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  • Welcome, everyone.

  • A "Forbes" article about Meb Faber's book

  • begins with the question, how does an investment manager

  • reconcile all of the various prognostications

  • he hears on a daily basis?

  • His curt and brief response was, ignore them.

  • Over 70 years ago, Ben Graham and David Dodd

  • proposed valuing stocks with earnings

  • smoothed across multiple years.

  • Robert Shiller later popularized this method

  • with his version of the cyclically adjusted price

  • to earnings, or the cape ratio, in the late 1990s

  • and correctly issued a timely warning of poor stock returns

  • to follow in the coming years.

  • Our speaker today Mr. Faber applies this valuation metric

  • across his global investments.

  • He's a co-founder and CIO of Cambria Investment Management

  • and has authored numerous white papers and three books--

  • "Shareholder Yield," "The Ivy Portfolio," and "Global Value."

  • A frequent speaker and writer on investment strategies

  • who has been featured in the "Barons,"

  • "The New York Times," and "The New Yorker,"

  • he is here today to speak about his investing philosophy.

  • So without further ado, friends, let's welcome Mebane Faber.

  • MEBANE FABER: It's great to be here today.

  • This is a nice, intimate audience.

  • So I usually fly through this pretty quick.

  • So if I'm going too fast, I say something

  • you don't understand, just raise your hand and wave at me.

  • This is interesting.

  • Because this is probably the first time in my entire life

  • I've been the most dressed up person in the room.

  • You know, suits for me, it's normally weddings, funerals.

  • I live down in So Cal.

  • So casual is kind of our normal entire anyway.

  • So it's a bit humorous.

  • Anyway, all right.

  • So we're going to get started real fast.

  • Since I don't see too many familiar

  • faces, quick introduction.

  • Again, my name is Mebane Faber, although I go by Meb.

  • Mebs lately have had a lot of great press.

  • This is the Meb who just won the Boston Marathon.

  • And as one of my friends' moms on social media

  • said when I posted a link to this,

  • said I didn't even know you ran, I said, well,

  • I know if you've seen any photos,

  • but he's in much better shape, much skinnier than I am.

  • I grew up in Colorado before spending some time

  • in North Carolina.

  • I went to college at University of Virginia.

  • So if anybody is watching the College World Series tonight,

  • go Hoos.

  • We're playing Vanderbilt.

  • So pretty excited about that.

  • May have to make a last minute trip to Omaha

  • here if we win one of the first two games.

  • Actually studied engineering in biology so.

  • I feel like I'm in good company today.

  • Probably a lot of engineers here.

  • My first job out of college was in Washington, DC.

  • Worked as a biotech analyst for biotech stocks

  • and was going to grad school at the time

  • before moving to San Fransisco.

  • So I lived in the Bay Area for about a year and a half

  • and then a brief-- and actually lived

  • with an early Google employee.

  • So I was gravitating more towards the quant side

  • of the business of the time.

  • So moved away from the bench, from the science--

  • I was always really terrible at it anyway--

  • but more towards quantitative investing.

  • A brief stop in Lake Tahoe, where I can get away

  • in most of the country saying that I actually

  • had gainful employment there.

  • But most to you can see through that and say,

  • you're probably a ski bum.

  • As you know, there's probably not a lot

  • of high investment companies going on in Tahoe.

  • But an interesting side story was that when I did live there,

  • I managed to sneak my way into a really, really great Google

  • party.

  • And if any of you all have been around long enough--

  • this is probably 2004-- anybody here

  • that used to go to the parties they had at Squaw-- wow, OK.

  • We got a couple.

  • So, I mean, we're talking six stages--

  • this is probably pre-IPO days.

  • You could still get away with this.

  • Six stages and ice sculptures and fire.

  • And they flew almost everybody in from around the world.

  • And of course, I wasn't working at Google

  • but had a number of friends did.

  • So I managed to sneak my way in.

  • And I remembered as I was walking today.

  • I'd completely forgotten about this.

  • But they gave every Google employee two drink tickets

  • and then I think you had to buy the rest or something.

  • But the good news is, most of my friends

  • worked in travel employment up there.

  • So I had it from friends working the hotel front desk

  • setting up the tents with the guys.

  • One of the guy says, here, you want some drink tickets?

  • You know, because we're all obviously

  • sneaking into the parties.

  • And he said, sure.

  • You know, you only get one or two.

  • He goes, here's 50.

  • Needless to say, I managed to get kicked out

  • of the party later that night, or the after party,

  • but really had a great time there.

  • It was really a lot of fun.

  • Moved down to LA.

  • I guess this should be a Kings photo now.

  • But I've been in Manhattan Beach for the past seven years.

  • When I started my company Cambria Investment Adviser,

  • spent a lot of time learning how to surf.

  • But I'm pretty terrible.

  • Look like this and this.

  • And if you've see the videos on YouTube lately,

  • one of the benefits of having technology,

  • of course, the go pros of the world,

  • is you get amazing footage, right?

  • But also, you learn some things you really probably

  • didn't want to know.

  • So being a surfer in Manhattan beach

  • and all of a sudden realizing that, yes,

  • underwater there's a lot of great white sharks.

  • So you've been seeing a lot of these videos coming out lately

  • where stand up paddleboarders are just

  • watching these great whites swim through the line up.

  • I would rather just not know, of course,

  • that our friends are there.

  • But they're harmless, right?

  • A bit about my company-- we started in 2006.

  • We manage about 430 million, maybe 440 million now.

  • We do individual accounts.

  • We manage public funds.

  • The goal-- and I feel like this try to include a Silicon Valley

  • term-- disrupt traditional high fee investing.

  • I have 100% of my net worth invested in our public fund.

  • So this isn't a theoretical exercise

  • we're going to talk about today.

  • But this is what I do with all my own money.

  • Now, before we start, this is a fun little quiz

  • we're going to pass around.

  • It's anonymous.

  • So don't worry.

  • Nobody's going to see what you wrote down.

  • But asked a simple question is for those of you

  • invest in stocks-- so ignore bonds.

  • Ignore real estate.

  • Ignore commodities or whatever else you

  • may trade-- currencies.

  • And you have to be US resident.

  • Otherwise, you'll bias the data.

  • How much do you put in the US?

  • So let's say you have 80% in the US, 20% in Japan.

  • Write down 80%.

  • So there's a little piece of paper

  • that's going to go around.

  • Just write down a number.

  • And then when it gets to the end, raise your hand.

  • And we'll get back to this a little bit later.

  • You can find a lot of information that we write about

  • and publish.

  • Again, I have a blog-- Mebfabor.com.

  • My company's website-- Cambria Funds.

  • There's a third site called The Idea Farm, but all of which

  • we publish.

  • Most of it is free.

  • There's 1,500 articles I've written

  • on the blog, about a dozen white papers, three books.

  • And as a benefit of sitting here during a lunch break

  • or taking the time out today or if you're watching the webcast,

  • I'm more than happy to send you a free book.

  • You can only pick one, though.

  • But the topic of this one today is a book

  • we put out a couple months ago called "Global Value."

  • But we've also published two others.

  • But I'll have more than happy to send you one.

  • Shoot me an email.

  • My personal email address-- mebane@gmail.

  • I tried to get meb@gmail in the early days,

  • but they said, no three letter Gmail addresses when it first

  • came out, sadly.

  • But anyway, shoot me one.

  • "Ivy Portfolio" is best in harder paperback.

  • It came out at a time when the Kindle software

  • wasn't that great yet.

  • So I would recommend reading that one in a hard cover

  • or paper back.

  • The other two, I would be happy to send you a free copy.

