainly would not be in China's interests.

  • For centuries in the past, Imperial China was feared and respected

  • as the dominant power in Asia,

  • as Susan Shirk has correctly observed.

  • But that was all a very long time ago

  • when China faced no real competition

  • until the arrival of European colonial powers in the 19th century.

  • China now operates in a highly competitive regional environment

  • against such major powers as the United States,

  • Japan and India.

  • And of late, many Southeast Asian countries have become increasingly concerned

  • about China's assertiveness and several of them,

  • including Vietnam and the Philippines and indeed Singapore,

  • have taken steps to align themselves much closer to the United States.

  • In my view, not even Russia can be counted by Beijing as a long-term friend,

  • let alone an enduring ally.

  • And I say that for all sorts of geopolitical and cultural reasons.

  • When we look at the overall state of the relationships,

  • China's poor relationships with the United States, Japan, and India

  • do not in our view augur well for its ability

  • to shape the future regional order.

  • Moreover Beijing's increasing aggressiveness and harsh attitudes

  • towards its pre-emptive territorial claims in the region,

  • run the risk of miscalculation and conflict.

  • This risk coupled with Beijing's inclination

  • to challenge established international norms of behaviour

  • is a suitable point to turn in a moment to China's military build-up

  • and an examination of its strengths and weaknesses.

  • But before I do that let me just refer back to the relationships

  • that China has with Japan.

  • They're clearly at a level of high tension if not poisonous.

  • There are all sorts of historical faults on both sides.

  • But the way in which China is now leaning on a newly re-assertive Japan,

  • is pushing, as I've said, Japan closer to the United States.

  • Now does China really stop and reflect that if it pushes too hard,

  • including the use of military power,

  • in places such as the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands,

  • might not that force Japan along a path that's clearly

  • within Japan's very speedy capability

  • towards an independent nuclear weapon?

  • You wouldn't have thought so.

  • With regard to India, it is different.

  • And I'm not arguing that India is about to become an ally of the United States,

  • but of late, again, we've seen an India,

  • by the way, unlike China,

  • a democratic country with rule of the law,

  • with freedom of press,

  • an India that is increasingly having a relationship with Japan

  • as indeed Australia is,

  • and an India that as I've said will not become an ally of the United States

  • but is historically aligning itself,

  • including with military weapons sources

  • away from its traditional supplier of military weapons, Russia,

  • towards India.

  • And how is it that China, Beijing,

  • in which the most powerful position of the land

  • is not President of the People's Republic, in my view,

  • or General Secretary of the Party,

  • it's Chairman of the Central Military Commission

  • which is the most powerful position

  • and when Xi Jinping holds that position,

  • how come when he's in India,

  • the Chinese allegedly, according to some academic commentators in the West

  • unknown to the central leadership

  • if you can imagine that

  • commits military aggression on the dispute in the Himalayas?

  • I for one do not accept that any military action in China

  • is not under the direction of the Central Military Commission.

  • And then we come to the matter I've mentioned of Russia.

  • It is a relationship of convenience,

  • particularly now that Putin has his back against the wall

  • with regard to economic sanctions which are starting to bite.

  • And of Europe, and I've just come back from both Sweden and Finland,

  • which is now seeing Russia as the new re-emerging threat.

  • And is it really a relationship under the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement

  • between China and Russia that we see enduring?

  • Well I've mentioned the geopolitics.

  • Well resource rich, oil and energy rich,

  • minerals rich Siberia,

  • a part of the continent more than double the size of Australia,

  • shares a long common border with China.

  • It is an increasingly sparsely populated Russian Far East

  • with bad demographics.

  • And how would Australia react as a large sparsely populated resource rich country

  • to that sort of geopolitical challenge?

  • As a former defence planner I can tell you.

  • And then we have the relationship with the United States

  • which we all want to see improve and be a good relationship.

  • But it's not looking brilliant.

  • And the way in which China increasingly using military power indirectly,

  • unlike directly, Russia at the moment,

  • but indirectly as a force of coercion to threaten Japan,

  • to threaten countries in Southeast Asia and to threaten India,

  • does not all go well for the norms of international behaviour

  • and a stable and peaceful region.

  • With regard to China's military capabilities,

  • again, I think, you know,

  • we've had too much straight line extrapolation in this country

  • with regard to China.

