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從瓜島到長崎 (WWII Battlefield S4/E5)
In the summer of 1942,
the Japanese Empire stretched over a vast area of the western Pacific
After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941,
Japanese forces moved quickly to capture Hong Kong,
Burma,
Malaria,
Borneo, the Philippines,
and Singapore.
By the spring of 1942,
Japanese troops were in New Guinea
as the expanding empire swept into the Solomon Islands,
By the end of May,
Japanese territory spread as far as the large jungle island
that would give its name to one of the best-known episodes of the Pacific War,
Guadalcanal.
Japan's expansion was a seemingly relentless advance.
But around the time they reached Guadalcanal,
the tide was already beginning to turn against the Empire.
The May 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea
forced Japan to shelf(?) the idea of attacking New Guinea's capital.
Port Morseby.
In early June,
the stunning American victory at Midway
persuaded the Japanese leadership
to halt their expansion into the Pacific.
Consolidation was now the order of the day.
But the Empire was still a force to be reckoned with.
In the middle of June 1942,
Allied intelligence in the Solomon Islands
reported a worrying development.
The Japanese occupiers of Guadalcanal
were constructing an airfield on the north coast of the island.
Coconut trees were being felled in the thousands.
and the reports suggested
that the airstrip will be operational in a matter of weeks.
This was serious news for the Allies.
A Japanese air presence on Guadalcanal
would threaten the precious supply line between Hawaii and Australia.
In Washington,
the American chiefs of staff considered their response.
One idea was to carry out a raid against Guadalcanal,
and put the airfield out of commission.
But eventually a plan was hatched
that was far more bold in scope.
Instead of merely raiding Guadalcanal,
the Americans decided to capture the island.
The plan was to effect an amphibious landing by American Marine forces,
eject the small Japanese presence,
and establish an Allied airbase on the island.
By June the 25th,
the decision was made to go ahead with the operation,
its code name
Watchtower.
The Prelude
When the decision was made to capture Guadalcanal,
the American planners knew very little about the background that lay ahead
the island was almost entirely unfamiliar.
Maps were few and unreliable,
and only a limited air reconnaissance was possible.
And this was not the only problem that affected American preparations.
The success of the Guadalcanal offensive
would depend on the Marine troops
whose task was to go ashore
and physically capture the vital airstrip.
But when the Marine commander
General Vandegrift
received his orders at his headquarters in New Zealand on the 25th of June,
he knew that his men were far from combat ready.
It was early in the previous month that the marines
had left their home base in North Carolina.
And by the end of June,
only 1/3 of their number had arrived in New Zealand.
General Vandegrift had been told
not to expect any operational duties until 1943.
Now his unprepared division
was expected to go into battle in a matter of weeks.
Vandegrift was forced into urgent preparations in New Zealand
as his men and supplies arrived in the region.
Despite an outbreak of influenza amongst his troops
and the inconvenience of a strike
amongst the dock workers in the Port of Wellington,
by the end of July
the Marine troops were in position
on the island Fiji
awaiting a final rehearsal for the task ahead.
General Vandegrift by now secured a postponement to the day of attack
from August 1st to August seventh.
But he knew that his preparation time have been far from ideal.
And in Fiji,
the inexperience of the American Marines revealed itself.
The Guadalcanal expedition
would be an amphibious operation
quite unprecedented in size.
And the Fiji exercise
revealed the logistical difficulties involved.
There was little evidence of coordination
between the amphibious landing groups
and the accompanying naval and air support.
Equipment proved unreliable.
And the whole exercise was judged to be a little less than a farce.
But there could be no delay in the timetable.
August the 7th would be the date
when the American plan would be put into action.
The intentions of the American leadership for the Guadalcanal offensive
were relatively straightforward.
An armada of transport ships
would sail from Fiji to the Solomon Islands
and into the channel to the north of Guadalcanal.
There, the main amphibious force
would take to their landing crafts and go ashore
while supporting units
secure the smaller islands of Tulagi,
Gavutu,
and Tanambogo.
The transport vessels would not be alone.
Instead,
they were just part of a much larger invasion force
To the north and northeast,
lay a substantial protective naval presence
under the command of Admiral Crutchley of the Royal Australian Navy.
5 cruises and 9 destroyers
Generous air support was also provided.
Some 100 miles to the south,
An American carrier fleet formed into position.
The value of the aircraft carrier
had already been proved dramatically at the Coral Sea and Midway.
And so the Carriers Saratoga,
Wasp,
and Enterprise were deployed
to provide fighter support for the Guadalcanal offensive.
Alongside the carriers,
one battleship,
6 cruises and some 16 destroyers,
These substantial resources
were all deployed in support of Vandegrift's First Marine Division,
a landing force reinforced
with crack units of paratroops and Marine raiders.
But nothing could hide the fact
that the 1st Marine Division had only been formed recently
and the majority of its men
lacked any experience of battle.
The American Marines could not be sure
of the size of the force that waited them on Guadalcanal.
But they could guess the strength of the Japanese fighting spirit.
The best intelligence available suggested
that the force of 7,000 troops were in position on the island
and these were likely to include soldiers
with recent experience of fighting in difficult jungle conditions.
By contrast,
there were few men in the American Marines
who would ever come across
an environment like that of Guadalcanal.
The Americans also knew that Japanese strength
did not derived only from its positions
at Guadalcanal itself.
Somewhere to the northwest,
in the vicinity of New Britain,
lurked the might of Japanese naval power,
the 4th Inner South Sea Fleet.
These were the concerns that face the American commanders
on the eve of battle in early August 1942.
American Commanders
In overall command of the Watchtower Operation
was Vice Admiral Robert Lee Gormley.
The 57-year-old who had served as a liaison officer in London
Gormley arrived in New Zealand in March 1942
to take up command of the South Pacific area
and South Pacific Force.
Not long afterwards,
he received the order to proceed
with the Guadalcanal attack.
But Gormley would not be in the South Pacific
when the fighting finally ended.
His eventual removal
may have been the result
of one of his decisions in the early days of the offensive.
But in August 1942,
Admiral Gormley was the man in charge.
Amongst his subordinates,
Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher,
known to his men as Blackjack,
a veteran of the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.
Fletcher was seen as an ideal choice
to command the naval task force
on which the success of the Guadalcanal offensive would depend.
But Fletcher's reputation
would also be affected by the decision of his superior
Admiral Gormley.
Once again, there was no such concern
when operations began.
Rear Admiral Fletcher's huge task force
was divided into two groups:
with the key amphibious force under the command of
Rear Admiral Richmond Jake Turner.
Like Gormley and Fletcher,
Turner was in his late fifties.
Although he had never seen active combat service
instead he was regarded as an authority in the business
of planning an amphibious attack.
At Guadalcanal,
he would get the chance to put his theories into practice.
Rear Admiral Turner's direct subordinates included
Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift.
And it was this marine commander
who would become most associated
with the eventual outcome of Guadalcanal.
A veteran of the so-called Banana Wars in the Caribbean
Vandegrift knew all about jungle fighting.
Though he was astonished when he learned
how little time his 1st Marine Division would have to prepare for the offensive,
this gifted soldier put aside his concerns
as he took on the business of leadership on the ground.
Vandegrift's marine division
was reinforced with paratroops.
It was also supported by the 1st Marine Raider Unit
under the command of Colonel Merit Edson.
Like his commander,
Edson had combat experience
and it's for this reason that his raiders
were given one of the most difficult tasks on the opening day of battle.