  • All right, so we're going to get started on the talk now.

  • And it's interesting.

  • Because a lot of people, when you talk about investing,

  • it's an interesting science.

  • And it's interesting because so many people

  • have such widely held beliefs, right?

  • And so, talking about it, in many ways,

  • to certain people, especially that aren't as open minded,

  • it's like talking about politics.

  • It's like talking about religion, right?

  • Trying to convince a buy and hold indexer

  • that you should be tactical is just

  • as difficult as trying to convince a Republican to be

  • a Democrat or someone to switch religions.

  • It's really difficult.

  • But we're going to talk about some interesting stuff

  • today that probably goes against a lot of conventional wisdom.

  • So keep an open mind.

  • You may agree with some of it, may not.

  • But it should be interesting.

  • I was going to name this chart or this topic

  • You Suck at Investing.

  • And when I say this, I don't mean any of you specifically.

  • I'm not pointing out any one of you, although most of you do.

  • But you're terrible at investing.

  • This is the broad investing public.

  • This is an example of a study that comes out

  • by Dow Bar that shows investor returns, dollar

  • weighted returns.

  • As you can see, typically, everything

  • did good except for the average investor.

  • Morningstar replicates this study for funds, right?

  • So the average investment fund-- when the money comes in,

  • when the money comes out.

  • And typically, what happens-- people are emotional.

  • They have a behavioral bias or they

  • rush into stocks or performance of a fund at the top

  • and then sell at the bottom.

  • And they do it over and over and over again.

  • That costs you roughly about 2% a year typically, right?

  • So all you that are getting really excited about stocks

  • again after the fifth year of this bull market

  • but weren't investing in 2008 or 2009,

  • you maybe want to take a little bit of pause, think about it.

  • But it's important to come up with a systematic investment

  • approach to avoid some of these genetic behavioral biases

  • we have.

  • A good visual representation of this

  • is, there's an American Association

  • of Individual Investors-- polls their readers and says,

  • simple question.

  • Are you bullish on the stock market, bearish, or neutral?

  • This goes back to late '80s.

  • So the red is kind of average values.

  • The green triangle is where we are now.

  • So kind of average.

  • What you can see, though, is a little bit of complacency.

  • The neutral is a little higher than normal, right?

  • And that kind of reflects what's going on the market.

  • There's low volatility.

  • A lot of people haven't really participated.

  • They got out in '08, '09, and have never really gotten back

  • in.

  • Don't really know what to do.

  • But we do see, when were people most bullish?

  • The absolute worst time in history

  • to be bullish-- January of 2000, for those

  • of you that were investing them.

  • When were people most bearish?

  • The absolute best time to be investing in my career,

  • March, 2009.

  • This goes to show, the whole point

  • is that your emotions could work against you, right?

  • And it's what has come down on our genetics

  • for many millions of years, right?

  • What was important when you're on the savanna

  • and a tiger is chasing is very different than what the skill

  • set and genetics needed to trade shares

  • of IBM or Google or short gold or whatever it may be, right?

  • But this isn't anything.

  • This is something that's been going on for hundreds of years.

  • This is an example that goes back to the early 18th century.

  • This is in a paper we wrote called Learning

  • to Love Investment Bubbles.

  • But this is an example of one of the most famous bubbles.

  • And there's some great books on this topic.

  • "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds"

  • is a really wonderful one-- talks

  • about many historical bubbles.

  • What this shows is an example of a stock that went parabolic

  • in the early 18th century.

  • It was a [INAUDIBLE] stock.

  • We talk about it in this paper.

  • It's a really interesting story.

  • It involves a lot of the things that typically happen

  • in bubbles-- easy access to money, credit, people

  • borrowing.

  • But the most important one is people making a lot of money.

  • And a very great example is one of the most rational, brilliant

  • scientists of all times, Sir Isaac Newton,

  • was an investor in this company.

  • It goes to show his experience that will probably

  • mimic a lot of investors experiences

  • in stock that went parabolic and went in bubbles.

  • So an example-- I joke a lot on my blog and Twitter

  • that this probably looks like a chart of Bitcoin, to which I

  • get a lot of hate mail about, strangely.

  • I've been writing for seven years.

  • And all of a sudden, I start getting hate mail.

  • Anyway, so this example.

  • So Neuton buys in, doubles his money.

  • What is that?

  • Yeah, doubles his money.

  • Could not be happier.

  • What's the worst possible thing when

  • you've made money and gotten out?

  • Well, it's that your friends are making more money, right?

  • Someone just sold an app company.

  • Uber's valued at $18 billion.

  • Someone else did this Yo app that's getting

  • millions of downloads, right?

  • What's the worst possible thing that could happen?

  • It's your friend in the next cubicle

  • is making more money than you.

  • Or your friends are all getting rich but you're not.

  • So what happens, of course?

  • Well, then he decides to buy back in, OK?

  • Well, of course, he's buying near the top, at the peak.

  • What happens?

  • It crashes 90%.

  • Well, then he sells at the bottom, OK?

  • Well, this is something that happens over and over again

  • in investing.

  • And so I just want to show it's nothing new.

  • And think about this as we go forward.

  • So what can you do?

  • Is there anything you can do to remove this emotional decision

  • making to combat our behavioral biases?

  • Well, so there are these two good looking guys

  • you may recognize, may not.

  • On the left is Ben Graham, often known

  • as the father of security analysis.

  • He wrote a couple great books.

  • He's a professor early 20th century

  • called "Security Analysis-- An Intelligent Investor."

  • And what he proposed is, when looking at an investment

  • to value the company and often to smooth out the valuation

  • by using earnings over a number of years.

  • Not just looking at one year of earnings,

  • but his preferred metric was smoothing it out over five

  • to seven years.

  • There's a way to smooth out the business cycle, right?

  • As a way to have a fundamental anchor

  • to be able to compare companies to each other on a long term

  • basis.

  • Fast forward 80 years later-- so this is nothing new.

  • This has been around almost a century.

  • Robert Shiller, recent Nobel laureate,

  • just won with Eugene Fama, professor at Yale.

  • He put out a white paper in the late '90s

  • called "Irrational Exuberance."

  • Sorry, excuse me, a white paper, then a book

  • called "Irrational Exuberance."

  • Alan Greenspan later used the term in Congress,

  • promptly sent the stock market down quite a bit.

  • But he says, let's take a look at this.

  • But let's use it on the market-wide basis as a whole.

  • Let's look at 10 year average earnings across the entire US

  • stock market called the 10 year Cyclically Adjusted Price

  • Earnings ratio-- CAPE, right?

  • So this is an example of what that looks like back to 1881.

  • So that's a long time.

  • And the problem you have with efficient market people--

  • people that say, the market's efficient.

  • You can't predict bubbles-- or sorry, bubble don't exist.

  • First of all, they say, bubbles don't exist.

  • They do exist.

  • You can't predict them.

  • And that doesn't make much sense to me.

  • If you look at this chart, there's

  • an average value of around 16, 17 times earnings,

  • right, that the US stock market has been in.

  • There's times when it's been incredibly low,

  • in the low single digits-- think 1910s as well

  • as post depression.

  • But there's also times when things get incredibly bubbly.

  • If you look at the late '20s, you get to a value of over 30.

  • If you look at the biggest bubble in the US stock

  • market's ever seen in the late '90s, you have a value of 45.

  • Does it seem even remotely reasonable

  • that it is a good a time to buy stocks when they're trading

  • at 45 times earnings in 1999 as it

  • was in the early 1980s at a value of five?

  • That does not pass a common sense sniff test for me.

