字幕表 動画を再生する 英語字幕をプリント Prof: Okay, now let me--I actually would like to spend as much time as I can on Durkheim's methodology. I have lots of notes. This is the twenty-fourth lecture, note, this semester for this course. But let me rush through of the test questions and just to tell you how I would like to deal with them. I think the first one is very obvious, probably a bit too obvious. The question is how can you make it interesting? I hope that the distinction between power and domination is clear. Right? Power means that somebody can impose its will on somebody else, even if that other person opposes it. There is a strong element of coercion involved. Right? You can coerce people to obey your command. Domination implies that you do not have to use coercion systematically, because people tend to internalize the reasons those who have power use in order to legitimate why they should have power. Right? And then this brings us to the notion of legitimacy. Right? Legitimacy are the claims which are made by those who have power, which try to justify why it is reasonable that they should issue commands and others should obey it. So far, very simple. Right? What is kind of controversial about this? It's controversial the way how Weber uses the notion of legitimacy. Normally we, in modern democratic theory, we believe--right?--a system is legitimate when it has popular consent. We think about universal suffrage. People go to free and fair elections, and then they elect leaders, and then they follow those elected to office this way. Then power is legitimate. But I think Weber wants to have a broader notion of legitimacy. Because free and fair elections, operating with universal suffrage, go back one-hundred years in human history, and in some countries it still does not exist. And Weber does not want to describe the last ten minutes of human history for human history's twenty-four hours. Right? He wants to offer some conceptual tools to understand the whole twenty-four hours. So that's why he has this interesting notion of legitimacy; which it does imply that people have to have a certain degree of belief in the validity of the legitimacy claims. But it is a rather passive notion of belief. They don't have to love the person in position of authority; they do not have to elect it. They simply--it's enough if they think, "Well I cannot think of a better alternative." Right? Another dictator could be worse than this one. Right? This is a dictator, but a reasonable one. And Weber will say, as long as this is happening, the person in authority will not have to use coercion systematically, and therefore it will be legitimate. Right? Let me also just say--of course, the coercive element is also in domination. Right? If people disobey the law, then they will be coerced. There is certainly a promise of coercion, even in modern free democracies. People are put in jail; in this country people are even executed. Right? So there is an element of coercion. Just the real question is how systematic that coercion should be? And for Weber, pure exercise of authority is relatively rare and marginal. I would say, for instance, the sort of last year or two or three of Hitler was fairly illegitimate. Hitler had to use massive coercion. Certain epochs of rule of Stalin in the Soviet Union were illegitimate, not all the rule of Stalin. During the Second World War he established some legitimacy. But when he had to imprison ten million people-- right?--and to kill tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands, that is an indication that this is illegitimate. Okay? So that's the way how I would handle it--right?--to work around this interesting conception of legitimacy, and what is for and against this. Well this is again a very simple question, traditional and legal-rational authority. Right? The basic difference is--right?--that traditional authority, you have a personal master. In legal-rational authority you do not have a personal master. You obey the laws, and the people who are in charge, who are superiors, will also have to obey the same laws, what you are required to do. And traditional authority is legitimated by the sanctity of age-old rules. Here again I think the interesting issue, if I would write about this, will be, well this is a big historical distinction. But Weber also uses it to describe, in contemporary society, different types of organizations. So contemporary theory has a big dose of traditional authority in it--right?--and I would try to elaborate on this. Well this is--right?--one of the trickier questions: Why does Weber believe that bureaucracy is efficient? And you may agree or may disagree with him. So first of all, I would state why Weber believes that bureaucracy is efficient. I would emphasize that he thinks that bureaucracy is the most efficient, in the technical terms--not necessarily otherwise. And then, of course, the way how he defines bureaucracy. People are put into position in terms of their competence. There is a rule of law. It is a predictable environment, a bureaucratic environment. There is a hierarchy of appeals; if somebody makes a mistake, how to appeal. This, of course, all makes it efficient. Now we know that bureaucracies are often inefficient. So how to reconcile this? Well it's not that Weber was totally insensitive to the problem of inefficiencies of bureaucracies, and he formulated it how that bureaucracies are caught between formal and substantive rationality. That's the way how I would probably defend Weber--to say he was not that naīve to believe that bureaucracies are always efficient. They would be efficient if they would be purely formally rational, but they are not. And one good example is welfare bureaucracies, which do establish a kind of patron-client relationships--right?--between bureaucracies and clients. Some people refer to this as welfare dependency, which makes it, of course, a cause of inefficiency. Well this is a nice question to answer, and we discussed this a great deal. We know that charismatic leaders appear in times of crisis, when people are looking for a change. Right? So Barack Obama, during the presidential campaign, he has read Weber carefully; he knew how to frame--right?--his message exactly as a charismatic message. It was all about change, and it was about hope. Right? In contrast with Hillary Clinton or John McCain. Both of them emphasized that "we are experienced'. This is not what people wanted to hear when they wanted to have change. So yes, in this respect, Barack Obama did have a charismatic appeal, and this charismatic appeal did gel. Right? Many people responded to his charisma. He was criticized by his opponent that he's a rock star--right?--because people got so excited about him. So he could appeal to the emotion of people. Right? He could appeal to them. But, of course, as we again discussed in discussion sections-- also briefly in class--Barack Obama has a charismatic appeal, but he operates in a legal-rational authority. Right? And we just have seen that very recently--right?--making a decision about the war in Afghanistan. Right? Well he had to deal with realities. Right? So well Weber would--in the classical sense, charisma in Weber is reserved to great religious leaders, such as Muhammad or Jesus or whatever, or the great prophets. And in this sense charisma is not really applicable to politicians operating in legal-rational authority. So Weber would have some unease to call Barack Obama a charismatic leader. I would think he would concede that certainly Barack Obama had charismatic features, as such. Now the fifth question: Durkheim and the study of law. Why on earth he starts from the study of law in analyzing society? Because he's a methodological collectivist, and because he wants to capture something like the collective conscience, which is more than the sum total of individual consciousness. But he's also a scientist, and I hope I will have a little time to talk about the methodology. He wants to be very rigorous, and he doesn't want to start with ideas; he wants to start with facts. Well he's caught in--right?--a contradiction. So collective conscience is ideas. Right? How on earth you study them objectively? And law is a great example, because law is written down. Right? There is written law. You can study it objectively, and it is not only individual consciousness what guides us all. So I think this is the major reason why his point of departure is--as an example--law because this is what he can rigorously study. It can be seen as a social fact--right?-- that this is the law, and to understand why this law came into being, under what circumstances, and how does it influence people? Well, of course, the inspiration comes from Montesquieu. All right. Well agreement and disagreement. I think the real question is whether you buy into methodological collectivism or not. Some of you may be methodological individualists. Especially if you are an Econ major, you tend to be an economic individualist, a methodological individualist. Right? You tend to believe that there are rational individual actors who pursue interest, and you are very skeptical about anything which is assumedly above the individual. So in that case, if you are a methodological individualist-- and, in fact, I think the dominant trend in social sciences today is methodological individualism and a great deal of skepticism about methodological collectivism-- that can be a kind of critical handle on it. Or at least you can show this is the way how it can be criticized, and you can show why you actually think that methodological collectivism is reasonable. Okay, the sixth question, organic and mechanical solidarity, and how this is related to Weber's typology of authority. I mean, it's pretty simple. There are very important distinctions--di fferences--between Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim looks at what brings society together. The central concept is solidarity. Weber looks at social conflict, what takes society apart. So he looks at struggle around power. Right? Weber is coming from the lineage of, I would say, Hobbes and Nietzsche. Right? That's where the Weberian view comes from.