Known to his men as Red Mike,
Edson was a master of special tactics
and he would become one of the most celebrated soldiers of the Pacific War,
with Guadalcanal
the first location to witness his abilities as a leader of men.
Japanese Commanders
The Americans enjoyed no monopoly
of excellent leadership at Guadalcanal.
In charge of Japanese naval operations in the South Pacific
was Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa(三川軍一).
Prior to the American attack,
Mikawa had expressed well-documented concerns
about the fractured nature of the Japanese Pacific command.
But when fighting began,
Mikawa would put his opinions to one side
as he deployed his naval forces in brilliant style.
Complimenting Mikawa's naval forces,
the Japanese regional ground presence
consisted of the 17th Army of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake(百武晴吉)
General Hyakutake had a formidable force at his disposal
The 50,000 men that made up 17th Army
included the 35th infantry Brigade of Major General Kawaguchi(川口清健),
a commander who revealed his keenness for the fight
as soon as he was engaged on Guadalcanal.
A strong desire to get to grips with the enemy
was also revealed by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki(一木清直)
a veteran of the war in China
and a passionate believer
in the prowess of the individual Japanese soldier.
As commander of the 2nd Battalion,
28th Infantry Regiment,
Colonel Ichiki
had the chance to put his beliefs to the test
in the first major land action on Guadalcanal itself.
It would be an engagement where Colonel Ichiki
revealed just how much motivation a commander can instill in his men
It would also be an action
that would give rise to one of the most enduring myths
about the Guadalcanal offensive.
But there can be no doubt that Colonel Ichiki experienced the first-hand
the power of the weapons available to his enemy.
American Weapons
The American triumph for the Battle of Midway
proved once and for all
the importance of powerful carrier aircraft.
And of the dive bomb was available to the American commanders
that was none better than the Douglas SBD,
the Dauntless.
All through the Pacific War,
this two-seater warplane
proved a menace to Japanese ships.
With one 1,600 pound fuselage mounted bomb
and two 325 pound devices on the wings,
this elegant aircraft was quick to prove its value
against ground positions during the fighting at Guadalcanal.
Colonel Ichiki's men
would become especially aware of the Dauntless's power.
American commanders were also able to deploy
a great carrier borne fighter in the Guadalcanal theater.
The F4F, the Wildcat,
a single seat fighter
whose distinctive foremost powered by a 1,200 horsepower engine
generating a top speed of 318 miles per hour.
By August 1942,
the Wildcats had also seen action at Midway
and at the Coral Sea.
___ perhaps not as great a warplane as the Dauntless,
the introduction of the Wildcats proved invaluable
for the American efforts of Guadalcanal.
The Bell P-400
was essentially an export version of the P-39 Air Cobra.
And as such,
lacked amongst other components,
the ability to fit oxygen bottles
giving it a maximum seating of 12,000 feet.
Unusable as an interceptor,
its formidable armament of one nose mounted 37 mm canon
2 x .50 caliber
and 4 x .30 caliber machine guns
together with two 500-pound bombs
ideally suited the P-400 to the ground attack role.
But it's unusual tricycle under carriage
and the engine placed behind the pilot
the propeller drive shaft running between his legs,
the P-400 was not popular with the man who flew it.
Despite this valuable support from the air,
Vandegrift and his colleagues knew
that they would also need substantial amounts of ground resources
for the kind of jungle warfare that lay ahead.
The marine troops themselves were a key resource.
To get them from the transport ships to the shore,
the American forces relied on the landing craft
like the LCIL,
the Landing Craft Infantry Large,
In operation,
this one 164 ft vessel
had the ability to deliver 210 troops to the beach
via the ramp gangways (?)affixed to the bow.
The LCIL
could also be
used to deliver 75 tons of material.
At Guadalcanal,
American hardware on the ground
included light mobile tanks
well-suited to jungle warfare.
The most famous of these was the M3.
First produced in 1941,
its 6 guns were dominated by a
main weapon of 37 mm caliber
with armor up to 43 mm thick
The M-3 provided strong protection
for its 4 men crew.
Unfortunately,
a problem with the disembarkation
at the Guadalcanal beachhead
meant that General Vandegrift could not
call on as many of these fine vehicles
as he had originally hoped.
But the contribution of the M-3
was still crucial
in some of the fiercest engagements of the offensive.
The conflict on Guadalcanal
saw the use for the first time in a combat situation
of the American build
landing vehicle tracked
or the Alligator,
developed from the rescue craft
used in the swamp areas of the southern U.S.A. in the mid-1930.
Powered by 2 Cadillac V-8 engines,
propulsion through the water came from paddles attached to the tracks
which would also have mobility on soft sandy beaches.
Over 18,000 vehicles were built,
including various models with differing offensive armaments
ranging from the fitting of a tank turret to the upper surface
through the additional 75 mm howitzers
But the main benefit of the Alligator
was its ability to drive straight out of the water
and into cover before unloading its cargo,
making it far less a target
than ships, men, and supplies lined up on an exposed beach.
Another American weapon that proved itself
not only at Guadalcanal
but also in subsequent jungle battles
was the 75 mm pack howitzer,
the M-1A1.
Light and maneuverable,
the pack howitzer was a long established weapon
in the American arsenal.
Ideal for dropping by parachute,
the M-1A1
possessed a maximum range of some 9,700 yards
and the Japanese would feel
the force of its 13 pound shells
in the fighting of 1942.
A light and versatile weapon,
the 37 mm gun
when used in the antitank role
fired a solid shot round
that could penetrate 25 mm armor
at 1,000 yards,
and an armor piercing round
that could penetrate 58 mm.
Both types of rounds
proved more than adequate in defeating the lightly armored tanks
used by the Japanese on Guadalcanal.
If one was used in the anti personnel role,
the 37 mm gun
proved its worth with devastating effect.
Using canister fire,
the gun was effectively turned into a 37 mm shotgun.
While posing little threat against tanks,
it could decimate the frontal infantry attacks favored by the Japanese.
Weighing at 912 pounds,
the gun was very light
and could easily be dismantled and transported through the jungle.
Over 18,000 were produced,
and the gun was widely used in the Pacific theater.
The standard weapon of the infantrymen of the 2nd World War
was the rifle.
Most of the world's armies at this time
used the hand operated bolt action weapon
that had been in use since before the 1st World War.
The only exception to this rule
was the U.S. military.
Entering service in 1936,
an standard issue by 1940,
the M-1 Grand Rifle
was a gas operated semiautomatic rifle
fed by an 8 round magazine.
Slightly heavier than the traditional rifle,
the M-1 Grand
was a particularly reliable weapon,
a significant advantage
when fighting in the damp jungle conditions of Guadalcanal.
But for all the quality of the American hardware
the circumstances of the Guadalcanal assault
meant not enough material
was actually landed on the island.
The fact that American ground commanders
were not able to call on their full complement of hardware
continue to be discussed today.
What is certain is that when the American transport ships withdrew,
half their material cargo was still on board.
And the marines left behind
knew that that enemy also possessed many fine weapons of war.
Japanese Weapons
Success in jungle warfare could often be decided
by one of the most ancient of all aspects of combat
--- the skill and resources of the individual soldier.
And for the Japanese infantryman,
much of his strengths derived from the quality of his rifle,
typically, the type 99.
Originally introduced as the type 38
in the early years of the 20th century,
the 1930's saw this 9 pound weapon
modified from its original 6.5 mm caliber
to accommodate a new 7.7 mm cartridge.
Extensively used in the fighting in China,
the Type 99
was an ideal gun for the jungle sniper.
And Japanese troops were also keen to use the weapon with its bayonet attached
as the American marines found out
in one of the bloodiest engagements of the Guadalcanal fighting.