  • So if you look at this, you say that OK, does it work?

  • Historically, being a scientist, an engineer, does this work?

  • Historically, it's worked great.

  • If you buy stock market when it's cheap at, say,

  • less than a CAPE ratio of 10, you get great future returns.

  • These are 10 returns going forward-- real returns.

  • So we're netting out inflation.

  • And it's a nice stair step down.

  • The more you pay for stocks, the lower your future returns are.

  • It is-- again, it's not rocket science.

  • It's simple.

  • But this works out over a long term time horizon.

  • If you look at where we are now, we're at a value of around 26.

  • So unfortunately, in the worst bucket

  • where the red line is right now where future returns should

  • be pretty muted, pretty low.

  • We don't think it's a bubble.

  • It's not crazy.

  • But I was talking about this at lunch today.

  • There's a spectrum of future returns, right?

  • And simply, the more the market goes up

  • in the meantime means the lower your future returns are

  • going to be.

  • The more the market goes down in the meantime,

  • the higher your future returns are going to be in general.

  • The best possible thing that could

  • happen, if you're a young person in this room, is the market

  • could crash by 50%.

  • Maybe the best possible thing, but the best possible thing

  • for your investing career.

  • Because you can then invest in the US for the next 10, 20,

  • 30, 40 years at a much cheaper valuation.

  • That is not the opportunity set right now, unfortunately.

  • We're going to stop on this one real quick.

  • It's just a scatter plot for the nerds out there like me

  • that goes to show that valuation-- it looks almost

  • like a shotgun blast, right?

  • Doesn't explain everything.

  • We're in kind of the yellow area.

  • But in general, the more expensive you pay for stocks,

  • the worse the future returns are.

  • The less you pay for them, the better the future returns are.

  • I don't expect you to see this chart.

  • I don't expect you to really even appreciate what it is.

  • From just the colors, it looks like a bowl

  • of, like, Fruity Pebbles, right?

  • But what this is-- this is CAPE ratio buckets.

  • So the dark green, or the cheapest buckets, all the way

  • out to red, which are the most expensive.

  • And these five columns are future annualized

  • 10-year returns.

  • And the only take away from what you

  • should see in this chart is that most of the green stuff

  • is on the right, meaning your starting points

  • when they're cheap-- great future returns.

  • And most of the red stuff is on the left.

  • When you pay too much, in general,

  • you get crappy returns going forward.

  • However, it's not guaranteed, right?

  • You see there's three great returning years

  • on the far right when you started out

  • with pretty rich valuations.

  • And on the left, there's even a few green, light greens,

  • when markets are cheap that you had kind of low returns.

  • So valuation is not-- it is what we like to call a blunt tool.

  • It is not an exact science, which makes it challenging

  • as well as fun.

  • But if you look at the 10 best times

  • to buy stocks in the past-- I think

  • this is 114 years-- awesome returns.

  • 16% a year, net of inflation.

  • You can really compound massively at that level.

  • The starting valuation was around 11.

  • The 10 worst possible times to be

  • buying stocks over the past 114 years--

  • negative returns every year.

  • Starting valuation was an average of 23, all right?

  • So where do we find ourselves today?

  • A secular bull market starting point around 11 or a secular

  • bear market starting point around 23.

  • The bad news is we're on the more expensive side.

  • There's a caveat, of course.

  • This is the PE ratios versus inflation.

  • When inflation is low and contained--

  • let's call this 1% to 4% safe range which

  • goes to about here to here-- people

  • are willing to pay more for stocks, right?

  • Because the future is slightly more certain.

  • When inflation is really high-- think about Argentina,

  • think about these countries that have

  • consistent high inflation-- Venezuela--

  • when you're a business and you're

  • trying to plan for the future, it's really difficult.

  • On top of that, your future cash flows are worth less.

  • Because every month you're losing money

  • to this erosion of inflation.

  • So you'll see a warning sign.

  • This may never happen in the next 10, 20 years.

  • Who knows?

  • Maybe it will.

  • In the '70s, the US had double digit inflation.

  • It's hard for many of us to comprehend now.

  • But thinking about inflation going up

  • that much-- we live in a world of,

  • let's called it 1 and 1/2, 2% inflation

  • hopefully right now, not even that much.

  • But the takeaway is, that until inflation

  • gets above really that 3%, 4% kind of upper level,

  • people are willing to pay more for stocks for that certainty.

  • Again, they're not willing to pay

  • 26, which is off this chart.

  • But they're willing to pay a little bit more.

  • There's a lot of criticisms of this valuation methodology.

  • What I want to impress on you, when you're valuing something,

  • most of the valuation indicators should agree.

  • So it doesn't even really matter if you're using CAPE

  • or you're using price to book or you're

  • using cash flows or Buffett's favorite market cap, the GDP,

  • in general they should say the same thing.

  • But, so a lot of people say the measurement period is too long.

  • In our book "Global Value," we show

  • that the best period is around five to seven years.

  • So Ben Graham was right.

  • Seven years, I think, was the best.

  • 10 is just fine.

  • What's the worst?

  • One year earnings.

  • What do most analysts on Wall Street use?

  • One year earnings.

  • So we don't know why.

  • A lot of people say that ignores depressions or bubbles.

  • We're not going to get into that because we

  • don't have enough time today.

  • And we certainly aren't going to get into the accounting,

  • talking about reported and operating earnings.

  • But if you want to email me or you have questions,

  • I'm more than happy to talk about it.

  • This is a good chart from my good friend John Housman

  • that goes to show it doesn't even

  • matter what valuation metric you use.

  • These are a bunch of different models using

  • earnings, dividends, Schiller CAPE.

  • This is Buffett's favorite-- 10 year market cap GDP.

  • And then, how does it actually work

  • in the future 10-year returns?

  • And what you can see in general is

  • they all tend to move together, right?

  • Generally.

  • They're not going to be incredibly specific.

  • But what this shows is that this is projected future returns,

  • right?

  • So it's like the valuation chart flipped upside down.

  • But what it goes to show-- and it's

  • pretty good at this-- it says, look.

  • When were returns projected to be the worst?

  • Late '90s, right?

  • That's a terrible time to be buying stocks.

  • But as the market has gone down, stocks have gotten better.

  • And in 2008, stocks were supposed

  • to return double digits.

  • But no one wanted to be buying, even though they were cheap.

  • But certainly not a good buying opportunity

  • is the early '80s, which is the start of the biggest bull

  • market we've ever seen in the US, but getting better.

  • So again, people like to think in terms of,

  • stocks are expensive.

  • They're going to crash.

  • Sell.

  • When stocks are cheap, we've got to buy them.

  • They're going to go up to double digits.

  • But in reality, it's usually somewhere in the middle.

  • People don't like hearing something like,

  • the future expected returns are going to be about 4%,

  • which is what we think, which is what the model shows,

  • which isn't that exciting.

  • So as you think about this, and thinking about bubbles

  • and thinking about the efficient market

  • and not overpaying for something,

  • we think it's important to understand risk, right?

  • And the risk of loss and the very real risk

  • of losing a lot of money.

  • A Great Arthur Ashe quote-- either you understand the risk

  • or you don't play the game.

  • And we have a picture of the mouse who's

  • trying to get the cheese but being smart

  • about it-- wear a helmet.

  • And someone on Twitter the other day said, you know,

  • Meb, your CAPE measure, the Schiller CAPE measure

  • is kind of like the difference of chance of fatality

  • if you're driving a car at 200 miles an hour

  • versus five miles an hour, right?

  • You're much more likely to get into a big wreck fatality

  • at 200 miles an hour then you are at five.

