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PROFESSOR: OK, so what I want to do today is to finish up
the lecture that we were engaged with last week about
utilitarianism and then to move on to what is perhaps the
most dead-guy-on-Tuesday lecture of the semester, that
is, an explanation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
So in order to make up for the fact that the second part of
the lecture is fairly dry, we'll have a couple of clicker
questions in the first part of the lecture.
OK, so as you recall from our lecture last class, John
Stuart Mill, in the selections from Utilitarianism that we
read, says two extraordinarily famous things that serve in
some ways as the heart of the utilitarian view.
The first thing that he says is that he articulates what's
known as the greatest happiness principle.
This is a principle that's supposed to tell you what it
is for an act to be morally right.
And what Mill says is, there's a proportionality between the
rightness of the act and something that it produces.
In particular, a proportionality between the
rightness of the act and the amount of happiness it
produces, regardless of how that happiness is distributed.
In particular he says "actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness, they're wrong as
they tend to promote the reverse of happiness," and the
happiness with which we're concerned is not the agent's
own happiness but "the happiness of all concerned."
The second extraordinarily famous saying that he says in
the opening passages of Utilitarianism is that the
motive with which an act is performed is irrelevant to the
act's moral worth.
He says the motive has nothing to do with the
morality of the action.
"He who saves another creature from drowning does what is
morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of
being paid for it."
So we might summarize what these principles say, as
saying that the first one tells us that what matters for
the morality of an act is the aggregate amount of happiness
that it produces.
And what we're concerned with here are aggregates, not
individuals.
We're interested in how much good is done overall, not
where those pieces of good might happen to fall.
And what the second principle tells us is that what the
utilitarian, who is after all a consequentialist, is
concerned with are consequences.
They're interested in the outcome of the act, not the
process by which that outcome was achieved.
So the first reading that we did for last class was a
selection from Mill's Utilitarianism where he
articulated these principles.
And it's important to recognize that these get
something profoundly right about what we're thinking
about, I think, when we try to articulate what lies behind
our moral judgment.
It does seem right that what we're interested in is what
the world is like after a particular action is taken,
and to the extent that we're interested in what the world
is like, our primary interest is not in how that state of
affairs came about, but what that state of affairs is.
And our primary concern, if we're taking a moral stance,
is not in how much we ourselves have, but rather in
how much good there is in the world overall.
That said, there have been, since utilitarianism was
articulated, a classic set of objections which are raised to
the view, some of which we'll talk more about today, and
some of which we encountered in the selection from Bernard
Williams that we read last class.
Now you will all recall that Williams' discussion begins
with a story of a gentleman that he calls Jim, who finds
himself in a South American village that's run by a rather
unsavory cowboy.
And some of the citizens of that village have been
protesting the unsavory cowboy's leadership.
And so what the unsavory cowboy has done is he has
rounded up twenty of those villagers, and he's
planning--simply to show the others that he's in charge--to
kill those twenty villagers.
When Jim arrives, Pedro the cowboy tells him that, if Jim
is willing to shoot one of the villagers, the other nineteen
will be set free.
So that's the Jim case.
Jim shows up in a town.
The sheriff of the town has selected twenty people at
random to be shot, but if Jim is willing to kill one of them
the other 19 will be set free, so--
clickers out--
Question: In the Jim case, what is Jim
morally obliged to do?
Is the moral thing for Jim to do in this case to shoot the
one man, thereby liberating the other nineteen, or is the
right thing for him to do to refuse to shoot the one,
thereby letting all twenty die?
OK, so let's see how the numbers came out.
So almost 3/4 of you, actually more than 3/4 of you, think
that what the morally right thing for Jim to do in this
case is to shoot one man, thereby
liberating the other nineteen.
We'll have a chance next week to talk a lot in about these
sorts of questions.
Our reading for Thursday is a series of moral dilemmas with
this structure.
But what I want to ask those 77% of you, who answered
"yes," to do now is to think about whether you take what
Williams says is the natural utilitarian next step.
Williams argues that if you are a committed utilitarian,
and you think that the morally right thing for Jim to do is
to shoot the one and release the other nineteen, then you
ought to feel no moral compunction about doing so.
