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  • >>> GOOD AFTERNOON AND WELCOME. ON BEHALF OF CDC, I'D LIKE TO

  • WELCOME YOU TO PUBLIC HEALTH GRAND ROUNDS.

  • CONTINUING EDUCATION CREDITS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH GRAND ROUNDS ARE

  • AVAILABLE FOR PHYSICIANS, NURSES, PHARMACISTS, HEALTH

  • EDUCATORS, AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS.

  • PLEASE SEE MORE AT THE GRAND ROUNDS WEBSITE.

  • GRAND ROUNDS IS AVAILABLE ON ALL OF YOUR FAVORITE WEB AND SOCIAL

  • MEDIA SITES. FOR TODAY'S SPECIAL SESSION, WE

  • WILL ONLY BE TAKING QUESTIONS BY E-MAIL AND SOCIAL MEDIA, AND

  • WE'RE ALSO LIVE TWEETING TODAY. HERE'S A PREVIEW OF UPCOMING

  • GRAND ROUNDS SESSIONS. PLEASE JOIN US LIVE OR ON THE

  • WEB AT YOUR CONVENIENCE. I'D LIKE TO THANK TODAY'S

  • FEATURED SPEAKERS AND THE MANY PEOPLE LISTED HERE WHO HELPED TO

  • MAKE THIS SESSION POSSIBLE. WE HAVE A FEATURED VIDEO SEGMENT

  • ON YOUTUBE AND OUR WEBSITE CALLED BEYOND THE DATA, WHICH IS

  • POSTED SHORTLY AFTER THE SESSION.

  • THIS MONTH'S SEGMENT FEATURES MY INTERVIEW WITH

  • DR. JORDAN TAPPERO. WE'VE ALSO PARTNERED WITH THE

  • CDC PUBLIC HEALTH LIBRARY TO FEATURE ARTICLING RELEVANT TO

  • THIS SESSION. IT'S NOW MY PLEASURE TO

  • INTRODUCE THE CDC DIRECTOR, DR. TOM FRIEDEN.

  • [ APPLAUSE ] >> THANK YOU ALL, VERY MUCH FOR

  • BEING HERE, AND THANKS TO THE SPEAKERS AND THOSE WHO

  • CONTRIBUTED TO THE TALKS THAT WE'LL HEAR.

  • EBOLA WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED EPIDEMIC WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED

  • RESPONSE. WE'VE NOT YET GOTTEN TO ZERO,

  • ALTHOUGH WE'RE TANTALIZINGLY CLOSE, BUT WE'RE OPTIMISTIC THAT

  • WE WILL. THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN ENORMOUS.

  • IT'S BEEN THE RESULT OF ENORMOUS ACTIVITY AND EFFORT ON REALLY

  • ALL PARTS OF CDC AND A LARGE NUMBER OF OUR NATIONAL AND

  • INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS AND THE COUNTRIES AND COMMUNITIES IN

  • WEST AFRICA. WE STILL HAVE 150 PEOPLE IN WEST

  • AFRICA IN THE THREE AFFECTED COUNTRIES, AND WE STILL NEED

  • PEOPLE TO GO. SO IF YOU'RE WILLING, BARB IS IN

  • THE FRONT OF THE ROOM. WE'LL ALSO TAKE E-MAILS WITH

  • VOLUNTEERS. I THINK THERE ARE REALLY THREE

  • KEY LESSONS FROM EBOLA. THE FIRST IS THAT EVERY SINGLE

  • COUNTRY NEEDS STRONG CAPACITY TO FIND, STOP, AND PREVENT HEALTH

  • THREATS WHEN THEY EMERGE. THAT'S WHAT GLOBAL HEALTH

  • SECURITY AGENDA IS ALL ABOUT, AND THIS IS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY

  • FOR THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE CDC, TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS AND

  • LABORATORY SYSTEMS, SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, EMERGENCY RESPONSE,

  • VACCINATION, AND OTHER PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRIES AROUND THE

  • WORLD THAT NEED IT MOST AND HAVE IT LEAST.

  • THE SECOND KEY LESSON I BELIEVE IS THAT WHEN COUNTRY CAPACITIES

  • ARE OVERWHELMED, THE WORLD NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO SURGE IN MORE

  • RAPIDLY TO SUPPORT PROGRESS. THAT MEANS AT CDC, WE'VE CREATED

  • THE GLOBAL RAPID RESPONSE TEAM, ABLE TO PUT 50 PEOPLE VIRTUALLY

  • ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD WITHIN JUST A COUPLE DAYS.

  • WE'RE WORKING TO SUPPORT AND STRENGTHEN THE WORLD HEALTH

  • ORGANIZATION, THE AFRICAN UNION CDC, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SO

  • THAT THE WORLD CAN MOVE RAPIDLY WHEN SOMETHING IS TOO MUCH FOR

  • AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY. AND THE THIRD IS THE ENORMOUS

  • IMPORTANCE OF INFECTION CONTROL. HEALTH CARE WORKERS ARE ON THE

  • FRONT LINE. THEY'RE POTENTIALLY AT RISK.

  • THEY'RE ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IN REPORTING DISEASES

  • AND OUTBREAKS, AND HEALTH CARE FACILITIES CAN BE BOTH

  • AMPLIFIERS OF DISEASE AND CONTROLLERS OF OUTBREAKS.

  • AND WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY'RE SAFE FOR HEALTH CARE

  • WORKERS, SAFE FOR PATIENTS, GOOD INFORMATION SOURCES FOR PUBLIC

  • HEALTH, AND PART OF THE SOLUTION IN TERMS OF STOPPING OUTBREAKS.

  • AS WE MOVE FORWARD, WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SURE

  • THAT WE DON'T GO BACK TO THE WORLD THAT EXISTED BEFORE EBOLA,

  • A WORLD IN WHICH THERE WAS NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WHETHER

  • COUNTRIES WERE READY, ON THE ONE HAND, AND INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE

  • FROM THE WORLD TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES TO BECOME READY ON THE

  • OTHER. EBOLA PROVIDES US WITH REALLY A

  • UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE PREPAREDNESS IN COUNTRIES AROUND

  • THE WORLD, AND IT'S UP TO US TO SEIZE THAT OPPORTUNITY AND MAKE

  • SURE WE MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

  • SO I'M VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PRESENTATIONS AND THANK

  • THE SPEAKERS FOR BEING HERE. [ APPLAUSE ]

  • >> THANK YOU VERY MUCH, DR. FRIEDEN.

  • OUR NEXT SPEAKER IS JENNIFER NUZZO.

  • >> THANK YOU SO MUCH. I'M VERY GLAD TO BE HERE TO TALK

  • ABOUT WHAT'S CLEARLY ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING HEALTH SECURITY

  • CHALLENGES IN A VERY LONG TIME. THE EBOLA CRISIS STARTED IN WEST

  • AFRICA AND SICKENED MORE THAN 28,000 PEOPLE.

  • IT'S CAUSED UPWARDS OF 11,000 DEATHS.

  • IT'S BEEN DEVASTATING TO THE ECONOMIES THAT HAVE BEEN

  • AFFECTED. PRESIDENT OBAMA AND DIRECTOR

  • FRIEDEN BOTH RIGHTLY DESCRIBE IT AS A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL

  • SECURITY. I COMPLETELY AGREE.

  • THE CHALLENGES THAT HAVE ARISEN DURING THIS CRISIS REALLY ARE

  • ENORMOUS, BUT WE CAN AND SHOULD LEARN FROM THEM SO WE UNDERSTAND

  • HOW WE CAN RESPOND BETTER IN THE FUTURE.

  • AND HOPEFULLY PREVENT SUCH A CRISIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN.

  • THAT'S WHAT I WANT TO TALK ABOUT TODAY, SOME OF THESE LESSONS.

  • BEFORE I GET INTO THE CHALLENGES, I WANT TO TALK A

  • LITTLE BIT ABOUT WHAT I THINK WORKED WELL BECAUSE THERE HAVE

  • BEEN A LOT OF BAD NEWS STORIES THAT HAVE DOMINATED, AND I WANT

  • TO RIGHTLY SORT OF CELEBRATE RESPONSES THAT WENT WELL.

  • FIRST, THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE EBOLA CRISIS

  • WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH, MUCH WORSE IF IT WEREN'T FOR THE HEALTH

  • CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONALS WHO ARE ON THE

  • FRONT LINES TACKLING THIS CRISIS.

  • THE BRAVERY, SACRIFICE, AND IMPACT OF THESE INDIVIDUALS IS

  • REALLY ENORMOUS. THEY WERE RIGHTLY RECOGNIZED AS

  • "TIME" MAGAZINE'S PERSON OF THE YEAR.

  • I CONSIDER THAT TO BE AN ENORMOUS SUCCESS.

  • I'M ALSO INCREDIBLY PROUD OF U.S. LEADERSHIP DURING THIS

  • CRISIS. THIS GRAPH HERE SHOWS SOME OF

  • THE U.S. COMMITMENTS. IT DOESN'T INCLUDE THE EBOLA

  • SUPPLEMENTAL THAT CONGRESS PASSED.