  • So that leaves us with the problem.

  • Every pension fund in the country

  • expect 8% returns per year.

  • We wrote a paper called, "What if 8% is 0%?"

  • Pension funds investing with eyes closed, fingers crossed.

  • What do you do?

  • US bonds yield 2 and 1/2%.

  • Stocks should return around 5%.

  • That's not that exciting, right?

  • Your 4% yield or 4% roughly return.

  • The math doesn't work out.

  • It doesn't work out for a lot of institutions

  • that are going have really big troubles with their pension

  • funds that will likely eventually go broke

  • in the next 10 to 20, 30 years.

  • So what do you do?

  • If you're looking at return, what do you do?

  • This is a chart.

  • We've never seen anyone do this.

  • So we had to go create this.

  • We said, all right.

  • We live in a global world.

  • Let's look at 45 developed and emerging economies, countries,

  • and come up a CAPE ratio for all of these, right?

  • And so we took this back to the early '80s.

  • And in general, the takeaway of this chart

  • is that most things move together, right?

  • And generally, stocks are correlated, right?

  • It's a globalized world, right?

  • What happens in the US is going to affect

  • what happens in China and India and Japan and vice versa.

  • So in general, they move together.

  • However, you can see some pretty wide dispersion

  • at certain times and over the years.

  • And then you also see a few things.

  • This massive, massive outlier over here, this bubble.

  • There's a lot of young faces in the crowds,

  • so you probably don't remember this.

  • But Japan in the late '80s was widely

  • expected to take over the world, right?

  • Their companies were better.

  • Their cars were better.

  • There were more efficient companies.

  • The valuation of their stock market

  • is the biggest bubble we've ever seen.

  • And it's not even close.

  • They hit a valuation ratio CAPE of like 95 or maybe it's 99.

  • I can't see.

  • 95, it looks like.

  • And so it's funny.

  • Because you hear commentators talk about the lost

  • decades in Japan and how terrible the stock market

  • returns have been in the '90s and 2000s, right?

  • No, it's because they had one of the biggest

  • bubbles you've ever seen.

  • And it's taken them that long to work that off, right?

  • When did Japan finally get back to a reasonable valuation?

  • Only in the last few years.

  • What happened?

  • Japan is the best performing stock market

  • in the world last year.

  • But the efficient market person will

  • say that it was just a good a time to buy Japan in late 1989

  • when the real estate under the Imperial palace

  • was worth more than the entire state

  • of the real estate of California.

  • Things that just don't make sense.

  • But to us, coming up with this objective measure

  • of a fundamental metric, fundamental anchor,

  • can that help you?

  • So we said, we reran the same test.

  • Does starting valuation impact future returns?

  • And the answer is, it does in the same exact way

  • that the US did, right?

  • The less you pay for something, the better it is.

  • I don't care if it's baseball cards, a Tesla, whatever

  • you think.

  • The less you pay for it, the better it's going to be.

  • The more you pay for it, the worse your returns

  • are going to be.

  • Where are we right now?

  • With foreign developed markets and foreign emerging,

  • they're both right around 15.

  • So the two red bars here emerging

  • was a little bit cheaper.

  • So this bar developed is a little higher than 15.

  • But much better returns than in the far right bucket,

  • which is the US.

  • So, much more opportunity.

  • What happens if you went back and said, you know what?

  • We're going to only investing in the cheapest countries.

  • Instead of this global portfolio, what if we just

  • invested in the cheapest 25% of countries each year?

  • Takes five minutes a year, rebalance.

  • Well, that would have done fantastic.

  • So this is what the global portfolio

  • would have looked like.

  • The top CAPE, which is the cheapest countries,

  • did a much better job than the bottom CAPE,

  • the expensive countries, OK?

  • Again, not complicated.

  • But buying value works.

  • It has worked over time.

  • Enormous amount of literature that

  • shows this investing in stocks worked great.

  • This is what the equity curve looks like, right?

  • This is a logarithmic chart to equalize returns over time.

  • But again, yellow line, that's investing in what's expensive.

  • Not a bright idea.

  • Black line, buy and hold of all the countries.

  • The blue and red lines are two different variations

  • of buying the cheapest.

  • One is you said, you know what?

  • It probably makes sense to invest in the cheapest.

  • But only invest in the cheapest when they are the cheapest.

  • What if everything is expensive?

  • So like, in the late '90s, for example, right?

  • You don't want to be investing in stocks

  • when everything is expensive.

  • So we use the absolute metric caps of around,

  • I think it was 18 in the book-- maybe it was 20-- to say,

  • you know what?

  • If things get that much, we'll start to move the cash, right?

  • And so you'll come with a little bit less volatile portfolio.

  • Same returns over time, but avoid

  • some of the big draw downs and losses of buy and hold.

  • But what's really interesting-- and this

  • happens a lot in various fields-- is I have a buddy,

  • John Bollinger says, you know, all

  • the information is in the tails, right?

  • So the ends of the distribution.

  • That's when things get really interesting.

  • And so, what we call is-- there's a famous investing

  • phrase that says, investing when there's blood on the streets.

  • Hopefully not literally, but when

  • things are really, really bad.

  • So we call this at a CAPE ratio below seven,

  • which doesn't happen that much.

  • It's only happened in the US a couple times.

  • Future returns are fantastic.

  • One, three, five years, you're compounding your money

  • at 20% percent a year.

  • What's the opposite?

  • Bubble, right?

  • Where the markets are really expensive-- over 45.

  • So that's the peak of the US, right?

  • But anyone remembers back to 2006, 2007,

  • if you were investing then, the BRICs, right?

  • This expression-- Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

  • That's where you want to invest.

  • That's where the world's going.

  • What they didn't mention was that China and India

  • were both trading at CAPEs above 40.

  • I think China hit 65, right?

  • And so China has had horrific stock market

  • returns since then.

  • Is anyone talking about China that much anymore?

  • No.

  • But China is at a great valuation now.

  • But this is what happens over and over.

  • People are much more interested in investing here-- they're

  • excited because returns have been great-- then there.

  • It's really hard to invest in the low markets.

  • Part of that is simply behavioral, right?

  • All the news is bad, right?

  • The news is usually terrible.

  • So let's give you some common examples.

  • Where are we now?

  • I just updated this at the end of last month.

  • You look at the left.

  • The cheapest markets in the world-- Greece

  • had the lowest valuation we've ever seen at a value of 2

  • in the summer of 2012.

  • Greece is now up 200%.

  • Their stock market off the bottom.

  • Russia hit a value around five, maybe got down to four

  • a couple months ago.

  • Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Italy, most of Europe, right?

  • But where the returns are best is

  • when things go from truly horrific to merely less bad.

  • Russia is a perfect example.

  • We've been on TV the last few months

  • pounding the table for Russia, saying

  • Russia is cheap on every valuation metric we can find,

  • to which all the TV anchors say, well, what about Crimea?

  • What about Putin?

  • What about all these things that are happening?

  • But that's when you want to be investing.

  • Sir [INAUDIBLE] famous quote.

  • He says, don't ask me where things are best.

  • That's the wrong question.

  • Ask me where things are the worst.

  • The challenge with why this strategy works and will

  • continue to work-- imagine going home

  • to your wife, your husband, sister, brother, neighbor,

  • and say, you know what?

  • I heard this great presentation today.

  • I'm putting my money into Greece and in Russia.

  • Now, the next four-- the next-- you'll get slapped or divorced

  • or what not.

  • In my industry, you'll get fired, right,

  • as a money manager.

  • And it's funny because the European names--

  • the European names don't elicit as much hatred right now,

  • right?

