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  • - You can't have this conversation on CNN or Fox.

  • You can't do it, right?

  • Because if you are only talking about

  • how the Israeli Defense Forces are responsible

  • for these brutal killings,

  • or if you're only talking about

  • what Hamas did on October 7th,

  • and you don't talk about the broader context, right, you are

  • absolutely not understanding what's happening

  • in this war right now.

  • - Today on Big Think, we're gonna be talking to Ian Bremmer,

  • president and founder of Eurasia Group

  • and GZERO Media about the ongoing conflict

  • between Hamas and Israel.

  • Ian, thank you so much for joining us today.

  • - It's great to be back with Big Think.

  • - This region has been embroiled in turmoil for thousands

  • of years, so there's many historical

  • factors we could discuss.

  • But I would like to know from your standpoint,

  • is it more helpful to focus on recent history

  • to better understand this conflict?

  • - Both the Jews and the Palestinians have long,

  • long running and legitimate claims to live

  • on this territory.

  • Palestinians, some 700,000 plus were

  • kicked off these territories

  • after 1948 post-Holocaust.

  • The Jews had lived on these territories for millennia,

  • and a number of empires have kicked them off.

  • We can talk about that.

  • There are people that are far more expert on those histories

  • than I am, but the reality is that for the Jews

  • and the Palestinians that are fighting over this land today,

  • they've been living there for their lifetimes and,

  • and so it's really not about who has a right

  • to live on the territory.

  • It's rather that they need to find a way

  • to live together in peace.

  • And what has happened over the past years is that

  • everyone in the world has basically given up

  • on finding a peaceful solution

  • because they've tried for decades, it's too hard or

  • because they're not interested;

  • they have other things that they would rather do.

  • That's where we are today.

  • The last time that the Americans

  • who are not an honest broker for peace in the region,

  • the United States, a principle ally in the entire Middle East

  • is Israel.

  • So you can't say, "Oh, well, you know, they're the ones

  • that can broker peace between Israel and the Palestinians,

  • because they're equally trusted."

  • That's not true. But they do have the dominant military

  • presence in the region, and they also have the dominant

  • diplomatic capability on the region.

  • So they've been the ones

  • that have played the most significant role.

  • And the last time an American senior diplomat was

  • really invested on trying to figure out a way to bring peace

  • to this region was when John Kerry was Secretary of State

  • in the first couple of years

  • of the Obama administration.

  • And he did shuttle diplomacy between the Israelis,

  • the Palestinians, the Jordanians, the Egyptians, I mean,

  • all the time, for 18 months

  • this was his top priority.

  • He wanted a Nobel Peace Prize for it. He failed.

  • And after that, basically the Americans gave up.

  • It was the pivot to Asia.

  • It was no longer focusing as much on the Middle East.

  • And then when the Russians invade Ukraine, it's

  • focusing on Europe too.

  • But no one's spending real time on the Palestinians,

  • the Gulf States, who had been providing so much money

  • for humanitarian support

  • for Palestinians living in the West Bank,

  • and particularly Gaza, as well as refugees in other places

  • that they were saying there could be no peace

  • in the Middle East unless the Palestinian-Israel

  • issue is resolved.

  • Well, it turned out they were willing

  • to make peace with Israel.

  • They're, they're willing

  • to engage open diplomatic relations, allow Jewish tourists

  • to come to their country, trade

  • and investment, technology cooperation, security cooperation.

  • But what about the Palestinians?

  • Well, too hard to resolve, and Israel,

  • and particularly this far-right,

  • Netanyahu-led government has been willing to not only

  • expand illegally, the settlements in the West Bank, reducing

  • the territory that the Palestinians can live on,

  • and making it harder for them to get to work, go to school,

  • you know, have a possibility for a viable future.

  • But also, Netanyahu's government was engaging more

  • with Hamas in Gaza at the expense

  • of the Palestinian authority,

  • because they never wanted to pursue a two-state solution.

  • So they forgot about the Palestinians too.

  • So when you look at everyone around the world

  • that was committed to the Palestinians, finding a way

  • to live viably on their territories,

  • the answer is this has not been a priority for anyone

  • for a long, long time.

  • And their own government in the West Bank that

  • recognizes Israel's right to exist, as opposed to Hamas,

  • which does not, they were corrupt.

  • They were divided.

  • They couldn't speak for Palestinians in Gaza,

  • and they were being weakened by the Israeli government.

  • So, I mean, this was a long introduction

  • to talk about the history,

  • but the point is that if you are looking for people

  • that are responsible, historically,

  • for why we are in the mess that we are in today,

  • and it is an unholy mess,

  • and I use that term very literally, you know,

  • you can look everywhere

  • and you have people to blame that

  • that is where we are today.

  • - Thank you for that. I'm, I'm curious, you know,

  • to talk about some of the domestic politics within Israel,

  • because that's something that I think has not been paid

  • enough attention to

  • and specifically the actions of the Netanyahu government

  • and the people who they are partnering with as it relates

  • to this conflict, but also just internally inside of Israel.

  • What does it look like in terms of the partnerships

  • and the dynamics that are happening there?

  • What has been the lead up to this conflict in terms

  • of the internal politics with Israel,

  • and how has that had an effect on just the general

  • relationship between Israel

  • and the Palestinians in the various places?

  • - You know, Israel is a very political society.

  • The average Israeli citizen reads

  • a lot about news and politics.

  • If you go to a cafe in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem

  • or Herzliya, you're gonna hear a lot

  • of people talking about politics.