There's a clear right thing to do.
The right thing is to kill the one, so
it's to save the nineteen.
You may feel moral disapprobation--indeed you
should feel moral disapprobation--towards Pedro
who put Jim in this situation.
But you ought to feel no moral disapprobation towards Jim,
and even more importantly according to Williams, Jim
himself ought to feel no moral compunction.
So among the 77% of you who answered that Jim did the
right thing in killing the one and saving the nineteen, do
you think that in shooting the one man, Jim ought to think of
any hesitation that he feels as mere squeamishness,
something that ought to be overcome?
Or do you think that Jim ought to think of the hesitation
that he feels in doing what the utilitarian and in what
you yourself said was the right thing, do you think he
ought to think of his hesitation as being indicative
of something morally relevant?
So there's roughly seventy of you who should
be answering this.
Let's see how the numbers come out.
OK, so most of you take on only part of the
consequentialist picture here, at least in the way that
Williams understands it.
Most of you think that, although the right thing for
Jim to do in that case is to kill the one to save the
nineteen, it's not the case that he ought wholeheartedly
to endorse that as the right thing to do.
In a minute, I'm going to present to you Williams'
analogy to the case of residual racism to try to help
you see why someone who really has taken on board the
consequentialist outlook thinks that the combination of
views which most of you present, where you think the
right thing to do is to kill the one to save the nineteen,
but you also think the right thing to do is to feel bad
about that in some way, have not fully appreciated what the
utilitarian stance provides you with as a way of
understanding morality.
So Williams, as you know, presents us with two cases.
The first is the case that I've just given you, the case
of Jim and the captive Indians.
The second is the case in high '70's fashion of a man who is
needing to go back to work because it's difficult to have
his wife working outside of the home.
I leave that to you as a period piece.
But the work which George is provided in Williams' example
is work in a bioweapons lab, something to which George
feels moral opposition.
But if George doesn't take the job in the bioweapons lab a
much more gung-ho person, somebody who's likely to
advocate the use of bioweapons in all sorts of contexts, will
get the job instead.
So the two cases that Williams presents us with there have a
common structure.
And a common structure which we're going to see again and
again in moral dilemmas.
There's one act that the person can do that leads to a
particular outcome, another act that the person can do
that leads to a different outcome, where the first act
is worse on its surface than the second.
So Jim has the possibility of shooting one person, or
shooting no people.
Those are the choices that Jim faces.
If Jim does the first act, shooting one person, then
nineteen people will go free; if Jim does the second act,
which is not to shoot anybody at all, to refuse Pedro's
bargain, then all twenty people will be shot.
Likewise, George faces a choice between doing one
thing, taking the job in--
sorry, George faces the choice between taking the job in the
bio lab and not taking the job in the bio lab.
If George takes the job in the bio lab, then the gung-ho
biological weapons fellow won't [will]
get the job, and the outcome will be better [worse].
If George doesn't take the job, then the gung-ho
biological weapons person won't get the job and the
outcome will be better.
So, in both cases we have an act killing the one versus
killing none, taking the job versus not taking the job,
which is worse than another, but the outcomes of those acts
are inverted.
The consequentialist tells us not to look at the act side of
the equation, but to look at the
outcome side of the equation.
The only things, says the consequentialist, that we need
to take into consideration, is how many people are saved or
how much bio-weapons research is done.
According to the consequentialist, what we do
is we look and we see, outcome one is better than outcome
two, and then reading back from that, we decide which
thing we ought to do.
We ought to do act one because it's the thing that produces
the better outcome.
The deontologist or virtue ethicist says, not so fast.
Don't jump straight to the consequence, look also at what
it is that is needed to be done by the individual to
bring about that consequence.
And recognizing that act one is worse than act two, the
deontologist or virtue ethicist says, it's at least
important to take seriously as a possibility that the right
thing to do in this situation is the second act, even if the
outcome that it leads to is worse.
Now what Williams points out is that if one takes seriously
the first of these stances, the one where what we're
looking at is the outcome and not the process which gave
rise to that outcome, then any hesitation we feel towards
bringing about that outcome as the result of that particular
act is due to what we might call a certain kind of
squeamishness.
