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  • Professor Shelly Kagan: The first question we want to

  • discuss has to do with the possibility of my surviving my

  • death. Is there life after death?

  • Is there a possibility that I might still exist or survive

  • after my death? Now at first glance--and in

  • fact, I think, at second glance it's going to

  • turn out to be true--you might think that the answer to this

  • question would depend on two basic issues.

  • Do I survive my death? Do we survive our deaths?

  • You think, the first thing we have to get clear on is well

  • what am I? What kind of a thing am I?

  • Or generalizing, what kind of thing is a person?

  • What are we made of? What are our parts?

  • It seems plausible to think that before we could answer the

  • question, "Do I survive?" we need to know how I'm built.

  • And so the first thing we're going to spend a fair bit of

  • time on is trying to get clear on what's a person?

  • What are the fundamental building blocks of a person?

  • The second question that you might think we'd want to get

  • clear on is, "What's the idea, or what's the concept,

  • of surviving?" Before we ask, "Do I survive?"

  • we need to get clear on "What am I?"

  • and "What is it to survive?" What is it for something that

  • exists in the future to be me? Now this question can be

  • discussed philosophically in quite general terms.

  • What's the nature of persistence of identity over

  • time? But since we're especially

  • interested in beings like us, people, this topic,

  • this sub-specialized version of the question of identity,

  • gets discussed under the rubric of the topic,

  • personal identity. What's the key or the nature or

  • the basis of personal identity? As we might put it:

  • What is it for somebody who's here next week to be the same

  • person as me? What's the nature of personal

  • identity? So, as I say,

  • at first glance you might think to get clear on the answer,

  • "Do I or might I or could I survive my death?"

  • we need to know, what am I? What's a person?

  • What's the metaphysical composition of people,

  • on the one hand? And we need to get clear on the

  • nature of identity or persistence or,

  • more specifically, personal identity.

  • Now as I say, I believe that when push comes

  • to shove, we do need to get clear about both of those

  • questions and so that's going to take the first several weeks of

  • the class. We're going to spend a couple

  • of weeks talking about, "What's a person?"

  • And then we're going to spend several weeks,

  • or at least a week or so, talking about the nature of

  • personal identity. But before we can even get

  • started, there's a question, really an objection to the

  • whole enterprise. So we're about to spend a lot

  • of time asking the philosophical question: Is there life after

  • death? Could there be life after death?

  • Might I survive my death? But there's a philosophical

  • objection to the entire question.

  • And the objection is fairly simple.

  • It says the whole question is misconceived.

  • It's based on a confusion. Once we see the confusion,

  • we can see what the answer to our question is.

  • Could I survive my death? The answer has got to be--this

  • is what the objection says--the answer has got to be,

  • obviously not. All right, so here's the

  • objection. I should mention that the very

  • first reading that you're going to be doing is a couple of pages

  • from Jay Rosenberg, a contemporary philosopher.

  • He gives us a version of this objection.

  • So I'll give you one version. You'll have another version in

  • your readings. The objection basically says:

  • What does it mean to say that somebody's died?

  • We're asking, "Is there life after death?"

  • What does it mean to say that somebody has died?

  • Well a natural definition of death might be something like

  • the end of life. So then, if that's right,

  • then to ask, "Is there life after death?"

  • is just asking, "Is there life after the end of

  • life?" The answer to that ought to be

  • pretty obvious. Well, obviously,

  • the answer to that is no. After all, if we're saying once

  • you've run out of life, is there any more life?

  • Well, duh! That's like asking,

  • when I've eaten up all the food on my plate, is there any food

  • left on my plate? Or what happens in the movie

  • after the movie ends? These are stupid questions,

  • because once you understand what they're asking,

  • the answer is just built in. It follows trivially.

  • So although it has seemed to people over the ages that the

  • question, "Is there life after death?"

  • is one of the great mysteries, one of the great philosophical

  • things to ponder, the objection says that's a

  • kind of illusion. In fact, once you think about

  • it, and not all that long, you can see the answer's got to

  • be no. There couldn't possibly be life

  • after death. There couldn't possibly be life

  • after the end of life. Or suppose we ask the question

  • in a slightly different way. Might I survive my death?