  • It's also a very fragmented society.

  • There are a lot of different political parties.

  • And, and in order

  • to get a government together in the Knesset,

  • you can't govern by yourself

  • because you'd never get a majority.

  • You have to find a coalition with other partners.

  • And Netanyahu, who has, you know, faced all sorts

  • of internal corruption scandals and,

  • and who's Likud party has also been painted

  • with a lot of those challenges.

  • The only way he could form a government this last time

  • around was with a hard-right group.

  • A party that specifically has, you know, said some

  • of the most horrible things about wanting

  • Palestinians removed from the West Bank, about wanting

  • to take over their territories.

  • In some ways, the hard-right partners

  • of Netanyahu have been as unyielding

  • and aggressive about the Palestinians not having rights in

  • the occupied territories as Hamas has been

  • about the Jews not having the right

  • to have an Israeli state.

  • Now, that does not reflect the opinions

  • of the Israeli people as a whole, but it has meant that

  • before the events of October 7th,

  • the terrorist events against the people of Israel, you had

  • enormous domestic instability.

  • That domestic instability was the people of Israel

  • revolting against Netanyahu, attempting

  • to change a very strong, independent judiciary of

  • that country to basically report to the executive

  • and report to whoever was in charge in the Knesset.

  • And the reason for that, more control for Netanyahu

  • and his coalition, and the ability to avoid getting charged

  • and jailed for these corruption scandals

  • and investigations that are ongoing.

  • And, and for months, the news in Israel had nothing to do

  • with Hamas, had nothing to do

  • with the Palestinians in Gaza.

  • It instead was about a potential constitutional crisis

  • that was pending in Israel, that Israel's legitimacy

  • as a democracy in the Middle East was under threat, not

  • because of what they were doing to the Palestinians, but

  • because of what Netanyahu was doing to the country,

  • to the balance of power in Israel.

  • So that was, they were taking their eye off the ball.

  • The other thing that happened is the hard-right part

  • of the Israeli government was doing everything possible

  • to expand their territorial influence in the West Bank.

  • And the Palestinians living there were angry

  • and there were a lot of clashes.

  • There were violent reprisals.

  • And the Israeli Defense Forces some

  • of the best in the world,

  • incredibly well-trained high morale, while a lot of them

  • had been sent to the West Bank

  • and to the border zone inside Israel proper in an effort

  • to contain and respond to that violence.

  • Where were they in Gaza? Not worried about Gaza.

  • Netanyahu was providing Hamas in Gaza

  • with more resources, with more money, with more ability

  • to have work visas to come on over into Israel.

  • Why? Because they were just focused on governance.

  • According to Netanyahu, they just wanted to rebuild Gaza

  • 'cause he wanted a stronger Hamas

  • to weaken the Palestinian authority.

  • So what happened is you took one of the world's

  • best-trained, most effective defense forces,

  • intelligence forces, security forces, border forces, and,

  • and you had them focusing on everything

  • but a terrorist organization that was running

  • Gaza with a people that had abysmal

  • economic conditions, life conditions, half of them

  • without enough food to eat, 90%

  • of them without access to clean water.

  • And everyone is now talking about

  • how Israel has a right to self-defense.

  • They have a right to be able to defend their borders.

  • And that is absolutely true.

  • But that right did not begin after October 7th.

  • That right existed before October 7th.

  • And the Prime Minister of Israel

  • and his hard-right government failed the Israeli people.

  • They did not defend their country,

  • they didn't defend their borders.

  • They weren't concerned with

  • or focused on the real threats that were right there

  • just on the south of Israel, that wanted to destroy

  • everything that the Israeli people have been building

  • since 1948.

  • So the Israeli people want Netanyahu out.

  • They overwhelmingly blame him

  • and his government for the events of October 7th,

  • consistently in polls taken inside Israel.

  • In fact, one of the only things

  • that the Middle Eastern peoples can agree on in,

  • in this conflict is that the Israeli Prime Minister

  • and his government need to go, that they, that they are not

  • fit for office either to govern Israel

  • and defend Israel, or to engage

  • and create peace with the Palestinians.

  • - You know, it's interesting to bring up the government

  • of Israel and how people

  • are perceiving their actions in the lead up to,

  • and even just in the response of the October 7th attack,

  • I'm curious, you know, to bring it

  • to the surrounding nations

  • and their relationship with Israel.

  • And, you know, you mentioned how the treatment

  • of Palestinians has taking a back seat

  • to sort of recent concerns.

  • I'm, I'm curious if you can paint a broader picture

  • of just like what types of relationships has been happening

  • with, between Israel

  • and other nations, other Arab nations that surround them,

  • and how the concerns

  • of the Palestinians have just not been the forefront of

  • the discussions between those parties.

  • - No, they, they have not.

  • And to be fair, I mean, the fact

  • that the Palestinians have not been

  • diplomatically important to, for example, the Gulf States

  • or, or even to countries like Jordan

  • and Egypt that have been more willing to engage with Israel

  • as the Palestinian plight has become worse, there has been

  • a lot of effort to bring aid, humanitarian support in

  • for the Palestinians

  • and the Gulf states who are very wealthy,

  • have been providing a lot of that.

  • But when the Israeli government,

  • after the events of October 7th started

  • engaging in widespread bombardment across Gaza,

  • which has led to thousands

  • and thousands of casualties: civilian casualties, children,

  • almost 50% of the Gaza population are children, right?