The utilitarian says, and we started with the quotes from
Mill for this reason, that thinking about who does an act
is morally irrelevant, just as thinking about who gets the
goods is morally irrelevant.
What matters, says the greatest happiness principle,
is how much aggregate happiness is produced; what
matters not, except in so far as it affects the amount of
happiness, is who produces that happiness or where that
happiness goes.
So there is room on the consequentialist picture for
second-order thinking about the
distributions of happiness.
If gross inequities in the amount of happiness across a
society produces itself less happiness, then we can take
that into consideration in our calculus.
If performing a particular kind of act produces in an
individual less happiness, we can take that into
consideration in our calculus.
But ultimately the only things that go into the equation in
determining whether an act is morally right is the amount of
happiness and not where that happiness is distributed.
Now, as Epictetus pointed out, some things are up to us and
some things are not up to us.
And when Jim arrives in Pedro's village, one of the
things that is not up to him is the fact that he faces a
forced choice of the structure that Pedro has
presented him with.
It goes without saying that what Pedro has done is
outrageous, but the structure of the situation that Jim
confronts is a very simple one.
Either Pedro will kill twenty people or Jim will kill one
person and the other nineteen will not die.
That's what's there for Jim to be deciding on.
Nonetheless, 75% of the 75% of you who thought that Jim did
the right thing in that situation think that Jim ought
to feel some squeamishness about carrying out that act.
What Williams points out is that if one takes seriously
the consequentialist picture, then perhaps the morally right
thing to do is to try to cultivate in oneself moral
sentiments that accord with one's moral judgments.
If through rational argumentation and reflection
you come to realize of yourself that--although you
are committed to racial equality, although you are
committed to gender equality, although you are committed to
equality regardless of gender identification, you're
committed to not being ageist, you're committed to not being
discriminatory on the basis of physical disability--you
might, as a result of having lived in a society largely
structured in ways that encode a kind of residual racism and
sexism and homophobia, you might find in yourself certain
sentiments that lead you instantaneously to respond in
ways that run contrary to what your moral commitments tell
you you ought to do.
In those cases, I take it you think that there's some moral
mandate upon you to try to get rid of
those instinctive responses.
If you're really committed to anti-racism, then you want to
the extent possible to have a harmonious soul when engaging
in interracial encounters.
If your reason tells you that you're committed to
anti-racism, you want your spirit and appetite to be in
line in that way.
So there are instances where morality on reflection tells
us that something is right, and the consequence of that
for our behavior towards ourselves is that we ought to
try to cultivate in ourselves instincts that
correspond to that.
Williams says the utilitarian should say that in cases like
the Jim case, Jim is like the residual racist. He knows what
the right thing to do is, but he has a residual tendency to
be pulled in the morally wrong direction.
If you don't think that it's true that Jim ought to change
his attitudes in that case, and you do think that the
residual implicit racist ought to try to change her attitude,
it would be useful to try to think about what holds those
two cases apart.
OK, so that's what I want to say in closing about the
utilitarianism and it's critics.
And we'll return as I said to those issues twice more, once
on Thursday when we read Judy Thomson's trolley problem
paper and once next Tuesday when we look at some empirical
work on that question, which suggests a naturalistic
explanation for why it is that Jim feels the
hesitation that he does.
What I want to do now is to introduce you to the third of
all the main moral outlooks that we're going to consider
this semester.
So last lecture we looked very carefully at consequentialist
moral theories in the form of John Stuart Mill, and those
are theories which locate the moral value of an act in its
consequences.
In the first part of the class we spent a lot of time looking
at Aristotle's virtue theory, which located the moral worth
of an act in the actor.
Remember we looked at acts having more worth only if
they're done as the result of a sort of
constancy of character.
What we're going to look at today is the third piece of
this story, of a moral view that says the morality
attached to an action is not the result of what the actor
is like, it's not the result of what the consequences are
like, rather it is about the act itself.
In particular, we're going to look at the deontological
theory of Immanuel Kant.
So, Immanuel Kant was an 18th century German philosopher
who, like Plato and Aristotle, provided a comprehensive and
systematic philosophical theory that to this day is
taken seriously as one of the ways one might make sense of
the world as a whole.