  • Well what does the word "survive" mean?

  • Well, survive is something like we say that somebody's a

  • survivor if something's happened and they haven't died.

  • They're still alive. When there's a car accident,

  • you ask, so-and-so died, so-and-so survived.

  • This person survived. To say that they survived is

  • just saying that they're still alive.

  • So, "Might I survive my death?" is like asking,

  • "Might I still be alive after"--well what's death?

  • Death is the end of life. So-- "might I still be alive

  • after I've stopped living? Might I be one of the people

  • who didn't die when I died?" Gosh, the answer to that is,

  • again, duh! No.

  • You couldn't possibly survive your death, given the very

  • definition. It should remind us of--at

  • least it reminds me of this joke that you probably told.

  • It seemed hysterical when you were seven.

  • The plane crashes exactly on the border of Canada and the

  • United States. Exactly on the border.

  • There's dead people everywhere. Where do they bury the

  • survivors? The answer is:

  • You don't bury the survivors. So when you're seven you think,

  • "I don't know. Do they bury them in Canada?

  • Do they bury them in America?" The answer is:

  • You don't bury the survivors, because survivors are people

  • that haven't yet died. So, "Can I survive my death?"

  • is like asking, "Could I not have yet died

  • after…?" The answer is,

  • of course, you have to have died if you died and you haven't

  • survived if you've died. So the question can't even get

  • off the ground. That, at least,

  • is how the objection goes. Now I don't mean to be utterly

  • dismissive of the objection. That's why I spent a couple of

  • minutes trying to spell it out. But I think there's a way to

  • respond to it. We just have to get clearer

  • about what precisely the question is that we're trying to

  • ask. This is something that

  • Rosenberg tries to get clear on as well.

  • So here's my attempt to make the question both a bit more

  • precise, and a question that's an open question.

  • A question we can legitimately raise.

  • Well, now as you will hear on several occasions over the

  • course of the semester, I'm a philosopher.

  • What that means is I don't really know a whole lot of

  • facts. So I'm about to tell you a

  • story where I wish I knew the facts.

  • I don't know the facts. If I could really do it right,

  • I'd now open the door and bring in our guest physiologist,

  • who would then provide the facts that I'm--what I'm about

  • to go is "blah, blah, blah."

  • But we have the physiologist come in and he'd actually tell

  • us these things. I don't know them.

  • I don't have that person. But take a look at what happens

  • when a body dies. Now, no doubt,

  • you can kill people in a lot of different ways.

  • You can poison them, you can strangle them,

  • you can shoot them in the heart.

  • The causal paths that result in death may start different,

  • but I presume that they converge and you end up having a

  • set of events take place. Now what are those events?

  • This is exactly where I don't really know the details,

  • but I take it it's something like: because of whatever the

  • original input was, eventually the blood's no

  • longer circulating and oxygen isn't making its way around the

  • body. So the brain becomes

  • oxygen-starved. Because of the lack of oxygen

  • getting to the cells, the cells are no longer able to

  • carry on their various metabolic processes.

  • Because of this, they can't repair the various

  • kinds of damage they need, or create the amino acids and

  • proteins they need. So as decay begins to set in

  • and the cell structures begin to break down, they don't get

  • repaired as they would normally do,

  • and so eventually have breakdown of the crucial cell

  • structure and boom, the body's dead.

  • Now as I say, I don't really know whether

  • that's accurate, the little rough story I just

  • told, but some story like that is probably right.

  • And in typical philosophical fashion, I've drawn that story

  • for you up here on the board. So the events that I don't

  • really know the details of, we can just call B_1,

  • B_2, B_3,

  • up through B_n. Before B_1 begins,

  • you've got the body working, functioning,

  • in its bodily way--respirating, reproducing the cells,

  • and so forth and so on. And at the end of the process,

  • by B_n, the body's dead.

  • B for bodily. B_1 through

  • B_n; that's what death is.

  • At least, that's what death of the body is.

  • As I say, it's the sort of thing that somebody from the

  • medical school or a biologist or a physiologist or something

  • could describe for us. So here's the question then.