  • Most people say Hungary, Austria, Italy, OK.

  • Interesting.

  • You go back a couple years when the euro was disintegrating--

  • no one wanted to be investing in those countries.

  • Italy-- second best stock market in the world this year.

  • It's up, I think, almost 20%.

  • So when things-- as the news flow recedes,

  • Russia from the bottom-- here's the dumb things you

  • here at the bottom, right?

  • US government press secretary goes to Twitter and says,

  • someone asked him about Russia.

  • And he says, you know what?

  • I would be selling Russian stocks if I were you.

  • In fact, I would be shorting them.

  • This is the press secretary giving this advice

  • to the general public of not only selling Russian stocks,

  • but shorting them, OK?

  • He's suggesting, first of all, telling the investment

  • public, short anything-- horrific advice.

  • You can lose your entire account.

  • Talking about shorting a market that goes up and down 5% a day,

  • the volatility is off the charts.

  • And oh, by the way, it's the second cheapest market

  • in the world.

  • What's happened since then?

  • I like to-- not patting myself on the back,

  • Russia is up, what 25% from the bottom.

  • Press secretary no longer has a job.

  • I'm not saying that's why-- related.

  • But if you look at the right side,

  • these are the most expensive.

  • I was really unpopular in the last year.

  • I give talks in Colombia, in Bogota, and in Mexico.

  • And I said, look.

  • I love your country.

  • I love the food.

  • I love the people.

  • But your stock market is one of the most expense in the world.

  • And Columbia at the time was in the mid to high 30s.

  • And their market has got pounded since then.

  • Again, I'm only going to start traveling to countries

  • where they're really cheap now so they'll

  • enjoy my message, say that's great.

  • Bring us good news.

  • US is one of the most expensive in the world, OK?

  • The US is not in a bubble.

  • It's nowhere close.

  • But returns?

  • Maybe 5% a year going forward.

  • But what's important is even if you invest in the indexes,

  • right-- the broad foreign developed--

  • there's huge dispersion within those indexes, right?

  • So what we talk about is buying a basket of these countries.

  • And here's why you need to buy a basket instead of just one.

  • This is Greece stock market.

  • And the black numbers are the CAPE ratios over time.

  • Late '90s-- reasonable CAPE ratio, awesome return.

  • Market doubled.

  • 150% returns.

  • Hits a value of 40.

  • That's bubble territory.

  • Massive bear market around with the rest

  • of world-- 2000, 2001, 2002.

  • Hits a low single digit value.

  • Great time to be buying.

  • Massive run up again.

  • Hits a value where the US is right now.

  • Not terrible, but then the Euro crisis 2008 happens.

  • The challenge here is what they call

  • catching a falling knife, right?

  • Where the market is falling.

  • It's getting cheaper and cheaper.

  • But then it proceeds to get cheaper still, right?

  • Once this got to 10, you would say, that's cheap.

  • And then you bought it.

  • And it goes to eight.

  • Then it goes to six.

  • Then it goes to four.

  • Then it goes to two, right?

  • So you watched it continue to get cheaper.

  • There's a famous investing joke that says,

  • what do you call market that's down 90%?

  • That's a market that was down 80%,

  • and then proceeded to go down 50% more, right?

  • The way the math works out.

  • And we talked about this at lunch.

  • The compounding that people talk about-- eighth

  • wonder the world is compounding, right?

  • Where if you just invest long enough,

  • it works out in your favor.

  • Well, what they don't talk about is the opposite.

  • The bigger hole you get in, the compounding works against you.

  • So the kink doesn't really happen

  • until you lose about 10% to 15% of your money.

  • You lose 10%, it takes, what 11 to get back to even?

  • You lose 20, it takes 25.

  • You lose 50, it takes 100% to get back to even.

  • You lose 75%, it takes 300% to get back to even.

  • You think 75% is unrealistic?

  • US had a 90% drawdown in the '30s.

  • US has had multiple 50% draw downs.

  • Every G10 country in the world has lost at least 2/3

  • of its stock market value at one point.

  • So go ask someone in Cyprus what they think about buy and hold

  • investing.

  • You'll get a very different perspective than someone

  • in the US.

  • We've been publishing these values for a while.

  • This is a good example of 2013 and where

  • the values stood at the time.

  • I don't expect you all to see this.

  • But again, Columbia was up at 34, Peru at 34.

  • Greece, Ireland-- I don't include the frontier markets

  • usually.

  • But we use Argentina because they're too small to liquid.

  • But a lot of those names.

  • And then what happened?

  • Well, had you bought a basket of the bottom five countries

  • or 10 20% returns in 2013.

  • If you bought the most expensive, minus 5%

  • to minus 18%, right?

  • So buying expensive stuff-- not a great idea was.

  • There's two outliers here.

  • One, cheap country Russia, which went from seven down to five,

  • had negative returns last year?

  • And what's the outlier on the opposite side?

  • Expensive country that got more expensive-- the US had

  • a monster year last year.

  • There's nothing that can stop-- so this

  • is one of the challenges of being

  • an investor with a long term time horizon.

  • You have to mentally prepare yourself for the possibility,

  • however small it may be, that the US market can decline 80%

  • or increase in value 100%, right?

  • Those valuations have existed in the past-- so,

  • from where we are today.

  • What's the only difference?

  • What people are willing to pay, right?

  • That's it.

  • How much are you willing to pay for one share of the S&P 500?

  • And so both of those happen in the past.

  • And most people set up their investing program

  • or how they invest ignoring both of those possibilities.

  • Say, you know what?

  • If I just have a long enough time horizon,

  • things are going to be OK.

  • Can you sit through a 50% bear market?

  • Can you sit through an 80%?

  • Going back to the statistics earlier, remember.

  • People can't.

  • They buy things here, they sell things

  • there over and over again.

  • The good news-- I don't want this to be too depressing.

  • This is the average of global valuations.

  • Generational lows, single digit CAPE ratios.

  • Early '80s-- again, best time to buy in everyone's career.

  • But expensive things got expensive.

  • Late '90s, a special bubble.

  • Market got hammered, went back up. '07, right?

  • Bubble-- bubble territory again.

  • Huge bear market.

  • But most of the world has lagged the US over the past five

  • years.

  • So we're down in this cheap territory.

  • Most of the world's pretty cheap.

  • And going back to this chart, many countries

  • are really cheap, all right?

  • So moving towards the left side of this chart

  • away from the right side the chart is important.

  • Why this matters to you-- where's that piece of paper?

  • Did you pass it up to me?

  • Oh jeeze, you guys are even worse than normal.

  • OK, there's another bias called over confidence.

  • And I'm sure this room has it in spades.

  • This is why I became a quant is I read a lot of literature

  • on my suggest behavioral-- there's

  • a lot of great behavioral books.

  • James Montier writes some of the best there are.

  • But to take a little time to read those books.

  • Because you'll see a lot of behavioral bias--

  • overconfidence, right?

  • More than half this room thinks they're smarter than

  • the other half, better looking, better drivers, right?

  • Statistically, that's impossible.

  • And the same thing with the population.

  • I asked this question.

  • I've asked it in my last eight speeches.

  • I've gotten the same answer more or less at every speech.

  • The average amount people invest--

  • and I'm sure you circled it here.

  • This is, right?

  • 78% in the US.

  • That's called home country bias.

  • That happens in every country around the world.

  • Americans invest all their money in the US.

  • Italians invest all their money in Italian stocks.

  • People in Greece do the same thing.

  • People in Japan.

  • That's a terrible idea.

  • And I'll tell you why.

  • It can be a good year.

