for being with us at The Global Boardroom.

Great to join you, thank you.

Let's start with the pandemic.

The US wants to lead the global response to Covid-19.

We always hear that.

But at the same time there have been criticism that one,

you're not sharing patents.

Two, there is an effective ban on exports

of some raw materials that are needed for vaccines production

elsewhere.

And there's also been criticism of Washington's response

to the horrendous situation right now in India,

where China, Russia, others, have really been ahead at least

in speaking out and in trying to help.

So, my question to you is are you leading in the way

that you would want?

And is China winning in vaccine diplomacy?

Well, I think we are leading.

And I think we're going to be leading increasingly

effectively because let's step back for one second

to look at what we've done, but also,

critically where we're going.

On day one of this administration,

President Biden put us back into the World Health Organization,

which is critical.

And of course we are now the leading contributor

in the world to COVAX, the facility that makes vaccines

available particularly to low and middle income countries.

$2bn invested.

Another $2bn between now and the end of 2022 as other countries

step up.

And, of course, that's not as obvious in some ways

or not as a direct, it doesn't seem

to have an American flag on it.

But it is a critical vehicle for making available vaccines.

There have been some challenges with COVAX.

It's been underfunded to date.

And, of course, India had been a primary supplier

and for obvious reasons that's been pulled back.

But COVAX remains an important facility.

In addition, besides that, we've worked

closely with partners in the so-called quad, with Australia,

with Japan, and India, to find other ways

to increase vaccine production and access over time.

We made some initial contributions, loans,

to our closest land neighbours, Canada and Mexico.

And now that our population has full access to vaccines,

we are in a place where with some of the vaccines that we've

contracted for, including the AstraZeneca

vaccines, of which there are about 60m,

we'll be able to move out and make those available.

We share this conviction, no one in the world

will be fully safe until, in effect, everyone is.

And as long as the virus is replicating somewhere

it could be mutating.

And as long as it's mutating it could come back to bite anyone,

including the United States.

So, we're really leaning into this.

So, you are starting to lean into this now.

But would it have made sense, months ago, for the US

and for other countries, including the UK,

to say we're going to vaccinate our populations, all of those

let's say over 40.

And then we're going to start sharing

with the rest of the world.

Rather than we're going to vaccinate

as much as possible, as quickly as possible,

and then, if we've got leftovers,

we'll give them away.

Well, you know, I think everyone has an obligation

and feels an obligation to vaccinate

their own populations.

But beyond that, just as it's necessary for our own security

and well-being, to see the rest of the world vaccinated,

so is it important for the security and well-being

of the rest of the world to see Americans vaccinated.

This works in both directions.

And I think we've had to do both.

Now, we're in a position where I believe we can.

So, we're putting in place a process

for the vaccines we've contracted

for that can be made available.

But also, critically, looking at ways

that we can ramp up production with other countries

around the world so that there is

a constant and growing supply.

We also don't know what some of the contingencies

are going to be, going forward.

Are people going to need booster shots at some point?

As younger people are able to get the vaccine,

we have to provide for them.

All of that's being factored in.

And then maybe a word about India

because it's so, so important.

This has touched Americans profoundly because we have,

as does the UK, such deep connections to India,

to the Indian people, and we've seen the images,

we've talked to colleagues and friends.

We've made a very significant effort, very quickly,

to try to get to India as much as we could

of what it needs most critically in this moment, oxygen

supplies, the various things that go into to holding

and distributing oxygen, PPE, therapeutics,

precursors to the extent that they're needed for vaccines.

All of that has started to flow.

We're in direct regular contact with our counterparts

from India.

Beyond that, what I've seen is an amazing mobilisation,

not just of the United States government,

but of our private sector and of Indian-Americans as well.

I was on a call a week ago with virtually every leading CEO,

it was a who's who, all wanting to help.

And the government, our government,

is co-ordinating those efforts.

So, we are doing everything we can.

India came to our assistance early

on, in our hour of need when we were having

real struggles with Covid-19, providing

millions and millions, for example, of protective masks.

We remember that and we're determined to do everything

we can to help now.