  • Suppose we call that process "death of the body."

  • Call what has occurred by the end of that sequence of events,

  • "bodily death." Now here's a question that we

  • can still ask, at least it looks as though we

  • can still ask it. Might I, or do I,

  • still exist after the death of my body?

  • Might I still exist after bodily death?

  • I don't mean to suggest in any way that we yet know the answer

  • to that question, but at least that's a question

  • that it seems as though we can coherently raise.

  • There's no obvious contradiction in asking:

  • Might I still exist after the death of my body?

  • The answer could turn out to be no.

  • But at least it's not obviously no.

  • If the answer turns out to be no, it's going to take some

  • sustained argument to settle it one way or the other.

  • The answer could turn out to be yes, for all we know at this

  • point. This just brings us back to the

  • thought that whether or not I could still exist after the

  • death of my body looks like it should depend on what I am.

  • So in a minute, that's the question that I'm

  • going to turn to. But it's a bit cumbersome to

  • constantly be asking: Might I still exist after the

  • death of my body? So no harm is done,

  • once we've clarified the question that we're trying to

  • ask, if we summarize that question in a bit of a jargon or

  • slogan. We say, instead of asking:

  • Might I survive? Or: Might I continue to exist

  • after the death of my body? --you might put it this way.

  • You might say for short: Will I survive the death of my

  • body? No harm done.

  • Or: Will I survive my death? Because what we were just

  • stipulating we mean when we talk about my death in the context of

  • this question is the death of my body.

  • No harm done. We can just say for short:

  • Will I survive my death or might I survive my death?

  • For that matter, no serious harm done if we ask:

  • Is there life after death? As long as we understand that

  • what we're not asking about there is life of my body.

  • Just another familiar way of trying to ask:

  • Will I still be around after my death?

  • Will I still exist after my death?

  • So I think there's a perfectly legitimate question and that's

  • the question we now want to turn to.

  • As I said, it looks as though to answer the question,

  • "Could I continue to exist after the death of my

  • body?"--"Is there life after death?"

  • "Could I survive my death?" for short--to answer that

  • question, we need to get clearer about: What exactly is it for

  • something to be me? That's a question we'll turn to

  • in a couple of weeks. First, we've got to get clearer

  • about: What am I? What kind of an entity am I?

  • What am I made of? In philosophical jargon,

  • this is a question from metaphysics.

  • So we're asking the metaphysical question:

  • What kind of a thing is a person?

  • It seems plausible to think that whether or not a person can

  • survive or continue to exist after the death of his or her

  • body should depend on how he's built,

  • what he's made of, what his or her parts are.

  • So, let me sketch for you two basic positions on this

  • question. What is a person?

  • Two basic positions. They're both,

  • I imagine, fairly familiar. What we're going to have to do

  • is try to decide between them. They're not the only possible

  • positions on the question of the metaphysics of the person.

  • But they're, I think, the two most prominent

  • positions and definitely the ones most worth taking seriously

  • for our purposes. So, first possible position is

  • this. A person is a combination of a

  • body and something else--a mind. But the crucial thing about

  • this first view that we want to talk about is that the mind is

  • thought of as something separate from,

  • and distinct from, the body. To use a common enough word,

  • it's a soul. So people are,

  • or people have, or people consist of,

  • bodies and souls. The soul is something,

  • as I say, distinct from the body.

  • I take it the idea of the body is a familiar one.

  • It's this lump of flesh and bone and muscle that's sitting

  • here in front of you and that each one of you sort of drags

  • around with you. It's the sort of thing that we

  • can put on a scale and prod with a stick and the biologists can

  • study, presumably made up of various

  • kinds of molecules, atoms and so forth.

  • So we've got the body. But on this first view,

  • we also have something that's not body.

  • Something that's not a material object.

  • Something that's not composed of molecules and atoms.

  • It's a soul. It's the house of,

  • or the seat of, or the basis of,

  • consciousness and thinking, perhaps personality.

  • But the crucial point for this view is that the proper

  • metaphysical understanding of the mind is to think of it in

  • nonphysical terms, nonmaterial terms.

  • That, as I say, is the first basic view.

