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  • - I'm here today with Dr. Kishore Mahbubani.

  • He is the distinguished fellow

  • at the Age of Research Institute

  • of the National University of Singapore.

  • We're here to discuss his new book Has China Won,

  • The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy.

  • Thanks for joining us.

  • - My pleasure.

  • - I can't think of a more important playing field

  • on planet Earth to zoom in and explore

  • than the one you have chosen.

  • What inspired you to write this book?

  • - Well, I see a great tragedy coming

  • and it's a completely unnecessary tragedy,

  • this coming geopolitical contest

  • between the United States and China.

  • And the basic message in my book

  • is a very simple one

  • which is that a geopolitical contest

  • between the United States and China

  • is both inevitable and avoidable.

  • So I try to explain in the main part of my book

  • why it's inevitable

  • and why also the United States should really think very hard

  • and deep before it plunges

  • into this geopolitical contest with China.

  • - So where did the pressure mount

  • that put us on this inevitable trajectory

  • which is so dangerous?

  • You can speak to both American and Chinese contributions.

  • - Well I think it's clear

  • that both sides have made strategic mistakes

  • that in some ways led to the eruption

  • of this geopolitical contest.

  • But in a more fundamental way

  • the geopolitical contest

  • was actually in some ways inevitable

  • because the history teachers 2,000 year logic

  • which to some extent Graham Allison has captured in his book

  • Destined for War,

  • that whenever the world's number one emerging power,

  • which today is China,

  • is about to overtake the world's number one power,

  • which today is the United States,

  • that inevitably the geopolitical contest breaks out

  • and then both get locked into a struggle.

  • But of course, the other question is

  • what triggered it now?

  • And the trigger was caused by strategic mistakes

  • made by both China and the United States.

  • In the case of China,

  • what I try to document in the book

  • is that there was for a long time

  • a very powerful constituency in the United States,

  • the American business community,

  • that was so engaged with China,

  • making lots of profits from China,

  • and therefore that constituency always applied the brakes

  • whenever the United States seemed to be heading

  • towards a struggle against China.

  • - They used to have these treasury reports

  • and within the currency manipulator

  • and they always stopped shy of declaring that.

  • - Exactly, you're absolutely right

  • and that actually is a demonstration

  • of the point I was gonna make.

  • And what happened was that this time around

  • when Donald Trump launched his trade war,

  • the logical thing should have been

  • for the American business community to say stop,

  • we have a lot of stake with China.

  • Instead, they just stepped aside

  • and allowed the trade war

  • to carry on against China.

  • So that was China's big strategic mistake.

  • But as I try to document in the book,

  • the mistake made by the United States

  • was in many ways much bigger.

  • And it was a bigger mistake

  • because the United States decided

  • to launch a major geopolitical contest against China

  • without first working out

  • a comprehensive, long term strategy

  • on how you deal with a country

  • that has got a population

  • that's four times bigger

  • and the United States is only 250 years old,

  • less than 250 years old.

  • China has been around 2,200 years.

  • And what is shocking is that no thought was given

  • to this at all.

  • And this insight was given to me actually

  • as I documented the book, by Henry Kissinger,

  • in a one on one lunch I had with him at his club.

  • And so that thought led me to investigate further

  • about what are the potential other mistakes

  • the United States is making

  • in proceeding with this geopolitical contest?

  • So the goal of my book

  • is actually to help United States, help Americans,

  • to think very hard and very deep

  • before they take on an assignment

  • which future historians will marvel at

  • that they just jumped in two feet first

  • without thinking hey, what am I getting myself into?

  • - Well I sense inside of American political economy

  • there's almost a page from the playbook of Bismarck.

  • If you can't solve your problems inside,

  • look outward and pick an enemy to unify your people.

  • And the problems,

  • which you cite very eloquently in the book,

  • of more than half the population

  • having a declining standard of living since 1989,

  • is really quite daunting and quite distressing.

  • - Yes, you see what I've tried to point out in the book

  • is that there are lot of misconceptions

  • that Americans have about their own strengths

  • and about China's weaknesses.

  • So for example, it is taken as a given,

  • it's like ideological certainty

  • that when a thriving democracy

  • takes on a geopolitical struggle

  • against a communist party system,

  • the thriving democracy will always win,

  • as it demonstrated in the first world war

  • against the Soviet Union.

  • But then if you dig deeper

  • and you try to understand

  • what is the core situation of American society today

  • and the core situation of Chinese society,

  • you discover that the United States

  • is actually having to deal

  • with some major structural challenges.

  • And one of the key structural challenges

  • is that the average income of the bottom 50%,

  • yes 50% of the American population

  • has been sliding down over a 30 year period.

  • And as I try to analyze in the book,

  • this is not just an accident.

  • This is a result of deep structural forces

  • in American society

  • that have moved America away from being a thriving democracy

  • towards becoming a plutocracy.