The Japanese infantrymen
could also draw confidence from the weapons used to support him.
The Type 92 battalion gun
may have been one of the strangest looking machines of the Second World War,
but it was also one of the most widely used.
It's relatively short range
meant that it was often used for direct fire duties
in close contact with the enemy,
a task greatly assisted by its relative lightness in action.
This enabled the Japanese gunners to attack, move on,
and then attack again
from an entirely new direction of fire.
A tactic that may be disturbing impact
upon the troops who found themselves in a tight 92 sights.
The Japanese, like the Americans,
also recognized the value of carrier launched war planes.
And in 1942,
they possessed seaborne carrier aircraft at the peak of its powers.
The legendary
Mitsubishi A6M
the Zero fighter.
Or as American troops christened it, the Zeke.
A single seat aircraft,
the zero was introduced in 1939.
And its capabilities came to the attention of the Allies
when it was used during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Its range was remarkable,
its speed equally impressive,
and its pilots enjoyed excellent maneuverability.
The zero's armament was also a force to be reckoned with.
2 machine guns in the nose
with two 20 mm cannons mounted in the wings.
Developed to replace the G-M3,
which had been in production since 1936,
the Mitsubishi G-4M
entered service in the spring of 1941,
The G-4M,
or Betty bomber as it was known by the Americans,
was a Japanese navy's frontline land-based bomber.
The Betty was armed with one canon and 4 machine guns,
and was also capable of carrying either a full bomb load
or a single torpedo,
a weapon ideally suited to the Pacific conflict.
In the early stages of the war in the Pacific,
the Betty proved to be a worthy opponent
against the limited performance of the U.S. fighters,
But as better Allied aircraft began to enter the Pacific theater,
the situation began to change.
Like the Mitsubishi Zero,
the Betty was designed without self sealing tanks
to increase performance and range,
and subsequently,
became notorious with the airmen flew it as a fire hazard.
Derived from the Type 89 medium tank
which first came into service in 1929
and saw extensive service in the war with China,
the Chi-Ha Type 97
was hopelessly outclassed
when engaging even the smallest American tanks.
The earlier Type 89's main gun
could not be loaded with armor-piercing rounds
which relegated it to an infantry support vehicle.
The Type 97's better armament
for the 47 mm gun and 2 machine guns
could do nothing to improve its combat effectiveness.
With armor plating no thicker than 13 mms
and half that of its American counterpart,
the Sherman,
the Type 97
was used widely by the Japanese army throughout the entire Pacific conflict.
The 70 mm infantry howitzer,
or mounting gun Type 92,
was found to be completely inadequate against American armor
and was relegated
to nothing more than an infantry support weapon.
The one major advantage of this artillery piece
during the conflict was that it was capable of being dismantled
and carried by its crew of 5
albeit with some difficulty
through the dense jungle and hilly terrain at(?) Guadalcanal.
A light gun,
weighing 468 pounds,
roughly half the weight of the comparable American gun
it fired an 8.3 pound high explosive round
up to a range of 3,000 yards.
While the Japanese military failed to recognize
the submachine gun as a viable infantry weapon,
it regularly employed the light machine-gun in an infantry support role.
The Nambu 7.7 mm Type 99 light machine gun
was actually based on the British Brandon gun
and used extensively in the Guadalcanal campaign.
The Nambu was an extremely accurate weapon
with a high rate of fire
and could even be fitted both with a bayonet
and a telescopic sight.
To the Japanese officer,
the samurai sword was a revered symbol of the spirit of ancient Japan
believed to be the embodiment of the summarized code
the expression of his iron discipline
and unswerving devotion to duty
The swords issued to Japanese offices were generally lower quality
mass made examples.
But as fighting weapons and as a symbol of military authority,
a sword was considered essential by Japanese officers.
Even by WWII
with the development of far more effective and destructive weapons,
the sword
carried into battle by a Japanese officer
held a vital link with the ancients Samurai code of honor, Bushidō(武士道).
As the American invasion force
moved into position in the Solomon Islands on the 7th of August 1942,
the story of the Pacific War still had a long way to run.
But the next chapter was about to begin at Guadalcanal.
The Landings
For the pleasant surprise of the American troops,
the landing on Guadalcanal was made without the attentions of the enemy.
This was fortunate
since the disembarkation proved to be as uncoordinated
as the rehearsal suggested it might be.
Before long,
the so-called Red Beach
was strewed with supplies,
men,
and material.
And no one seemed to know
who was responsible for what.
But at least the Japanese were no where to be seen.
And by the end of the day,
the marines were already moving towards the Japanese airfield.
But elsewhere,
the forces of the Empire were present in numbers.
At Tulagi,
the marine raiders of Colonel Edson encountered fierce Japanese resistance,
especially during the night that followed the landing.
In the darkness of the jungle,
no fewer than 4 Japanese assaults were beaten back
(?)and it took to the end of the second day
before Colonel Edson could report the final reduction of Japanese troops.
Fierce battles were also joined
the connected islets Gavutu and Tanambogo.
with the latter only (?)falling after the intervention of naval support
---the big guns of the Destroyer Buchanan.
The Americans that always expected
the task of capturing the small islands to be difficult.
But on Guadalcanal itself,
success proved to be relatively straightforward, at least at first.
By the afternoon of the second day of operations,
American marines have moved west from Red Beach
to secure a position of the nearly completed Japanese airfield,
the site quickly given the name
Henderson field, in honor of the hero of the battle of Midway.
The Japanese forces had simply fled to the hills.
As dusk fell on the 8th of August 1942,
the first objective of the operation had been achieved.
And no losses on the northern islands had been happy.
General Vandegrift could reflect on the job well done.
But any overconfidence would prove to be premature.
War in the Jungle
As soon as the Americans made their move,
Admiral Mikawa of the Japanese 4th in the South Sea Fleet
ordered the battle group to set sail for Guadalcanal
through the Solomon Islands channel that became known as The Slot.
But before they could arrive,
Mikawa also dispatched the force of bombers
with fighter escort
against the American forces.
Alerted,
Admiral Fletcher dispatched 60 Wildcat fighters
to greet them in the skies over Guadalcanal.
In a fierce dogfight,
16 Japanese aircraft were lost
against a total of eleven American airplanes.
Admiral Turner decided to move his own fleet into defensive positions
north and south of Savo island
with the Destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot
in the advance positions.
It was these outposts
that were first cited by the Japanese battle groups
at 0100 hours on the morning of the 9th of August
Minutes later,
Admiral Mikawa with cruiser fleet
sailed past entirely unnoticed.
Now he ordered his small cruiser-borne float plains into the air.
At 0145 hours,
the pilots began to drop flares
that revealed the full presence of the Allied ships.
Now Mikawa gave the order for the torpedoes to be launched
and the big guns to be fired.
The battle of Savo Island had begun.
The Japanese had taken their enemy by surprise
and (?)they made their advantage pay.
The Allied cruisers
Vincennes, Quincy, Canberra, and Astoria
were all lost.
Another was seriously damaged
as the Japanese battle group swept around Savo Island
and back out through the slot to the northwest.
The Imperial Navy had triumphed in the first of 4 major battles
it would take place in the seas around Guadalcanal.
For the marine commander Vandegrift,
this loss of supporting fire power was a disaster
and the Battle of Savo Island
was a comprehensive victory for the Japanese.
But the Americans to console themselves
with the facts that Mikawa fleet had not taken out the transport ships.
But more bad news had already reached the marines.
