字幕表 動画を再生する 英語字幕をプリント PROFESSOR: OK, so what I want to do today is to finish up the lecture that we were engaged with last week about utilitarianism and then to move on to what is perhaps the most dead-guy-on-Tuesday lecture of the semester, that is, an explanation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. So in order to make up for the fact that the second part of the lecture is fairly dry, we'll have a couple of clicker questions in the first part of the lecture. OK, so as you recall from our lecture last class, John Stuart Mill, in the selections from Utilitarianism that we read, says two extraordinarily famous things that serve in some ways as the heart of the utilitarian view. The first thing that he says is that he articulates what's known as the greatest happiness principle. This is a principle that's supposed to tell you what it is for an act to be morally right. And what Mill says is, there's a proportionality between the rightness of the act and something that it produces. In particular, a proportionality between the rightness of the act and the amount of happiness it produces, regardless of how that happiness is distributed. In particular he says "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, they're wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness," and the happiness with which we're concerned is not the agent's own happiness but "the happiness of all concerned." The second extraordinarily famous saying that he says in the opening passages of Utilitarianism is that the motive with which an act is performed is irrelevant to the act's moral worth. He says the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action. "He who saves another creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for it." So we might summarize what these principles say, as saying that the first one tells us that what matters for the morality of an act is the aggregate amount of happiness that it produces. And what we're concerned with here are aggregates, not individuals. We're interested in how much good is done overall, not where those pieces of good might happen to fall. And what the second principle tells us is that what the utilitarian, who is after all a consequentialist, is concerned with are consequences. They're interested in the outcome of the act, not the process by which that outcome was achieved. So the first reading that we did for last class was a selection from Mill's Utilitarianism where he articulated these principles. And it's important to recognize that these get something profoundly right about what we're thinking about, I think, when we try to articulate what lies behind our moral judgment. It does seem right that what we're interested in is what the world is like after a particular action is taken, and to the extent that we're interested in what the world is like, our primary interest is not in how that state of affairs came about, but what that state of affairs is. And our primary concern, if we're taking a moral stance, is not in how much we ourselves have, but rather in how much good there is in the world overall. That said, there have been, since utilitarianism was articulated, a classic set of objections which are raised to the view, some of which we'll talk more about today, and some of which we encountered in the selection from Bernard Williams that we read last class. Now you will all recall that Williams' discussion begins with a story of a gentleman that he calls Jim, who finds himself in a South American village that's run by a rather unsavory cowboy. And some of the citizens of that village have been protesting the unsavory cowboy's leadership. And so what the unsavory cowboy has done is he has rounded up twenty of those villagers, and he's planning--simply to show the others that he's in charge--to kill those twenty villagers. When Jim arrives, Pedro the cowboy tells him that, if Jim is willing to shoot one of the villagers, the other nineteen will be set free. So that's the Jim case. Jim shows up in a town. The sheriff of the town has selected twenty people at random to be shot, but if Jim is willing to kill one of them the other 19 will be set free, so-- clickers out-- Question: In the Jim case, what is Jim morally obliged to do? Is the moral thing for Jim to do in this case to shoot the one man, thereby liberating the other nineteen, or is the right thing for him to do to refuse to shoot the one, thereby letting all twenty die? OK, so let's see how the numbers came out. So almost 3/4 of you, actually more than 3/4 of you, think that what the morally right thing for Jim to do in this case is to shoot one man, thereby liberating the other nineteen. We'll have a chance next week to talk a lot in about these sorts of questions. Our reading for Thursday is a series of moral dilemmas with this structure. But what I want to ask those 77% of you, who answered "yes," to do now is to think about whether you take what Williams says is the natural utilitarian next step. Williams argues that if you are a committed utilitarian, and you think that the morally right thing for Jim to do is to shoot the one and release the other nineteen, then you ought to feel no moral compunction about doing so. There's a clear right thing to do. The right thing is to kill the one, so it's to save the nineteen. You may feel moral disapprobation--indeed you should feel moral disapprobation--towards Pedro who put Jim in this situation. But you ought to feel no moral disapprobation towards Jim, and even more importantly according to Williams, Jim himself ought to feel no moral compunction. So among the 77% of you who answered that Jim did the right thing in killing the one and saving the nineteen, do you think that in shooting the one man, Jim ought to think of any hesitation that he feels as mere squeamishness, something that ought to be overcome? Or do you think that Jim ought to think of the hesitation that he feels in doing what the utilitarian and in what you yourself said was the right thing, do you think he ought to think of his hesitation as being indicative of something morally relevant? So there's roughly seventy of you who should be answering this. Let's see how the numbers come out. OK, so most of you take on only part of the consequentialist picture here, at least in the way that Williams understands it. Most of you think that, although the right thing for Jim to do in that case is to kill the one to save the nineteen, it's not the case that he ought wholeheartedly to endorse that as the right thing to do. In a minute, I'm going to present to you Williams' analogy to the case of residual racism to try to help you see why someone who really has taken on board the consequentialist outlook thinks that the combination of views which most of you present, where you think the right thing to do is to kill the one to save the nineteen, but you also think the right thing to do is to feel bad about that in some way, have not fully appreciated what the utilitarian stance provides you with as a way of understanding morality. So Williams, as you know, presents us with two cases. The first is the case that I've just given you, the case of Jim and the captive Indians. The second is the case in high '70's fashion of a man who is needing to go back to work because it's difficult to have his wife working outside of the home. I leave that to you as a period piece. But the work which George is provided in Williams' example is work in a bioweapons lab, something to which George feels moral opposition. But if George doesn't take the job in the bioweapons lab a much more gung-ho person, somebody who's likely to advocate the use of bioweapons in all sorts of contexts, will get the job instead. So the two cases that Williams presents us with there have a common structure. And a common structure which we're going to see again and again in moral dilemmas. There's one act that the person can do that leads to a particular outcome, another act that the person can do that leads to a different outcome, where the first act is worse on its surface than the second. So Jim has the possibility of shooting one person, or shooting no people.