  • It reminds me when I was in the intelligence game in the 1970s

  • of the straight line extrapolations that were made

  • both in the intelligence communities and in many of our academic

  • so-called experts on the Soviet Union,

  • that the Soviet Union was going to grow and grow,

  • that in the period of Western Stagflation,

  • the Russian model of central planning,

  • quote, was more successful,

  • that the Soviet Union was on a winning streak

  • with regard to its intervention

  • without any response worth talking about from the West

  • in Afghanistan in 1979.

  • And the proclamation by our experts on the Soviet Union,

  • most of them,

  • that the Soviet Union was about to outstrip the United States in military power.

  • That was the view of Robert Gates, the deputy direction of CIA

  • when I saw him in 1986.

  • In 1986.

  • In 1989 down went the Berlin Wall.

  • In 1991, I can't sing my favourite Beatles song Back in the USSR anymore.

  • So you know, as John has said, whether it's,

  • you know, Japan in 1980,

  • or the Soviet Union in the late 70s and early 1980s,

  • beware the so-called experts who will tell you with great authority

  • that it is inevitable

  • that China will be the dominate military power in the region,

  • if not globally.

  • The fact is that China, not now foreseeably is not a superpower.

  • There's too much casual use of that word.

  • Let me tell you what a superpower is.

  • A superpower has two attributes.

  • Number one, it has the capacity to wreak vast nuclear destruction

  • anywhere on the globe, anytime.

  • There's only two countries now capable of doing that,

  • America, and guess what, Russia.

  • China does not have that capability.

  • The second attribute of a superpower is

  • the capacity to decisively project conventional military power

  • anywhere in the world and intervene

  • just like our American friends are doing time after time after time,

  • whether we agree with that or not.

  • China does not have that capability.

  • Now China undoubtedly has developed substantial military capabilities

  • in the last twenty years or so.

  • I'm not arguing against that.

  • And China has taken notice

  • of the overwhelming use of American conventional military power

  • in the first Gulf War in 1991.

  • And it's moving to a more sophisticated

  • what it calls informationized military

  • for fighting short notice high intensity regional wars

  • and it's moved away from People's Army.

  • But the fact remains that as far as China is concerned,

  • even with its main military priority,

  • that is, to retake Taiwan, at the time of its choosing,

  • according to the Pentagon,

  • China still has substantial deficiencies

  • in amphibious assault in order to do that.

  • And in addition,

  • the latest Pentagon report on China

  • says that the limited logistical support remains a key obstacle for China

  • in preventing China's navy from operating more extensively

  • than beyond the immediate East Asian surrounds

  • and particularly in the Indian Ocean.

  • In addition, and I quote Pentagon report

  • it is not clear whether China has the capability to collect

  • accurate targeting information

  • and pass it to launch platforms in time

  • for successful strikes against targets at sea

  • beyond the first island chain.

  • That's the island chain Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines.

  • I would argue that even within that first island chain,

  • even within that,

  • China has substantial deficiencies

  • with regard to anti-submarine warfare, air defence,

  • and the so-called capacity to take out American aircraft carriers

  • and I'll come back to that.

  • For those of you who are interested,

  • this month the Rand Corporation,

  • a quite conservative American corporation,

  • John, has come out with a report which I commend to you

  • called China's Incomplete Military Transformation.

  • And it quotes extensively from Chinese sources

  • and it gives other information about issues

  • such as anti-submarine warfare and so on.

  • And I draw to your attention that this report says

  • that in China's own journals and literature

  • there is an acknowledgement that the PLA's own weaknesses

  • revolve around a concept alternately referred to as "two incompatibles"

  • I don't speak Chinese

  • or two gaps.

  • And these two incompatibles or gaps acknowledged by the PLA

  • are the modernization levels of China's armed forces,

  • particularly problems in the human area,

  • and I'll come back to that,

  • and the actual military capabilities of the armed forces

  • to live up to this concept of fighting high intensity informationised warfare.

  • So what are the problems identified with the first incompatible,

  • that is the modernization problem?

  • The available literature according to Rand denotes,

  • in China, denotes several areas abroad and endemic

  • to the People's Liberation Army in the realms of training,

  • organization, human capital,

  • force development, and logistics.

  • It is well known that a lot of the training is unrealistic and artificial.

  • It is well known that the amount of time that officers in the PLA

  • have to spend on studying, believe it or not,

  • Marxism and Leninism can take 20 to 25% of their time.

  • Good luck.

  • Let them do more of that.

  • Then waste their time.