  • I mean, this is now being seen across the region,

  • and it is impossible for any government of the region,

  • any Arab government of the region to just sit and stand by

  • and say, "Okay, we don't care.

  • We're still gonna work with Israel.

  • The way we were working with them." Israel had benefited

  • from being seen as an economic

  • juggernaut, a security juggernaut,

  • a technological juggernaut.

  • And a lot of the countries in the region wanted

  • to work more closely with Israel as a consequence of that.

  • That's why you had the UAE and Bahrain

  • and Morocco signing the Abraham Accords, not just

  • to normalize diplomatic relations,

  • but also to dramatically expand trade

  • and investment with Israel.

  • That's why the Saudis were improving their informal

  • relations and were moving towards normalization.

  • Even though the Saudi population is going

  • to be quite cautious

  • and conservative on the Palestinian issue, they say,

  • "No, the priority is we gotta find

  • a way to work with Israel."

  • But once you have Israel in response to these terrorist acts

  • going after Hamas,

  • and as they're doing so killing all

  • of these Palestinian civilians,

  • well then there's a freeze on everything; then if you are,

  • you know, Jordan, you say, "We can't work with,

  • we can't engage with Israel going forward."

  • If you're Turkey, Turkish President Erdogan, who has said

  • that Hamas is not a terrorist organization, he has said

  • that Hamas is a liberation movement,

  • and he hasn't condemned the Hamas from the

  • hostages that've taken from the

  • 1,400 civilians that they killed.

  • Not at all. So they've thrown out

  • the Israeli diplomats on the ground as well.

  • And when that's happening across the region

  • and the Arab Street is demonstrating in solidarity

  • with the Palestinians, then even if you have a number

  • of wealthier Arab countries that want to continue to work

  • with Israel, they can't because of the domestic pressure.

  • And, and so the, the efforts

  • that had made Israel the strongest, geopolitically,

  • that had had ever been, since independence, suddenly

  • are moving in a very different direction, it's, it's hard

  • for those countries to even maintain present levels

  • of engagement with Israel.

  • And indeed, a lot of the progress

  • that had been made could be lost.

  • So it's very interesting.

  • You have an environment where

  • before the acts of October 7th,

  • Israel was the most divided domestically

  • because of the response to Netanyahu,

  • but the strongest in the region.

  • Then the events of October 7th happen,

  • and suddenly Israel is enormously unified.

  • Everyone is responding.

  • You get a, a unity war cabinet

  • because everyone says, we must defeat Hamas.

  • We must destroy these terrorists

  • that have just threatened our homeland

  • and have killed our children.

  • Right? And, but the international environment from Israel

  • has suddenly become one

  • of massive criticism and condemnation.

  • And that is clearly true in its immediate region.

  • It is clearly true for Iran, which continues along

  • with Hamas to believe that,

  • that the Jewish people in the state

  • of Israel should be replaced with Palestine.

  • But that's also true for all of the proxies

  • of Iran across the region, the Shia proxies in Yemen

  • and in Iraq, in Syria.

  • It's true across the global South where we have governments

  • that are outraged and coming after Israel,

  • and even for the United States, which is

  • by far the strongest ally of Israel in the world.

  • You have significant pressure, especially

  • among young people, and especially

  • among Democrats in Congress saying,

  • "We can no longer provide the kind of support

  • that we have historically given what's happening

  • presently on the ground."

  • So domestically in Israel, much more cohesive and stronger

  • and resilient; internationally, much more fragmented

  • and, and much more challenging

  • for the Israelis going forward.

  • - I'm curious, you know, to think about

  • this situation in regards to

  • what Hamas' motivation was for the attack.

  • And so do you think that there was a strategic goal

  • of the Hamas attack on October 7th?

  • And was this in a way, setting a trap for Israel?

  • And if so, was it successful?

  • Was this outcome of people turning the tide

  • of opinion against Israel internationally, part

  • of a strategic goal for Hamas when doing this attack?

  • - It's very hard to say that Hamas actually

  • expected the kind of success

  • that they experienced

  • on October 7th. There were some 2,000

  • Hamas fighters, terrorists that managed to get across one

  • of the most well-defended borders with some

  • of the best intelligence out there.

  • Human intelligence, signals intelligence managed

  • to get across the border, kill Israelis

  • with reckless abandon,

  • and capture some 250 hostages

  • and bring them back into Gaza.

  • I have a hard time believing that Hamas expected

  • that they would have that kind of success,

  • that they would be able

  • to kill more Jews in one day than had happened anywhere in

  • the world since the Holocaust.

  • I have a hard time with that.

  • I think it, it turned out that Netanyahu

  • and the Israeli government was dramatically weaker

  • and less focused on defense

  • than Hamas could have anticipated,

  • because the level of success that Hamas has had

  • is a death sentence for those leaders

  • and for those fighters, I mean, there is really no choice.

  • There is no one in the Israeli political leadership,

  • the entire spectrum from left to right that would say,

  • "Oh, we can now leave Hamas intact.

  • We've hit him for a few weeks. And that's enough."

  • I mean, the idea that Israel,

  • after what they experienced on October 7th would, would have

  • a few weeks of attacks,

  • but then could still live neighboring to Gaza,

  • which is being run and controlled by Hamas-

  • no country in the world would live with that.

  • And let's also remember that the people that were killed

  • by Hamas, the people that are hostages, those

  • that are Israeli, by the way, these are not,

  • this isn't a settler population.

  • This isn't a hard-right population.

  • This was a progressive population.