Kant has theories of metaphysics, that is, what
kind of stuff there is.
He has theories of epistemology, that is, how we
know about what kind of stuff there is.
He has theories of ethics, what the right thing to do is.
And he has theories of aesthetics, that is, what
gives things aesthetic value.
Famously, Kant articulated his views about the three major
domains of philosophy three enormous and dense books: the
first, The Critique of Pure Reason, which told you about
what the world is like and how we know it to be that way,
which he wrote first in 1781 and then revised; the second,
The Critique of Practical Reason, which is an account of
the nature of morality; and the third, The Critique of
Judgment, which is an account of the nature
of aesthetic value.
But in addition to those dense works Kant also wrote what he
took to be more popular presentations of his view.
In the case of metaphysics, he wrote a book called The
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.
And in the case of ethics, he wrote something that he calls
the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, which
is of course the work from which we read
excerpts for today.
So I give you this context because I want you to know
that, as hard as the reading that we did from Kant was, I
chose for you perhaps the easiest part of the easiest
book that he wrote.
So, what should you take home from Kant if you take home
nothing else?
If you take home nothing else from our reading of Kant, I
want you to take home Kant's idea of the categorical
imperative.
And my goal in the remainder of lecture today is to bring
you, by reading through with you the text of Kant that we
had today, to a point where you will be well positioned to
understand what Kant means by the categorical imperative.
And depending on how the next twenty minutes go, we'll get
to that either right at the end of today's lecture or
right at the beginning of Thursday's.
OK, so Kant's text, the Grounding for the Metaphysics
of Morals begins with a very famous passage where Kant
says, "nothing can be regarded as good without qualification
except the good will." This claim should be familiar to
you, O readers of Book II of Plato's The Republic.
This is the classic distinction between things
that have intrinsic value and things that are merely of
instrumental worth.
And indeed much in the way that Plato's Socrates does,
Kant goes on to enumerate some things which fall into the
other category, the category of things that are of mere
instrumental utility.
Among the things that cannot be regarded as good without
qualification, says Kant, are talents of the mind like
intelligence and wit, qualities of temperament like
courage and perseverance, gifts of fortune like power
and riches and honor and health.
And he says, taking a direct gibe at Aristotle, and noting
as such that he's so doing, neither can the ancient
virtues--(oh, my goodness, how do I close that
email?)--neither can the ancient virtues of moderation
and self control be considered as good in themselves.
Why?
Because though being intelligent, or brave, or
rich, or controlled, will help you to achieve the goals that
you have, they don't determine what those goals might be.
They magnify your effectiveness as an agent, but
they don't determine the valence, the
value of your agency.
So, says Kant, a witty, persevering, rich, healthy,
moderate thief will be an outstanding thief--but that
doesn't make his thiefdom good.
Each of the virtues that has traditionally been extolled as
a virtue, says Kant, gains its value only in so far as the
good will is part of it.
Now a good will, says Kant, is good not because of what it
affects or accomplishes, it's good in itself.
When I say that Kant is a critic of consequentialism I
am not exaggerating.
Kant doesn't think that the outcome of
the act is what matters.
And in an extraordinarily famous passage, famous in part
because of the rather shocking translation which has come
down to us of it, Kant says, "the good will would remain
good, even if by the niggardly provision of step-motherly
nature it wholly lacked the power to accomplish its
purpose." By which he means, even if you with your good
will were frustrated in all of the goals that you set out to
achieve, your actions would still have moral worth.
And somewhat more poetically and a bit less vocabulary that
is challenging to the modern ear, Kant says, even if it
didn't achieve its outcome "it would like a jewel still shine
by its own light as something which has
full value in itself.
Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither
augment nor its value."
Now the question is this: How could anybody come
to have this view?
How could anybody have a view of morality that says, what
matters for an act to be moral is not the outcome that it
produces, but rather the description under which the
act is done?
What I want to try to do right now is to put you inside the
Kantian picture so that you get a sense of what that
worldview looks like.
So in the passages that we read for today, Kant makes
three particular claims. He says that an action must be
done from duty in order to have moral worth.
The first notion that I want to try to explicate for you is
the Kantian notion of something
being done from duty.