  • There's problems of the constant interference of the Party with the military.

  • And with the military,

  • unlike our militaries,

  • the role of the People's Liberation Army and the oath of allegiance they take

  • they take is not to the People's Republic of China.

  • It is to the Communist Party of China.

  • And Bob, I'm going to ask you to contradict me,

  • even in the Soviet Union,

  • the Soviet Red Army did not have the role and influence in the Party

  • the way that the People's Liberation Army has.

  • In the Soviet Union,

  • the worst thing you could be accused of was Bonapartism.

  • That's why Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin was sent into exile

  • for boasting about how he won the Second World War.

  • That is not the case in China.

  • When Deng Xiaoping sent the tanks into Tiananmen Square,

  • I was in CIA headquarters when that happened

  • and the evidence is impeccable.

  • The evidence is impeccable

  • that it was a direct order from Deng Xiaoping

  • whose position was no longer President,

  • no longer General Secretary.

  • Guess what he was.

  • Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

  • I rest my case.

  • So I commend the Rand report to you.

  • Time is moving on I just want to take a couple of examples

  • of some of the military deficiencies.

  • And the first one I want to address is anti-submarine warfare.

  • And the second one is air defence.

  • I mentioned both of them earlier.

  • Again let me commend to you one of the best reports in the public domain

  • is by Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics at Princeton.

  • It came out late last year.

  • Unlike many commentators

  • he's not inclined to exaggerate China's military capabilities.

  • For example he cites a survey by the United States Office of Naval Intelligence

  • describing China's capabilities in the acquisition of targeting information

  • essential for anti-submarine warfare as,

  • and I quote, marginal.

  • China's navy, of course, has begun to invest in the underwater sensors

  • dedicated fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and surface vessels

  • necessary to locate and track enemy submarines.

  • But it has yet to address its shortcomings in ASW.

  • This is an important deficiency given America's big advantage

  • in terms of tracking other submarines

  • and the difficulty all other countries have of detecting American submarines.

  • China's conventional submarines are relatively easy to detect

  • and its nuclear boats possess little ASW capability and are still noisy.

  • Even its latest ballistic missile firing submarine, SSBN, the Jin class,

  • according to one American report,

  • makes more noise than a Delta Four submarine of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

  • If that is true, they've got a problem.

  • They have a serious problem.

  • China's military would be hard-pressed

  • to prevent hostile submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles

  • which are the new thing,

  • as James Goldric will tell us, in anti-submarine warfare.

  • It would be hard-pressed to prevent them from operating close to its shores

  • and destroying its surface fleet.

  • It also remains unclear how capable of joint coordination

  • China's different services are in operations over water.

  • Integrated operations between a highly regimented

  • and rigidly structured Chinese Air Force

  • and an immature and sea-based Navy

  • would require technological and service-culture innovations,

  • as well as exercises less carefully scripted than has been usual,

  • to develop the requisite interoperability and inter- service coordination.

  • As I've said earlier, in promoting officers and selecting leaders,

  • the Chinese prize loyalty to the Communist Party and reliability

  • over independence and innovation.

  • In the meantime,

  • the United States is pressing ahead with technological game changers,

  • such as unmanned undersea vehicles

  • for reconnaissance, surveillance and strike

  • that could radically change undersea warfare

  • to China's huge strategic disadvantage.

  • There are similar gaping deficiencies in China's air defence capabilities

  • against any technologically advanced enemy.

  • As Friedberg points out,

  • China's ability to detect and intercept ballistic missiles

  • or stealthy aircraft and cruise missiles

  • appears to be limited.

  • Moreover, the United States is working on technological advantages

  • that will make China's task of air defence even harder --

  • they include a new low observable penetrating bomber

  • and long-range precision strike with very high-speed hypersonic vehicles

  • as well as what's called prompt global conventional strike

  • with conventional warheads on ICBMs.

  • Such developments would greatly increase the expenditure

  • that Beijing would have to devote

  • to both active and passive defence measures.

  • And you've heard John Lee say

  • that the trade-offs in future because of demographics and economics,

  • the trade-offs in future

  • between endless investment in the military

  • and these other demanding things in the Chinese economy

  • is no longer a free good.

  • Is no longer a free good.

  • None of this is to underrate the potential challenge to regional stability

  • from China's military modernisation.

  • But neither is it to succumb to the current fashion

  • of exaggerating China's military capabilities.