In the hours before the Japanese attack,
General Vandegrift was informed of a decision made by Admiral Fletcher
he had decided to withdraw his forces of carriers in the south.
Having agreed with his superior Admiral Gormley,
the fuel of the aircraft resources were insufficient
to maintain a secure presence in the region.
As a consequence of this controversial decision,
Admiral Turner
announced that he would also have to withdraw his amphibious task force.
By the end of the 9th of August, just 2 days into the operation,
Admiral Turner's ships had left Guadalcanal
taking half of the marine supplies and material with him.
There had been no time to unload anymore.
On Guadalcanal,
and on the smaller island to the north,
the First Marine Division
were left to defend for themselves.
It was potentially a disastrous turn of events.
There was nothing else for Vandegrift to do
but secure his defensive perimeters as(?) best as he could.
And set his men
to the task of completing the Henderson field airstrip.
if it could be brought into operation quickly,
it would be a precious asset to the now isolated marines.
The work was hampered by the lack of materials
and also by the constant presence of Japanese war planes in the skies above.
Before long,
the enemy would be even closer ___.
In the hot, humid jungle conditions,
General Vandegrift's inexperienced man
were quickly learning
the often desperate facts of war.
The Japanese 17th Army of Lieutenant General Hyakutake
was now ordered to retake Guadalcanal.
And he selected the 35th infantry brigade
of Major General Kawaguchi to carry out the task.
It was now that the Rear Admiral Tanaka
came up with the imaginative idea
by moving troops from New Britain to Guadalcanal
using fast night convoys of cruisers and destroyers,
the so called ___ which became known as the Tokyo Express.
Such was the effectiveness of the procedure
(?)in delivering Japanese forces to Guadalcanal.
On the 18th of August,
with Henderson Field still not operational,
the first of these night convoys succeeded in landing 2 echelons of troops.
To the west, a special landing force went ashore at Kokumbona.
To the east at Taivu Point,
the 2nd Battalion of the 28th infantry Regiment
under the command of Colonel Ichiki.
It was a bold move,
perhaps a little too bold.
General Hyakutake
decided not to wait for his scattered 35th Infantry Brigade to form up.
instead, he acted at once.
And Ichiki's men quickly advanced from their beachhead.
By the evening of the 20th of August,
they had reached the edge of the American position
to the east of Alligator Creek.
That night,
Colonel Ichiki launched his attack.
It was a fearsome engagement.
That became known as the Battle of the Tenaru
The Japanese hold themselves __ the Americans in the bayonet charge.
Their courage was phenomenal
as they ran into the line of American artillery, machine gun and infantry fire.
When they were forced to withdraw,
the inspirational Ichiki
ordered survivors to regroup
and once again they charged the American positions.
But the bravery of Ichiki's men would not be enough.
By the following afternoon,
the Japanese assault failed.
And the last of the Ichiki's men
found themselves surrounded by an American force
now reinforced by light armor,
At some point Colonel Ichiki himself died in the fighting
although a popular myth suggests that he committed harakiri
when he realized that the battle was lost.
The American victory of the Tenaru was (?)total,
and the battlefield was a scene of slaughter.
800 of Ichiki's 900 men were dead.
Significantly, the final elimination of the Japanese troops
was assisted by American power in the air.
The Henderson Field was now operational.
And on August the 20th,
19 Wildcat fighters
and 12 Dauntless dive bombers landed on Guadalcanal.
The American occupation was now a less tentative enterprise.
But the battle for the island was still far from won.
In late August and early September,
the ships of the Tokyo Express
brought substantial numbers of troops to the east and west Vandegrift's perimeter.
In early September,
the American commander brought his Raiders and paratroop
down to Guadalcanal itself.
And on September the 7th,
dispatched them east to attack Tasinbako,
a village believed to be a center of Japanese strength.
Vandegrift's intelligence was accurate.
Japanese troops were based in Tasinbako.
(?)And a brief engagement resulted
before the raiders captured the village.
But the Japanese contingent was small
and Colonel Edson soon found out why.
A far larger force had been present in Tasinbako,
but they had now moved on.
This was the 35th Brigade of General Kawaguchi
and it set off south into the jungle
with the likely intention of moving west
before attacking Henderson Fields to the north.
Hurriedly General Vandegrift organized his men
into position for the suspected Japanese attack.
His assumption was that his Japanese counterpart
would strike against the ridge
that lay the south of the air strip. if they did
they would find the American raiders and paratroops waiting for them.
Vandegrift's assumption was correct.
On the evening of the 12th of September,
Japanese warship unleashed the barrage of shell fire,
not against the airfield
but against the ridge that would provide the (?)grim name for the battle to come,
--- Bloody Ridge.
It would be no exaggeration.
When the Japanese shelling ceased,
Kawaguchi's men made an initial assault
that push the American defenders back.
But the real attack came the following evening,
September the 13th.
That night
(?)saw the island of Guadalcanal being enveloped in the fog of war.
Kawaguchi's brigade now launched themselves
for a heroic drive against the American positions.
They were met by a line of mortar and artillery fire.
A heavy Japanese fire power was also deployed
from a group of 7 destroyers in a coastal water ___ ___.
The American Wildcat pilots
were also able to bring the power of their guns to there.
But still the Japanese infantry surged forward.
It was a night of desperate fighting.
No fewer than 12 occasions,
the Japanese troops charged the American line.
On occasions,
the defense appeared on the point of breaking.
But the raiders and paratroops
somehow held firm throughout the night.
By the morning of the 14th of September,
the battle was won
and what was left of Kawaguchi's forces
was retreating east.
The ridge was covered with bodies
and it was still in American hands.
Henderson Field remained secure.
General Vandegrift arrived on Guadalcanal on August the 7th
with a largely inexperienced body of men.
Now, 6 weeks later,
they had become a battle-hardened force to be reckoned with.
But it was no time for complacency.
The marines still faced many difficulties on Guadalcanal.
Tropical diseases such as dysentery were rife amongst the American troops.
A typical roll call
revealed one in 5 men on the sick list.
There was also the continued presence of the enemy.
Vandegrift's men were allowed no respite
from Japanese bombardment from the air and sea.
By mid-October,
the Japanese ground presence on Guadalcanal had also been reinforced.
The commander of the 17th Army
had moved his headquarters to the island
and General Hyakutake
could call on the force of 20,000 men
for a new assault against an American presence,
itself now 23,000 strong.
This would be the 3rd major Japanese attack.
It would also be the last.
In broad terms,
General Hyakutake's plan was for a simultaneous attack from 2 sides.
From the west, Major General Sumiyoshi would lead an assault
with armor support against the American perimeter,
at his disposal some 5,600 men.
Meanwhile to the south,
Major General Kawaguchi would attack with 7,000 men
and a strong artillery element.
On the evening of the 22nd of October,
the Battle of Henderson Field began.
To the west,
an artillery barrage announced Japanese intentions.
When the guns fell silent,
Sumiyoshi's battalions threw themselves
against the American defensive line with the support of their tanks
Now it was the turn of the American big guns to intervene.
Artillery pieces
and dedicated anti-tank weapons
rained down their shells on the Japanese men and armor.
Infantry fire was also ferocious.
Despite the trademark hunger for the fight displayed by the Japanese soldiers,
the western assault was complete repulsed in a matter of hours.
The American positions should also have been under simultaneous attack from the south,
but here it was silence.
General Maruyama had found
the march through the Guadalcanal jungle tough going.
Too tough,
at the stated(?) moment when the assault began,
his men were still hacking their way through the thick vegetation.
Crucially,
Maruyama had to abandon his mortars and artillery pieces on the way.
