字幕表 動画を再生する 英語字幕をプリント Mr. Earnest: Good afternoon, everybody. It's nice to see you. I'm joined at the briefing today by David Cohen from the Treasury Department. We spent a lot of time over the last several weeks, even months, discussing the strategy that the President has put in place to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. We have, for understandable reasons, spent a lot of time talking about our strategy related to the military -- military airstrikes by our coalition partners. We've talked a lot about our effort to train and supply local forces on the ground to take the fight to ISIL. We've talked a lot about our ongoing diplomatic efforts to build a broad international coalition. But another core component of this strategy is our efforts to shut down ISIL's financing. This is David's area of responsibility and expertise, and so he's here to give you some brief remarks at the top and to answer your questions about it. So with that, David, why don't you get us started. Under Secretary Cohen: Thanks, Josh. Good afternoon, everybody. So what I thought I would do is briefly recap a speech that I delivered earlier today describing Treasury's role in leading the effort to disrupt the financing for ISIL, which is part of the, as Josh mentioned, the overall effort to disrupt, degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. So I began by sketching the key source of ISIL's current revenue, and noted that ISIL presents a somewhat different terrorist financing challenge for a couple of reasons. One, it has obviously amassed wealth at a pretty rapid clip. Much of its funding, unlike sort of al Qaeda and al Qaeda-type organizations, does not come from external donations but is gathered -- internally gathered locally in the territory in Iraq and Syria where it currently operates. But nonetheless, ISIL's financial foundations can be attacked through the application of some tried and true techniques that we've developed over the past 10 years at the Treasury Department, and with some modifications on some of these approaches. So with respect to ISIL's sources of revenue, obviously ISIL's sale of oil has gotten a lot of attention. Our best understanding is that ISIL, since about mid-June, has earned approximately a million dollars a day through the sale of smuggled oil. There's been some progress recently in beating back ISIL's ability to earn money from the sale of smuggled oil, in particular due to the airstrikes that have been conducted on some of the ISIL oil refineries. Second, ISIL has earned about $20 million this year through kidnapping for ransom, through receiving ransoms to free innocent civilians, often journalists, that it has taken hostage. Third, ISIL earns up to several million dollars per month through its various extortion networks and criminal activity in the territory where it operates. And finally, as I mentioned, external donations are not right now a significant source of funding for ISIL, but it does maintain some really significant links to Gulf-based financiers, as a spate of Treasury designations we did last night -- last week, rather -- or last month, highlights. So we are leading a three-pronged effort to combat ISIL's financial foundation, closely linked up with the other members in the U.S. government of the anti-ISIL coalition, as well as with international counterparts. So first, we're focused on cutting off ISIL's funding streams. With respect to oil, we are looking very carefully at who the middlemen are who are involved in the sale of the oil that ISIL is smuggling. At some point, there is someone in that chain of transactions who is involved in the legitimate or quasi-legitimate economy. They have a bank account. Their trucks may be insured. They may have licensing on their facilities. There is someone who our tools, our designation tools can influence. And so we are looking very carefully at identifying who the people are that are involved in this chain of transactions that we can apply our tools against. Secondly, we are working to turn the growing international norm against paying ransom to terrorist organizations into a reality. This year there were two U.N. Security Council resolutions that very clearly came out and said that paying a ransom to terrorist organizations is something that no country, no member state should be involved in. This is something that has been longstanding U.S. policy, longstanding U.K. policy, and something that we're trying to get our partners around the world to turn from a norm into a reality. Third, we are looking at these external funding networks. Although it is not currently a significant source of revenue, there is obviously a big pool of money out there that has historically funded extremist groups. Very focused on ensuring that this does not become a more significant means by which ISIL is able to fund itself. And finally, on the crime and extortion networks, the best way to address this, again, is through the military activity and other activity on the ground to push ISIL out of the territory where it's currently operating. But it does sort of play into our second line of activity, which is to prevent ISIL from gaining access to the international financial system. So as it has funds at its disposal, it's critically important that it does not get access to the financial system through the bank branches that are in the territory where it's currently operating. There are dozens of bank branches in Iraq where ISIL is currently operating. We're working closely with the Iraqis and with others around the world, both in the private financial sector and in the public sector, to ensure that ISIL is not able to gain access to the international financial system. And the third line of effort is to apply sanctions against the key leaders in ISIL. It has a relatively sophisticated, complex organizational structure. We're going to look to designate the leaders, designate the people who act in