  • Despite its many achievements,

  • China is still a weak state

  • and as Andrew Shearer points out,

  • its transition to exercising influence as a sea power

  • has provoked region wide balancing behaviours.

  • In other words the reactions of Japan and Vietnam and the Philippines.

  • As time goes on,

  • neighbours around China's periphery may also feel compelled

  • to field similar capabilities to China

  • in order to address the growth in long-term Chinese strike assets.

  • And I'm thinking of Japan here.

  • Ongoing requirements of China's naval and air forces

  • to secure Chinese near-seas priorities

  • make it highly unlikely that a force that is still modest in size

  • will be able to sustain a robust top-end footprint

  • in the distant far seas,

  • no matter how much its capabilities improve.

  • Finally before I hand over to John for some initial conclusions,

  • in our paper I quote a particular academic Robert Ross in America

  • who makes a very good point,

  • that China is continental power.

  • It is not a natural maritime power.

  • Continental powers often have insecure borders.

  • China has the longest most diverse borders in the world

  • in addition to the potential that John Lee has pointed out for internal instability.

  • Maritime countries including the United States,

  • Britain, Australia, New Zealand,

  • don't have those internal security problems.

  • When you look at the history of continental countries

  • that have aspired to being great maritime powers,

  • they've failed;

  • France, Germany, the Soviet Union.

  • And it remains to be seen whether China can make that transition.

  • I'm of the view that China is not capable of challenging US dominance,

  • of regional sea lanes or the security of America's strategic partners

  • in maritime Southeast Asia.

  • And further, we point out in our article that in our view,

  • China is 20 years behind the United States

  • in high-technology weapons and sensor development.

  • It is not a military superpower and will not become one

  • until it develops the capability

  • to project decisive military power anywhere in the globe.

  • Presently, China is only a regional military power entirely

  • without any modern combat experience whatsoever

  • and with major deficiencies in doctrine, human capital and training

  • particularly the complexity and realism of joint operations.

  • China's ability to develop a powerful military is also seriously constrained

  • by the fact that its own technological defence industry levels

  • remain relatively low

  • and that its only source of foreign arms is Russia.

  • And China, to give you one example,

  • has been trying for 35 years

  • to develop a high performance military jet engine,

  • not an easy technology.

  • And it has not succeeded.

  • And where does it get them from?

  • Russia.

  • And are they highly reliable jet engines?

  • No.

  • I leave you with that example.

  • -John Lee: It may seem unoriginal

  • but I'm just going to read a couple of paragraphs from the article

  • because I think provides a very good summary,

  • particularly of my contribution to the article and the talk itself.

  • Now in our view,

  • China may be approaching the zenith of its power

  • as its economy encounters serious structural impediments

  • and demographic barriers to growth.

  • This will also have important implications for the opportunity costs

  • forgone of ever-increasing defence expenditure

  • in a technological arms race with the United States,

  • which Beijing cannot hope to win.

  • Our analysis portrays a China in which worsening domestic problems

  • will remain the leadership's highest priority

  • and addressing such concerns

  • will take up an increasing share of economic resources and national wealth.

  • Just by the way, as China has gotten richer as a country,

  • domestic problems have gotten worse, not better.

  • So economic growth, per se, is not solving China's domestic problems,

  • but actually worsening them.

  • The Communist Party leadership will struggle

  • to keep a lid on growing popular discontent,

  • which may have implications for its very survival

  • under certain circumstances.

  • We have also described a lonely power that has very few friends in Asia.

  • Although China's world view of itself

  • is shaped by strong historical impulses of a hierarchic order

  • with itself at the apex,

  • very few countries in the region appear willing to concede to China

  • the status of the dominant power.

  • Indeed, it is much more likely

  • that countries such as the United States, Japan and India

  • will concert together

  • either directly or indirectly

  • against an increasingly assertive China.

  • In military terms,

  • China's Achilles heel is that it lags at least 20 years behind the United States

  • in key technology areas.

  • The fact that China has no experience whatsoever of modern warfare

  • and its military hierarchy depends crucially on loyalty to the Party

  • means that China's actual warfighting capability must be in serious doubt.

  • Moreover, China's military buildup is causing a classical response

  • in kind as countries such as Japan, India and many Southeast Asian countries

  • acquire advanced maritime military forces in order to check China.

  • They may not be able to balance against China,

  • the Southeast Asian countries,

  • but they can complicate matters significantly for the Chinese military.