  • I'm going to say more about that view, a fair bit more about

  • that view, over the next couple of weeks.

  • First, let me sketch the other basic view.

  • So this first view we can call "the dualist view."

  • Dualist, of course, because there's two basic

  • components--the body and the soul.

  • Although I may occasionally slip, I'm going to try to

  • preserve the word "soul." When I use the word "soul," I'm

  • going to have in mind this dualist view according to which

  • the soul is something immaterial, nonphysical.

  • Some other kind--the body is a material substance.

  • The soul is an immaterial substance.

  • That's the dualist view. The alternative view that we're

  • going to consider is not dualist, but monist.

  • It says there's one basic kind of thing and only one basic kind

  • of thing. There are bodies.

  • So what's a person? A person is just a certain kind

  • of material object. A person is just a body.

  • Of course, it's a very fancy material object.

  • It's a very amazing material object.

  • That's what this second view says.

  • The person is a body that can do things that most other

  • material objects can't do. So on the monist view--which

  • we'll call "physicalism," because it says that what people

  • just are, are these physical objects--on

  • the physicalist view, a person is just a body that

  • cannow you fill in the blank. You point out the kinds of

  • things that we can do. We can talk.

  • We can think. We can sing.

  • We can write poetry. We can fall in love.

  • We can be afraid. We can make plans.

  • We can discover things about the universe.

  • According to the physicalist view, a person is just a body

  • that can do all of those things: can reflect,

  • can be rational, can communicate,

  • can make plans, can fall in love,

  • can write poetry. That's the physicalist view.

  • As I say, we've got two basic positions.

  • There's the dualist view--people are bodies and

  • souls. And there's the physicalist

  • view, according to which there are no souls.

  • There are no immaterial objects like that.

  • There are only bodies, though when you've got a

  • functioning body like ours, so the physicalist says,

  • these bodies can do some pretty amazing things.

  • The kind of things that we all know people can do.

  • Two basic views. From a logical point of view,

  • I suppose you might have a third possible view.

  • If we've got the monist who says there's bodies but there's

  • no souls, you could imagine somebody who says there are

  • souls but there are no bodies. This would roughly be a view

  • according to which there are minds, but there aren't really

  • physical objects. Physical objects are a kind of

  • illusion, perhaps, that we fall into.

  • Or thinking about them in materialistic terms might be

  • greatly confused or mistaken. This view is sometimes known in

  • philosophy as idealism: all that exists,

  • are minds and their ideas. Physical objects is just a way

  • of talking about the ideas the mind has or something like that.

  • Idealism is a position that's got a very long history in

  • philosophy and for many classes would be worth taking a fair bit

  • of time to consider more carefully.

  • But for our purposes, I think it's not a contender.

  • So I'm just going to put it aside.

  • The positions that I'm going to--and there are other

  • possibilities as well. There are views where mind and

  • body are just two different ways of looking at the same

  • underlying reality where the underlying reality is neither

  • physical nor mental. That view's also worth taking

  • seriously in a metaphysics class, but for our purposes,

  • I mention it and put it aside. The two views we are going to

  • focus on are, on the one hand,

  • the dualist view--people have souls as well as bodies--and the

  • physicalist view--all we have, all we are, are bodies.

  • Let me say something more then about the dualist position.

  • According to the dualist, the mind is this immaterial

  • substance and we could call it by different names.

  • No harm would be done if we call it a mind,

  • though the reason I will typically talk about a soul is

  • to try to flag the crucial point of the dualist view.

  • The mind is based in, or just is something

  • nonphysical, something nonmaterialThe soul can

  • direct and give orders to the body, on the one hand.

  • On the other hand, the body generates input that

  • eventually gets sensed or felt by the soul.

  • You take a pin and you stick it through my flesh of my body and

  • I feel pain in my soul, in my mind.

  • So, two-way interaction. As always with philosophy,

  • there's more complicated versions of dualism where maybe

  • the interaction doesn't work both ways,

  • but let's just limit ourselves to good, old-fashioned,

  • two-way interactionist dualism. So my mind controls my body.

  • My body can affect my mind in various ways.

  • But for all that, they're separate things.

