Um, it's reallyyoucouldconsiderthatcomponentofindustrialorganizationalpsychology, butit's, ah, componentthathas a strongemphasisonindividualdifferences, andsoyoucouldconsideritfirst, anexplorationofthepracticalutilityofpsychologicalconceptsinpredictingrealworldphenomena.
Buthecouldalsoconsiderit a partofthevalidationofthepsychometricmodelsofpersonalitythatwe'vedescribedbecauseoneofthethingsthatyouwanttodotodeterminewhetherornot a constructSoit's a hypeofthehypotheticalpsychologicalphenomenonorentitywhetherornotthat's riel, dependstosomedegreeonwhatit's goodforright, partoftheaimofsciences, predictionandcontrol.
Andsoit's usefultotake a lookatimportantlifeoutcomesamonghumanbeingsandtodeterminewhetherornotyoucanpredictthem.
Becausethat's onewayoftesting.
Whetherornotthephenomenathatyou'vederived, say, fromyourstatisticalanalysis, bothinthecaseoffluidintelligenceorintelligencemorebroadlyandinthecaseoftheBigFiveactuallyhasthecapacitytomanifestitselfin a meaningfulwayinintheworldoutsideofinsidethelab.
Performanceintheworkplaceis a is a trickymeasure, a trickyissue.
I'vebeenworkingonperformancepredictiontestsfor a longtimebecause I wasinterestedinbecause I'm a clinicalpsychologistandbecause I have a practicalside, I'm ofteninterestedinwhattheutilityofpsychologicalmeasurementsmightbeoutsidethelab.
Andoneistthe e ethicalnecessitytogiveeachperson a fairchance, andtheotheristheethicalnecessitytoplacetheproperpersonintheproperposition.
And, youmightsay, Well, youcoulddothatrandomlyandlikeTherearecountriesinEurope, forexample, thathave a quasirandomapproachtotheselectionofuniversitystudents.
SoHollandislikethattheyhave a prettyopenadmissionpolicynow.
Whatthatmeansisthateveryonehas a chancetogotocollege.
Butthedownsideofitisthatthefailurerateinthefirstyear, forexample, isextraordinarilyhighnow, youmightsaythat's a perfectlyreasonablepricetopayfortheopenadmissionandfortheopportunitytogiveeveryone a chance.
Butyoucouldalsosay, Well, that's a hellof a wasteoftimeforthepeoplewhogointothefirstyearofcollegeoruniversityandfail.
Becauseif I couldtellyouwell, youknow, youhave, ah, 80% chanceofsuccessinthisdomainandonly a 20% chanceinthisdomain, youstillmightwanttotaketheriskinthe 20% successdomain.
Butyoumightalsothink, well, I mightaswellgooffandfunctionwheremyparticularcombinationofProclivitieshasthebestopportunitytomanifestitselfandbecausewhynotpositionyourselfforsuccessratherthanfailure?
It's about 0.12 It's somethinglikethat, whichmeansthatifyoujustpickpeoplerandomlyforsuccessorfailure, let's sayyou'd have a 50 50 chanceofpredictingwhethersomeonewasgoingtobe a successor a failureisjust a cointoss.
Soletmeexplainthatso 0.50 point 50 Ifyousubtractonefromtheanother, yougetzero.
Sothepredictabilityofselectionbychanceis 0.50 minus 0.50 equalszero.
That's thepredictivevalidityofchance.
Ifyouhave a predictorof 0.20 whichisapproximately, that's sortofthelowendestimateforconscientiousness, thenthatwouldchangeyouroddsratiofrom 0.50 point 50 rightrandom 2.60 point 40 because 400.60 minus 0.40 is 0.20 Andsothecorrelationcoefficientturnsouttobethethedifferencebetweentheoddsbetweentheodds, soandsoitgivesyou a quickruleofthumb.
So, forexample, soifyouhave a 0.20 predictorthatgivesyou 60 40.
Wehave a 400.30 predictorthatgivesyou 65 35 because 350.65 minus 0.35 point 30 Andifyouhave a 0.6 predictor, whichisreallyuponthehighend, right, youreallystarttopushyourlimitsofstatisticalpredictpredictionvalidity.