  • In summary, as The Economist observes:

  • China needs Western markets,

  • its neighbours are unwilling to accept its regional writ,

  • and for many more years the United States will be strong enough militarily

  • and diplomatically to block it.

  • Now I'm now going to hand over to Paul to make some final comments.

  • -Paul Dibb: Thanks John.

  • What does all this mean for Australia's national security planning

  • and the forthcoming Defence White Paper?

  • First, the most important point to make

  • is that any suggestion the United States should move to one side in Asia

  • to make strategic space for China should be rejected.

  • China is not now or foreseeably a strategic peer of America's

  • and any move by Washington to concede China's so-called legitimate strategic interests

  • would smack of appeasement;

  • and offered unnecessarily and for little conceivable gain.

  • So, when Beijing proclaims that the entire South China Sea

  • is a core strategic interest,

  • a term traditionally reserved for Chinese claims over Taiwan and Tibet,

  • China's maritime expansionist ambitions should be firmly resisted.

  • Second, Australia does not need to structure its Defence Force for war with China.

  • Beijing is not developing the conventional forces

  • with which to invade or directly attack Australia.

  • But we should develop the high-technology naval and air assets,

  • including submarines,

  • necessary to contribute to any Allied conflict in the region,

  • including in Northeast Asia,

  • where we might need to make a contribution

  • or where Australia needs to help resist Chinese military adventurism.

  • Developing these capabilities will further complicate

  • the strategic and operational environment for a still isolated China,

  • which in turn will place further constraints on,

  • and likely encourage greater caution from Beijing.

  • In Northeast Asia, this would suggest, for Australia,

  • niche contributions from us in such areas as submarines and air power.

  • Our Army cannot make a difference to conflict outcomes in Northeast Asia.

  • Closer to home, however,

  • we could make a much more substantial contribution

  • by having the capability to block the straits of Southeast Asia

  • in the event of a serious war in Northeast Asia

  • involving the United States.

  • Third, short of military conflict

  • Australia must be able to resist Chinese coercion

  • whether by military or other pressures

  • with regard to our own direct security interests,

  • including if necessary our economic security.

  • We also need to be capable of countering coercion in our region

  • of primary strategic interest

  • particularly Southeast Asia.

  • It is in Australia's crucial strategic interests for Southeast Asia

  • to avoid being dominated by China geopolitically

  • or becoming a Chinese security domain.

  • Southeast Asia forms a strategic shield

  • to Australia's vulnerable northern approaches

  • and Canberra needs to place high priority

  • on strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian countries,

  • particularly in the defence arena,

  • and to help them resist Chinese coercion.

  • Thank you.

  • -male #1: We have about 15 to 20 minutes for questions

  • so if you could please introduce yourself and speak loudly

  • so the cameras can pick you up.

  • -Tom Mooney: Thank you for a really informative lecture.

  • My name's Tom Mooney.

  • I'm with the SDSC here in the ANU student.

  • The topic tonight was "Why China Will Not Become the Dominate Power in Asia."

  • And tonight we've heard about

  • the contemporary capabilities of China's military.

  • But isn't it true that in order to become a dominate regional power,

  • all that China needs to do is to make a cost so high to the US

  • that the US won't interfere in what China perceives as its region of influence?

  • Which can be done through the asymmetrical capabilities

  • not necessarily how to bridge the gap between the US.

  • -Paul Dibb: You want to have a go?

  • -John Lee: Yes.

  • Well yes. But the same rule applies to China.

  • I mean clearly China is pursuing an asymmetric strategy

  • that is to impose, as you say,

  • prohibitive costs to lower the political will of Washington to intervene.

  • If it does that,

  • as I think you're implying,

  • it lowers the credibility of the alliance system.

  • And so on and so on.

  • But the same thing applies to China.

  • I mean, in a sense, when I say all you have to do,

  • I'm not it's easy, but all you have to do

  • is impose prohibitive costs on the Chinese of assertive behaviour

  • that is unacceptable.

  • Now it's pretty clear that America has that capability.

  • In a sense, the political tolerance or threshold

  • of what the Chinese Communist Party can accept

  • is much lower than I think for Washington.

  • I mean we have to look at history.

  • When Washington enters wars, they enter wars to win.

  • You know, I do fear that

  • the Chinese are making a huge political and strategic miscalculation here.

  • I agree with you.

  • That is prime strategy to inflict prohibitive costs.