  • QUITE ENORMOUS, ESPECIALLY TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

  • AND IT'S NOT JUST THE U.S. ALSO NGOs AND VOLUNTEERS WENT

  • OVER, POTENTIALLY PUTTING THEIR LIVES AT RISK.

  • I KNOW THAT CDC STAFF PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN ALL OF THIS, AND

  • REALLY, YOU DESERVE OUR NATION'S THANKS FOR ALL OF YOUR HARD WORK

  • AND EFFORTS. I KNOW THAT THE WORK CONTINUES,

  • AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO OFFER THANKS ON THAT FRONT.

  • IT'S NOT JUST ME WHO THINKS THIS IS IMPORTANT.

  • THE AMERICAN PUBLIC REALLY DOES TOO, AND IT'S REALLY HARD TO

  • TELL IN THE MEDIA REPORTS, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THIS POLLING DATA

  • FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE MAJORITY OF

  • AMERICANS THINK THAT WORKING OVERSEAS, YOU KNOW, TO MAKE

  • INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HELPS PROTECT

  • AMERICANS HERE, LIKE IT HELPS TO PREVENT BY SPREADING -- HELPS

  • THE PREVENTION OF SPREADING DISEASES.

  • AND NEARLY SIX IN TEN THINK THIS IS IMPORTANT TO DO NOT JUST FOR

  • OUR OWN PUBLIC HEALTH BUT ALSO TO ENHANCE PROTECTION ABROAD.

  • THERE'S ALSO GOOD SUPPORT FOR WHAT WE'VE DONE AT HOME TO

  • TACKLE EBOLA CASES THAT HAVE RISEN IN THE U.S.

  • THIS SURVEY SHOWS THAT THERE'S A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN BOTH

  • CDC, PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES, AND LOCAL HOSPITALS TO BE ABLE TO

  • RESPOND -- RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED IF EBOLA WAS DIAGNOSED IN

  • YOUR AREA, HOW CONFIDENT WERE THEY THAT THE AREA WOULD BE ABLE

  • TO RESPOND. THERE WAS A DIP IN CONFIDENCE

  • FOR SURE AFTER THE TEXAS EBOLA DEATH, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE

  • NUMBERS, THEY'RE STILL PRETTY HIGH AND CERTAINLY WELL ABOVE

  • WHAT YOU TYPICALLY SEE FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

  • I KNOW, DON'T SET THE BAR TOO HIGH.

  • I THINK ANOTHER KEY SUCCESS IS THE RAPID EXPANSION OF

  • DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE REGION.

  • IT'S IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT, YOU KNOW, ALTHOUGH WE THINK THAT

  • THE FIRST EBOLA CASES PROBABLY HAPPENED SOMETIME IN MAYBE

  • DECEMBER 2013, THE FIRST CASE THAT WAS CONFIRMED WAS CONFIRMED

  • IN MARCH 2014 WHEN A SPECIMEN WAS SENT TO FRANCE FOR

  • LABORATORY TESTING. THAT WASN'T GOING TO BE

  • SUSTAINABLE TO SEND SPECIMENS OUT, SO THERE WAS MUCH EFFORT IN

  • ENHANCING THE DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES LOCALLY.

  • I KNOW CDC STAFF WERE PARTICULARLY INVOLVED IN SETTING

  • UP THESE LABORATORY NETWORKS THAT EMERGES REALLY WITHIN A

  • MATTER OF MONTHS. THAT'S A GREAT SUCCESS AS WELL.

  • THIS WASN'T THE FIRST TIME THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THOUGHT ABOUT

  • EBOLA. THANKS TO SOME ADVANCED

  • INVESTMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, RAPID RESPONSE

  • FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND FLEXIBLE REGULATORY MECHANISMS

  • LIKE EMERGENCY USE. WE ALSO SAW THE DEVELOPMENT OF

  • ADDITIONAL DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS FOR EBOLA.

  • SINCE AUGUST 2014, TEN DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS HAVE NOW BEEN

  • DEVELOPED THAT CAN BE POTENTIALLY USED UNDER EMERGENCY

  • CONDITIONS. SO THAT IS BY FAR NOT A

  • COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF ALL THE SUCCESSES.

  • I JUST WANTED TO REALLY HIGHLIGHT WHAT I THINK IS

  • PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. BUT I REALLY DO WANT TO TURN

  • ATTENTION NOW TO WHAT ARE SOME OF THE CHALLENGES THAT WE NOT

  • ONLY EXPERIENCE DURING EBOLA BUT WHAT WE'RE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE,

  • YOU KNOW, MOVING FORWARD FOR FUTURE HEALTH SECURITY THREATS.

  • THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF AFTER-ACTION REPORTS, EXPOSES OF

  • ALL THE THINGS THAT WENT WRONG. I'M NOT GOING TO TRY TO GIVE A

  • COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EVERYTHING THAT I THINK DIDN'T WORK, BUT

  • WHAT I DO WANT TO FOCUS ON IS WHAT I THINK ARE THE KEY ISSUES

  • THAT WE NEED TO ADDRESS GOING FORWARD BECAUSE WITHOUT

  • ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE SIMILARLY

  • DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN FUTURE HEALTH SECURITY THREATS.

  • SO ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS ON SURVEILLANCE.

  • NOW, WHEN THE WORLD AWOKE TO THE CRISIS THAT WAS UNFOLDING IN

  • WEST AFRICA, THERE WERE A LOT OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING ESTEEMED

  • PUBLIC HEALTH FOLKS, WHO CALLED THIS CRISIS A SURPRISE.

  • YOU KNOW, THEY EXPLAINED IN THE PREVIOUS OUTBREAKS THERE WEREN'T

  • NEARLY AS MANY PEOPLE INVOLVED. THEY WERE IN RURAL AREAS AND

  • TYPICALLY CONTAINED. BUT I GUESS WE HAVE TO EXAMINE

  • WHETHER OR NOT IT REALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SURPRISE.

  • THIS MAP HERE SHOWS THE RANGE OF FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO

  • HARBOR THE EBOLA VIRUS. WHEN YOU ASK THE QUESTION, WAS

  • EBOLA IN WEST AFRICA A SURPRISE, THE ANSWER FROM THE HEALTH

  • COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE IS NO. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT I WANT TO

  • TALK ABOUT A LITTLE BIT BECAUSE THOSE WHO ALSO WORK IN

  • PREPAREDNESS, THIS IS THE CHALLENGE.

  • DEFEATING THE MENTALITY OF IT HASN'T HAPPENED, THEREFORE IT

  • ISN'T GOING TO HAPPEN. WE HAVE TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO GET

  • AROUND THAT. I THINK IT'S SOMETHING THE

  • BIPARTISAN 9/11 COMMISSION CALLED A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION.

  • WE HAVE TO BETTER ANTICIPATE WHAT THREATS ARE GOING TO BE.

  • BUT EARLY DETECTION IS HARD. I DON'T THINK IT SHOULD BE OUR

  • SOLE FOCUS. WHAT I THINK IS ALSO PROBABLY

  • PERHAPS AN EVEN GREATER PRIORITY IS MAKING SURE WHEN WE DO

  • RECOGNIZE THERE'S A CRISIS THAT WE HAVE THE RIGHT INFORMATION AT

  • OUR HANDS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY.

  • CLEARLY WHAT HAPPENED IN TEXAS WAS A SHORTCOMING OF

  • SURVEILLANCE. IT TOOK DAYS AND MULTIPLE VISITS

  • TO A HOSPITAL FOR THAT PATIENT TO BE DIAGNOSED WITH EBOLA.

  • WE NOW KNOW THERE ARE VARIOUS REASONS FOR WHY THAT IS, BUT WE

  • NEED TO FIX THAT TO MAKE SURE THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN AGAIN.

  • THERE'S ALSO PROBLEMS ON THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRONT.

  • AFTER SARS IN 2003, A LOT OF EFFORT WAS PUT INTO TRYING TO

  • FIX SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE SAW WITH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.