  • But in gen-- It can be a good idea.

  • In general, it's a terrible idea.

  • The US-- this is global market capitalization.

  • What percentage of all these countries

  • are they say of the entire world?

  • US is half.

  • If you're a vanguard John Vogel devote, index

  • through and through, buy and hold,

  • you should only have half your portfolio in US stocks.

  • No one does.

  • You go to a financial advisor, any advisor almost

  • on the planet and say, what do you think?

  • How much should I put in the US?

  • It's almost always 70%, which is the broad average

  • for the country-- not just retail, but professional

  • as well.

  • Same thing happens in every other country, right?

  • And it's more insidious in other countries.

  • Because often, they're a tiny part of market cap.

  • So, Canada, you're 4%.

  • But you're putting 70% in Canada?

  • You're getting no exposure to the global world.

  • Think back to the Japan example and why this is so bad.

  • And this lines up the two bubbles just

  • to show you how bad the Japanese just

  • dwafted our cute '90s internet bubble, right?

  • This is kind of months to the peak. we just lined them up.

  • But this goes to show that this massive bubble-- look

  • how long it took Japan to work that off, right?

  • It only got cheap in the 2010, 2011, 2012.

  • Japan in the late '80s was half of world market cap.

  • Same as we are today, right?

  • That's hard to think.

  • Those negative return for the next 20 years

  • were a massive drag on your portfolio,

  • right, on a global portfolio, which

  • is what market cap weighting does.

  • Market cap weighting means you're

  • investing based on the broad portfolio.

  • You invest the most in the biggest companies.

  • Right now, that's what Exxon, Apple-- certainly up there.

  • But usually, the only metric they're using is price.

  • They're not using valuation.

  • They're just, what's biggest?

  • Well, that's a terrible thing.

  • This is a chart of the S&P 500.

  • This is the blue line.

  • This asks a simple question.

  • What if you invest in the biggest stock, biggest company

  • in the US when each one held the Crown?

  • So, familiar names-- Apple, Cisco, Exxon, GE, IBM,

  • Microsoft, Walmart.

  • It's a horrific thing to do.

  • Look at how much worse the returns are.

  • Let's think about why.

  • It's simple capitalism, OK?

  • When you're big, when you're Google,

  • you have a huge target on your back.

  • Why?

  • Well, everyone else would like to make money too.

  • And they see how successful you are.

  • So it's simple competition.

  • There's a study that came out-- some friends down

  • in So Cal-- research affiliates that said,

  • what happens when you invest in the largest

  • company in the market?

  • One of your future speakers actually did a study on this

  • as well-- Munish [? Perbri. ?] He'll be talking, I think,

  • next month.

  • He said, what happens if you invest

  • in the largest company in the market?

  • That company underperforms the market

  • by 3% a year for the next 10 years, all right?

  • Big time out-performance.

  • Happens in every sector.

  • The largest stock in every sector

  • underperforms the market in the next 10 years by 3% a year.

  • So getting-- and the reason being, again,

  • going back to Japan, market cap weighting over weights expense

  • countries and companies, all right?

  • So because the reason they're expensive,

  • there's only one variable, which is size.

  • Typically, the biggest is most expense.

  • So it's not always the case.

  • Right now, for example, small caps.

  • I would not touch them with a 10 foot pole in US.

  • They're the most expensive they've ever

  • been relative to large cap stocks.

  • So I would highly avoid.

  • But again, the US isn't always one of the most expensive.

  • This shows us right now.

  • Black line is the US.

  • Red line is average CAPE valuations.

  • Yellow is cheapest and blue is most expensive.

  • So there was times when the US was

  • one of the cheapest countries, right?

  • In the early '80s-- best time to be buying.

  • And there's times when it's been relatively

  • cheap to the rest of world.

  • This, you could kind of use this is a guide saying,

  • are we cheap relative to the world or are we not?

  • And we're right now.

  • We're one of the most expensive.

  • So not-- a great time to be getting away from the US.

  • Some other questions I think I'm going

  • to zoom through in the next five minutes.

  • Does this work with sectors in the US?

  • It does.

  • Robert Shiller has published extensively on this.

  • Does it make sense to add some other things like trend?

  • We talked at lunch about my favorite section

  • is value and trend.

  • So when something is cheap, it's starting to go up, right?

  • Italy is a great example now.

  • Brazil maybe turning the corner here.

  • But we're going to shift here real quick

  • and talk about something because this is a engineer focused

  • crowd, because you have an appreciation for data,

  • this is interesting topic and probably

  • an area for study for those of you

  • who are thus interested in stocks.

  • Going back to what we were talking about earlier,

  • than most people stink at stock picking.

  • They're horrific at it.

  • They're really, really bad for a lot of emotional reasons.

  • But it's a tough game you're playing because you're up

  • against the smartest investors in the world.

  • So these hedge funds that have staff

  • of 50 people that are out there paying them

  • the top money in the world, that's

  • who you're competing against.

  • It's not the guys on the internet chat rooms, right?

  • But the math of it is difficult.

  • There's a paper called "The Capitalism Distribution"

  • published by some friends of mine that show just how

  • difficult is the average stock.

  • It's 2/3 of stocks.

  • If you just picked it out of a hat, 2/3 of stocks

  • underperform the index.

  • Because when you own an index, you

  • are guaranteed to own the winners.

  • The losers simply go down to value

  • and they go out of business.

  • One of the reasons why stock investing works is you're

  • just investing in capitalism.

  • You're investing in business, right?

  • But 2/3, if you're just picking out of a hat,

  • if you pick the company out of the "Wall Street Journal,"

  • chances are, you're going to underperform the index.

  • So the math is is already working against you.

  • Half of stocks are losers over their lifetime, right?

  • But it's the tails, right?

  • Going back to earlier, it's the tails that matter.

  • It's the few Googles, Apples, Walmarts

  • of the world that account for the vast majority

  • of your gains.

  • So a question I asked-- when I was in college,

  • I said I meet all these-- there's all these hedge fund

  • managers, tehse interesting guys that I said, well,

  • why wouldn't I just outsource this to Warren Buffett?

  • He's clearly much better at this than I am.

  • He's been managing money forever incredibly successfully,

  • one of the richest people in the world.

  • Why wouldn't I just outsource my stock picking to him?

  • And what most people don't know is that you can.

  • The SEC requires that any institution over $100 million

  • has to publish their holdings.

  • It's every quarter.

  • There's a 45 day delay.

  • But they are available online, all right?

  • So I said, why wouldn't I just invest what Buffet buys?

  • And being an engineering, being a quant-- this is late

  • '90s-- I said, I can't do this until I work with the data.

  • And what we found largely is you can.

  • If you bought Buffett's top 10 stock picks, updated every

  • quarter when the values are public--

  • and there's now an academic paper that validates this--

  • you would have beaten the market by-- well,

  • this goes back to '99-- 7% a year.

  • That is a monster number.

  • That would outperform every possible mutual fund out there.

  • The paper takes it back to the '70s, finds

  • similar outperformance.

  • This is a local company I helped co-found many years ago called

  • Alpha Clone that does a lot of the analytics

  • with these hedge fund.

  • Now, it's important when you're focusing on these funds--

  • and this requires a little bit of demand expertise

  • to at least kind of know what's some

  • of these funds do-- you want funds that

  • are stock pickers, that are not shorting,

  • that don't have too much turnover.

  • They're not active traders.

  • They're not doing anything weird like arbitrage.

  • They're not doing futures or derivatives.

  • But in general, stock pickers long term time horizon,

  • this works great.

  • You have a lot of benefits.