  • Still there's this very tight connection.

  • We sometimes put it: the soul is in the body,

  • though talking about spatial locations here may be somewhat

  • metaphorically intended. It's not as though we think

  • that if you start opening up the body you'd finally find the

  • particular spot. Here's the place where the soul

  • is located. Though it does seem,

  • from this dualist perspective, as though souls are located,

  • I'm sort of viewing the world from here.

  • Just like each of you is viewing the world from a

  • particular location. So maybe your soul is located,

  • more or less, in the vicinity of your body.

  • Crucial point, of course, the attraction of

  • the dualist view, from our point of view,

  • is that if there's a soul as well as the body,

  • and the soul is something immaterial,

  • then when the body dies, when we have B_1

  • through B_n and the death of the body occurs.

  • So at the end of B_n, the body stops repairing

  • itself. Decay sets in.

  • We all know the sad story. The worms crawl in,

  • the worms crawl out. At the end of the day--well it

  • maybe it takes longer than a day--the body has decomposed.

  • Yes, all that bespeaks the end of the body.

  • But if the soul is something immaterial, then that could

  • continue to exist, even after the destruction of

  • the body. That's the attraction,

  • at least one of the attractions, of the dualist

  • view. The belief in the soul gives

  • you something to continue to exist after the end of your

  • body. So what's death?

  • Well, if normally there's this super tight connection between

  • my soul and my body, death might be the severing of

  • that connection. So the body breaks and no

  • longer is able to give input up to the soul.

  • The soul is no longer able to control the body and make it

  • move around. But for all that,

  • the soul might continue to exist.

  • And so at least the possibility that I'll survive my death is

  • one worth taking very, very seriously if we are

  • dualists.

  • A couple of things to point out about this view.

  • One is I've been talking as though a person is a

  • combination, kind of a soul and body sandwich.

  • So a person has two basic building blocks.

  • The bodily part and the soul part.

  • It's natural to talk that way, but if we want belief in the

  • soul to help us hold out the possibility at least that there

  • might be life after death, then I think we need to

  • actually say that strictly speaking, it's not that a person

  • is a soul plus a body. Strictly speaking,

  • I think we need to say the person just is the soul.

  • After all, if the person is the combination, if the person is

  • the pair, soul plus the body, destroy the body,

  • you've destroyed the pair. If the person is the pair and

  • the pair no longer exists, the person no longer exists.

  • So if we want belief in a soul to help us leave open the door

  • to the possibility that I survive the destruction of my

  • body, it had better not be that the

  • body is an essential part of me. It's simpler,

  • more straightforward to say instead, "What I am strictly

  • speaking is a soul." As long as the soul exists,

  • I exist.

  • Of course, my soul, me, I, have a very tight

  • connection to a particular body. But still, you could,

  • in principle, destroy the body without

  • destroying me. Look, I have a particularly

  • close connection to the house I live in.

  • But for all that, you can destroy my house

  • without destroying me. So that's I think the position

  • that we ought to ascribe to the dualist.

  • The person is, strictly speaking,

  • the soul. The soul has a very intimate

  • connection with the body, but the person is not the soul

  • and the body. The person is just the soul.

  • So even if that intimate connection gets destroyed,

  • the person, the soul, could continue to exist.

  • The second point to clear up is that there's really three

  • different issues that might interest us.

  • One, metaphysically, are bodies and souls distinct?

  • Is the mind to be understood in terms of this immaterial object,

  • the soul? So are there two kinds of

  • things? That's the first question.

  • Are souls and bodies distinct? Second question,

  • though, is: Does the soul, even if it exists,

  • survive the destruction of the body?

  • It could be something separate without surviving.

  • That's why I've tried to say if there are souls,

  • at least that opens the door to the possibility that we will

  • survive our death. But, it doesn't guarantee it,

  • because absent further argumentation,

  • there's no guarantee that the soul survives the death of the

  • body. Even if it's separate,

  • it could be that it gets killed at the very same time or

  • destroyed at the very same time that the body's being destroyed.