  • These were the people in Israel

  • that were most interested in making peace

  • with the Palestinians.

  • And so you now have a situation where people

  • that I know, friends of mine in Israel that I would consider

  • to be very thoughtful, moderate politically,

  • that are saying, "I wanna level this place.

  • I wanna make it a parking lot."

  • Not not differentiating between Hamas fighters

  • and Palestinian civilians

  • and Palestinian women and children.

  • That, that, I mean, to you and I that sounds insane,

  • but, but on the back of

  • what the Israelis have just experienced, that is the emotion

  • that is coming out.

  • And so I don't think that Hamas expected

  • that they were going to have that kind of success,

  • but I absolutely believe that Hamas' efforts

  • to defend themselves,

  • and when I say themselves, I don't mean the Palestinian

  • people, I mean just the fighters and the leadership;

  • they do that by attempting to

  • get the Israeli Defense Forces to kill

  • Palestinian innocents, to kill civilians.

  • And what we have now seen for a month

  • has been extraordinary brutality and violence.

  • And we have seen refugee camps and hospitals

  • and schools and United Nations aid workers blown

  • to pieces by Israeli Defense Forces.

  • And the Israeli Defense Forces are the ones

  • that are pulling the trigger.

  • They are the ones that are bombing these people.

  • And now there's a ground war.

  • They're the ones that are on the ground as well.

  • But it is Hamas that is operating on the ground

  • with tunnels underneath those targets.

  • It is Hamas that has their missiles

  • and their commanders in residential buildings

  • and right next to playgrounds and right next to hospitals

  • and even shooting out of mosques.

  • Now they know exactly what they're doing.

  • They're not just holding 200 plus Israelis

  • and other civilians hostage illegally,

  • but they're also holding large numbers

  • of Palestinian civilians hostage.

  • And so the Israelis, yes, the Israeli Defense Forces

  • are responsible when they are killing lots

  • and lots of Palestinian civilians to get at one, two,

  • or three militants.

  • But Hamas is also deeply responsible

  • for making the only way that Israel can kill terrorists

  • to ensure that large numbers

  • of Palestinian civilians also die.

  • That they are not just fighting Israel militarily

  • because they will lose badly if they

  • fight Israel militarily.

  • They are fighting in the court of public opinion.

  • They are fighting an information war,

  • and they are using disinformation.

  • We have seen this play out over four weeks,

  • and there aren't that many Jews around the world.

  • There are a lot more Muslims.

  • And so if, if Hamas is able to get out

  • all of this information that says, "Look at all

  • of these Palestinian kids that the Israelis are killing,"

  • and they don't say anything about

  • how Hamas is also putting them at risk,

  • well then they're going to look a lot stronger.

  • And is that a trap for Israel? Absolutely.

  • That's a trap for Israel. Absolutely.

  • That makes Israel weaker

  • and more vulnerable than the geopolitical position they were

  • in on October 6th.

  • I mean, that strong position of Israel with the countries

  • of the region working with them, that's a direct threat

  • to the future of Hamas.

  • That's a direct threat to their being able

  • to drive their agenda to undermine Israel,

  • to remove Israel from the region.

  • So, and, and the, the problem is

  • that you can't have this conversation on CNN or Fox.

  • You can't do it because it's the headlines.

  • And, and so, you know, know you can do a minute of it,

  • you can do two minutes of it,

  • then you move on to the next thing.

  • It, if you are only talking about

  • how the Israeli Defense Forces are responsible

  • for these brutal killings,

  • or if you're only talking about

  • what Hamas did on October 7th,

  • and you don't talk about the broader context, right, you are

  • absolutely not understanding what's happening

  • in this war right now.

  • - I'm interested in talking about

  • disinformation and misinformation.

  • You mentioned that as part

  • of your answer to the previous question.

  • I'm, I'm curious what you think the role digital media plays

  • in this conflict, both being a vehicle for disinformation,

  • but also being a vehicle for accurate, on-the-ground

  • information about what's happening.

  • - It has become increasingly difficult for anyone

  • to get good, valuable information

  • on social media, on Israel-Palestine,

  • the number of accounts that if you look not

  • at one post, but if then you go back into the account

  • and say, "Okay, what are they presenting?

  • Are they actually presenting the news

  • because it's being put out

  • as if they're presenting the news?

  • There's a headline that you need to focus on,"

  • then you realize, wait a second,

  • this entire account is only focusing on the suffering

  • of Jews, or this entire account is only focusing on the

  • suffering of Palestinians.

  • I, I would wager that that is the vast majority

  • of the social media verified, algorithmically

  • promoted accounts that people are presently

  • digesting on this conflict.

  • And by definition, that is disinformation

  • because it is not interested in understanding the entirety

  • of what's going on.

  • The one thing that we know for certain is that the level

  • of suffering that has occurred on the ground for Jews

  • and for Palestinians over the last four weeks is unlike

  • almost anything that's been experienced

  • by anyone watching this video right now.

  • And yet you would never feel that way if you were digesting

  • the accounts that are driving most of the media

  • in social platforms.

  • So fundamentally, this is a disinformation-rich

  • and dominant environment.

  • Some of that is assertively fake news.

  • Some of that is assertively filtered

  • and promote programmed news that only gets you one piece,

  • one side of the story.

  • And God forbid you say something that is more nuanced,

  • that doesn't align fully with what either

  • or both of those sides are promoting.

  • They come after you and they say it's fake news.

  • They come after you and they call for violence.