An action done from duty, says Kant in his second
proposition, has its moral worth not in the purpose that
is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to
which the action is determined.
So the way that an action done from duty has more worth is
not by looking to see what outcome you're expecting from
it, but rather by looking to see under what
characterization did you perform the act.
And again, I'll spell out what each of those terms mean.
Finally, says Kant, duty, which lies at the heart of
deontological moral theory, "duty is the necessity of an
action done out of the respect for the law." Kant believes
that it is only when you subject your will to a law
which you have made for yourself--that is, the moral
law whose binding force upon you you have recognized--it is
only in that circumstance that you are truly free.
So Kant says, "duty is the necessity of an action done
out of the respect for the law," and when you perform an
action out of respect for the moral law, says Kant, then and
only then do you act autonomously.
OK, so three, incredibly complicated,
subtle claims from Kant.
Let's try getting to the bottom of what they mean.
So let's start with the first claim, the claim that an act
has moral worth only when it is done from duty.
So Kant points out that there's three kinds of
motivation that we might have in performing an act.
We might do an act out of duty, we might do it out of
inclination, or we might do it out of self-interest. Only
cases of the first kind, in fact only pure cases of the
first kind, have moral worth.
Actions that are done merely in keeping with, but not from
moral duty, have no moral worth according to Kant.
So if you obey the law but you do so only out of self
interest, your obedience, says Kant, has no moral worth.
if you rescue the drowning child from the pond but you do
so only because there's a sign on the tree that says, "Rescue
Drowning Children: $1 Million Reward," your act
has no moral worth.
So we can think about what Kant's claim amounts to and
how it differs from the other ones that we've been looking
at by thinking of the question space in
terms of a flow chart.
So we're trying to decide whether a particular action
has moral worth, and the first thing we want to ask ourselves
is: "Does the action accord with duty?
If the answer to that is no, that is, if you've done
something like lied, or stolen something, or murdered
somebody, or allowed something terrible to happen in front of
you that you could have easily, at no cost to
yourself, prevented, all of the authors that we've read,
not surprisingly, say that the act has no moral worth--
Oh so, did that just disappear that was supposed to
be in red on black?
Is it completely invisible from the back?
Oh, that's a pity--
OK, so what that says in red is no lying and stealing--
but it's in red.
I can't change it in the middle of the slides, but I'll
remind you what those things say.
OK--
The second question that we ask, having eliminated now
from the realm of morally worthy acts those that don't
accord with duty, is: What motive the act was done with?
So perhaps you act in a morally worthy way out of
self-interest without immediate inclinations.
So you pay your taxes because if you don't pay your taxes
you're going to have to pay more taxes.
You obey the speed limit but only because you were afraid
you might get caught otherwise.
Mill says those acts have moral worth.
Kant says no, they don't--
And again, that's supposed to be in red but it's now
invisible--
Suppose that you do an act in such a way that you have an
inclination that's in keeping with duty.
So Kant thinks you have a duty not to commit suicide, and he
considers a case where you fail to commit suicide because
you're happy.
Kant thinks you need to be loyal to your life partner,
but he says that there's no moral worth to remaining loyal
to your life partner while you are in love.
There's no moral worth, says Kant, to acting kindly towards
somebody when you feel sympathy towards them.
Because in those cases, though your act is in keeping with
what morality demands, it's not done because it is the
right thing to do.
You are doing it because your inclination happens to line up
with what morality demands of you.
Now Aristotle, of course, took this situation to be the one
in which moral worth is paradigmatically expressed.
But Kant thinks in such cases you can not tell that an act
was done from the moral law.
All you can see is that it was done in keeping with the moral
law, it corresponds to what the moral law demands, but we
can't see from that that the motive was duty.
It's only in the third case, the case where you act from
duty without any inclination and without any self-interest,
that Kant thinks the moral worth of an
action can be seen.
If you preserve your life when you feel the inclination to do
otherwise, if you act kindly in situations where there's no
reward for you and you feel no sympathy, in those cases, says
Kant, we can see that the act was done, not merely in
keeping with, but from the moral law.
This isn't to say that Kant doesn't think a life lived in
the way that Aristotle suggested life is lived is a
badly [well]
lived life.