CFO-like capacities, as well as to designate those outside of Iraq and Syria who are providing support to ISIL. So with that, why don't I take a few questions? Mr. Earnest: Olivier, you want to start us off? The Press: Please. Thanks, David. Do you have a sense of ISIL's overall net worth? I realize that these analogies are not perfect, but do you have a sense of where they are in overall net worth? And could you maybe give us just where they rank either in income or in overall wealth against other notable extremist groups? Under Secretary Cohen: There's no question that ISIL is among the best-financed terrorist organizations -- leaving aside state-sponsored terrorist organizations -- that we've confronted. I can't give you a precise figure on what its current net worth is. But I think an important point, though, is to not confuse funding with financial strength. ISIL has massed millions of dollars in funding, but a terrorist organization's financial strength turns on its ability to continue to tap into funding streams, its ability to use the funds that it has, and also its expenses, ISIL, in its ambition to control large swaths of territory -- cities, towns and millions of millions of people -- has a significant expense side of its balance sheet. And as we work to cut off its access to revenue, ISIL's ability to deliver even a modicum of services to the people that it's attempting to subjugate will be stressed. And so its ability to continue to hold that territory against a population that in the past has shown a willingness to push back against al Qaeda-types is going to be stressed. The Press: And one more. You said that external donations are not right now a significant source of revenue. Again, I'm sorry, can you put a dollar amount on what that means? How much smaller is it than a million dollars a day from smuggling oil, or $20 million this year from ransom? Under Secretary Cohen: It is smaller. In September, we announced designations that included sanctions against a Gulf-based facilitator -- actually, a Syria-based facilitator who received $2 million from Gulf-based donors. So I don't mean to suggest that this is an insignificant source of financing, it's just in comparison to their other revenue streams right now, it's not as important to them. The Press: Which countries are most lenient toward paying ransoms? And how do you approach this problem? Under Secretary Cohen: Look, we approach this problem by lots of quiet diplomacy, working with the countries, and making the point -- which I think is both logical and, frankly, has borne out -- which is that the payment of ransoms just encourages further hostage-taking. And so we all have an obligation to protect our citizens. And the best way to protect our citizens is to take away the incentive in the first place for terrorist organizations to take hostages. The U.S. policy against paying ransoms has been longstanding, and it applies across the board to any hostage-taker. But in the context of a terrorist organization that is taking hostages, this policy has even more force, because we know that the funding that comes from the ransoms is used by these terrorist organizations to fund all of their violent activities. And so the best way to translate what is this emerging international norm into practice is really to make the case to our partners around the world that payment of ransoms ultimately redounds to the detriment of all of our citizens. The Press: Is it mostly European nations that are lenient towards paying, or is it Gulf States? Or who exactly? Under Secretary Cohen: Look, I'm not going to identify any particular countries that are involved here. There are, as evidenced by the fact that ISIL has received $20 million or so this year in ransom payments, there are still ransoms being paid. And I think it's incumbent on everybody and the anti-ISIL coalition and more broadly to adhere to the Security Council resolutions and to not pay ransoms. The Press: What would be an example of the external funding sources that you talked about a minute ago? An example or two? Under Secretary Cohen: Well, an example are these donor networks in the Gulf where money is collected. There are bundlers, essentially, who collect funds and move the funds out of the Gulf into Iraq and Syria. I mean, one of the things we're concerned about -- and again, we have recently designated some individuals who are involved in this activity -- is the use of social media to solicit funds, and the ability, frankly, to move beyond sort of person-to-person fundraising and to use social media as a way to raise funds, bundle those funds, and move them out of the Gulf into Syria and Iraq. And so that's something that we're very focused on. The Press: You mentioned going after the middlemen when it comes to dealing with the oil revenue generated by ISIS. Do you know who is buying that oil ultimately? Are there nations buying it? Under Secretary Cohen: I don't think it's -- that's what we're looking into. And our intelligence community and our partners are highly focused on identifying exactly who it is in these smuggling networks that are involved. These smuggling networks didn't just pop up overnight. These are historic, longstanding smuggling networks that have been the way by which all sorts of commodities, including oil, have been traded over the years. But what's different now, frankly, is that the oil that had previously moved through these smuggling networks, we now know that that oil finds its origin with ISIL. And anyone involved in the sale of this oil is, frankly, assisting ISIL, funding ISIL. And so, in the past, if some of these people in these networks were willing to sort of turn a blind eye as to where the oil came from, that's no longer tenable because this oil, everybody should know, is coming from ISIL-controlled territory, and trading in this oil is just funding ISIL. The Press: And do you know how much money is coming from the West?