  • But think about what is prohibitive for the Chinese Communist Party

  • If you consider both their military vulnerabilities

  • and your domestic weaknesses,

  • they have less room to move,

  • I think, than most people realise.

  • -male #2: Taiwan has come up several times

  • and of course you have the situation with Taiwan and China's economies

  • have become integrated in many ways

  • and you have the One China Policy

  • which the Communists Party adheres to and the [inaudible] favour

  • because they want to be the one ruling China,

  • but in Taiwan, I understand that

  • there's growing sentiment for independence from China.

  • Now if you get in a situation where there's an independence movement

  • and say, a referendum is won to say,

  • to renounce the One China Policy and Taiwan's an independent country,

  • this leads quite a quandary I would think for the Chinese

  • because they do have the economic integrations

  • which they would lose in a conflict.

  • A conflict would be very costly

  • in terms of getting masses of troops across the straights.

  • What is likely to be the effect on China if Taiwan does move towards independence?

  • -Paul Dibb: Yeah.

  • We've got a Taiwanese representative actually here

  • and I was in Taiwan for the first time with an ANU group in September

  • and I'd never been there before

  • because when I was an official I was not allowed to be there

  • although I was allowed to go to communist China.

  • What is impressive about Taiwan,

  • and I say this very seriously,

  • it is a vibrant democracy,

  • a vibrant democracy.

  • And I think it was last May when under the Sunflower Movement,

  • the students occupied the Parliament over allegations

  • that President Ma that that government was moving economically too close to China.

  • Isn't it interesting that students would do that over that over that issue?

  • It is true as you say that the economic relationship

  • and the tourism relationship is very profound.

  • My memory is, William you can correct me,

  • there's 800 flights a week between China and Taiwan.

  • It is good for the mainlanders to go to Taiwan

  • and switch on the TV in their hotels and watch parliament,

  • watch talk back TV,

  • go to a book shop where you can buy any book, hmm?

  • So, you know, there is that creeping short of culturalisation of the mainland.

  • I think on the issue of the independence movement,

  • I'm not an expert on Taiwan.

  • I doubt very much,

  • and the Americans would not want a declaration of independence.

  • And as long as China faces very substantial military costs,

  • which it still does,

  • an amphibious assault,

  • as some of the military here know,

  • is amongst the most difficult and challenging of any capability to develop,

  • particularly if you've got a dug in and capable enemy.

  • So, you know, the issue of Taiwan,

  • is one of those hypothetical contingencies

  • that when foreign ministers of Australia are asked the question,

  • they should but don't always say,

  • "It's a hypothetical. I won't answer it."

  • [laughter]

  • -male #2: I have my answer.

  • -male #3: I've got some assessments.

  • Paul, when you gave your last part of the talk

  • and started talking about the policy implications,

  • it seemed a bit disconnected from everything you'd said before.

  • You could almost have begun by saying,

  • "Okay, we've covered all that,

  • whether China would become the dominant power

  • is actually a straw man and a red herring.

  • China s a problem

  • and we've got to do a lot to counter it."

  • Do you agree?

  • -Paul Dibb: Yes, but I mean, that doesn't mean to say that

  • because I think China is a problem.

  • It's got weaknesses,

  • that if China is stupid enough and provocative enough,

  • as it may well be over Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, to do something,

  • that we could afford to sit there

  • and say we're going to do nothing and we have no military capability.

  • I'm under no illusions that projecting power up into Northeast Asia

  • is extremely difficult and challenging.

  • And we won't be able to make a difference.

  • It would be a niche contribution.

  • But I think closer to home, as I've said,

  • the capacity to blockade the straights of Southeast Asia,

  • we're talking about high-level conflict war here,

  • is within our capacity.

  • And I think our American friends would expect us to have that sort of capability.

  • And I think in any case, by the way,

  • as Rick Armitage, a friend of yours and mine would say if he was here,

  • "If American Marines are dying on the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands,

  • we expect you Australians to bleed for it.

  • -male #4: [inaudible] As you've said,

  • one of China's issues is diplomatic explanation

  • especially after those few years

  • we can start seeing China taking a different path now.

  • You can probably kind of see it

  • with the proclamation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

  • but now the formation of the Asian infrastructure and investment bank,

  • do you kind of see China taking a different path

  • to kind of be more conciliatory role?

  • What difficulties do you think that you might have with that?

  • -Paul Dibb: That's yours John.