  • They call to dox you, they'll call for,

  • there'll be death threats.

  • And I've seen this with almost everyone I know that's trying

  • to have a more civil, a more focused, decent,

  • grounded human conversation.

  • This is nothing like

  • what people are like in the real world, in the real world-

  • everyone understands that they're both people.

  • In fact, they come from the same part

  • of the world, they're family.

  • But you couldn't, you wouldn't get that-

  • and if you were on social media.

  • Now, I wanna, I wanna be clear that when you say

  • that something is not black

  • or white, that doesn't mean everything is the

  • same shade of gray.

  • I mean, we, we can all admit that, you know, Hamas

  • targeting civilians is not the same

  • thing as Israel targeting the military,

  • but also killing a lot of civilians.

  • We can also both agree that both

  • of those are deeply problematic compared

  • to not having any civilians die.

  • We know that we, we also know that the economic conditions

  • that Palestinians are living under in Gaza are radically

  • worse than those of Palestinians in the West Bank,

  • which are radically worse than those

  • of Jews living in Israel.

  • That's context. Those are not equal shades of gray,

  • but it's not black or white.

  • There is no space for that on social media. There's none.

  • Social media is dehumanizing. It is hate-inducing.

  • And it is actively preventing people

  • from getting good information

  • and from talking to each other.

  • What we need is less social media.

  • We need more long-form content.

  • We need more person-to-person engagement.

  • We need more community, more schools, more family.

  • We, we need more humanity. Algorithms are not humanity.

  • Algorithms are programmed by business models

  • that are productizing people for profit.

  • And it just so happens that the process of doing that

  • is more, is facilitated more

  • directly through very,

  • very strong emotions that, that that is what we have today.

  • But that is the opposite from what we need

  • if we want to understand

  • and if we want to resolve this Israel-Gaza war.

  • - I would love to just do a quick follow up on that

  • 'cause you know, one of the things that I found interesting

  • as a dynamic was certainly when there was the,

  • the hospital bombing that happened in Gaza,

  • and there was a rush of reports that said Israel was

  • to blame for that attack.

  • And then following up, there was a lot of

  • what seemed like open source intelligence reporting

  • that said that that might not have been the case.

  • How do you take an example like that

  • where a legacy institution like the New York Times

  • and some other institutions reported something

  • that ended up being walked back in terms

  • of the truthfulness of the statement.

  • How do you weigh that with what you were just talking about

  • in terms of social media?

  • - Information warfare.

  • This was the New York Times, it was the Wall Street Journal,

  • so it wasn't just left or right, it was both,

  • they both have a lot of journalists

  • that are very professional and they do very solid work,

  • but they were getting their real-time information

  • from social media

  • from the region,

  • and it was a disinformation-rich environment.

  • And so you see these blaring headlines,

  • and it's the middle of the night when this hospital is hit

  • and no one has good information.

  • You don't have journalists that are on the ground that are,

  • that are real-time reporting to you.

  • So they're getting that information secondhand from

  • journalists on the ground.

  • And most of those journalists are getting

  • that information from Hamas sources.

  • And so they said: "A hospital is hit. 500 people are dead.

  • And it was an Israeli missile that hit them."

  • And it turned out that all three of those pieces

  • of information were false.

  • It was a hospital parking lot was hit,

  • far fewer people were killed,

  • though a lot of people were killed.

  • And it was not an Israeli Defense Forces

  • missile that hit them.

  • But by that point, the story had already went out

  • to everyone who wanted to believe

  • that, and they ran with it.

  • And not just the journalists that are more supportive

  • of the Palestinian than the Israeli cause,

  • but also the governments in the region who condemned Israel,

  • the governments of the region

  • who decided they weren't gonna meet with Biden,

  • the Palestinian authority, the Jordanian, the Egyptians

  • as Biden was meeting with Netanyahu.

  • Now this was absolutely essential at a time

  • that the United States was sending its President to try

  • to find a way to, to stabilize this environment.

  • And they, they probably would've failed,

  • but they're much more likely to fail if they can only talk

  • to Israel and they can't talk to the other side.

  • And, and they failed because of Hamas misinformation.

  • The, this was happening to a lesser degree

  • in the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war,

  • but it was happening much more successfully

  • by the Ukrainians

  • who almost everyone in the world supported.

  • So you'll remember there was this Snake Island attack

  • and you had, you know, this, this news report

  • that was put out and promoted by the Ukrainian military

  • and the government that showed that there were, you know,

  • people on the ground

  • and the Russians demanded

  • that they surrender, they refused.

  • They, they used an obscenity

  • and the Russians blew them all up and they died.

  • And they were seen as heroes all over the world,

  • except it never happened.

  • No one was killed on Snake Island.

  • The people were captured and they were released.

  • And that got a little bit of news weeks later,

  • but the purpose was already served: equal disinformation.

  • Everyone ran with that story.

  • The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, they ran with

  • that story, but it didn't have as much of an impact

  • because everyone was sympathetic to Ukraine anyway.

  • And it wasn't going to change.

  • Whether it happened or didn't happen wasn't going

  • to change the outcome. In this circumstance,

  • early fog of war,

  • but there was massive, massive disagreement over like

  • who you wanted to sympathize with and right,

  • because a lot of people are sympathetic

  • to the Palestinians who've historically had a much,

  • much harder situation,

  • and the Israelis are more powerful-

  • but then a lot of people are really sympathetic to Israel

  • because of the terrorist attack against all of them.

  • So there's a lot to play for.