  • A LOT OF EFFORT WAS PUT ON TO UPDATING THE INTERNATIONAL

  • HEALTH REGULATIONS AND FOLLOWING THEM OUT AND PUTTING THEM INTO

  • FORCE. AND THERE'S ENORMOUS POTENTIAL

  • IN THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, BUT

  • UNFORTUNATELY WHAT WE SAW IN EBOLA IS THEY DON'T COMPLETELY

  • SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IN FACT, I DON'T THINK ANYBODY

  • THINKS THAT IT'S A GOOD THING THAT EBOLA WASN'T DECLARED A

  • PUBLIC HEALTH EVENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN UNTIL

  • AUGUST WHEN THERE WERE ALREADY FOUR COUNTRIES REPORTING CASES,

  • YOU KNOW, OVER 1700 CASES AND A THOUSAND DEATHS, WHICH WAS FOUR

  • TIMES AS MANY CASES AS WE HAD SEEN IN ANY PRIOR EBOLA

  • OUTBREAK. SO WE NEED TO FIGURE OUT BETTER

  • MECHANISMS FOR HOW WE MOTIVATE GLOBAL ACTION IN RESPONDING TO

  • CRISES. I THINK IF YOU LOOKED AT EARLIER

  • SLIDE OF U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EBOLA CRISIS, I MEAN, THERE

  • WAS AN ENORMOUS, REALLY UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF

  • COMMITMENT TO RESPONDING. WE DID A LOT OF REALLY IMPORTANT

  • THINGS ON THE GROUND. ONE THING THAT WE DIDN'T DO WAS

  • ASSESS ORGANIZATIONS WHO WERE ON THE FRONT LINES WHICH KEPT

  • ASKING FOR TEAMS OF CLINICIANS WHO COULD TREAT SICK EBOLA

  • PATIENTS. THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS

  • ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, NOT JUST BECAUSE, OF COURSE, WE WANT TO

  • PROTECT PEOPLE, TAKE CARE OF PEOPLE WHO ARE SICK, BUT BECAUSE

  • WE FOUND THAT IT'S VERY HARD TO GET POPULATIONS TO ACCEPT OUR

  • PUBLIC HEALTH MESSAGES IF WE CAN'T GIVE THEM SOME ASSURANCES

  • THAT WE'RE GOING TO TAKE CARE OF THEIR LOVED ONES IF THEY GET

  • SICK. AND IT'S ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WE

  • HAVE EFFECTIVE MEDICAL RESPONSES TO INFECTIOUS DISEASE

  • EMERGENCIES. HEALTH CARE FACILITIES CAN

  • BECOME ULTIMATELY SOURCES OF INFECTIONS FOR THE REST OF THE

  • COMMUNITY IF WE DON'T FIGURE OUT HOW WE CARE FOR THE SICK AND

  • PROTECT THE WELL WITHIN THE FACILITIES AS WELL.

  • POLITICS WAS ANOTHER PROBLEM. IT'S ALWAYS A PROBLEM.

  • I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU AN EXCERPT FROM AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT.

  • THIS EXCERPT, JUST SOME OF THE THEMES THAT EMERGE ARE TENSIONS

  • BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES, DISAGREEMENTS OVER

  • WHAT LEVEL OF ACTION, WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CLOSE BORDERS,

  • IMPLEMENT QUARANTINES. IT SOUNDS VERY FAMILIAR, RIGHT?

  • SOUNDS LIKE THE STORY OF EBOLA. IT'S ACTUALLY AN EXCERPT FROM A

  • TABLE TOP EXERCISE THAT OUR CENTER CONDUCTED IN 2001 CALLED

  • "DARK WINTER." IT WAS A FICTIONAL SMALLPOX

  • RESPONSE. BASED ON "DARK WINTER," REALLY

  • THREE OTHER EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES SINCE 2001 SHOULD HAVE

  • BEEN COMPLETELY -- I MEAN, YOU COULD TELL THAT WITHIN

  • SHORT-ORDER, PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS WERE GOING TO HAVE TO

  • DIVERT THEIR ATTENTION FROM RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS TO

  • TRYING TO MANAGE THE POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM LEADERS TRYING TO

  • DO THINGS LIKE SHUT DOWN BORDERS, CANCEL TRAVEL, ALL

  • THINGS THAT OUR BEST EVIDENCE SAY LIKELY WILL NOT WORK AND

  • WOULD ULTIMATELY EXACERBATE THE TOLL OF THE CRISIS.

  • THIS IS A STATE RESPONSE, A STATE EBOLA RESPONSE PLAN.

  • YOU CAN SEE THAT THE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS THAT DRAFTED

  • THIS PLAN WERE CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM.

  • THEY TALKED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF, YOU KNOW,

  • QUARANTINING A-SYMPTOMATIC INDIVIDUALS, THAT THERE'S NO

  • SCIENTIFIC RATIONALE FOR THIS. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS PLAN WAS

  • ULTIMATELY SCRAPPED BY THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN THAT STATE

  • WHO BASICALLY DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT POLICIES THAT WERE NOT

  • CONSISTENT WITH CDC GUIDANCE. AND THIS IS REALLY UNFORTUNATE.

  • ONE THING I THINK THAT'S PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT, AND I

  • WANT TO POINT IT OUT IN THIS SLIDE, YOU CAN SEE THERE'S A

  • TERM OF ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION. WE HAVE TO PUT THIS TERM TO BED.

  • WHAT IT MEANS IS BASED ON NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER.

  • AND IT'S DANGEROUS BECAUSE WHEN WE SAY OUT OF ABUNDANCE OF

  • CAUTION, IT GIVES THE PERCEPTION THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE

  • SOMEWHERE, AND IT BASICALLY REINFORCES PEOPLE'S FEARS THAT

  • THEY'RE GOING TO GET SICK. AND IT'S DANGEROUS.

  • IT CREATES AN INCONSISTENCY IN OUR MESSAGE.

  • WE CAN'T SAY THERE'S NO THREAT, BUT OUT OF AN ABUNDANCE OF

  • CAUTION, WE'RE GOING TO SCRUB DOWN EVERY SINGLE PLACE THIS

  • INDIVIDUAL WENT BEFORE THEY BECAME SICK.

  • I KNOW THAT WHEN THE DOCTOR GOT SICK IN NEW YORK, I GOT LOTS OF

  • CALLS FROM THE MEDIA ASKING, WE

  • WELL, IF THEY SAY HE LIKELY DIDN'T INFECT PEOPLE BEFORE HE

  • BECAME SICK, WHY ARE THEY SCRUBBING THE BOWLING ALLEY?

  • WHY ARE THEY CLOSING DOWN THE MEATBALL SHOP?

  • WHAT'S UNDERLINING THOSE QUESTIONS THAT THE MEDIA WAS

  • ASKING IS, ARE THEY LYING TO US? THAT'S A REALLY BAD PLACE FOR

  • PUBLIC HEALTH TO BE. SO WE HAVE TO BE VERY AWARE OF

  • THE CONSISTENCY OF OUR MESSAGE. AND THESE WEREN'T LIKE CRAZY,

  • OUT THERE MEDIA OUTLETS ASKING THESE QUESTIONS.

  • IN FACT, MANY OF THEM CAME FROM NPR, WHICH YOU CONSIDER TO BE

  • GENERALLY BALANCED ON THE ISSUES.

  • SO MOVING FORWARD, HOW DO WE MOVE BEYOND THESE CHALLENGES?

  • DOES EVERYBODY KNOW WHO THIS IS? OKAY, GOOD.

  • I'LL JUST LEAVE IT THERE. SO WE HAVE TO FIX SURVEILLANCE.

  • THIS PICTURE SHOWS SOME OF THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE TO THE

  • ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD AT THE HOSPITALS AFTER THE EBOLA CASE

  • IN DALLAS. ESSENTIALLY WHAT IT DID WAS TRY

  • TO ASK SOME OF THE QUESTIONS LIKE TRAVEL HISTORY.

  • I THINK THESE APPROACHES ARE REALLY IMPORTANT, AND I THINK WE

  • SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM AND MAKE SURE THEY EXIST

  • ELSEWHERE BECAUSE I KNOW THAT I'VE TALKED TO PUBLIC HEALTH

  • DEPARTMENTS THAT EXPRESS FRUSTRATIONS WHEN THEY GET

  • QUESTIONS FROM THEIR HOSPITALS LIKE, WHEN CAN WE STOP ASKING

  • TRAVEL HISTORY? IN THIS DAY AND AGE, WE CAN'T.

  • WE HAVE TO TRY TO CREATE A CULTURE AROUND THIS.

  • THE OTHER THING WE ABSOLUTELY NEED TO FIGURE OUT IS HOW WE ARE

  • GOING TO MEDICALLY MANAGE PATIENTS IN ACUTE INFECTIOUS

  • DISEASE EMERGENCIES. THE ABSENCE OF A CLINICAL

  • RESPONSE IS ONE OF THE GREATEST CHALLENGES FACED DURING EBOLA.

  • I COMPLETELY AGREE AND THINK WE HAVE TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO DO

  • THIS. WHEN THE U.S. -- I MEAN, IF WE

  • ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS BEING A NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS, AND I

  • COMPLETELY AGREE THAT IT IS, THINK ABOUT WHAT THAT MEANS.

  • WE DON'T GO TO WAR BY JUST ISSUING A GENERAL CALL TO

  • VOLUNTEERS AND SEE WHO SHOWS UP, RIGHT.

  • WE RECRUIT INDIVIDUALS, WE MAKE SURE WE HAVE APPROPRIATE SKILL

  • SETS. WE TRAIN THEM FOR THE MISSION.

  • WE MAKE SURE THAT THEY KNOW WHAT THE MISSION IS AND WE GIVE THEM

  • ALL THE PROTECTION THAT WE CAN TO MAKE SURE THEY COME BACK

  • SAFELY. AND WE PAY THEM FOR THEIR JOB.

  • AT THE VERY LEAST, WE MAKE SURE THAT THEY'RE NOT FIRED WHEN THEY

  • RETURN TO THEIR DAY JOBS. BUT WHEN WE'RE THINKING ABOUT

  • MEDICAL RESPONSE, WE ALSO HAVE TO EXAMINE THE GENERALIZED

  • ABILITY AND SCALEABILITY. NOW, I THINK THE TIERED RESPONSE

  • FOR U.S. HOSPITALS FOR EBOLA DEVELOPED IS IMPORTANT WORK, AND

  • IT MAKES SENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT EBOLA CRISIS.