He was also out of communication with his colleagues to the west.
He was unable to tell Sumiyoshi to delay.
It was October the 24th,
(?)before the now weakened southern sector could make its attack,
and the result was predictable,
more fierce fighting and victory for the American marines
leaving behind another blood-soaked battlefield.
American satisfaction was now understandable.
The marines s__(?) off 3 major Japanese attempts
to eject them from Guadalcanal.
But celebration was tempered
by the loss of the American Carrier Hornet.
during a naval engagement to the north of Guadalcanal.
This was the Battle of Santa Cruz,
the last of the 4 great sea battles that took place
while the marines struggle to maintain their hold on land.
In general,
Japanese sea power around Guadalcanal
proved far more effective than the operations on the island itself.
Both the Japanese
and the American navies lost about 25 warships
in the course of their confrontations in the region.
But it is as a marine operation
that Guadalcanal is best remembered today.
When Vandegrift's exhausted men were finally withdrawn in early December,
they had endured 4 months
in isolated difficult terrain
with no respite from the attentions of the enemy.
1,600 marines had died.
4,700 had been wounded.
But they had won and the Japanese knew it.
Their casualty list was 4 times of(?) this size.
On December 31st,
the Imperial command made the decision
to withdraw the remaining Japanese forces from Guadalcanal.
By February the 8th, they had gone.
and the American 14th Corps were left in complete control of the island.
In the months that(?) followed
the Henderson Field air strip was built up into a major military facility.
The supply lines of Australia and New Zealand were secure
and Japanese advance had been turned back for the first time.
Now the Americans could consider the future with greater confidence
and Guadalcanal would be the first staging post
on the long road that lay ahead.
This previously unknown patch of jungle
is now deservedly famous.
It was the first of the many islands on which Americans were forced to halt
on their way to final victory.
In February 1943,
the armed forces of the United States
stood as a masters of the Pacific island of Guadalcanal.
The small jungle outpost had been virtually unknown 6 months before.
But it was now a name familiar to the American public.
The successful invasion of Guadalcanal
by the marines of General Alexander Vandegrift
had captured the national imagination,
and the departure of the Japanese
marked a turning point in the story of the 2nd World War.
The seemingly relentless Japanese expansion was over
and it was now the task of America and her Allies
to roll back the frontiers of the Empire.
But it would be a long and costly enterprise.
In February 1943,
Japan remained in control of a vast area of the Pacific ocean
and her forces were prepared to die to defend it.
The Allies were already familiar with this powerful warrior spirit.
At Guadalcanal, the Japanese defenders revealed
their distaste for any idea of surrender.
Death in battle was the only fitting end for a defeated Imperial soldier.
in the 2-and-a-half years that followed,
the same attitude showed itself across the western Pacific
as the United States led her Allies on an amazing journey
from island to island towards the land of the rising sun itself.
This was a period that saw some of the bloodiest fighting of the entire war,
at sea,
in the air,
and especially on land.
The names of battlefields like Tarawa,
Iwo Jima,
and Okinawa,
are now synonymous with close quarter fighting of the bitterest kind.
The Japanese desire to fight on to the end
resulted in casualty lists of biblical proportions,
and few were taken prisoner.
The missions of Japanese Kamikaze pilots
also come to typify
the disregard for life amongst imperial fighting men
even when the Allies had fought their way to the edge of Japan itself.
It took the most deadly weapon ever created
finally to bring the conflict to an end.
The journey from Guadalcanal to Nagasaki
remains one of the most revealing chapters in the history of warfare.
New Plans in the Pacific
The American triumph for Guadalcanal
force the Japanese imperial command to consider a new strategy
for the prosecution of the Pacific War.
6 weeks after the Japanese withdrawal,
the new approach was decided.
In essence, it was a defensive strategy
pertaining to secure control of key strongholds across a vast frontline
while allowing for the possibility of a counterattack
if the opportunity existed.
March 1943,
also saw the agreement of the Allies strategy for the conflict to come.
For the Washington Pacific Conference,
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided to pursue a 2 pronged attack
through the many islands of the western Pacific.
The Southwest Pacific Command was given responsibility
for an advance beginning at Guadalcanal.
Its task:
to sweep through the Solomon Islands and New Guinea
towards the islands of the Philippines.
In overall command
the charismatic Douglas MacArthur,
the general who had famously sworn to return to the Philippines
after the Japanese conquest in March 1942.
To the north,
the Central Pacific Area Command of Admiral Chester Nimitz
was allocated the second thrust of the American offensive.
This would involve a vast naval force
advancing from island to island
across thousands of kilometers of ocean
from the Gilbert Islands
through the Marshals and Carolines to the Marianas.
Eventually,
the 2 prongs of the offensive
would converge for a final
unified assault on the island of Formosa
before moving against the islands of Japan itself.
It was an audacious plan
but the vast amount of naval material required for Nimitz's objectives
was still not available in early 1943.
So it was the forces of Douglas MacArthur
that began the task of pushing back the frontiers of the Japanese Empire.
it will be an achievement of epic proportions.
in the spring of 1943,
the American Southwest Pacific Command
considered its options for the task that now faced them.
It was already obvious that the main Japanese stronghold in the region
was the fortress of Rabaul on the island of New Britain.
This was the headquarters of the Japanese 8th Area Army,
a force of 100,000 fighting men.
If Rabaul could be destroyed,
then further progress towards the Philippines
would become a far easier enterprise.
By early May 1943,
General MacArthur and his colleagues had determined their plan.
MacArthur himself would lead an advance along the northeast coast of New Guinea
driving the Japanese back before crossing over to New Britain.
At the same time,
his deputy Admiral William 'bull' Halsey,
would lead an invasion force from Guadalcanal through the Solomon Islands
so that Rabaul could be attacked from 2 sides.
The operation was given the code name
Cartwheel.
And on the 30th of June 1943,
the fight back in the Pacific began.
That day
the 43rd American infantry Division
took to their landing craft for an assault on the Solomon Island at(?) Rendova.
The island was lightly defended.
And 2 days later,
the American troops were able to land on the island of New Georgia.
Their objective was now the Japanese airfield at Munda.
it was just 10 km away,
but it would take a month for a bitter fighting
before American troops secured the position.
A massive artillery barrage was required
but not even the power of the 155 mm howitzer shells
could force the Japanese to abandon Munda.
It took the intervention
of American air power and reinforcements on the ground
before the airfield was finally taken.
This was an auspicious beginning
to the eastern thrust of operation Cartwheel.
Admiral Halsey knew
that there were far more substantial Japanese positions located at
Kolombangara, and especially Bougainville.
This was the headquarters of the 17th Army
of General Harukichi Hyakutake,
a veteran of the Guadalcanal fighting.
But the American commander proved equal to the challenge.
Much to the surprise of Hyakutake,
Halsey ordered that Kolombangara should be bypassed.
Instead,
he dispatched American and New Zealand troops
to the more lightly defended island of Vella Lavella.
2 month later, in early November,
Halsey also achieved tactical surprise
by launching his attack on Bougainville from the west.
General Hyakutake had not anticipated
the landing in the swamp region.
But by the time he scrambled his forces in response,
the American marines were establishing a bridge head on the island.
With this achieved,
the Japanese commander was never able to regain the initiative
and Bougainville eventually fell on November the 26th.
The eastern objectives of Operation Cartwheel
by now had been fully achieved.
To the west,
General MacArthur had also enjoyed considerable success.