  • And the fact that Hamas had

  • that meaningfully successful disinformation in the early

  • moments of the war was a really big win for them.

  • Either way, the point is the same,

  • that we are no longer fighting a war

  • that is only on the ground with the success

  • or not of who's winning militarily.

  • So much more of the fight is being determined by

  • who is able to drive real-time disinformation

  • with the headlines in social media.

  • - Israel has launched a ground defensive in Gaza.

  • Do you believe such actions will make Israel safer,

  • or do you believe it could have the opposite effect?

  • - My view is that Israel has every right to want

  • to destroy Hamas as an organization.

  • But we are talking about 30 to 40,000 fighters.

  • And Hamas is, you know, they are,

  • they're absolutely integrated in the firmament

  • of civilian society across Gaza.

  • And you may remember that in the early days of the war,

  • Israel said that they were going

  • to do a siege on all of Gaza.

  • So not just Hamas, because you can't have a siege on Hamas.

  • Instead it was 2.3 million people:

  • We're not getting you food, we're not getting you water,

  • we're not getting you fuel,

  • we're not getting you medication.

  • And you know that that is going

  • to cause massive humanitarian tragedy.

  • But that was the Israeli response.

  • And my response to that is, "You don't wanna do that."

  • That is, you know, that's gonna create war crimes

  • and so you need to get humanitarian aid.

  • And finally they got some men, but nowhere near enough.

  • Then as they're bombing

  • and they're bombing all sorts of targets.

  • And as I said, it's not just fighting against Hamas on the

  • ground, it's also fighting information warfare.

  • They hit an ambulance.

  • Now that ambulance, it looks like it was being used

  • by Hamas fighters.

  • But if you've got videos that are showing

  • that the Israelis are hitting an ambulance,

  • what is Hamas gonna say?

  • What are people gonna run with?

  • It's, "Look, they're, they're hitting ambulances."

  • So you can't, it's not just what's happening on the ground,

  • it's also how what's happening on the ground is perceived.

  • So now you have a ground war

  • and that ground war is going to lead to far,

  • far more Palestinian civilians getting killed.

  • And it's happening

  • before large numbers of civilians can get out.

  • The Israeli government has been, they've sent leaflets,

  • they've warned everyone, you've gotta evacuate,

  • but they're telling people to evacuate into the south

  • before there's adequate food or water or fuel

  • or medicine for those people in the south

  • before there are adequate refugee camps set up

  • for those people in the South.

  • So who's gonna leave? How many people will go?

  • And of course, Hamas is also preventing

  • some of them from leaving.

  • It's hard to do. So my point is, Israel has time.

  • There is an urgent desire to get rid of Hamas,

  • but the Israelis are now laser-focused on their border

  • of security in a way that their government was not

  • before October 7th.

  • They are laser-focused on air defense.

  • They're laser-focused on sea defense in a way

  • that they were not before October 7th.

  • So my point is, spend more time

  • not just on how you're going to blow up Hamas,

  • but also on building your information war

  • on building your relations with other countries.

  • If the, if you're losing support from the United States

  • because you refuse to allow in aid for the Palestinians,

  • then you need to spend more time sending

  • in aid with the Palestinians.

  • If you're losing the Europeans, it's,

  • Ukraine has been in a much stronger position

  • because the entire West was standing with Ukraine.

  • The entire West is not standing with Israel.

  • And in part that's because the Israeli war cabinet has

  • refused to allow in the aid.

  • They've refused to provide adequate, safe zones

  • for the Palestinians to be able to, to, to spend time,

  • to get to and to live as families.

  • That's a huge problem.

  • So I believe that ultimately the Israelis will be safer

  • if they spend more time working with their allies

  • and developing a multilateral response.

  • Nobody out there from the West believes

  • that Israel should leave Hamas alone.

  • Nobody believes that there should be a permanent ceasefire

  • and they don't have the right to defend themselves.

  • That's not the argument.

  • The argument has been for a humanitarian pause.

  • The argument has been for a temporary ceasefire

  • that allows far more Palestinians to have the ability

  • to live and to live safely because the future of Israel

  • and peace in the region depends not just

  • on Israel destroying Hamas,

  • but also depends on the ability to create conditions

  • for peace between Israel

  • and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

  • And yes, there are some in Netanyahu's government

  • that have no interest in that.

  • Those people will be out of government after the war.

  • The Israelis do not want them anymore.

  • Do not trust them anymore.

  • But, but you can't be,

  • Israel will not be successful if they fight

  • this war by themselves.

  • They will not be successful if by destroying Hamas,

  • they also destroy the conditions for long-term peace

  • with the Palestinian people.

  • We all know that when Israel

  • was fighting against the PLO

  • and they removed them from Lebanon,

  • they ended up with Hezbollah-

  • that's not better. When the Americans fought against Saddam

  • Hussein and destroyed the Ba'ath party in Iraq,

  • they ended up with the Islamic state-

  • that's not better. So if Israel is going to destroy Hamas,

  • but they don't create the conditions for peace

  • with the Palestinian people,

  • they will end up with something worse.

  • So I am not suggesting that Israel should say, "Okay, okay,

  • okay, let's, we'll just make peace with Hamas."

  • They can't, that's not doable.

  • No one in Israel would support that.

  • But they have to also create conditions for peace

  • with the Palestinians that will live there

  • 'cause they're not going anywhere.

  • The idea among some in Netanyahu's government,

  • and by the way, far too many, that what really needs

  • to happen is you need the Palestinians to leave.