  • BUT WE ALSO NEED TO THINK ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT WE CAN APPLY THIS

  • MODEL TO OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS.

  • AND I THINK THE ANSWER MAY BE NO.

  • BECAUSE IF YOU CONSIDER WHAT WE'RE DOING WITH THESE TIERED

  • HOSPITALS, THE TOTAL CAPACITY IS PROBABLY VERY LOW.

  • WE KNOW IT REQUIRES VERY INTENSE COMMITMENT OF STAFF.

  • WERE THERE TO BE MORE CASES, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HOSPITALS

  • TO MAINTAIN FOR A LONG TIME. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE POLITICAL

  • LEADERSHIP, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO WANT TO CHECK THE BOX.

  • WE'VE SOLVED ALL THE PROBLEMS. I KNOW FOLKS IN PUBLIC HEALTH

  • DEPARTMENTS WHO ARE GETTING QUESTIONS LIKE, WHAT'S THE MERS

  • HOSPITAL? WE HAVE TO EXAMINE WHETHER OR

  • NOT THIS IS A MODEL WE WANT TO ROLL OUT FOR ALL INFECTIOUS

  • DISEASE. THE NEXT THING WE HAVE TO DO IS

  • REALLY WORK ON PROMOTING EVIDENCE-BASED POLICIES.

  • THAT MEANS THINKING IN ADVANCE OF THE NEXT CRISIS WHAT MEASURES

  • WE'RE GOING TO TAKE AND WHAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THEM AND

  • SOCIALIZING THESE PLANS, NOT JUST WITH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP,

  • BUT ALSO WITH THE PUBLIC. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT IS COMING

  • FROM THE THINK TANK WORLD AND WE TAKE REALLY SERIOUSLY.

  • WE WERE HORRIFIED BY THE POLITICAL DEBATES OVER TRAVEL

  • RESTRICTIONS DURING EBOLA. WE TRIED TO DO OUR PART BY

  • TALKING TO THE MEDIA AND BRIEFING POLICYMAKERS AND

  • WRITING PIECES TO TRY TO COUNTERACT THOSE, I WOULD CALL,

  • REFLEXES. BUT WE CAN'T JUST, YOU KNOW,

  • FOCUS ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. WE ALSO HAVE TO REACH MEMBERS OF

  • THE PUBLIC AND FIGURE OUT WHETHER OR NOT THE PLANS WE HAVE

  • FOR THEM ARE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT AND BE

  • WILLING TO DO IN AN EMERGENCY. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS IS SOME

  • COLLEAGUES OF MINE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THE STATE OF

  • MARYLAND TO DO SOME ALLOCATION. BASICALLY ASKING OPPOSING

  • QUESTIONS TO THE PUBLIC. IF THERE WASN'T ENOUGH TO GO

  • AROUND, WHO SHOULD WE ALLOCATE THE CARE TO?

  • YOU KNOW, WHOSE LIVES SHOULD WE PREFERENTIALLY TRY TO SAVE?

  • APPARENTLY THE RESULTS OF THOSE FOCUS GROUPS HAVE BEEN

  • COMPLETELY EYE OPENING AND VERY USEFUL FOR STATE PLANNING

  • EFFORTS. WE NEED TO DO MORE THINGS LIKE

  • THAT TO MAKE SURE WE ARE APPROPRIATELY CAPTURING THE

  • VALUES OF THE PUBLIC IN OUR RESPONSE PLANS.

  • THE GOAL HERE IS THAT WHEN WE ACTUALLY ROLL OUT THE PLANS,

  • IT'S DONE SO IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PUBLIC, THE POLITICAL

  • LEADERSHIP, AND PUBLIC HEALTH. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT HAD TO

  • HAPPEN AFTER THE LEADERSHIP IN NEW YORK CITY HAD TO GO EAT

  • MEATBALLS AS A SHOW OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE GENERAL

  • PUBLIC WAS NOT PUT AT RISK. ONE THING THAT I'M REALLY

  • WORRIED ABOUT WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH PLANS IS

  • WHAT THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF SOME OF THE MEASURES THAT WE HAD

  • TO TAKE DURING EBOLA. ONE I'M QUITE WORRIED ABOUT IS

  • THE MONITORING OF TRAVELERS FROM WEST AFRICA.

  • I UNDERSTAND WHY WE DID THIS. POLITICALLY, IT WAS FAR

  • PREFERABLE THAN RESTRICTING TRAVEL TO AND FROM THOSE AREAS.

  • BUT WHAT WE'RE ALREADY SEEING IS -- I WORRY THAT WE'VE CREATED

  • EXPECTATIONS OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT THIS IS

  • SOMETHING THAT WE CAN AND SHOULD DO IN FUTURE CRISES THAT

  • ORIGINATE ABROAD. WE NEED TO EXAMINE WHETHER OR

  • NOT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WE WANT TO ROLL OUT, AND IF NOT, WE

  • MAY NEED TO RESET POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS AROUND THIS.

  • AS DIRECTOR FRIEDEN SAID, I THINK WE HAVE ENORMOUS

  • OPPORTUNITY IN FRONT OF US TO, YOU KNOW, BUILD ON SOME OF THE

  • LESSONS OF EBOLA, PARTICULARLY USING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY

  • AGENDA AS A MECHANISM TO DO SO. I'VE HEARD A LOT OF CRITICISMS

  • OF THE GHSA FROM PEOPLE, OR SKEPTICISM.

  • THIS IS TOO AMERICAN, TOO WESTERN CENTRIC.

  • THEY DON'T REALLY CARE ABOUT HEALTH SECURITY.

  • I THINK EBOLA KIND OF PROVES THE FALLACY OF THAT THINKING.

  • ALSO, IF WE'RE GOING TO DO HEALTH SECURITY RIGHT, WE'RE

  • GOING TO DO IT BY BUILDING CORE PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITY.

  • I SAY THIS BECAUSE DURING THE EBOLA CRISIS, I GOT A CALL FROM

  • "THE NEW YORK TIMES" SAYING THE THING THEY'RE DOING IN TEXAS,

  • CONTACT TRACING, IS THIS SOMETHING THE PUBLIC HEALTH CAN

  • DO? I SAID, YES, AND I WAS ABLE TO

  • CONNECT THEM TO MY COLLEAGUES IN TB CONTROL, WHO TOLD THEM A LOT

  • ABOUT CONTACT TRACING. LOTS OF HEALTH SECURITY LESSONS

  • EXIST IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH BATTLES THAT HAVE COME BEFORE

  • EBOLA. HIV, TB, EVEN H1N1 HAS LESSONS.

  • AND JUST AS AN EXAMPLE, I TRIED TO KIND OF CROSS WORK TB

  • CONTROL. YOU CAN PROBABLY CIRCLE ALL OF

  • ACTION PACKAGES UNDER THE GHSA AS BEING RELEVANT TO CONTROL.

  • WHAT I HAVE TO SAY IS THAT IF YOU DON'T THINK THAT THE GLOBAL

  • HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA IS RIGHT FOR YOU, CALL IT WHATEVER YOU

  • WANT. IF YOU WANT TO STRENGTHEN YOUR

  • CAPACITY IN THE NAME OF TB CONTROL, THAT'S TYPE.

  • WE JUST CAN'T HAVE ANOTHER EBOLA CRISIS.

  • CLEARLY IT SHOWED US IN MANY PLACES, INCLUDING HERE, THERE'S

  • A LONG WAY TO GO. SO THANK YOU.

  • WITH THAT, I'LL END WITH A REQUEST.

  • OUR JOURNAL HEALTH SECURITY, WE'RE GOING TO BE PUBLISHING A

  • SPECIAL ISSUE. I'M THE EDITOR OF THAT.

  • I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM ANYONE WHO'S LISTENING TO THIS IN TERMS

  • OF WHAT YOU'RE LEARNING ABOUT SURVEILLANCE.

  • SO PLEASE CONSIDER SUBMITTING A MANUSCRIPT.

  • THANK YOU SO MUCH. [ APPLAUSE ]

  • AND NOW I'M GOING TO TURN IT OVER TO OUR NEXT SPEAKER, DAVE

  • BLAZES. >> GOOD AFTERNOON.

  • THANK YOU, ALSO, FOR INVITING ME TO BE A PART OF THIS REALLY

  • IMPORTANT PANEL. JOHN ASKED ME TO TALK ABOUT

  • SURVEILLANCE, DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND HOW IT RELATES

  • TO GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY. UNFORTUNATELY, I STILL THINK IS

  • LARGELY ASPIRATIONAL IN MANY PARTS OF THE GLOBE.

  • YOU MENTIONED WE HAD TROUBLE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY DOING

  • SURVEILLANCE FOR THIS, BUT YOU CAN IMAGINE THE SITUATION IN

  • MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. MY STANDARD DISCLAIMERS.

  • I UNFORTUNATELY DON'T HAVE ANY CONFLICT OF INTERESTS.

  • OKAY. SO SURVEILLANCE.