  • -John Lee: You mean what difficulties will they have

  • in trying to take a much more conciliatory role?

  • -male #4: Yeah.

  • -John Lee: You know, put in simple terms,

  • I think they've blown trust.

  • I mean there were certain pockets within various countries in the region

  • who were always suspicious of China

  • but on the whole, there was a wide degree of good faith, I think,

  • and desire to want to see a responsible stake holder,

  • if you want to use that term, emerge.

  • Now, for whatever reason,

  • you can speculate about as you say China's become more assertive.

  • Even if China successfully implements all of these initiatives,

  • and some of them are quite good,

  • for example, the Infrastructure Bank,

  • I'm quite supportive of,

  • the strategic viewpoint of China won't change.

  • I mean will China give up its claims to much of South China Sea?

  • No.

  • Will China wind down military spending or acquire capabilities

  • that may help it seize those claims?

  • No.

  • You know, will China have a different policy to the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands,

  • a fundamental strategic policy?

  • No.

  • So it can do all these other things.

  • But I think that trust that was there maybe 5, 10 years ago,

  • I think is broken.

  • -male #5: Hi Paul. How are you?

  • My interest is Indonesia.

  • But my question relates to that.

  • Have you factored in at all the environmental costs

  • of the massive [inaudible] of the environment in China?

  • What impact might that have on their economic and their ability

  • to develop the economy and to fund the military?

  • And the political factors involved?

  • -John Lee: Yeah, I mean there's a political and economic pull.

  • They're political and economic factors as you are suggesting.

  • The political factors are that

  • those instances of mass unrest I mentioned.

  • A large proportion, not a dominant proportion,

  • but a large number of them are protests against things

  • like polluted rivers

  • and not necessarily polluted air but instances of party corruption,

  • SOE corruption

  • where their own regulations have been broken for corrupt reasons

  • and where these have spurned protests.

  • So there's a political dimension there.

  • And hence the last meeting of the CCP,

  • National People's Council,

  • environmental factors was one of the major things

  • that President Z actually mentioned for that reason.

  • The economic factors, much of it feeds into things like water, you know.

  • I can't remember the statistic in my head,

  • but something like half of all of the drinking water in China is polluted.

  • The agricultural water or the bull water is getting worse and worse.

  • Yeah, I mean, China, in a sense has had from a growth perspective,

  • because China has ignored every other consideration

  • that most countries take into account,

  • has been able to achieve to some degree,

  • the growth that it's been able to achieve.

  • Now suddenly it has to deal with the opportunity cost

  • that every other country has to deal with domestically

  • and these will grow greater.

  • So yeah, obviously it's difficult to quantify,

  • but it is a significant inhibitor

  • of the increase of national warfare capability model that they've had,

  • what, for the last 20, 25 years.

  • -John Murray: Okay, thank you, John Murray.

  • I've been riding high to preserve the South Pacific Islands

  • for the last 12 to 13 years.

  • *

  • Many of whom have been recipients of impressive Chinese economic aid

  • and soft loans.

  • Some of their spokesmen have expressed concern

  • that the loans will eventually be called in by China requesting port facilities

  • and that they will add to China's so-called string of pearls.

  • According to [inaudible] Navy.

  • But from what you've said of the defence facilities and capacities of China,

  • it could not even become a dominant power in the South Pacific,

  • let alone Asia.

  • -Paul Dibb: No, but it could like the former Soviet Union

  • when it was messing around in the South Pacific

  • with its so-called hydrographich and fishing vessels as cover

  • for intelligence and other operations,

  • it can cause, you know, severe concern and consternation about,

  • these are very, as you know better than me,

  • very vulnerable potentially unstable small countries.

  • We would be seriously concerned,

  • any Australian government would be seriously concerned,

  • if China was looking to develop port facilities

  • that were a cover for military facilities.

  • There is no evidence of that so far,

  • unless Doug King contradicts me.

  • And China traditionally at this stage

  • has not sought to develop significant military facilities overseas

  • or then places like Sri Lanka and so on.

  • It is sniffing around.

  • I was two years ago in Timor to observe the democratic elections there

  • and I couldn't help but notice that

  • the following buildings had been built by the Chinese:

  • the foreign ministry, the defence ministry, and the Presidential Palace.

  • Now look, every country has the right to do that sort of thing.

  • But its' something we need to scrutinise extremely closely.

  • -male #6: Well this might seem to be an unrealistic scenario.