Let me ask you, President Biden said in his speech

to Congress last month that he hears from other world leaders

that they're happy to see the US back

but they often ask for how long.

How are you dealing with such concerns

and what are you hearing from your counterparts?

Well, you know I've heard some of the same thing.

I've heard a profound satisfaction

that we are back, that we are engaged, that we're working

closely with allies, and partners, and others, both

on a direct bilateral basis but also through institutions.

Multilateralism, as it's called in the lingo of foreign policy.

And sure, there's a question about the durability.

I understand that.

But I think that the more we can show success,

the more we can show especially to our own people

that this kind of engagement, this kind of work

with other countries, is actually

delivering results for them.

The more we're going to be able to sustain that going forward.

That really is the, I think, the challenge.

If we demonstrate that our kind of engaged foreign policy

is making a real difference in the lives

of our fellow citizens, they're going to support that

and they're going to support that going forward,

irrespective of who's president.

Let's talk about China, the biggest strategic challenge

that the US now faces.

You laid out your positions, both you

and the Chinese in Alaska, and the US

said it's going to stand up to its values,

the Chinese weren't too happy with that

and said they wouldn't accept interference

in the core issues, whether it's Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang.

What did you learn in Alaska about the Chinese approach

that you may not have known?

I'm not sure we learned anything new about their approach

and we did after the public fireworks have

about eight or 10 hours of very direct conversation

covering a whole series of issues.

The adversarial, the competitive,

and the co-operative, because all three

are features of our relationship.

But we wanted to have an opportunity

to speak directly and clearly to our Chinese counterparts

just so that there are no misunderstandings

and no miscommunication especially

about what we're all about.

And the case that we made to them is as follows.

We are not about trying to contain China

or to hold China down.

What we are about is upholding the international rules-based

order, that we've invested so much in over many decades, that

has served us well, but not just us.

We think for all its imperfections,

it's served the world pretty well,

including, by the way, China.

And anyone who takes action that would disrupt that order, that

would challenge that order, that would seek to undermine it,

we're going to stand up and protect it.

So, to your points, when China says to us things

that we complain about whether it's Xinjiang and the egregious

treatment of uighurs, or whether it's Taiwan,

or whether it's Tibet, or whether it's

Hong Kong, that these are internal matters,

they don't regard us.

That's simply not true.

When it comes to Xinjiang, for example,

China signed on to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

at the United Nations.

When it is not...

Well a lot of countries signed up to the Declaration of Human

Rights and you know...

Well, that's the point.

But our point is we take this seriously.

And this is part of the rules-based order.

And if you're not going to abide by your commitments,

we're going to say something about it

and we have the right to.

I'm interested in what happens next?

And what are you hoping to accomplish this year,

for example?

Look, we're engaged with China in a whole variety of places

on a variety of issues as part of the normal course

of doing business.

We're engaged with them right now on Iran and the effort

to return to compliance with the JCPOA.

There are going to be no doubt discussions about North Korea

and its nuclear programme going forward.

We're talking about climate.

President Xi has participated in President Biden's climate

summit.

There are a whole series of areas where we have clearly

overlapping interests.

And we're engaged.

But beyond that, we want the engagement

that we have with China to be results oriented

and practically focused on getting things done,

not just talk for the sake of talk.

That's what we're focused on.

One thing that you have said is that the US

wants to rebuild to demonstrate the resilience

of its own democracy and then approach China

from a position of strength.

I'm still trying to figure out what the end goal is.

You said, it's not to contain China.

But do you think that you can convince China to actually

change its behaviour?

I think in some areas, particularly when it's not just

the United States, it is countries around the world that

feel aggrieved by some practise that China is engaged

in, coming together, that stands a much better chance.

Let's just take economic and commercial issues, for example.

When it's the United States alone complaining about them,

we're 25 per cent of world GDP.

If we're working closely with other similarly aggrieved

countries, mostly democracies, that might well be 40 per cent,

50 per cent, 60 per cent of world GDP.

That's a lot harder for China to ignore.

And we've seen in the past when countries

that have been unhappy about the conduct of the government