Atthatpoint, thatgivesyou 0.0.80 minus 0.20 Andsowhatyouhavedoneifyouuse a predictive, uh, predictorthathas a correlationcoefficientof 0.60 whichyoucouldget, forexample, ifyoutookconscientiousnessandcombinedthatwith a goodtestof I.
Thatmovesyouroddsratioofselectinganaboveaveragepersonforthepositionfrom 0.50 point 502.80 point 20 Soitcutshere.
Yourfailureratebymorethanhalfrightbringsitdownfrom 200.50 point 20 because 0.80 minus 0.20 point 60 Sothat's a reallygoodthingtoknowthat's calledthebinomialeffectsizedisplay.
It's reallygoodthingtohaveinyourmind.
It's verysimple.
It's just a it's justsubtraction, anditgivesyousomesenseofthepoweroffofofstatisticalpredictions.
Nowthequestionmightbe, Well, let's sayyouhad a predictorof 0.20 conscientiousness, youmightsay.
Becauseifthere's a tremendousdegreeofproductiveofdifferenceinproductiveoutputbetweenpeople, thenincreasingyourabilitytopredictsomeone's performanceevenbysomerelativelysmallincrementsmighthavemassiveeconomicutility.
I wouldsayit's a littlehigherthanthat's probably 0.25 especiallyifyoudothingslikecorrectformeasurement, errorandsoforth.
AndwhatMichellesaidwasbecauseit's only 0.25 Let's sayyousquarethatthat's 5% ofthevarious.
Youleave 95% ofthephenomenonunexplained.
Youmightaswellnotevenbothermeasuringpersonality.
Andsothatactuallykilledthefieldofpersonalityfrom a secondmetricperspectiveforabout 25 years, reallyuntilabouttheearly 19 nineties, whenpeoplewokeupandthought, Wait a minute, Whatarethetypicaleffect?
TherearesomeoccupationswheretheperformancemeasureissortofbuiltintothejobButifyou're a managerinthemidlevelof a largecorporation, howthehellcanyoutellhowproductiveyouare?
It's sothere's a measurementproblemontheproductiveitymeasurementandaswellastheperformancepredictionend.
Andit's a veryintractableproblem.
Andthewaythatpeopleoftendothatisbysaying, Well, let's sayyou're a managerinthemidlevelof a corporation.
Howdowedeterminehowproductiveweare?
Youare.
Well, wemightaskyoutocompareyourwe'reworkproductivitywithyourpeers, maybeconstructup a questionnaireaskingaboutyourefficientuseoftimeandsoforth, andthenwemightgetyourpeerstodothesamethingtoyou.
Thisisactually I think, whyWhylargecompaniesstarttobecomeunstableisbecauseifthere's enoughlayersbetweentheoperationsofthepeopleinthetearsofthecorporationandtherialoutcomemeasure, whichisbasicallyprofitbecausethat's whatwe'vegot, thentherelationshipbetweenyouractivityas a managerandtheproductivityofthecompanystartstobecomeincreasinglyblurred.
Soanyways, it's quiteit's verycomplicatedallofthisand I wasalsocuriousbecausebecause I'm curious, I guess, istofindoutwhatwouldhappenif I took a measurethatwasderivedinthelabandthentriedtolaunchitoutin a intheactualrealworldenvironment, triedtomarketandsellit.
Andnowthatwasveryinformative, because I presumethatwedevelopedtestswhich I'lltalktoyouabout.
Look, ifyouuseourtests, wecanincreasetheprobabilitythatyou'llhireanaboveaverageemployeefrom 50 50 to 80 20 andtheeconomicbenefitofthatwillbestaggering, staggering.
And I'llshowyouthecalculationsthatenablethatsortofthatsortofpredictiontobemade, andyoumightthinkwell, andthisiswhatyoudothinkIfyou'renaiveaboutproducingsomethingofvalue, youmightthinkwell, ifyoucanproducesomethingthat's ofselfevidenteconomicvalue, sellingitwillbe a snap, andthatissowrong.