  • They need to, to go to Egypt, to the Sinai,

  • and maybe never come back, that they need

  • to take more territory

  • and let the settlers just, you know, sort of grab up all

  • of the West Bank and the Palestinians can go to Jordan-

  • they won't be Israel's problem anymore.

  • That is not a viable solution.

  • The Palestinians won't stand for it.

  • The Egyptians won't stand for it.

  • The Jordanians won't stand for it.

  • The Gulf states won't stand for it.

  • And these are countries that are not fundamentally Israel's

  • enemies, but they will not tolerate it.

  • So Israel must, must, must-

  • at the same time they are trying to destroy Hamas-

  • they must create conditions for peace

  • for the Palestinian people.

  • And my concern about a ground war today

  • on the ground in Gaza, is

  • that they are creating the conditions

  • to destroy Hamas without creating the conditions

  • for peace after Hamas.

  • - The United States and Israel have been

  • allies for a long time.

  • What effect are you seeing from the U.S. continuing

  • to support Israel, and how could

  • that play a role in the future of U.S. politics?

  • - I would say that Biden could not be more supportive

  • of Israel following the October 7th attacks.

  • His immediate decision to make a trip there,

  • the shuttle diplomacy by

  • Secretary of State Blinken in particular,

  • the willingness of the U.S. government to stay as long

  • as the United States exists,

  • that Israel will never have to stand alone.

  • Those are enormously powerful statements

  • and they are statements that are clearly shared in a broad

  • and bipartisan way in the United States.

  • But Generation Z, young people in the U.S.

  • support the Palestinian position

  • more strongly than they support Israel.

  • And you have seen that particularly on college campuses

  • across the country, but also more broadly

  • and many on the progressive wing of the Democratic party.

  • And I'm not just talking about "the Squad" and Rashida Tlaib

  • and AOC I'm talking more broadly are in increasingly,

  • deeply uncomfortable with the extent

  • of the Israeli military strikes against

  • Hamas and the Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

  • All of the, all of the human destruction

  • that we are all witnessing right now.

  • And President Biden has made it clear

  • to the Israeli war cabinet that the ability

  • of the United States to continue to provide

  • unconstrained support for Israel is a window

  • that will narrow if the present levels

  • of atrocities continue.

  • So the conditions

  • for peace are not just about making sure the

  • Palestinians have an opportunity to live,

  • they're also about making sure the Americans can continue

  • to support Israel the way they have here to fore.

  • I think it is not guaranteed

  • that in another four weeks time,

  • the U.S. will still be willing to provide the kind

  • of military equipment, high-tech, military equipment

  • and support that they have provided to Israel, historically,

  • if Israel continues

  • to fight the war the way they have been fighting it,

  • even the United States, Biden and his cabinet

  • and core members of Senate in the house are facing

  • that pressure from their own progressive wing-

  • and that is going to grow over time.

  • I also think that this is a risk for Biden in 2024

  • because this war right now is primarily about

  • Gaza and Hamas.

  • But there are American carrier strike groups in the Eastern med.

  • and in the Gulf.

  • They've already been involved in direct strikes

  • against Iranian Shia proxies in Syria.

  • There will surely be more

  • of those strikes in the coming weeks.

  • American servicemen and women have already taken casualties,

  • not deaths, not so far, but actually injured troops

  • because of the knock-on impact of the war

  • between Israel and Hamas.

  • So if it turns out

  • that the United States is directly involved in

  • a Middle Eastern war,

  • that Biden has not sold to the American people-

  • he hasn't justified-

  • you go from no wars started under the Trump administration

  • to two wars started under the Biden administration.

  • Neither of them started by Biden,

  • but both of them, the American taxpayers are paying for,

  • and one of which the Americans might be taking casualties.

  • That is a very hard thing to run on

  • if you are President Biden.

  • And they know it. It also, the distraction

  • of the Middle East and President Zelensky

  • of Ukraine has just been saying this has made it harder

  • for people to focus on the continued support for Ukraine,

  • especially given a counteroffensive that has failed.

  • So you now have these two massive global foreign policy crises

  • both of which are not looking so great

  • for the United States as we head into 2024.

  • I, I expect that Trump,

  • when he becomes the Republican nominee,

  • and that certainly looks very likely at this point,

  • will make a meal out of that.

  • That is a vulnerability for the United States

  • and Biden knows it.

  • So this is very much not just about the Middle East.

  • This has implications for the U.S. more broadly and globally.

  • - A lot of people are viewing this

  • as potentially a precursor

  • to something like we would see in World War III.

  • What do you think are the factors

  • that are keeping the situation from escalating

  • to a global conflict?

  • And do you think it could potentially escalate

  • to a bigger conflict

  • that involves a lot more parties like the United States

  • and potentially some other parties

  • both in the region and globally?

  • - We have seen that the Iranian President has,

  • and the Supreme Leader have both said things publicly

  • that imply that the world will burn

  • because of what the Israelis are doing in Gaza,

  • but they use the passive voice.

  • They are, they are very careful not to say,

  • "We Iran will do X, Y, and Z."

  • They'll say, "These are the impacts that it will have."

  • These are, these are clearly statements that are meant to

  • put Iran at a distance from direct involvement

  • and engagement, even though the Iranians are the ones

  • that have provided weapons and training and money for Hamas

  • and for Israel's principle enemies in the region.

  • We've seen that from Lebanon.