On the vast jungle island of New Guinea,
Allied troops had been a grips with the enemy
well before the attack in the Solomon Islands
Early in 1943,
an Australian garrison at Wau
had been engaged in a bitter fight
to hold the position in the face of a keen Japanese assault.
Only a last minute airborne reinforcement of troops
had saved the Australians from defeat.
And the Japanese offensive
was finally abandoned at the end of February.
It had been a bloody engagement.
200 Australians lost their lives in bitter close quarter jungle fighting.
But 1,200 Japanese also died at Wau.
And by spring 1943,
the Australian troops of General S__'s 3rd Division
were ready to play that part in support of Operation Cartwheel.
On April the 26th,
the Australian men left their base at Wau and set off towards the coast.
Their destination was a position near to the Japanese base at Salamaua.
It was a journey of just 55-km to the east
but it would take 2 months to cover the ground.
The jungle was virtually impenetrable
and the Australians also had to contend with
enemy outposts deep in the rain forest.
It was the 29th of June (1943),
before the exhausted units eventually arrived up the coast.
But they had achieved their objective.
Australian troops now joined together
with the landing party of American infantry
to attack Japanese positions at Salamaua and Lae.
Despite a vigorous defense,
by the 11th of September the Japanese were retreating into the mountains
in the face of the combined Allied attack.
By the 22nd of September,
Australian forces had arrived at the Japanese base at Fischhafen,
but the site was deserted.
The Japanese now chose to concentrate their resources in the regions of Sattelburg.
And it took another bloody engagement
before this stronghold fell on the 25th of November 1943.
But victory at Sattelburg
meant that the western thrust of Operation Cartwheel
had also completed its objective.
The next day, some 800-km to the east
American marines completed the capture of Bougainville
and the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul
was now under threat from two sides as planned.
But MacArthur and his colleagues
had already realized
that an assault on the Japanese 8th Army was unnecessary.
Simply isolating it would be enough.
it was a far less costly approach.
After establishing a defensive position on southern New Britain,
early in 1944
American and New Zealand troops
moved to capture the small islands to the north
the Rabaul Base was effectively surrounded,
and 100,000 troops found themselves cut off from the war.
With this achieved,
MacArthur's American forces moved against the northern coast of New Guinea
On the 22nd of April 1944,
an amphibious landing of some 80,000 men
arrived at the Japanese stronghold of Hollandia,
only to find it abandoned.
The Japanese presence on the island was now in retreat.
And with the Rabaul Base cut off,
there was little their commanders could do to halt the Allied progress
despite the best efforts of their men on the ground.
By the 15th of September,
a delighted Douglas MacArthur
was able to report his arrival on the island of Morotai.
The Philippines were not within striking distance.
MacArthur's promise that he would return to the islands
was now on the point of being realized.
And the Pacific War as a whole was going to plan.
In late 1943,
far away in the Gilbert Islands,
the men of Admiral Nimitz began their journey across the Central Pacific.
But this first step
gave Nimitz and his colleagues a hint of what lay ahead on the path to a victory
Progress at a Price
On the 20th of November 1943,
American Marines launched an amphibious assault on the island of.
Within days,
the American public knew that victory in the Pacific would come at a price.
Tarawa was a tiny objective,
an island just 3-km in length
but it took the loss of 1,000 American troops to capture it.
Many of these men never reached the shore.
Survivors recalled one Japanese machine gunner
who trained his weapon on the opening bow doors of the American landing craft.
For those troops
caught in his line of fire
there was little chance of survival.
Not for the last time,
the warm shoal waters of the Pacific ocean
were filled with the bodies of dead.
Tarawa was a taste of things to come.
When the Japanese guns eventually fell silent,
the island there was filled with the smell of death.
Only 17 of the 4,200 Japanese defenders were taken alive.
Prisoners of war would be a rare phenomenon during the Pacific conflict.
For the vast majority of Japanese fighting men,
surrender to the enemy was an option filled with shame.
It was quite literally
a fate worse than death
and it is this that provides the main explanation
for the tiny numbers of war prisoners taken in the Pacific.
But there was also another reason.
For the Allies, taking Japanese prisoners
could be a risky business.
At Guadalcanal,
American troops had discovered the fanaticism of their enemy.
Many commanders reported occasions
when a wounded Japanese came forward in an apparent surrender
When an American marine went to attend to his defeated adversary,
the Japanese pull the pin on a suicide grenade
that also killed his captor.
From Guadalcanal onwards,
American forces remained wary of taking any prisoners alive.
The concern that goes some way towards explaining the appalling death roll
that characterized the Pacific War.
But the slaughter at Tarawa
was still a shock to the American public in 1943.
And Admiral Nimitz was determined
to learn any lessons that he could from the carnage.
For his next objective, the Marshall Islands at Kwajalein,
the American commander did everything in his power
to minimize the Japanese threat
before his ground troops attacked.
The 3-day bombardment from the ships and carrier planes
of American task force 58 was launched against Kwajalein
before American infantrymen went ashore on February 1st 1944.
But as Nimitz must've suspected
not even this could neuter the fighting spirit of the individual Japanese soldier.
On the 4th of February,
the American commander was informed that Kwajalein had finally been taken
173 man of his 7th infantry Division had lost their lives.
4,938 Japanese had shared their fate.
Even when the battle was all but lost,
the soldier of the Japanese Empire
refused to surrender
and it was left to American flame thrower units
to complete the grim conquest of Kwajalein.
A similar loss of life was also reported on the Marshall island at (?)Ewinetor Atoll.
Here the Japanese lost all but 64 of 2,700 men
by the time the island was taken on the 21st of February(1944).
Again, an initial bombardment
by American naval and air forces contributed to the death toll.
But as on Kwajalein,
(?)it was a much closer kind of combat
that finally secured the capture of the island.
it was now clear to Nimitz and his fellow commanders
but the deployment of ground troops had to be a measure of last resort.
If strategic objectives could be obtained
without face-to-face fighting, then that would be the favored option.
Douglas MacArthur recognized this
when he decided not to attack the stronghold of Rabaul.
in February 1944,
Admiral Nimitz came to
a similar decision concerning the Japanese naval base at Truk Lagoon
at the Carolina islands.
The physical capture of the island was not essential.
Instead,
units ordered a massive two-day aero-assault
beginning on the 17th of February 1944.
Nine waves of Hellcat fighters,
avenger torpedo bombers,
and Dauntless dive bombers
transformed the paradise island into a scene of carnage.
Of the 275 Japanese aircraft situated on Truk,
just one was left in operation by the end of the so-called
Operation Hailstorm.
With Truk now effectively isolated,
Nimitz was able to proceed to his next objectives in the Mariana Islands.
By now American industrial strength
was securing a strategic advantage in the war,
In June 1944,
Nimitz deputy Admiral Raymond Spruance,
stood in command of a task force
whose complement of aircraft carriers alone totaled 15.
On board, a total of 900 warplanes.
The Japanese leadership knew that
the balance of materials was turning against them.
They also knew that the loss of Marianas
would be a catastrophe for the Empire.
if the islands were lost,
Japan itself would be within range of the heavier American bombers.
When the first amphibious landing was made on Saipan on June the 15th,
the Imperial Navy was given the task of
making a desperate strike against a huge American fleet.
Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa(小澤治三郎)
now took command of a task force comprising 55 warships
including 9 carriers with 473 aircraft.
These included the Zero fighters
that the Americans first encountered at Pearl Harbor
and which remains one of the most famous war planes of the 20th century.
But by mid 1944,
the legendary Zero found itself out classed by the American Hellcat.