  • Maybe when these physical processes, B_1 through

  • B_n, take place,

  • they set into motion--remember, after all we're interactionist

  • dualists. There's this very tight causal

  • connection between the body and the mind and the soul and the

  • body, the body and the soul. Just like when you prick my

  • body, that bodily process sets up certain things taking place

  • in my soul. Maybe when B_1

  • through B_n take place, they set up some other

  • processes in my soul. Call them S_1 through

  • S_n. And maybe S_1 through

  • S_n results in the destruction of my soul.

  • So simultaneously with my body dying, my soul dies.

  • Okay, this one's going to be a little bit trickier to draw.

  • The first part, S_1...,

  • that's easy. S_n.

  • The question is: How do I draw the soul?

  • I don't really know .

  • So the mere fact that we decide, if we do ultimately

  • decide that there is a soul, something nonphysical,

  • separate and distinct from the body, doesn't guarantee that we

  • survive our physical death. That's going to be a separate

  • question we'll have to turn to. The first question's going to

  • be: Are there any souls? Next question is going to have

  • to be: If there are, do we have any good reason to

  • think that they survive the death of the body?

  • Third question that might interest us, that does interest

  • us, is this: If it survives, how long does it survive?

  • Does the soul continue to exist after the death of the body?

  • Does it continue to exist forever?

  • Are we immortal?

  • Most of us would like that to be true.

  • We want there to be souls so that we can be immortal.

  • And so the question's got to be not only, is the soul distinct?

  • Does it survive the death of my body?

  • But does it continue to exist forever?

  • Those questions--hang on one second--are ones that especially

  • interest Plato. So in about a week or so we'll

  • start reading Plato's Phaedo.

  • The purpose of that dialogue, of that philosophical work,

  • is to argue for the immortality of the soul.

  • That's a question we'll be turning to.

  • Yeah? Student: [inaudible]

  • Professor Shelly Kagan: Great.

  • So the question is this. If the very idea of soul that

  • we're working with here under the dualist picture is the soul

  • as an immaterial substance, it's not made of ordinary

  • atomic matter. If the soul is immaterial,

  • doesn't it follow automatically,

  • trivially, that the soul can't be destroyed by a material

  • process? After all, there was death of

  • the body, B_1 through B_n.

  • That's a material process, a physical process.

  • Doesn't it follow that a soul, an immaterial entity,

  • can't be destroyed by a material, physical process?

  • That's a great question. What I want to say is,

  • the short answer for now is, I don't think it follows

  • automatically. It doesn't follow trivially.

  • It may follow. Plato's actually going to give

  • us some arguments for pretty much that same claim.

  • Plato's going to argue once we understand the sort of

  • metaphysical nature of the soul, we'll see why it couldn't be

  • destroyed. That's going to take some fancy

  • arguments. The reason I think it doesn't

  • follow trivially is because, remember, I said we're dealing

  • with interactionist dualism. We've already admitted that

  • bodies are able to affect the soul, right?

  • The body is having all sorts of light bounce off my eyes of

  • various wavelengths. And because of that my soul is

  • having various visual sensations about the number of people in

  • front of me, colors, and so forth and so on.

  • I gave the example of pricking my body.

  • That's a physical process that causes some sorts of changes in

  • the mental processes occurring in my soul.

  • Once we've admitted that on this kind of dualist picture the

  • material body can influence what happens in the immaterial soul,

  • then it doesn't seem that we have any grounds for shutting

  • the door to the possibility that the right physical process,

  • B_1 through B_n,

  • might set up this horrible mental, soul process,

  • S_1 through S_n,

  • resulting in the destruction of the soul.

  • It's a possibility. It's going to take more

  • arguments to rule it out. Yeah?

  • Student: [inaudible] Professor Shelly Kagan:

  • Yeah, another great question. The question was:

  • I said it seems plausible to say my soul is located,

  • more or less, here because I seem to view the

  • world from here. But maybe that's not right.

  • Maybe we shouldn't talk about the location of the soul at all.

  • After all, if the soul is an immaterial object,

  • can immaterial objects have locations?

  • I don't know. The short answer is I don't

  • know. I know very little about how

  • immaterial objects are supposed to work.