Youjustcannotbelieveit.
Sooneofthethingswefound, whichwasreallymindbogglingtome, wasthatyoucouldmake a casethattheprobabilitythat a companywilluse a testthatpredictsperformancethepro, theprobabilitythattheywillusethetestisinverselyrelatedtotheaccuracyofthetest, whichbasicallymeansthatthelessaccuratetestsareeasiertosell.
Because, really, whattheydobyistheMyersbreaksrightthatsellsabout a 1,000,000 units a year, andtheMyersBriggshaszeropredictiveutilitywithregardstoperformanceprediction.
Itwaslike, No, ifyoudothisforeachand I'llshowyouthemathematicsin a bit, eachpersonthatyouselectwiththistestwillbring $20,000 ofextravaluetoyourcompany.
You'renotgettingthatfor $9.
Andthentheysay, Well, wait a minute.
Wehave a budgetfortestingthat's limitedto $9 totest, theysay, Well, it's gonnaproduce $30,000 a yearinrevenue.
Theotherthingyoufindifyou'retryingtosellthelargecompaniesthisisthisisworthknowingisthatit's greatifyoucouldsellto a largecompany, causethat's a largecompanyman.
Andthenyoucan't getaccesstopeoplewhohavethedecisionmakingpowerbecausetheydon't letyouhaveaccesstotheandsothat's a hugeproblem.
Andevenfiguringthemoutis a hugeproblemandevenfiguringoutthatthosearethepeoplethatyouneedtotalktois a hugeproblemthatmighttakeyoufiveyearsjusttogetitthroughyourhead, thatthatyou'rewastingyourtime 95% ofthetimetalkingtothewrongpeople.
Ittookus a hugeamountoftimetogetthroughallthelayersandjusttheweekthatweweregoingtolaunchattheCEOresignedinthecompany's stockcrashedandthatwastheendofthatbangandandlargecompaniesarelikethat, likethey'reextremelyslowandthetypicaldurationthat a personlastsin a givenposition.
I mean, ifyouwouldhavetoldmewhen I firststarteddevelopingtheseteststhatoneofthereasonscorporationswouldn't buythatwasbecausetheyworked, that I wouldhavejustthought, really, comeon, Really, That's reallythereason.
Andyouthinkthat's a reallystupidtheorybecauselionsarecamouflagedandthey'relikegolden, likethegrassandzebrasareblackandwhite, soyoucansee a zebrafivemilesaway.
It's likethere's a zebra.
It's blackandwhite, sothewholecamouflagethinkthat's justnotworkingoutsowellas a hypothesis.
Okay, sobylawbiologistsgoandtheydecidetotake a lookatsomezebras, andsothey'relookingat a zebraatontheherdbecausethere's nozebra, right?
Allright, sothenyouthink, Well, webetteridentify a zebrasowecanseewhathe's upto.
Sothenyoutakeyourjeeponaccountofredpainton a stickwith a rag.
Ontheendofit, youdriveuptothezebrasandyoupainttheirhaunch, read a littlebit, put a nicereddotontheirhaunts, ormaybeclippedtherearwith a cattleclip, andthenyouyouknow, youstandbackandthink, Hey, I'm prettysmart.
Now I'm gonnawatchthatzebra.
Sowhatdoyouthinkhappenstothezebra?
Thelionskillit, right?
Right, right.
Becauselions, they'resmart, right?
Hunterhuntinganimals, airsmart, buttheyhavetoidentify a zebrabeforetheycanorganizetheirhunt.
Theycan't justhuntthewholeherd.
Theyhavetopickout a zebra.
Andsomaybeit's like a zebrathat's got a sorehiporsomething, andsoyouthinkwe'llnature's kind.
Itjusttakestheweek.
It's thoughnozebraorlionslikereallyhealthy, deliciouszebras, buttheylooklikealltheotherhealthy, deliciousseabreezesotheycan't get a beadonthem.
Andthatfollows a lawcalledPricesLawfromsomeonenamedDerektoSolaPrice, whowasstudyingscientificproductivityintheearly 19 sixties.