And when Vice Admiral Ozawa dispatched his first wave of aircraft
in the direction of the Marianas on June 19th 1944,
he must have suspected the likely outcome.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea
marked the end of the Japanese ability to wage carrier warfare in the Pacific.
The American task force
stationed to the northwest of Guam
not only possessed better aircraft,
they also possessed every detail of the enemy plan of attack
having succeeded in cracking the Japanese code system.
On the morning of June 19th 1944,
Ozawa launched 4 successive waves against the American fleet.
It became known as the great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
In just 3 hours of air combat,
a total of 243 Japanese war planes were lost.
Only 30 American craft shared their fate.
But the battle of the Philippine Sea was not yet over.
Despite his losses, Vice Admiral Ozawa was keen to re-engage the enemy.
after making a tactical withdrawal.
The American task force commander Marc Mitscher
was also willing to continue the fight.
When his reconnaissance planes located the Japanese fleet
on the afternoon of June the 20th,
Mitscher ordered his Hellcats, Avengers,
and Dauntless into the air
even though that objective was at the absolute limit of their range.
When the American aircraft arrived,
the result was another bitter of blow for the Japanese
with the Carrier Hiyō(飛鷹) sent to the bottom by a twin torpedo attack.
But the engagements of the 20th of June 1944
went not entirely one-sided,
100 American aircraft were also lost.
Some of them in combat,
a far greater number
forced to ditch at(?) sea after running out of fuel on the way back to the carriers.
Despite this,
the Battle of the Philippine sea was a triumph for the Americans.
And in Tokyo,
the loss of so many Japanese aircraft
forced the resignation of the Prime Minister Hideki Tojo.
The Allied assault on the Marianas
could now continue without interference from the air.
By July the 7th, the major objective of Saipan had been achieved
though here once again
the occupying ground forces revealed a fanatical desire to fight to the end.
On the last day of fighting, the Japanese commander
Yoshitsugu Saito
ordered a final infantry charge
into a line of American artillery and machine gun fire.
3,000 men died
including their commander
by the ritual suicide of harakiri.
With the fall of Saipan,
the end began to loom for the once-mighty Japanese empire.
By the end of July 1944,
the Marianas were at American possession
when(?) Japan now faced the menace
of long-range strategic bombing by the B-29 Super Fortress.
In August 1945,
it was also from a Marianas airfield
that the most devastating bomber raid of all was launched.
But a year earlier,
the American high command was still dependent on conventional weaponry
as the Pacific offensive continued.
Closing in on Japan
By the late summer of 1944,
the twin thrust strategy
had forced the Japanese to retreat across a vast area of territory.
But the American leadership now had to consider
the next steps towards the islands of Japan.
Originally,
the intention had been for the forces of MacArthur and Nimitz
to converge on the southern Philippines
and push toward the island of Formosa
before heading north.
But it was well known
MacArthur favored the capture of the entire Philippine chain.
And when his deputy Admiral Halsey
reported only light Japanese defenses in the south of the Philippines
during a raid in September 1944,
President Roosevelt decided to modify the American Pacific strategy.
MacArthur would be responsible for liberating the Philippines
while Nimitz would head northwest
towards Iwo Jima, Okinawa,
and the fringes of Japan itself.
The Pacific War was still far from over.
With Japanese defenses in the southern Philippines apparently light,
MacArthur decided to bypass the island of Mindanao
and make his landing in the center of the country.
On the 20th of October 1944,
in an emotional homecoming,
Douglas MacArthur once again set foot on Philippine soil
as his amphibious landing force secured the beachhead.
MacArthur could take confidence in the naval force that defended him
--- the American 3rd and 7th Fleets,
a total of 800 ships.
And this vast armada
soon found itself
involved in the largest naval battle of the world has(?) ever seen,
the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
As soon as the Japanese Imperial Command received news of MacArthur's landing,
they made the decision to deploy their naval forces
in a final attempt to stem the American advance.
In overall command,
the Tokyo based Admiral Soemu Toyoda,
at sea, Admiral Takeo Kurita took charge
and it was this
55-year-old commander
who almost pulled off a famous victory.
Kurita's plan was to engage the American fleet
positioned to the east of the Philippines
in support of the landings at Leyte.
39 warships would attack from the west
in a two-pronged pincer.
But Kurita also deployed another decoy carrier group
in the direction of the northeast.
This was a force that was superficially strong,
17 vessels including 4 aircraft carriers
under the command of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa.
But there were virtually no aircraft on board.
The whole group was a sacrificial offering,
intended to lure
Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet away from its position in support of the Leyte landings.
And the American commander took the bait.
On the 24th and 25th of October 1944,
the Battle of Leyte Gulf unfolded.
For the Japanese, the results were initially mixed.
Although the U.S. carrier Princeton was destroyed in a dive bomber attack,
American aircraft succeeded in destroying the huge Japanese battleship
the Musashi(武藏號),
(?)was still
The southern half of Kurita's pincer
found itself trapped overnight
in the narrow Surigao Strait
while his vessels were wiped out by the big American naval guns.
But Admiral Kurita's northern group remained intact
having made a tactical nighttime withdrawal to the San Bernardino Strait.
And the American 3rd Fleet
was now sailing away from this main Japanese deployment.
During the afternoon of October the 24th,
Admiral Halsey
was informed of what appeared to be the main Japanese attack force.
The commander already reveled in the nickname Bull Halsey
because of his habit of making immediate charges on the enemy
and now he lived up to his reputation.
By ordering his fleet to sail north,
he left the 7th Fleet of Admiral Kinkaid exposed.
And in the morning, Admiral Kurita
sailed into Leyte Gulf to face a drastically weakened force.
The decoy plan had worked.
Kurita's battle group now engaged the American battle group
known as Taffy III.
And Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague found himself outnumbered.
Three of his destroys were sunk.
The carrier Gambier Bay also went down
as the American ships maneuvered desperately to escape Kurita's attack.
Appeals for help was sent to the departed Halsey in the north,
but it was only when Admiral Nimitz himself intervened
that the 3rd Fleet finally turned around.
Halsey had been fooled
and his fleet was still unable to assist his colleagues.
The American landings on Leyte
were in real danger.
But now the Japanese commander made a mistake of his own.
Uncertain of the size of the American force that faced him,
Admiral Kurita decided to withdraw.
The Americans could hardly believe it.
Their landings on the Philippines were secure.
But the Battle of Leyte Gulf had one final sting in the tail(?).
On the evening of the 25th of October,
the American 7th Fleet was attacked by a new kind of weapon from the air.
--- obsolete aircraft,
packed with explosives,
and piloted by young Japanese men,
fully aware that they would die in the course of their mission.
These were the pilots of the so-called Divine Wind,
the Kamikaze.
And it was Leyte Gulf
that the Americans first felt the power of the suicide bombers.
In the months that followed,
a total of 40 American ships were destroyed by this (?)sunsettling weapon of last resort
and thousands of lives were lost in the process.
If there were any lingering doubts
about the willingness of the Japanese to die for their country,
the introduction of the Kamikaze removed them once and for all.
Despite this,
the American bridge head on the Philippines
was secured by the end of October 1944.
And there could be no doubt in Tokyo
that the war was now a lost cause.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea
had wiped out the Japanese power in the air
and the Battle of Leyte Gulf
marked the final effective appearance of the Imperial Navy.
But the fanatical resistance of Japanese ground troops continued
and it was this that led the United States to consider
the use of terrifying new weapons finally to bring the war to its end.
The fighting for the Philippines
typified the Japanese desire to fight on to the death.
tens of thousands of defending troops lost their lives
by the time the capital Manila
fell in early March 1945.