  • You can control the holdings yourself.

  • There's no fraud.

  • You don't have to lock up your money.

  • And the biggest one-- there's no two in 20 fees.

  • There's a number of examples where

  • these what we call clone portfolios just by investing

  • in what's available online-- you can go to SEC.

  • There's lot of websites that attract this-- Guru

  • Investor, Insider Monkey-- these underlying clones will end up

  • beating the manager.

  • Because the manager is charging 2%

  • management fee, 20% in performance.

  • So you actually can do better than they can.

  • Why any institution in the world doesn't do this

  • rather than investing in managers, I don't know.

  • My fourth book will probably be on this topic coming out

  • in the next few months.

  • So stay tuned.

  • But another one of my favorites to watch--

  • Seth [? Carmen, ?] Baupost.

  • Any time you could watch him, beats the market.

  • What is that, 9%?

  • 10% a year?

  • And one of the nice thing that the views are often

  • truly variant.

  • Some of these names they're picking, even if you don't

  • follow them blindly but use them as what we call an idea farm--

  • so a place to go look for new ideas

  • for stocks-- this is much better than going and asking

  • your broker for ideas or your next door neighbor.

  • Appaloosa-- another one of our favorites

  • has absolutely just destroyed the market by,

  • what, 18% a year?

  • David Tepper-- that's one of the reasons

  • he now owns part of the Steelers.

  • And then, of course, a local shop, ValueAct,

  • was in the "Wall Street Journal" last weekend.

  • Beats the market by 14% a year.

  • And it's something like six of the last seven years.

  • So these are all great places to look for research.

  • One last slide and then I'm going to one this down.

  • We talked about this at lunch a little bit.

  • And this is one of the biggest challenges

  • of investing is that, going back to the religion

  • and thinking about politics, is that people often

  • have their approach, right?

  • How many investors do you know say, you know what?

  • I'm investing for income.

  • I'm a dividend person.

  • This is how so many retirees say,

  • I'm buying high dividend stocks because I

  • get these checks I can cash, right?

  • Dividend payments.

  • Can't fake that.

  • Can't fraud that.

  • Well, dividend stocks, what this shows

  • is that the blue line is dividend high yield-- if you

  • bought a basket of high yielding dividend stocks--

  • and it goes back to the '60s-- the reason

  • investing in dividend stocks historically works

  • is because you're buying value companies that

  • are cheaper than the overall market.

  • There's reasons often because they're more leverage

  • and they're usually in a little more trouble.

  • But in general, they're cheap stocks, right?

  • So historically, high divident stocks

  • have traded about a 30% discount to the overall market.

  • So by buying dividend stocks, you're getting value, right?

  • But it changes over time.

  • This is what people call waiting for the fat pitch in baseball,

  • right?

  • Not swing it when things are balls but right

  • down the middle.

  • Well, what happened?

  • Dividend stocks were the cheapest

  • they've ever been in the late '90s relative

  • to the overall market.

  • Why?

  • Well, everyone wanted Pets.com.

  • They want all these internet companies,

  • these huge market cap Ciscos of the world.

  • They got incredibly, incredibly expensive, right?

  • So that was the best possible time

  • to be buying dividend stocks.

  • No one's talking about dividend stocks in the late '90s.

  • Massive returns.

  • Dividend stocks didn't even have a 2000, 2003 bear market.

  • Sailed right through it.

  • But what happens when you're in an environment where bonds

  • yield 2 and 1/2, US stocks are going to do maybe 4%,

  • people are looking for yield?

  • Massive amounts of money flows into these high yielding

  • stocks.

  • What does that do?

  • Well, it totally changes their composition.

  • High yielding dividends stocks now

  • for the first time in history traded a premium

  • to the overall market.

  • They're more expensive than the overall market.

  • You don't have to believe me.

  • You can go to Morningstar, type in your favorite dividend fund,

  • look at all the valuation metrics.

  • And they're more expensive buying the overall market.

  • So there's an entire group of people

  • that will be buying these stock the last few years

  • and wondering why in the world their portfolio is

  • underperforming the market so much.

  • And it's because they're buying something expensive, which

  • is an example of investor behavior totally distorting

  • something that historically has worked great.

  • The new fad is low volatility investing.

  • People investing in low volatile stocks

  • historically have beaten the market.

  • What's happened?

  • Massive amount of money's gone into those.

  • Those are also more expensive now.

  • If I had to do anything, I would avoid high dividend stocks,

  • small cap stocks as well.

  • So I'm going to wind this down.

  • Again, this wasn't theoretical.

  • We manage public funds.

  • I have 100% of my net worth invested

  • in-- Global Value is the one that goes and buys

  • these 10 countries.

  • But we'll be launching lots of new ideas as well.

  • So you have some good ideas, please,

  • please let me know afterwards.

  • Here's my contact information-- phone number, work.

  • That's not cellphone.

  • Blog, email address-- feel free to email me for a book.

  • And I think we got time.

  • I'm opening it up for questions now.

  • AUDIENCE: Hi.

  • So it seems to me that the global CAPE ratio

  • is kind of correlated over time.

  • So as a strategy, should you buy low CAPE ratio countries

  • and also short-sell high CAPE ratio countries?

  • MEBANE FABER: Good. question.

  • The question is, if you didn't hear it,

  • if it's a good idea to buy the cheapest,

  • why not also short what's most expensive?

  • It's really hard to do.

  • If there is-- that is what's essentially

  • called long shorter market neutral strategy, right?

  • Where you want to essentially arbitrage

  • the expensive stuff and the cheap stuff.

  • The problem is, over time, that works.

  • It works great.

  • But there's almost always large draw downs,

  • large losses in the meantime.

  • And let me give you examples why.

  • 2008, if you're doing a market neutral

  • approach, the expense of stocks just

  • get hammered all the way down, right?

  • And what happens at the bottom?

  • When you have it when the rally comes, what rallies the most?

  • It's the junk, right?

  • It's the junkie companies that are now trading at $1.80 or $4.

  • And all of a sudden, you're short those.

  • And then you lose 80% on the upside

  • even though your longs only did 30%.

  • So it's really, really hard.

  • There's some things you can do-- and this

  • is getting a little more complicated-- such as,

  • if you're shorting, you short less

  • the more the market goes down.

  • So you take chips off the table.

  • So you say, it doesn't make sense

  • to be shorting something if its already down 50%.

  • It can't go that much farther.

  • A country's not going to go to zero for the most part, right?

  • So you could have a short exposure like right now.

  • But as those countries go down, reduce the short exposure

  • over time.

  • But it's tough to do.

  • And again, two other caviar to what we talked about today.

  • One, you only need to update this about once a year.

  • A deep value approach needs time to work.

  • The more you update it, the worse it's going to do,

  • all right?

  • In two, going along the lines of what you're saying,

  • what's important about this strategy

  • is not just that you're buying the cheapest.

  • You're also avoiding the most expensive.

  • So avoidance, I think, is just fine.

  • Shorting, unlike the press secretary,

  • I wouldn't recommend it.

  • OK the question is, US has exposure to a globalize world,

  • right?

  • Roughly what, half of the US revenues come from abroad?

  • But vice versa-- as the world gets more globalized,

  • much of the countries abroad-- China, Mexico, Canada-- all

  • have exposure to the US too, right?

  • So our opinion is that we just assume correlations

  • of one-- very high correlation of stock markets, right?

  • So in that world, it comes to a more simple question.

  • It's not where revenues come from,

  • but where is it just cheapest?

  • So you're getting foreign exposure--

  • so you can get foreign exposure in the US at half.