  • So although I'm trying to sketch the dualist position,

  • as I explained on Tuesday, I don't myself believe in

  • souls. I don't actually think that the

  • dualist view is correct. You might say,

  • I'll leave that problem--are souls spatially located or

  • not--to be worked out by those who believe in it.

  • For our purposes, I think it doesn't really

  • matter. If you want to say souls have a

  • location, where are they located?

  • They're located more or less where my body is.

  • At least, as long as my body's working.

  • Maybe at death the soul gets liberated from the body and is

  • able to wander more freely. Sometimes people talk about,

  • in fact we'll be reading about this, out-of-body experiences.

  • And so maybe during those unusual times the soul wanders

  • from the body and comes back to it.

  • Or, alternatively, maybe the soul doesn't have any

  • location at all. Maybe that's just an illusion

  • created by the fact that I'm getting this visual input from

  • my body. My body certainly has a

  • location. Maybe the right way--imagine

  • somebody who was in a room with remote control television setup

  • and so forth and so on. And he's seeing what's

  • happening in Chicago, even though he's sitting in a

  • room in New Haven. Well, you could understand why

  • he might fall into the trap of thinking of himself as located

  • in Chicago with all the visual inputs coming from Chicago.

  • So maybe that's how it works with the soul.

  • We get lulled into thinking that we are where our bodies

  • are. But that's really a

  • metaphysical illusion. I don't really know.

  • For our purposes, I think it's not crucial.

  • Though it's a great question, but I'm not going to try to

  • pursue it any further. All right.

  • So one question: Is there a soul?

  • Second question: Does it survive the death of

  • our body? Third question:

  • If it does, does it live forever?

  • Does it continue to exist forever?

  • Is the soul immortal? We will initially think about

  • the first question: Do we have any good reason to

  • believe in souls at all? And only after a while will we

  • turn to the second and third question: Does it survive and,

  • more particularly, is it immortal?

  • That's the first basic view about the nature of a person.

  • A person has a soul, something immaterial and not a

  • body. I take it that the view is a

  • familiar one. Many of you probably believe in

  • it. Those of you who don't believe

  • in it have probably, at least, been tempted to

  • believe in it. I'm sure you all do know people

  • who believe in it. It's a very familiar picture.

  • But, of course, the question we're going to

  • have to ask ourselves is: Is it right?

  • Is there reasons to believe it's correct?

  • Turn now to the second basic view, the physicalist view,

  • according to which a person is just a body.

  • This is a materialist view. People are just material

  • objects, the sorts of things biologists poke and prod and

  • study. It's important--I think this is

  • the crucial point--that when we say a person is just a body,

  • we don't understand that to mean--the physicalist doesn't

  • mean that as--a person is just any old body.

  • It's not as though there aren't important differences between

  • different physical objects. Some physical objects can do

  • things of a far more interesting sort than other physical

  • objects. Here's a piece of chalk.

  • It's a physical object. It's just a body.

  • What can it do? Well, not a whole lot.

  • I can write on the board with it.

  • I can break it in two. You let go of it, it drops down.

  • Not a very interesting physical body.

  • Here's a cell phone. It's just a body.

  • It's not the most interesting physical object in the world,

  • but it's a whole lot more interesting than a piece of

  • chalk. It can do all sorts of things a

  • piece of chalk can't do. If the physicalist is right,

  • then here's another physical object for you--me,

  • Shelly Kagan. I'm a pretty impressive

  • physical object. Now arrogant as I may be,

  • I don't mean to suggest I'm any more impressive than you guys

  • are. Each one of us,

  • according to the physicalist, is just a body that can do some

  • amazing things. We are bodies that can think.

  • We are bodies that can plan. We are bodies that can reason.

  • We are bodies that can feel. We are bodies that can be

  • afraid and be creative and have dreams and aspirations.

  • We are bodies that can communicate with each other.

  • We are bodies that are--well, here's a word for it:

  • We're bodies that are people. But on the physicalist view,

  • a person is just a body. And that's where we'll take it

  • up next time.

Professor Shelly Kagan: The first question we want to

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A2 初級

2.人の性質:二元論対物理論 (2. The nature of persons: dualism vs. physicalism)

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    吳詠歆 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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