  • And by contrast,

  • China in the 30 year period

  • where the average income of the bottom 50% in America

  • has been sliding down,

  • in the same 30 year period,

  • the bottom 50% in China

  • have had their best 30 years in 3,000 years.

  • So at a time when the Chinese people

  • are experiencing the most amazing improvements

  • in their standard of living,

  • you must remember also

  • for most of Chinese history,

  • the bottom 50% struggled to survive.

  • They would die in famines and civil wars

  • and they had a very rough life.

  • And the last 30 years,

  • they have access to education, housing, health care, travel,

  • in a way they never ever had before in their lives.

  • So after China has gone

  • through the best 30 year period ever

  • under the Chinese communist party,

  • the United States is telling the Chinese people

  • why don't you get rid of the Chinese communist party?

  • And the Chinese people are scratching their head

  • and saying, excuse me, I've had the best 30 years.

  • And the Chinese communist party is succeeding

  • because while in theory it is still a communist party,

  • it is a communist party that is the exact opposite

  • of the Soviet communist party.

  • Because the Soviet community party

  • was run by all operatics.

  • The Chinese communist party

  • may possibly be the most meritocratic political party

  • in the world.

  • And the selection process

  • results in the best minds

  • running China today.

  • You met some of them - And experienced.

  • - You know Yan Xishan

  • you know how brilliant these people are.

  • So by going into this whole ideological reflex

  • and saying, hey,

  • democracies can always overcome communist parties,

  • the United States hasn't done a deeper analysis

  • and realized that this is not a contest

  • within a democracy and a communist party system,

  • it's a contest within a plutocracy and a meritocracy.

  • - You talked about it being a party of representation.

  • How that is maintained,

  • whether that is stable,

  • is still true for the last 30 years.

  • - Yes.

  • At the end of the day,

  • running China,

  • keeping a country of 1.4 billion together every day

  • is a massive challenge,

  • which is why for most of Chinese history,

  • China has more often been divided than united.

  • So the period like what China has experienced

  • for the last 30 years

  • with a strong central government

  • delivering phenomenal improvement in living standard

  • to its people

  • is very rare in Chinese history.

  • And so if you compare the record in governance

  • of the Chinese communist party,

  • especially after Deng Xiaoping launches Four Modernizations

  • 40 years ago in 1979,

  • it's quite amazing what China has accomplished.

  • And the Chinese must always measure

  • the record of their governance

  • not against what other countries have achieved

  • but what has been achieved in Chinese history.

  • And no Chinese government ever in Chinese history

  • has improved the living standards of the Chinese people

  • as much as the Chinese community party has.

  • And you're right,

  • I call it the Chinese civilization party

  • because the main goal of the Chinese communist party

  • is not to promote or to export communist ideology.

  • The main goal of the Chinese communist party

  • is to revive Chinese civilization

  • and bring it back to the standing and respect

  • that it used to enjoy in the world

  • for over 2,000 years.

  • And the key driving force in the Chinese mind,

  • which I think every American should be aware of

  • is that the Chinese are acutely aware

  • that they went through something like maybe 150 years

  • of national humiliation

  • starting from the opium war of 1842

  • going up to the Japanese occupation

  • and so on and so forth.

  • So they've gone through a lot of humiliation

  • and their desire, therefore,

  • is to regain the respect that China used to enjoy.

  • And it is somewhat sad that just at the moment

  • when the Chinese people feel

  • that hey, we are now finally achieving something meaningful,

  • that's the time when America decides to slap China.

  • The only thing to remember is you see,

  • they're trying to humiliate us again.

  • - And the scar tissue in the United States

  • echoes of the cold war visa vie the USSR.

  • And in your book you do a very nice job

  • of showing why the Chinese challenge

  • is very different than the Soviet challenge

  • in terms of weaponization and arms race,

  • in terms of ideology,

  • there are just many aspects

  • that you desegregate.

  • - Yeah, well I think you know

  • the reason why I encourage Americans

  • to think deeper

  • is that if they look very carefully

  • at the track record

  • of what China is doing

  • and what the Soviet Union is doing,

  • it is actually quite shocking

  • that in the geopolitical contest today

  • between China and United States,

  • instead of China behaving like the Soviet Union,

  • it is the United States

  • that's behaving like the Soviet Union

  • because I explain in the book in one chapter, I ask,

  • can America make mutants?

  • So for example, the contest between United States and China,

  • will not take this in the military sphere.

  • It will be in a nuclear war between United States and China,

  • there will not be a winner and lower,

  • there will be a loser and loser.

  • So logically, it should be

  • in the interest of the United States

  • therefore to reduce its defense budget

  • and take the money and invest in R&D

  • because that's where the real contest is.

  • But the United States cannot reduce its defense budget

  • because no matter how brilliant

  • a defense secretary you have,

  • whether it's Ash Carter or General Mattis,

  • because the process of deciding where to spend money

  • is locked in by the US Congress

  • and allocations are made to each constituency

  • by the congressmen

  • and therefore the defense budget

  • is large, irrational and unnecessary.