  • Nasrallah, Hassan Nasrallah who runs Hezbollah,

  • gave a really big

  • and very strongly anticipated speech where he said,

  • "You guys go Hamas, you're doing a great job."

  • But certainly did not in any way imply

  • that Hezbollah is going to be out there fighting for

  • and opening a second front as a consequence of

  • what Israel is doing on the ground in Gaza.

  • So, so far I would say we're four weeks in

  • the likelihood of expansion is significant,

  • but nobody sees World War III

  • coming anytime soon.

  • What we have is an expansion of Israel's fight

  • against Hamas,

  • and that means that we're gonna see a lot, a lot, a lot

  • more casualties.

  • And as that happens,

  • Israel will be under more international pressure,

  • there will be more antisemitism,

  • there'll be more attacks against Jews,

  • there will be more Islamophobia,

  • there'll be more attacks against Muslims,

  • there'll be more one-off nuisance strikes against

  • American bases in the region.

  • There'll be more American strikes against proxies of Iran.

  • That is an expansion of the war beyond Gaza.

  • It is not a regional war.

  • What we need to watch out for for a regional war is

  • that number one, Iran has influence over,

  • but not operational control over its proxies in the region.

  • And as the war in Gaza gets bloodier,

  • and if it looks like Hamas is really,

  • truly losing everything that they have,

  • there are others in the region that may well be willing

  • to fight and escalate against Israel

  • and against Americans in the region irrespective of

  • what Iran does or does not say to them.

  • So you can easily have farther escalation

  • by those organizations themselves.

  • The Shia militants in Iraq, in Syria,

  • the Houthis in Yemen in particular,

  • they could also engage in strikes into

  • the Straits of Hormuz.

  • They could hit oil tankers that could increase energy prices

  • and create a global recession.

  • Again, that would hurt Biden very dramatically.

  • We also, so far, thank God,

  • have not seen significant lone wolf terror attacks against

  • Americans inside the United States or in the region.

  • We've already heard from the head of the FBI

  • and from others that

  • that threat assessment is higher than they've seen at any

  • point post-9/11.

  • That's a real concern.

  • Obviously that's something that can happen.

  • If it does, the Americans are gonna need to respond.

  • So I, I don't think we are anywhere close to out

  • of the woods on this one.

  • And I, while I'm,

  • I'm deeply concerned about people out there talking about

  • World War III because I really don't see that as a,

  • you know, sort of proximate risk, the likelihood

  • that this can escalate in ways that none of the actors want

  • to see, but can happen anyway-

  • I think that's a very real possibility.

  • - This question comes from a subscriber in our Big Think

  • membership community.

  • Is there a two-state solution that ensures the rights

  • of Palestinians as well as the security interests of Israel?

  • - I cannot see any environment

  • where we have peace in the region without a two-

  • or three-state solution.

  • Whether, you know, you have

  • the Palestinians governed in the same way

  • with the same institutions

  • in Gaza and the West Bank are separate.

  • I don't know. But clearly,

  • the Palestinians must have the ability

  • to live in peace on land that they can defend and govern.

  • Now we are nowhere close to that,

  • but I think it was Henry Kissinger that said that

  • the time you get peace is when both sides are exhausted.

  • And he's someone that knows a lot about fighting wars

  • and war crimes, frankly,

  • but also knows a lot about negotiating peace.

  • And I do think that we are oddly closer

  • to a two-state solution today than we were on October 6th.

  • And the reason for that is

  • because everyone in this region

  • and with equities in this region now understand

  • that you can no longer ignore the Palestinian issue.

  • Or if you do, it's at your peril.

  • So yes, the, we're still in a time of war

  • and it's gonna get worse before it gets better.

  • But as we come out of this war, the level of demand

  • for finding a route for peace between the Palestinians

  • and the Israelis will be far more prioritized.

  • Much more capital will be expended on

  • trying to make that happen.

  • Some of that will be humanitarian resources to try

  • to rebuild Gaza.

  • Some of that will be diplomatic resources to try to come up

  • with what a new Palestinian authority

  • for Gaza might look like.

  • Who would those people be

  • and how would you build such an administration?

  • But you know, of course the more

  • suffering we see in the coming weeks

  • and months, I mean, if you're already talking about

  • half a percent of the Palestinian population in Gaza

  • is dead since October 7th;

  • one of every 200 Palestinians in Gaza dead-

  • and those numbers are going up.

  • I don't know exactly what those numbers are.

  • They fight between the United Nations

  • and between like, you know, the Gaza Health Ministry,

  • which is Hamas and you can't trust

  • them, but the numbers are big.

  • We know the numbers are big.

  • Like every one of those civilian deaths is going

  • to make it harder to get from here to there, right?

  • We've already suffered the pain

  • and tragedy to know that we need to move

  • to a two-state solution.

  • We know that.

  • But the damage that you can do to make that much,

  • much harder and longer term with the suffering

  • that will be remembered for generations

  • and generations, that is a very different story.

  • - Ian, thank you so much for your time today

  • and for the insights you're able

  • to provide the Big Think audience about this ongoing

  • and complicated conflict.

  • - It's great to be back with you.

  • - If you found this conversation

  • with Ian Bremmer valuable, we would love to hear from you.

  • Please respond with your feedback in the comments about the

  • format and the types of guests

  • or topics you would like to see in the future.

  • Thanks so much for watching.

- You can't have this conversation on CNN or Fox.

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Political scientist Ian Bremmer on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

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    Shao Chieh Lo に公開 2023 年 11 月 15 日
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