  • Or you can get foreign exposure elsewhere for much cheaper.

  • So it's more important to us in a globalized world

  • just to buy what's cheapest.

  • If the opportunity set is similar

  • and they're highly correlated, which they are-- I mean,

  • it's not one.

  • But global stocks in general are up around 70%, 80%.

  • That's great.

  • Because then the valuation means even more.

  • AUDIENCE: When you're looking at returns of global stocks,

  • are you taking into account currency fluctuations?

  • MEBANE FABER: Oh, I knew that question-- the question always

  • comes up.

  • Good question.

  • Question is, what about currencies?

  • And this is quite a simple sounding

  • question but a much longer answer.

  • When you're think about currencies,

  • there's a quote that says, currencies aren't-- currencies

  • aren't difficult.

  • They're just confusing.

  • And Americans are the worst at it, right?

  • Most people, when they think of currencies,

  • they think of, all right.

  • The peso is going down.

  • It's now cheaper to go buy steaks in Argentina.

  • Or maybe it's getting expensive to go skiing in Europe.

  • And that's it.

  • They don't think about them in terms of investing.

  • They do have a very real impact.

  • Over time, currency real returns--

  • because currencies adjust for inflation-- over time,

  • currency real returns are stable,

  • keyword being over time.

  • In any given year, you could have a currency

  • like Japan last year move 20%, 30%, which is a lot.

  • So I'm actually, if you have no value added way

  • to predict currencies, which I would argue most don't, I

  • would argue you have to choose one side or the other year.

  • You're either agnostic and you say, you know what?

  • I'm going to do it from US dollar base.

  • Or you hedge all your currency exposure.

  • But you pick one and stick with it.

  • And over time, they'll have the same performance.

  • And then a follow up is, can you do things

  • in currencies the same way you do

  • in stocks and bonds that have outsized returns?

  • So yes, you can actually index currencies with basic value

  • trend, momentum carry strategies that

  • perform great and don't correlate to stocks.

  • But that's the point of a whole other two hour talk.

  • So you guys have me back in 2015.

  • We'll talk about currency.

  • So I'm agnostic.

  • But it makes a big difference in the short term.

  • AUDIENCE: In terms of the current valuation,

  • it seems to me that Warren Buffett, Joe Greenblad and also

  • Howard [INAUDIBLE] post-- I think all of them

  • said it's [INAUDIBLE] right now?

  • And only one of note that is kind

  • of bearish in the long term is [INAUDIBLE].

  • So can you reconcile with them?

  • Because if Warren Buffett and Joe

  • Greenblad those said that it's [INAUDIBLE] it's hard for me

  • to think that it's expensive.

  • MEBANE FABER: Well, if you use Buffett's

  • own favorite valuation metric, which is market cap to GNP,

  • stocks are very expensive.

  • You also always have to ask why people

  • have the opinion they do.

  • If you're a money manager and have all your money invested

  • long stocks in the US, are you going to say they're expensive?

  • Probably not.

  • So it's challenging.

  • And going back to the intro of the speech,

  • I think you should ignore all of them, right?

  • Everyone's going to have an opinion.

  • Just like, you know.

  • A guy or girl walks by.

  • 10 people are going to have different opinions

  • and say, well, I like him, I don't like him.

  • He's attractive, he's not.

  • Whatever it may be.

  • But that's what makes a market, right?

  • There's someone who's bullish on US stocks

  • in 1999 the same as someone who is bearish.

  • So that's why it's important to me

  • to have an objective measure.

  • I don't care what it is.

  • You can use price, sales price, book price, cash flow, GDP,

  • enterprise, EBITDA.

  • By the way, all of those say US stocks are expensive.

  • There's not one that doesn't.

  • But you have to have an objective metric.

  • Otherwise, you're just-- what we have found in the literature,

  • and this applies to almost every field,

  • is experts are horrific at forecasting, including our US

  • government, the Federal Reserve, right?

  • They are horrific at forecasting the future.

  • But if you have an objective metric and say,

  • all right, stocks very well could go up 50% from here.

  • But all that's doing is mortgaging the future.

  • So it's unexciting to say, I think

  • stocks are going to do 4% a year.

  • That's not terrible.

  • It's better than 2 and 1/2% bond.

  • But is it worth taking the risk?

  • I would much rather invest in the really cheap stuff,

  • most of which happens to be in Europe right now.

  • So as I said on Twitter, cheer for the US on Sunday,

  • but buy Portuguese stocks.

  • AUDIENCE: So how do you avoid the value trap?

  • For example, if Greece had defaulted an exited

  • from the euro, even buying at two might have been expensive.

  • MEBANE FABER: How do you avoid the value trap?

  • Well, question is, how do you avoid

  • buying a falling knife and something

  • it's cheap getting cheaper?

  • And there's a couple ways to lessen

  • the impact of it, the first being,

  • diversify and buy a basket of 10 countries, right?

  • So, we own Czechoslovakia, lot of those countries

  • we talked about-- Brazil, Russia.

  • One may be doing poorly, another one's-- hopefully,

  • that's-- same thing as you buy a basket of stocks.

  • Helps diversify the risk.

  • Doesn't totally diversify it.

  • Because right now, for example, most of those countries

  • are in Europe, in emerging Europe.

  • So you're getting exposure that very well may do poorly.

  • Another way to do it is having a long enough horizon.

  • Give it a number of years to be able to recover.

  • And that's a big key with buying the really cheap stuff.

  • It's hard to watch something go down.

  • The last way is to-- for those who

  • have followed my research for a long time,

  • know that we write a lot about global maccarone trends.

  • And so another way is use trend following metrics, right,

  • which would help you say, all right, I'm

  • going to buy this something cheap,

  • but only once it starts going back up and has a nice trend.

  • And then you still have an objective buy and sell rule.

  • You buy when it's above the long term trend.

  • You sell when it's below.

  • Historically, that doesn't add to returns.

  • But it vastly reduces the drawdown and volatility.

  • So my favorite intersection would be value and momentum.

  • So buying what's cheap, but also going up.

  • So there's a number of ways to try

  • to minimize the damage it can do.

  • But it's part of buying what's cheap

  • is you're not ever missing all the risk.

  • AUDIENCE: So say you've decided to invest in certain countries.

  • How do you determine what to buy in that country?

  • MEBANE FABER: So the simplest would

  • be to buy the market cap weighted index.

  • Highly liquid companies.

  • We go a step further, which we actually

  • didn't publish in our book.

  • And out of the 30 biggest companies in that country,

  • we buy the 10 cheapest.

  • Use a bunch of just different valuation metrics.

  • So it's almost like a dogs of the Dow approach.

  • So our [? ETF, ?] for example, will

  • own about 100 stocks in those countries.

  • That adds about another percent return

  • on top of just buying the market cap.

  • Because you're getting away from market cap in general.

  • You're buying the worst of the worst.

  • But as the individual investor, it's

  • really challenging to buy individual foreign stocks

  • in general for a big enough portfolio

  • to diversify 100 stocks in all these countries

  • around the world.

  • And it's a huge pain with taxes, too.

  • So one way is to buy country funds like ETFs.

  • Even if you don't buy ours, you can buy-- just

  • moving away from the US in general

  • I think is a great first step.

  • Thanks for having me.

  • I'll stick around for a few minutes.

Welcome, everyone.

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メバネ・フェイバー『グローバルバリュー。バブルを見抜き、市場の暴落を避け、大きなリターンを得る方法" (Mebane Faber, "Global Value: How to Spot Bubbles, Avoid Market Crashes, and Earn Big Returns")

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    Jun-kai Qiu に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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