  • I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT SURVEILLANCE IS REALLY A KEY

  • COMPONENT OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

  • I DO THINK, THOUGH, THAT SURVEILLANCE DOESN'T EXIST IN A

  • VACUUM AT ALL. IT REALLY EXISTS ACROSS THIS

  • SPECTRUM OF SCIENCE, IF YOU WILL.

  • I THINK HISTORICALLY, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS MAINLY

  • DONE LABORATORY-BASE RESEARCH AS WELL AS CLINICAL TRIAL

  • DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES AND OTHER PRODUCTS FOR HEALTH

  • PROTECTION REASONS. SO SURVEILLANCE IS SOMEWHAT NEW

  • TO OUR PORTFOLIO. THIS REALLY CHANGED TWO DECADES

  • AGO WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON ISSUED THIS PRESIDENTIAL

  • DECISION DIRECTIVE NSTC-7. THIS PUT IN MOTION THE CREATION

  • OF SEVERAL ENTITIES, ONE OF WHICH WAS THE GLOBAL EMERGING

  • INFECTION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, GEIS.

  • THIS ORGANIZATION WAS TASKED WITH STRENGTHENING GLOBAL

  • DISEASE REDUCTION EFFORTS, DISEASE SURVEILLANCE, REALLY

  • TRYING TO ADDRESS ANY EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THAT MAY

  • OCCUR. THE GEIS PROGRAM, AS MANY OF

  • YOU HAVE PROBABLY HEARD ALREADY, IS NOW ALMOST TWO DECADES OLD.

  • YOU CAN SEE THAT IT'S ONE OF DOD'S RESPONSES.

  • THE SCOPE AND MANDATE HAS REALLY ONLY INCREASED SINCE THOSE TWO

  • DECADES AGO WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON ISSUED THIS DIRECTIVE.

  • I THINK NOW IT INCLUDES MANY OTHER DOD PROGRAMS SUCH AS

  • DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE

  • INVOLVED IN DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND MITIGATION.

  • IF YOU LOOK AT THE DISEASES LISTED HERE, RESPIRATORY

  • INFECTIONS, VECTOR BORN INVEXS, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS,

  • THEY REALLY HAVE A STAYING POWER.

  • THESE WERE IDENTIFIED 20 YEARS AGO AS IMPORTANT, AND THEY

  • REMAIN IMPORTANT TODAY. SO THAT REALLY HAS REMAINED

  • LARGELY UNCHANGED IN OUR EFFORTS.

  • LIKE ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY, WE NEED POLICY TO PROVIDE US

  • GUIDANCE ON WHAT WE DO. CERTAINLY THE DOD, WE HAVE A LOT

  • OF POLICY. THIS IS JUST SOME OF IT.

  • I WOULDN'T ASK YOU TO READ ALL OF THIS BY ANY MEANS, BUT SOME

  • OF IT APPLIES TO HHS AND OTHERS. SO WE IN DOD MOSTLY IN DISEASE

  • SURVEILLANCE AND THINGS RELATED TO HEALTH PLAY A COLLABORATIVE

  • ROLE AND ARE VERY MUCH SUPPORTIVE OF HHS' AND OTHER'S

  • MISSIONS, DEPENDING ON WHETHER IT'S DOMESTIC OR ABROAD.

  • I THINK WE'VE BEEN DIRECTED TO DO DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN

  • SUPPORT OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY, BUT IT'S OBVIOUSLY WE

  • CAN'T DO SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE.

  • SO WHERE DO WE FOCUS OUR EFFORTS IS A REALLY BIG QUESTION.

  • I REALLY LIKE THIS GRAPH. IT'S PRETTY OLD, MORE THAN A

  • DECADE OLD FROM AN IOM REPORT, BUT I THINK IT'S REALLY AT

  • PLACES WHERE MANY OF THESE FACTORS CONVERGE THAT WE SHOULD

  • BE FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS. I THINK THE HIGHEST YIELD FOR

  • DISEASES LIKE SARS AND MERS AND EBOLA ARE GOING TO BE WHERE

  • MICROBES CHANGE, WHERE WE INTERACT WITH MICROBES IN A

  • CONCENTRATED FASHION, WHERE THERE'S AN ENVIRONMENTAL

  • DEGRADATION IN POVERTY. SO WHERE THAT SWEET SPOT IS, IS

  • TOUGH TO FIND. IN MANY PLACES IT EXISTS IN

  • DEVELOPING SETTINGS WHERE IT'S DIFFICULT TO GO, BUT

  • INCREASINGLY, WE SHOULD REALLY FOCUS OUR EFFORTS IN THOSE HOT

  • ZONES OR SWEET SPOTS. I THINK INCREASINGLY, WE'RE

  • GOING TO BE BRANCHING OUT FROM THAT ONE HOT ZONE OR SWEET SPOT

  • WHERE ALL THESE FACTORS CONVERGE TO MORE ALONG THE PARALLEL LINES

  • THAT ARE DRAWN HERE BETWEEN FACTORS.

  • AS WE INCREASE OUR SURVEILLANCE PORTFOLIO AROUND THE WORLD AS A

  • GLOBAL HEALTH COMMUNITY, I THINK WE CAN GET TO MORE OF THESE

  • AREAS. SWITCHING A LITTLE BIT TO THE

  • DOD NOW IN A LITTLE MORE DETAIL, THE DOD'S TROPICAL DISEASE

  • RESEARCH LABS HAVE PROVIDED AN IDEAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH WE CAN

  • CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE. AGAIN, THESE LABS HAVE EXISTED

  • FOR DECADES, AS YOU CAN SEE HERE.

  • THE LAB IN CAIRO WAS CREATED MORE THAN 50 YEARS AGO.

  • I SEE SEVERAL PEOPLE HERE IN THE AUDIENCE WHO WERE STATIONED

  • THERE, WHO WORKED THERE. SO THE TRADITION GOES BACK A

  • LONG WAY IN MANY OF THESE LABS. THEY'RE OBVIOUSLY LOCATED IN

  • SOME OF THESE HOT ZONES THAT I'VE ALREADY TALKED ABOUT.

  • THAT'S NOT BY MISTAKE. THEY'RE THERE TO DO RESEARCH ON

  • TROPICAL DISEASE THAT AFFECT MILITARIES AS THEY'RE STATIONED

  • AROUND THE WORLD AND EXIST IN PLACES WHERE THOSE DISEASES

  • EXIST. SO THEY ARE STRATEGICALLY

  • POSITIONED. I THINK IT MAKES SENSE TO BUILD

  • SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY AROUND THEM.

  • THEY'VE REALLY BEEN KNOWN FOR MORE SCIENCE THROUGHOUT THE

  • YEARS, THOUGH, SO THEY'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN MANY MALARIA

  • DIAGNOSTICS, VACCINES, BOTH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, AND

  • EVEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORAL REHYDRATION SOLUTION.

  • I'LL FOCUS A LITTLE ON THE LAB IN CAIRO, EGYPT.

  • OBVIOUSLY THIS LAB IS THE OLDEST ONE IN OUR NETWORK, AND IT WAS

  • FORMED IN THE '40s. IT WAS ORIGINALLY RESPONSIBLE

  • FOR RESPONDING TO A TYPHUS OUTBREAK.

  • YOU CAN SEE THAT THEIR FOOTPRINT AND WHERE THEY WORK IS LARGER

  • THAN JUST IN EGYPT. THEY WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN

  • SOUTHERN EUROPE, AND INCREASINGLY IN WEST AFRICA.

  • THERE'S A DETACHMENT THAT EXISTS IN GHANA AND IS INCREASINGLY

  • WORKING IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES THERE, BOTH ON SCIENCE

  • AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE. YOU CAN SEE THE TYPES OF

  • PROJECTS THEY WORK ON ARE PRETTY BROAD AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH

  • THE GEIS MISSION OF THOSE DISEASES.

  • EACH OF THESE LABS OBVIOUSLY HAS A CHAIN OF COMMAND.

  • IN THE CENTER, THE ONLY SOLID LINES THERE ARE FROM OUR BUREAU

  • OF MEDICINE. THAT'S OUR HEADQUARTERS OF NAVY

  • MEDICINE, IF YOU WILL. NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER IS

  • THE PARENT COMMAND OF OUR OVERSEAS LABORATORIES.

  • SO EACH OF THOSE FALL UNDER -- EACH OF THOSE LABORATORIES FALL

  • UNDER NMRC. THEY OBVIOUSLY HAVE A MISSION

  • RELATED TO FOREST HEALTH PROTECTION.

  • SO DEVELOPING A MALARIA VACCINE, FOR INSTANCE.

  • OBVIOUSLY GLOBAL HEALTH AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE ARE DONE IN

  • COLLABORATION WITH MANY PEOPLE. THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT DONE IN

  • ISOLATION, AND WE'RE NOT DOING IT ALONE, BY ANY MEANS.

  • OBVIOUSLY THE MOST IMPORTANT COLLABORATOR IS THE HOST

  • COUNTRY. IF WE DON'T HAVE THEIR

  • PARTICIPATION, DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REALLY DOESN'T

  • HAPPEN. BUT ON A GLOBAL STAGE, REALLY,

  • THERE'S CLOSE COLLABORATIONS WITH THE REGIONAL W.H.O. OFFICES

  • AND OFTEN WITH THE CDC OVERSEAS, ASSIGNEES OR WHERE THEY'RE

  • CO-LOCATED WITH GDD SITES. I THINK DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IS

  • OBVIOUSLY A CONTINUOUS PROCESS AND ONE THAT INVOLVES DETECTION,

  • INTERPRETATION, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION.