Cases where your inclination happens to line up with duty
hopefully keep you out of this box of doing the wrong thing,
but they don't allow you to test your character and see of
yourself that the motivation that you have for doing the
right thing is to conform to what the moral
law demands of you.
So with that understanding of what it is to act from duty in
mind, we're now in a position to make sense of Kant's second
claim in our reading for today.
Then "an action done from duty has its moral worth not in the
purpose that's to be obtained by it, but in the maxim
according to which the action is determined." So remember
we've learned that an action done from duty is one that you
do in conformity with what morality demands, because that
is what morality demands.
Not because it's in your self interest, not because you were
inclined to behave in that way, but because that act is
what morality demands of you.
But in order to determine whether an act is what
morality demands of you, that act needs to be described in a
particular way to you.
And the way that you describe that act to yourself makes use
of what Kant calls a maxim, a subjective principle of
volition--that is, a description of something that
is about you, the subject, that's says what your desires
towards behavior are in that situation.
A subjective principle of volition, that is, a
description under which the act is done.
So it takes the form, perhaps: "In all engagings with all who
come into my shop, I will provide them with an honest
accounting of how much their transaction is worth,
regardless of whether I could be discovered cheating in
this." Or: "In all of my encounters with those who are
weak and in need of my help, I will provide them with the aid
that I can regardless of whether that would be of
benefit to me."
"Only by considering the motive and not by considering
the outcome can the action be expressive of the good will
itself." "The good will is the only thing that is good in
itself," says Kant, and it's only by looking at the
description under which an act is done that we can determine
whether the good will was implicated in the right way in
the choice to perform that action.
Third claim: "Duty is the necessity of an action done
out of the respect for the law." So we know that an act
has moral worth only if it's done from duty.
We know that in order to be done from duty it needs to be
done under a certain description.
And now we're told what it is that this duty amounts to.
In order for an act to be done from duty, says Kant, it must
have been done with explicit recognition that what one is
doing at that point is respecting the moral law in so
far as it articulates what morality demands of you.
Not in so far that it articulates ways that you
might have a well-ordered, harmonious, happy soul.
Not in so far that it articulates ways in which lots
of happiness could be spread around to lots of people.
Out of respect rather, says Kant, for the fact that it is
what morality demands of you.
The moral worth of an act, says Kant, does not lie in its
effect, for the effect could have come
about in multiple ways.
I can set out to release a biological gas in a subway
that's intended to kill thousands of people, and
because I'm not very good at chemistry, the result could be
that I produce an enormous amount of joy in those
thousands of people.
The effect can come about in lots of ways.
Kant says Mill would have to say that in releasing that gas
I have done something with more worth.
Kant says: No--what matters is the description under which
the act is done, and in particular that that
description be that one have respect for the law itself.
So I told you I was going to get you to the point of the
categorical imperative, and I am going to end the lecture
today by bringing you right up to that point, and then next
class we'll talk about it in more detail.
So the question is this, right?
This is a pressing, exciting question in Kant.
All right, I realize that we're in the in-Kant part of
things, but this is really exciting.
"What sort of law...?", says Kant.
He even puts a "but" to get you excited.
But, he says--cliffhanger...--
"what sort of law can that be, the thought of which must
determine the will without reference to any "intent"
expected effect, so the will can be called absolutely good
without qualification?" It's so exciting!
We're finding something that's going to make us genuinely
autonomous and free and moral!
Well remember: it can't be anything particular, it can't
be anything specific about the world or it's outcomes.
What can it be?
It can be the will's universal conformity of its actions to
law as such!
That is, what makes the law binding is the fact that it is
recognized by all rational agents as binding.
In particular, it takes the form of what Kant calls the
categorical imperative.
And here's the formulation of the categorical imperative
that we got in our reading for today: "Never act except in
such a way that I can also will that my act maxim should
become a universal law." Never do anything that you couldn't
will everybody else to do at the same time.
And we'll begin next lecture with the example that Kant
uses to illustrate this, namely the lying promise, talk
a little bit more about various formulations of the
categorical imperative, and then move to Judy Thomson's
trolley problem paper.
[SIDE CONVERSATION]
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13. Deontology

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Why Why 2013 年 4 月 22 日 に公開
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