  • If the United States was serious about taking on China,

  • it should cut its defense budget in half

  • but that's impossible.

  • And in that so,

  • it's like the old Soviet Union

  • that also couldn't cut its defense budget into half.

  • So in that sense the United States hasn't thought

  • very hard and very deep

  • about how different this contest with China is

  • whereas by contrast,

  • the Chinese are quite happy,

  • they're growing their defense budget

  • but at a fixed percentage of their GNP

  • and not increasing it.

  • And the Chinese are very happy

  • that America has 13 aircraft carrier fleets

  • 'cause each aircraft carrier fleet

  • is draining millions of dollars away

  • from the US Treasury every day

  • and paradoxically, in military terms,

  • an aircraft carrier today is a sitting duck

  • and as an American professor,

  • Tim Colton of Harvard told me,

  • it just takes $100,000 hypersonic missile

  • to bring down a billion dollar aircraft carrier.

  • It doesn't make sense anymore.

  • So clearly you need to have a fundamental strategic reboot

  • in American thinking.

  • And in that sense,

  • I'm trying to be helpful to America and say,

  • think very hard

  • about what are the big changes you need to make.

  • - One of the things that haunt people who are talking

  • about "new economic thinking" and technology

  • is the interface between this rivalry

  • between the US and China,

  • digital commerce platforms and cybersecurity.

  • And the story goes,

  • these are my friends at MIT again talking

  • that if you set up a digital platform

  • it aggregates a lot of information.

  • Hackers are able to use virtual private networks

  • and disguise their identity and their whereabouts.

  • So a hacker can be in Saskatchewan in Canada hypothetically

  • pretend to be New York attacking Shanghai

  • or be in Armenia

  • pretending to be Beijing attacking Washington DC.

  • I've talked to leaders in both countries,

  • very high leaders,

  • they recognize that given all the other tensions

  • and rivalry and scar tissue from history

  • and potential for misunderstanding

  • that they do not have a way to verify,

  • let's say you make an agreement,

  • we both pledge our trust

  • to abide by the cooperative behavior,

  • with the success and the presence

  • of disguised hackers,

  • you can't verify whether that's the case.

  • And people are struggling now

  • to try to figure out how to overcome this

  • because if you vulcanize the internet

  • and the trading systems,

  • you're accelerating that polarization

  • into competing systems.

  • And I don't know how to answer that

  • but I think it's a fantastic question to be exploring.

  • - It is, you're absolutely right.

  • And this is where one of my key recommendations

  • in the book is that

  • if you want to find solution,

  • there will be, of course, many challenges

  • in the relations within the United States and China,

  • not just in cybersecurity, law of the sea,

  • maritime areas, and many, many other areas.

  • The best solution is to look for multilateral solutions.

  • And in the area of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare,

  • it's good to agree on one common set of rules.

  • And I'll give you a simple example.

  • Nowadays with a good hacker can in theory

  • unleash the waters of a dam, right?

  • And then can you imagine

  • the thousands of people who will die

  • when the dam suddenly bursts, right?

  • So why not agree on one set of multilateral set of rules,

  • at least agree on the rules first,

  • of course implementing it right will be a challenge

  • but agree we will never attack a dam,

  • we will never attack a hospital,

  • we will never paralyze the electricity of a city,

  • we will never sort of thing.

  • So you have at least common sets of areas where you agree.

  • And of course, frankly,

  • it would make perfect sense

  • for an American military

  • to hack into a Chinese destroyer, of course,

  • that's fair game,

  • and vice versa too,

  • so that's fair game

  • but let's make sure you carve out areas and we say,

  • in these areas you don't do anything.

  • But of course, the interesting exception to all this,

  • and as you know,

  • since you're a monetary person,

  • I point out that the real achilles heel

  • of the United States

  • is the fact that the US dollar

  • is the global reserve currency

  • and that, as you know,

  • as French then finance minister started saying

  • exorbitant privilege,

  • enables Americans to live beyond their means.

  • So it's in America's national interest

  • to preserve the US dollar as the global reserve currency.

  • But by weaponizing it,

  • the United States has created incentive

  • for countries to move away from the US dollar.

  • And it is conceivable

  • for China to use block chain technology

  • to create not necessarily a new monetary system

  • but just a platform that enables countries

  • to trade with each other

  • without having to use the US dollar.

  • And the minute the US dollar

  • is no longer the dominant currency in global trade,

  • it can still of course

  • remain strong in the financial spheres,

  • but once the critical part of the system

  • where it's no longer essential for global trade disappears,

  • the US dollar becomes vulnerable.

  • And if it is no longer a global reserve currency,

  • then American standards of living will go down.

  • And that's another example

  • of where it is in interest of the United States and China

  • to work together.

  • - Thank you for joining us.

  • - Thank you very much.

- I'm here today with Dr. Kishore Mahbubani.

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中国は勝ったのか? (Has China Won?)

  • 58 1
    Yeung-On Yu に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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