  • IT'S CERTAINLY NOT A ONE-TIME EVENT.

  • WE HAVE TO PREPARE FOR THIS CONTINUOUS PROCESS.

  • I TOOK AS AN EXAMPLE, BECAUSE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT EBOLA, THE

  • AREA WHERE EBOLA WOULD FALL UNDER IN TERMS OF OUR

  • SURVEILLANCE PARADIGMS. SO IT WOULD FALL UNDER INVECTOR

  • BORN INFECTIONS. THE GOAL IS TO STUDY ANY

  • INFECTION RELATED TO THIS. IT'S PRETTY BROAD.

  • OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD INCLUDE THINGS LIKE DENGUE, MALARIA, AND

  • EBOLA. WHAT WE TRY TO DO IS SUPPORT

  • SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS THAT WOULD DETECT NOT ONLY HUMAN DISEASE

  • BUT RELATED DISEASES IN ANIMALS, IN VECTORS, AS WELL AS

  • ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS.

  • SO WE REALLY DO TRY TO RESPECT THE EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRIAD AND

  • PERFORM HOLISTIC SURVEILLANCE, NOT JUST LOOKING AT HUMANS WHERE

  • THE END RESULT MAY BE DISEASE BUT TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHERE

  • THOSE DISEASES COME FROM AND HOW WE MIGHT INTERVENE BEFORE IT

  • GETS TO HUMANS. OBVIOUSLY WE NEED ROBUST AND

  • ACCURATE DIAGNOSTICS AND CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS.

  • SO IT'S REALLY NOT JUST FINDING A CLUSTER OF CASES.

  • THAT'S ALMOST THE EASY PART. BUT MAKING SURE YOU HAVE THE

  • RIGHT DIAGNOSTICS IN PLACE AND THE ABILITY TO INTERPRET THOSE

  • DIAGNOSTICS IS REALLY IMPORTANT. THIS CAN BE EXTREMELY

  • CHALLENGING IN DEVELOPING SETTINGS, AS MANY OF YOU WHO

  • HAVE WORKED OVERSEAS UNDERSTAND. ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE DEALING

  • WITH A DANGEROUS PATHOGEN SUCH AS EBOLA.

  • I THINK WE'VE ALL HEARD OF LABORATORY ACQUIRED AND HOSPITAL

  • ACQUIRED INFECTIONS AND CERTAINLY DOING SURVEILLANCE IS

  • NOT AN EASY TASK IN THESE SETTINGS.

  • KIND OF ALONG THOSE LINES, IN TERMS OF A DIAGNOSIS, I'LL

  • MENTION A FEW OF OUR EFFORTS THAT THE NAVY CONDUCTED IN

  • COLLABORATION WITH MANY OTHERS DURING OPERATION UNITED

  • ASSISTANCE AS WE'VE TERMED IT. THE NAVY MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER

  • LABORATORY ACTUALLY WAS DEPLOYED FOR ABOUT NINE MONTHS AND DID

  • MANY OF THE INITIAL TESTINGS OF EBOLA PATIENT THERE IS.

  • THEY HAD TWO UNITS SET UP AT THE ISLAND CLINIC IN MONROVIA AND

  • ALSO A UNIVERSITY. YOU CAN SEE THE DATES HERE.

  • IT'S REALLY IMPORTANT THAT THESE LABS WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE

  • SUPPORT ON A PRETTY RAPID BASIS. THEY WERE ABLE TO DEPLOY WITHIN

  • A COUPLE WEEKS AND PROVIDE EXCELLENT DIAGNOSTIC SUPPORT AS

  • WELL AS ONGOING TRAINING FOR LABORATORIES THAT HAVE REPLACED

  • THEM. I GOT THESE NUMBERS FROM

  • COMMANDER BILLY WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE CDC IN HELPING

  • TO DEVELOP THESE DIAGNOSTICS. I THINK HE MENTIONED TO ME THAT

  • THE INITIAL DIAGNOSTICS WERE ACTUALLY PREPARED BACK IN 2002.

  • SO THEY WERE, YOU KNOW, QUICKLY REIGNITED AND SHARED WITH CDC.

  • OBVIOUSLY THE PCR WAS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAT WE

  • WORKED WITH YOU ALL ON, BUT ALSO THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATERAL FLOW

  • ESSAYS THAT SHOULD MAKE DIAGNOSIS FOR RAPID AND FACILE

  • IN DEVELOPING SETTINGS. I KNOW THERE ARE A NUMBER OF

  • DIFFERENT PLATFORMS BEING TESTED AT THIS STAGE AND HOPEFULLY

  • WE'LL GET TO ONE PRETTY SOON THAT CAN BE DEPLOYED IN A RAPID

  • FASHION OVERSEAS. SO AGAIN, I'M NOT GOING TO SPEND

  • MUCH TIME ON THE RESPONSE PART OF THIS.

  • I THINK DR. NUZZO AND I KNOW DR. TAPPERO ARE GOING TO DESCRIBE

  • MORE ABOUT THE EBOLA RESPONSE EFFORT THAT WE ALL HAVE HEARD

  • ABOUT. I WILL SAY THAT THE DOD

  • RESPONDED MAINLY WITH DIAGNOSTICS, WITH LOGISTICS, AND

  • WITH TRAINING. IT WAS INTERESTING TO TALK TO

  • DR. TAPPERO EARLIER TODAY IN THAT HE REALLY FELT THE DOD

  • CONTRIBUTION KIND OF STIMULATED A LOT OF INTEREST AND

  • REASSURANCE FOR OTHER PARTNERS WHO AT THAT POINT GOT ENGAGED IN

  • THE WHOLE RESPONSE. SO WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY DIRECT

  • PATIENT CARE BUT DID PROVIDE A LOT OF LOGISTICS AND TRAINING.

  • KIND OF ALONG THOSE SAME LINES OF THAT CONTINUOUS SPECTRUM OF

  • SURVEILLANCE, OBVIOUSLY PREVENTION IS KEY WHEN WE'RE

  • DEALING WITH PUBLIC HEALTH. SO I WOULD LIKE TO FINISH BY

  • HIGHLIGHTING SOME OF THE EFFORTS THAT OUR PARTNERS IN THE ARMY

  • ARE WORKING ON. COLONEL STEVEN THOMAS PROVIDED

  • THIS SLIDE TO ME. OBVIOUSLY IF WE CAN PREVENT

  • DISEASE, THEN WE MAY NOT HAVE TO RESPOND AS MUCH TO IT.

  • OBVIOUSLY THE WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH WORKED

  • VERY HARD ON TESTING ONE OF THE FIRST EBOLA VACCINES THAT WAS

  • PUBLISHED IN APRIL OF 2015 IN "THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL."

  • THEY HAVE ONGOING PROJECTS IN UGANDA AS WELL AS IN NIGERIA TO

  • TEST FURTHER VACCINES. SO PHASE TWO AND PHASE THREE

  • STUDIES ARE PLANNED. THE GREAT THING THERE IS

  • LEVERAGING SOME OF THE ASSETS THE DOD HAS INVESTED IN OVER

  • TIME. THE HIV VACCINE EFFORT THAT

  • NELSON MICHAEL AND OTHERS RUN AT THE MILITARY HIV RESEARCH

  • PROGRAM HAS INVESTED MANY, MANY YEARS IN SITES IN UGANDA AS WELL

  • AS IN NIGERIA. THEY'RE BEING LEVERAGED TO TEST

  • SOME OF THESE NEWER VACCINES. FINALLY, LET'S LOOK TO THE

  • FUTURE. I THINK HOPEFULLY WE CAN RELY ON

  • EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE OUT THERE TO OPTIMIZE DISEASE

  • SURVEILLANCE IN DEVELOPING SETTINGS.

  • INITIALLY, DARPA AND THEN GEIS AND NOW HOPEFULLY OTHERS ARE

  • SUPPORTING THIS. THIS WAS A PROJECT THE JOHNS

  • HOPKINS APPLIED PHYSICS LAB WORKED ON.

  • MANY OF YOU KNOW ABOUT THEIR ESSENCE WORK.

  • THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY BASED ON THE ESSENCE PLATFORM AND IS AN

  • OPEN SOURCE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM THAT COLLECTS DATA THROUGH CELL

  • PHONES OR OTHER MEDIA. THE KEY HERE IS REALLY THAT THE

  • DATA CAN BE COLLATED ON A NEAR REAL-TIME BASIS.

  • IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN ASIA, IT'S NOT REALLY EXPECTED THERE'S

  • GOING TO BE A PEAK OF DENGUE DURING THE RAINY SEASON, BUT

  • WHAT IS NICE AND REALLY WHERE THE VALUE OF THIS IS, IS THAT

  • THOSE REPORTS CAN BE GEO REFERENCED BASED ON YOUR CELL

  • PHONE SIGNATURE. THIS HAS OBVIOUS BENEFITS TO

  • PUBLIC HEALTH PROVIDERS WHO WORK IN RESOURCE LIMITED SETTINGS

  • LIKE MANY OF THE PLACES WE ALL KNOW.