  • If push came to shove and rather than a military action,

  • China were to contest were to contest America economically,

  • and possibly in partnership with Russia,

  • what do think of the possibility that

  • they might consider concocting some sort of bear raid type scenario

  • on the US economy using the foreign reserves

  • and what might such a possibility mean for US action to then reach?

  • -John Lee: Let's quickly address that.

  • The foreign reserves, everyone talks about this treasure chest

  • or this weapon that China has.

  • What people don't realise is that most of the foreign reserves

  • has really resulted from the surpluses that China has had with America or Europe

  • and it has to keep the money outside China

  • because of its currency policy.

  • Why that's important is because there are actually liabilities

  • against those foreign reserves,

  • that is what is owed to the export manufacturers inside the country.

  • I mean, in short, China can't just deploy those foreign reserves

  • because there are actually liabilities against that

  • and it would completely ruin their financial system.

  • Just on the other economic,

  • potential economic weapons that China has,

  • I think there's a misunderstanding that China is a driver of global growth.

  • If you look at interactions China has with advanced economies,

  • most of the interaction is making things for the advanced economies to consume.

  • So ultimately what that means is that

  • the Western consumer or the advanced economy consumer

  • is still much much more important to not just China, but Asia,

  • than the Chinese domestic consumption market.

  • Just to give you one more indication,

  • the Chinese domestic consumption market is about 3 trillion dollars US.

  • And about half of that you can't actually access.

  • The American and European domestic consumption markets

  • are about 12 trillion dollars US each.

  • And if you want evidence, during the global financial crisis,

  • trade between China and the rest of the region actually declined

  • when the Western economies went into recession.

  • What that tells you is that the trade is being driven by the Western consumer.

  • All that's happening mainly

  • is that it's a vast production chain

  • to make products for American and European consumers.

  • So I'm not saying China is completely impotent,

  • but it doesn't have those economic weapons that people assume it has.

  • -Paul Dibb: Yeah and I think, you know,

  • John, that unlike the former Soviet Union

  • which and aunotarchy, self-sufficient, non-trading, non-investing country,

  • China is fundamentally involved in the Western world,

  • global trading system.

  • By the way, and that gives it certain vulnerabilities.

  • It's not just the West sea lines of communication that are vulnerable.

  • I mean China currently imports 80% of its oil

  • through the straights of the Senkaku and Southeast Asia.

  • And that means it too is vulnerable.

  • And as John is saying,

  • when it comes to global supply chains,

  • China is intricately involved in that isn't it?

  • So if global supply chains get cut off because of war,

  • the impact of the conflict,

  • the impact on the Chinese economy,

  • is going to be very substantial, yes?

  • There's one thing that we haven't raised that

  • I'll just mention and I'll get John to talk about it a bit.

  • There was quite recently while I've been away in Scandinavia,

  • an article I understand by David Shambaugh

  • who you know very well, a very prominent American expert on China

  • who, as I read it in the press overseas,

  • is talking about the vulnerability and fragility

  • of the Communist Party ruling China.

  • Do you have a view on that John?

  • -John Lee: Yeah, I mean, David Shambaugh's article was essentially saying that

  • the CCP, is this the beginning of the end for the CCP

  • because of various things like slowing economic growth,

  • lack of morale, lack of autological conviction, etc.?

  • I agree with David's analysis of the problems.

  • I don't agree with his endpoint.

  • The reason why I don't' think that the Chinese Communist Party

  • under David's line of reasoning is at its end

  • is because if you look at modern industrialising societies,

  • regimes fall because of revolutions in cities.

  • They don't fall because of revolutions in the countryside.

  • Now the basic strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

  • has been for want for better term,

  • to try to co-opt urban elites

  • and it's done that by

  • as I mentioned being a primary dispenser

  • of career opportunity, wealth, etc.

  • We look at a middle classes in China

  • and the upper classes in China,

  • they're fairly closely tied to the Chinese Communist Party.

  • So it's actually not in the interests of urban elites right now in China

  • to want a different political setup.

  • Now of course if there're some economic disaster then the rules change

  • but assuming no economic disaster,

  • I think David's pointing out of the problems are correct,

  • but I don't necessarily agree with

  • what he says about where it's heading to.

-Paul Dibb: When John Lee and I decided to get together

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中国がアジアの覇権国にならない理由 (Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia)

  • 294 31
    噹噹 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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