Tragically, 100,000 citizens also died
before Douglas MacArthur could fulfill his promise
to return to the Philippine capital.
Bitter, close quarter fighting continued in the Philippines
right up till the end of the war
as MacArthur initiated a series of amphibious landings to retake all of the islands.
As late as September 1945,
pockets of Japanese resistance
continued to hold out
with no thought of surrender.
But the battle for the Philippines had effectively ended earlier in the year
as the attention of the American public
turned to the progress of Admiral Nimitz force in the northwest
with the greatest interest
in the outcome of 2 amphibious island invasions
operations that more than anything
persuaded the American leadership to turn to the ultimate weapon to bring the war to an end.
By February 1945,
bombing raids on the Japanese home islands had become commonplace.
But the B-29 taking off from airfields in the Marianas
still lacked effective fighter protection.
The island of Iwo Jima
could provide a base for American fighters
and so the decision was made to make an amphibious assault on Iwo Jima
beginning in February of 1945.
It would be the first of two amphibious assaults
that would be amongst the bloodiest episodes of the entire Second World War.
On February 19th 1945,
American marines began their arrival on the beaches of Iwo Jima
and it seemed at first as if their task would be a simple one.
The island had been subjected to a ferocious bombing campaign
and the landing troops
encountered nothing in the way of resistance on the shores.
But it was a very different story in land.
Under the command of Tadamichi Kuribayashi,
a total of 21,000 men
had dug themselves into deep defensive positions
with the peak of Mt. Suribachi, a focus for the defense.
Within hours of landing,
the American marines realized that these soldiers would have to be flushed out
almost one by one
with explosives,
and flame throwers
often proving more effective than infantry or artillery fire.
Predictably it was a terrifying task.
The marines
had to engage enemy for whom death was the greatest honor attainable in battle.
Soon, the smell of slaughter filled the air
as the assault on Mt. Suribachi began.
To add to the unsettling nature of the task,
the offshore American fleet
found itself attacked by the Kamikaze as the land fighting continued.
At times, the American advance
was slowed almost to a halt by the tenacity of the Japanese defense.
But on the morning of the 23rd of February,
4 days into the assault,
the Stars and Stripes flew from the highest point (?)of the Iwo Jima.
It remains one of the most striking images of the Second World War.
Even as the flag was being raised,
American construction battalions had begun the task of building new airstrips
as the Japanese resistance
slowly drew to its inevitable end.
By the end of March,
American victory on Iwo Jima was complete.
And a vital new airbase was in full service.
But the price had been high.
6,800 US servicemen died in the battle for Iwo Jima.
All but 200 of the 21,000 Japanese lost their lives.
In the subsequent fighting for the island of Okinawa,
the death toll was even higher.
In a virtually identical operation,
the American dead alone totaled 15,500.
80,000 Japanese shared their fate
along with 42,000 civilians.
it was a horrific outcome.
But for many Americans it was the Japanese tactics at Okinawa
that were more unsettling than the statistics of death rolls.
On April 7th,
the American offshore fleet was attacked by the biggest ever Kamikaze attack.
Some 350 pilots flying aircraft packed with explosives,
descended from the sky,
and aimed their planes at the American ships.
And this was just the first of many Kamikaze raids on the American fleet at Okinawa.
By the time the island was eventually taken after 12 weeks of fighting,
some 32 vessels had been lost to the Kamikaze,
and 5,000 seamen lost their lives.
Many Americans found the very idea of suicide bombing disturbing.
They wondered what kind of enemy they were dealing with.
The Japanese were now desperate to try
any tactic that might make an impact no matter what the cost in lives.
On the same day as the first big Kamikaze raided at Okinawa,
a flotilla of 10 Japanese warship arrived on the scene.
This was all was left of the once proud navy,
and it included the 64,000 ton Yamato(大和),
the biggest battleship ever built.
But the Yamato's journey to Okinawa
would be it's last.
Like the other ships, it was only given fuel for the one-way journey.
The Japanese high command knew the fate that awaited their pitiful fleet.
But they were prepared for the loss of life
if it could hamper the American invasion in any way.
As events transpired,
the monster Yamato made no impact at all.
With all remaining Japanese fighters deployed in support of the Kamikaze attack,
)the vessel was left as an easy target for American bombs and torpedoes.
In less than an hour,
three waves of attacks
sent Yamato to the bottom
long before she reached Okinawa.
It was as devastating as it was predictable.
And it was typical of Japanese tactics in the phase of defeat.
There can be no doubt
that the slaughter on Iwo Jima and on Okinawa
had a deep impact on the thinking of the American leadership.
The likely loss of American lives
in a full-scale invasion of Japan could only be guessed out
if a (?)seemed likely,
the enemy was prepared to fight to the death.
But in the early months of 1945,
another option began to grow in favor.
From November 1944 onwards,
the Japanese home islands
received regular visits from American bomber squadrons.
But in early 1945,
the commander of 21st American Bomber Command
conceived a devastating new strategy to force the ordinary Japanese citizen
to accept of the war was lost.
On the evening of the 9th of March, General Curtis Lemay
gave the order for a very different kind of bombing raid
from anything that had gone before.
That night
290 U.S. bombers took off
on a low level mission against the very center of Japanese power,
Tokyo itself.
Their cargo:
2,000 tons of incendiary devices
American planners knew that the Japanese capital was built largely of wood
and a concentrated attack
using napalm bombs could produce a terrible impact on the city.
Their analysis proved accurate.
On the night of the 9th~10th March 1945,
Tokyo was set ablaze.
The cumulative effect of the napalm devices
rendered futile any attempts to extinguish the fires that engulfed the city.
For a time,
the atmosphere itself took light.
And as many as 100,000 citizens may have perished
as a result of one bombing raid.
It was an overwhelming display of force
but if the American leadership hope that such an enormous loss of life
would bring that Japanese counterparts to the negotiating table,
they were wrong.
Although Japan was now hopelessly defeated as a military power,
the war carried on.
And the hellscape of Okinawa was still to come.
By July 1945,
many American citizens were resigned to the prospect of an invasion of Japan
--- an enterprise whose potential cost in lives could hardly be overestimated.
But the American leadership was now in a position to finish the war
in the most dramatic manner possible.
For years, Allied scientists had been working in secret on a new kind of weapon,
a bomb with the destructive power like nothing ever seen before,
the atomic bomb.
On July the 16th 1945, at the site in the deserts of New Mexico,
the new weapon was tested for the first time,
and it's power was obvious.
With the atomic bomb, the United States
could at last force the Japanese to accept that defeat.
On the 6th of August 1945,
an American B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay,
took off from a Mariana's airfield.
It flew at a height of 31,000 ft over the City of Hiroshima.
At 8:16 am local time,
an atomic weapon was released into the Japanese sky.
43 seconds later,
the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima,
and as many as 80,000 people died in an instant.
Now the Japanese leadership knew
that their country could be completely destroyed
at virtually no cost to their American enemies.
Following the 2nd atomic attack on Nagasaki on the 9th of August,
the Japanese high command accepted the inevitable
and a formal surrender of Japanese forces was soon a reality.
WWII was over.
But it had been a long hard and in the end terrifying enterprise.
Beginning at Guadalcanal,
the Americans and their Allies had forced their way
across a vast area of the planet's surface.
With every engagement
they encountered the remarkable spirit of the Japanese fighting men.
In the end,
it was the superior industrial and technological might of the United States
that gained victory in the Pacific.
But it was a triumph that had to be secured on the ground,
on some of the bloodiest battle fields of the 2nd World War.