  • SO HOPEFULLY THIS TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY, WHILE IN ITS INFANCY

  • NOW, CAN REALLY BE SPREAD TO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD SO THAT

  • WE CAN ACHIEVE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

  • AND THEN MY FINAL SLIDE IS INTERESTING.

  • SO THIS IS A PUBLIC HEALTH NETWORK IN PERU.

  • I WAS STATIONED THERE FOR FOUR YEARS.

  • THIS IS A PERUVIAN JOURNAL ARTICLE THAT JUST DESCRIBED A

  • PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH NETWORK. THE ORANGE DOTS ARE ACTUALLY

  • PERUVIAN ORGANIZATIONS. THE GREEN ARE FOREIGN RESEARCH

  • OR PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTIONS. AND THE CONNECTIONS OBVIOUSLY

  • ARE PROJECTS OR PAPERS. ONE OF THE THINGS I'LL POINT OUT

  • IS THAT THE NAVY LAB IS NOTED THERE IN ORANGE.

  • WE WERE VERY PROUD OF THIS. WE DIDN'T WRITE THIS ARTICLE,

  • ALTHOUGH WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE.

  • BUT THEY CALLED US A PROVEN ORGANIZATION.

  • THIS IS REALLY THE GOAL, I THINK, OF DISEASE SURVEILLANCE

  • AND CAPACITY BUILDING AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

  • EACH COUNTRY REALLY NEEDS TO DEVELOP THIS CAPACITY.

  • NOW, WE ARE OBVIOUSLY SUPPORTING DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN THESE

  • COUNTRIES AND SCIENCE. BUT THIS IS MAKES SENSE FROM

  • MANY DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS. THE ORGANIZATIONS, THEY'RE MORE

  • THAN 90% PERUVIAN. SO SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS,

  • EPIDEMIOLOGISTS. SO IT REALLY SHOULD BE AN ORANGE

  • DOT ON THE MAP. SO I THINK BUILDING CAPACITY

  • LIKE THIS WHERE IT'S MEANINGFUL AND SUSTAINED OVER TIME, I

  • THINK, REALLY HAS THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

  • OBVIOUSLY DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IS JUST ONE COMPONENT OF GLOBAL

  • HEALTH SECURITY, BUT I THINK IF WE DO IT RIGHT, WE CAN BUILD

  • THESE NETWORKS THAT WILL MAKE OUR WORLD A SAFER PLACE.

  • SO THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. [ APPLAUSE ]

  • >> OUR NEXT SPEAKER IS CAPTAIN JORDAN TAPPERO.

  • >> THANK YOU. I THINK WE'RE A LITTLE BIT

  • BEHIND SCHEDULE, SO HANG ON TO YOUR SEATS.

  • I'M GOING TO BE TALKING TO YOU ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL

  • HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA AND THE IMPACT OF THE WEST AFRICAN EBOLA

  • EPIDEMIC ON MOVING IT FORWARD. NEW VIRAL AND BACTERIAL PAT JENS

  • WILL CONTINUE TO EMERGE. TODAY'S WORLD OF INCREASING

  • INTERCONNECTIVITY AND MOBILITY ACCELERATES THIS SHARED GLOBAL

  • RISK. GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION AND

  • COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL LINKS EMERGING MARKETS TO THE REST OF

  • THE WORLD MORE SEAMLESSLY THAN EVER.

  • THE NEXT EPIDEMIC MAY VERY WELL BE JUST A PLANE RIDE AWAY.

  • AS EARLY AS THE 14th CENTURY, PEOPLE USED QUARANTINE TO KEEP

  • DISEASES LIKE THE PLAGUE FROM SPREADING ACROSS BORDERS.

  • IN MORE RECENT TIMES, THERE HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS

  • BETWEEN COUNTRIES TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL SPREAD OF DISEASE,

  • BEGINNING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONVENTION, AND LATER

  • THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS IN 1969.

  • BECAUSE OF THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH WE ARE CONNECTED, NO

  • COUNTRY CAN PROTECT ITSELF BY ITSELF.

  • THE LESSON BECAME INCREASINGLY CLEAR DURING THE SEVERE ACUTE

  • RESPIRATORY SYNDROME, OR SARS, OUTBREAK IN 2003.

  • AN OUTBREAK THAT SPREAD TO 37 COUNTRIES ACROSS THREE

  • CONTINENTS. TO ADDRESS THE SHORTCOMINGS OF

  • THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO SARS, W.H.O. REVISED THE INTERNATIONAL

  • HEALTH REGULATIONS IN 2005 TO BETTER CONTROL PUBLIC HEALTH

  • THREATS WHILE AVOIDING UNNECESSARY INTERFERENCE WITH

  • INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND TRADE. AS THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY IN

  • 2005, ALL 195 MEMBER STATES COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING THE GOALS

  • OF THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS OVER THE NEXT

  • FIVE YEARS. NOW, THE IHR REQUIRED THAT ALL

  • COUNTRIES HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT THEIR SURVEILLANCE

  • SYSTEMS AND LABORATORIES CAN DETECT POTENTIAL THREATS, WORK

  • TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO MAKE DECISIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH

  • EMERGENCIES, REPORT TRANSPARENTLY THROUGH

  • PARTICIPATION IN A NETWORK OF NATIONAL FOE CALL POINTS, AND

  • RESPOND TO PUBLIC HEALTH EVENTS. W.H.O. HAS THE AUTHORITY AND

  • RESPONSIBILITY TO DECLARE THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF HEALTH THREATS

  • CALLED PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS.

  • WE HAVE SEEN OVER TIME THAT GLOBAL HEALTH RISKS HAVE

  • INCREASED THROUGH THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ORGANISMS, DRUG

  • RESISTANCE, AND INTENTIONAL EVENTS.

  • HIV RAGED UNDETECTED FOR OVER A DECADE BEFORE ITS DISCOVERY.

  • DRUG RESISTANT ORGANISMS ARE A GROWING PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT.

  • TARGETED MAILS OF ANTHRAX SPORES DREW THE WORLD'S ATTENTION TO

  • THE REALITY OF INTENTIONAL RELEASE OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS.

  • AND THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF MERS AND EBOLA HAVE KEPT THE WORLD ON

  • HIGH ALERT. THE IHR COVERS ALL EVENTS THAT

  • MIGHT POTENTIALLY BECOME A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY OF

  • INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. SINCE 2005, W.H.O. HAS DECLARED

  • THREE OF THESE EMERGENCIES. THE H1N1 PANDEMIC IN 2009, THE

  • REEMERGENCE OF WILD POLIO VIRUS IN 2014, AND THE WEST AFRICAN

  • EBOLA EPIDEMIC. THE FIVE-YEAR CLOCK FOR IHR

  • COMPLIANCE STARTED IN 2007, BUT BY 2012, THE DEADLINE, FEWER

  • THAN ONE IN FIVE COUNTRIES HAD ATTAINED COMPLIANCE BY

  • SELF-REPORT. A TWO-YEAR EXTENSION TO 2014

  • INCREASED THE NUMBER OF FULLY COMPLIANT COUNTRIES BY ONLY AN

  • ADDITIONAL 10%. SO WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE

  • GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA? AS WE'VE SEEN, MOST OF THE WORLD

  • IS NOT PREPARED TO ADDRESS PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES, WHICH

  • INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS WILL

  • SPREAD WITHIN COUNTRIES AND ACROSS BORDERS.

  • THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF EPIDEMICS ARE DEAR.

  • A.I.D.S. HAS KILLED OVER 40 MILLION, AND ANOTHER 40 MILLION

  • PEOPLE ARE LIVING WITH HIV AND IN NEED OF LIFE-SAVING

  • TREATMENT. SARS KILLED NEARLY 800 PEOPLE

  • AND COST AN ESTIMATED $40 BILLION.

  • AND EBOLA HAS KILLED OVER 11,000 PEOPLE AND TIME COSTS HAVE YET

  • TO BE TALLIED. THE 2009 H1N1 PANDEMIC SHOWED US

  • THE WORLD IS NOT PREPARED FOR A GLOBAL RESPONSE.

  • PRESIDENT OBAMA DURING THE SEPTEMBER 2011 SPEECH AT THE

  • UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SAID WE MUST COME TOGETHER TO

  • PREVENT, DETECT, AND FIGHT EVERY KIND OF BIOLOGICAL DANGER,

  • WHETHER IT IS A PANDEMIC, H1N1, A TERRORIST THREAT, OR A

  • TREATABLE DISEASE. THE TRUTH IS, WE NEED PRACTICAL

  • STEPS THAT WE CAN TAKE TO ASSIST ALL COUNTRIES TO REACH THE IHR

  • GOALS, WHICH BRINGS US TO THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, A

  • UNIFYING FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE OUR GLOBAL RESPONSE TO

  • INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS. ON FEBRUARY 13th, 2014, LEADERS

  • FROM 28 MINISTRIES OF HEALTH, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

  • THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, OR FAO, AND THE

  • WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, OR OIE, CAME TOGETHER TO

  • LAUNCH THIS UNIFYING FRAMEWORK CALLED THE GLOBAL HEALTH

  • SECURITY AGENDA. THE VISION OF THE AGENDA IS TO

  • REALIZE A WORLD SAFE AND SECURE FROM GLOBAL HEALTH THREATS POSED

  • BY INFECTIOUS DISEASES. NOW, AT THE TIME OF THE LAUNCH,

  • EBOLA WAS SPREADING UNDETECTED FROM GUINEA TO NEIGHBORING

  • LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE. EBOLA HAD GALVANIZED THE

  • INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AROUND THE AGENDA.