Andwhatheshowedwasthatah, vanishinglysmallproportionofthescientistsoperatingin a givenscientificdomainproducedhalftheoutput.
Andsowhatyouseeinthis, what's happeningisthattodoreallywellat a givenproductivetask, whichwouldalsoincludegeneratingmoneyasas a proxyforforcreativeproductivity, isthatyouhavetobe a bunchofthingshavetogoyourwaysimultaneouslySomaybeyouhavetobereally, reallysmart.
Ittakes a littlewhiletolearnit, butonceyou'velearnedit, youbasicallydothesamethingallthetime.
There's not a lotofperformancevariabilityinthosejobs, andmostofthatwouldbenotbyconscientiousnessandalsotosomedegreebyneuroticismbecausethehigherpeople, herhigherneuroticism, wouldbemorelikelytomissworkbutyourbutt.
Butgeneralcognitiveabilityforexamplesnot a goodpredictor.
Butifthetasktoyou'redoingorshiftingconstantlysoyourresponsibilitieschangeoryou'rein a creativejobwhereyou'reconstantlysolvingnewproblems, thosearekindofthesamething.
Then I likeyou.
Asthecomplexityofthejobincreasesthepredictiveutilityof I Q increases, whichisonlytosaythatsmarterpeoplecanhandlecomplexsituationsfaster.
It's likethatdoesn't seemlike a particularlyradicalclaim.
Sopriceslawdictatesthatthere's massiveindividualproductivitydifferencesbetweenpeople, soincreasingyourpredictiveyourcapacityforpredictingperformance, evenbysmallincrementshas a hugeeconomicconsequencethatwasestablishedinthe 19 nineties.
Theequationswerefirstdevelopedinthe 19 nineties, andthat's partofthereasonthat I startedworkingonperformancepredictiontestsbecause I readtheeconomicsand I thought, OhmyGod, youcanproduce a testthatcosts $30 timessaymaybeyouhave 50 applicantsfortheposition, $1500 toadminister, andit'llproduceanincrementsofsomethinglike 30% ofsalarypermanentlyforthepersonthatyouputintheposition.
Solet's sayyouhire a $75,000 employees, anditincreasestheirproductivityby 30%.
Sowe'llsayroughly $25,000.
Youget a $25,000 returnon a $1500 investmenteverysingleyear.
Thatpersonoccupiestheposition.
Onaverage, that's fouryears.
That's $100,000 payoffforyour $1500 investment.
I readthat I thought, Oh, that'llbeeasytosell.
It's likewrong, Wrong.
Eventhoughtheeconomicpayoffwassomassive, I toldyoutheotherimpedimentsthatthatemerged.
Butthethearithmeticarethecapacitytoproducethesecalculationswasestablishedinthe 19 nineties, and I'llshowyoutheequationsin a bithere.
Okay, sowealreadytalkedaboutwhat a normaldistributionlookslike.
That's theredline, and a normaldistributionemergesas a consequenceofchanceprocesses.
Sowe'lltake a lookatthosehere.
Hopefully, thiswillwork.
Lookatthat.
Allright, sothere's yourcorporateadvertisementfortheday, butit's notoftenyousee a heroic, normaldistribution, butthere, Thereyougo.
SoSoSowhatyouseeisthatyouget a patternoutputas a consequenceofchanceprocesses.
Andsowhereyouhappentobeonthedistributionforallofthetraitsthatwe'vedescribedas a consequenceofinnumerablechancegenetic, geneticandculturalprocesses.
But a lotofthemare a lotmorethanpeopleliketoadmitourgenetic.
I mean, youcouldmakepeoplestupiderwiththeenvironment, butit's notthateasytomakethemsmarter.
Sobecauseit's what I thinkaboutit, right, it's wayeasiertomakesomethingworsethanitistomakesomethingbetter.
Andasyou, infact, asyouflattenoutthesocioculturalenvironment, sayyoutakeeverybodyandyouprovidethemwithoptimalnutritionandoptimalaccesstoinformation, whichyou'veprettymuchdonebytheway, with a computerright, becausehowareyougoingtogivesomeonemoreaccesstoinformationthantogivethem a Webenabledcomputer.