  • AT THE FIRST GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA MINISTERIAL IN

  • SEPTEMBER, WHICH CONVENED IN WASHINGTON AND WAS ATTENDED BY

  • PRESIDENT OBAMA, 44 COUNTRIES JOINED THE AGENDA.

  • NINE MONTHS LATER, THE SEVEN NATIONS OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST

  • ECONOMIES, THE G-7, PLEDGED TO HELP UP TO 60 COUNTRIES ACHIEVE

  • THESE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA TARGETS.

  • I JUST RETURNED FROM SEOUL, THE SECOND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY

  • MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHICH WAS HELD IN SEOUL, KOREA.

  • IN SEOUL, 51 COUNTRIES MADE FIRM COMMITMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE

  • AGENDA. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING,

  • COUNTRY LEADERS SIGNED THE SEOUL DECLARATION, REAFFIRMING THEIR

  • COMMITMENT TO IT AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT GLOBAL HEALTH

  • SECURITY SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS A SHARED, MULTISECTORIAL

  • RESPONSIBILITY, THAT NO SINGLE COUNTRY CAN ACHIEVE ALONE.

  • THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA GOES FURTHER THAN ANY

  • PRIOR GLOBAL COORDINATION AROUND MULTIPLE DISEASES AND

  • CONDITIONS. GHSA IS NOT ANOTHER SINGLE

  • DISEASE INITIATIVE. IT DRIVES A SET OF CONCRETE AND

  • ACHIEVABLE ACTIONS TO ACTUALIZE THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH

  • REGULATIONS. AND IT'S HELPED US REACH PUBLIC

  • HEALTH GOALS THROUGH A PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND MODEL.

  • THERE ARE 11 MEASURABLE TARGETS, ALSO KNOWN AS ACTION PACKAGES,

  • THAT COMPRISE THE BACKBONE OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA.

  • WHILE THEY MAY SEEM LIKE DISCREET ACTIVITIES, THEY ARE

  • OVERLAPPING AND INTERRELATED. TIME DOES NOT ALLOW ME TO WALK

  • THROUGH EACH AND EVERY TARGET, BUT ALL WORK TOGETHER.

  • FOR EXAMPLE, THESE TARGETS INCLUDE A NATIONWIDE LABORATORY

  • NETWORK WITH A SPECIMEN REFERRAL SYSTEM REACHING AT LEAST 80% OF

  • ITS POPULATION AND WITH EFFECTIVE MODERN DIAGNOSTICS IN

  • PLACE TO DETECT EPIDEMIC-PRONE INFECTIONS.

  • IT ALSO INCLUDES A TIMELY ELECTRONIC-BASED BIOSURVEILLANCE

  • SYSTEM. ALSO, A DEDICATED WORK FORCE OF

  • MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, INCLUDING AT

  • LEAST ONE TRAINED EPIDEMIOLOGIST FOR 200,000 POPULATION, AND A

  • PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER, OR EOC, ABLE

  • TO COORDINATE AN EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE WITHIN 120

  • MINUTES FOR ACTIVATION. TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE

  • TARGETS, WE WILL HAVE TO COMBINE EFFORTS ACROSS SECTORS.

  • FOR INSTANCE, REPORTABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS BACKED BY

  • COMPETENT NATIONAL REFERENCE LABORATORIES ARE INSTRUMENTAL IN

  • MONITORING AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF ANTIMICROBIAL

  • RESISTANCE AND THE SPILLOVER OF DISEASES.

  • IT'S ALL CROSS-CUTTING. WHEN ALIGNED WITH THE

  • INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, MOST OF THE IDEAS

  • BEHIND THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA ARE

  • COMPLEMENTARY. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA

  • BUILDS ON THE AGREEMENTS AND THE COMMITMENTS COUNTRIES HAVE

  • ALREADY MADE. THE AGENDA WAS DEVELOPED TO

  • ADVANCE THE IHR BY PROVIDING A PATH WITH CLEAR TARGETS AND

  • MILESTONES TO STRENGTHEN THE CORE CAPACITIES AND ACHIEVE IHR

  • COMPLIANCE. THEREBY, ENABLING A WORLD MORE

  • SAFE AND SECURE FROM INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS.

  • IN FACT, THE EBOLA CRISIS IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE

  • OF BEING PREPARED AND THE URGENT NEED FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

  • SINCE ITS DISCOVERY IN 1976, MORE THAN 20 EBOLA OUTBREAKS

  • HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, AND THEY WERE

  • ALL CONTAINED RELATIVELY QUICKLY.

  • IN DECEMBER OF 2013, EBOLA EMERGED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN

  • WEST AFRICA WHERE IT SPREAD UNNOTICED FOR MONTHS.

  • WHAT WAS DIFFERENT THIS TIME? THE THREE COUNTRIES LACKED THE

  • PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE TO QUICKLY DETECT AND RESPOND TO

  • THE OUTBREAK. THERE WAS DELAYED REPORTING AND

  • BORDER CONTROL WAS SPOTTY IN AN AREA WITH HIGH POPULATION

  • MOBILITY, AND THERE WAS A LACK OF INFECTION CONTROL IN HEALTH

  • CARE FACILITIES, INCLUDING THE ABSENCE OF BASIC PROTECTIVE

  • GLOVES, SOAP, AND RUNNING WATER. BY LATE JULY, EBOLA HAD REACHED

  • THE URBANIZED AND DENSELY POPULATED CAPITALS OF ALL THREE

  • NATIONS, AND THE FIRST TIME THE DISEASE CAUSED COMMUNITY WISE

  • TRANSMISSION IN CROWDED AREAS. IN AUGUST, MONROVIA, LIBERIA,

  • WAS EXPERIENCING THE FIRST EBOLA EPIDEMIC WITH CATASTROPHIC

  • RESULTS. HEALTH CARE WORKERS WERE

  • BECOMING INFECTED. MEDICAL FACILITIES THROUGHOUT

  • THE CAPITAL CLOSED. ROUTINE HEALTH CARE SERVICES

  • CAME TO A GRINDING HALT. THE MEDICAL NGO, DOCTORS WITHOUT

  • BORDERS, WAS THE ONLY REMAINING MEDICAL NGO TREATMENT UNIT IN

  • THE THREE AFFECTED COUNTRIES. WE KNOW FROM 40 YEARS OF

  • EXPERIENCE THAT A CRITICAL STEP IN STOPPING AN EBOLA EPIDEMIC IS

  • TO FIRST IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE CASES AND THEIR SYMPTOMATIC

  • CONTACTS. THEN REDUCE THE RISK OF DEATH BY

  • HALF BY ACCESS TO CARE. THEN ENSURE SAFE BURIALS FOR

  • PERSONS DYING FROM EBOLA. IN LIBERIA, THERE WERE TOO FEW

  • TRAINED CONTACT TRACING TEAMS TO FOLLOW KNOWN CONTACTS.

  • DESPITE MSF'S INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO EXPAND TREATMENT, THE

  • NUMBER OF BEDS COULD NOT CATCH UP WITH THE GROWING NEED.

  • AS A CONSEQUENCE, CONTACTING TEAMS THAT DID IDENTIFY

  • SYMPTOMATIC CONTACTS COULD NOT REFER THEM TO AN EBOLA TREATMENT

  • UNIT, LEADING SOME TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME VILLAGE, RESULTING IN

  • NEW TRANSMISSION HOT SPOTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

  • THERE WAS ALSO RESISTANCE FROM COMMUNITIES TO SAFE BURIAL

  • PREVENTION METHODS THAT CONFLICTED WITH TRADITIONAL

  • PRACTICES. IN MONROVIA, ONLY FOUR OUT OF AN

  • ESTIMATED NEED FOR 32 TRAINED AND EQUIPPED BURIAL TEAMS WERE

  • AVAILABLE TO REMOVE HIGHLY INFECTIOUS CORPORATIONS.

  • AS A RESULT, EBOLA CASES AND DEATHS GREW EXPONENTIALLY,

  • RESULTING IN MORE UNSAFE BURIALS AND NEW TRANSMISSION CHAINS.

  • CALLS FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS WENT UNANSWERED OUT OF FEAR.

  • COMMERCIAL AIRLINES WERE CANCELING SERVICES.

  • NATIONS WERE THREATENING TO CLOSE THEIR BORDERS.

  • NGO VOLUNTEERS WORRIED THEY WOULD BE STRANDED, THAT SAFETY

  • MEASURES WERE INADEQUATE, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE DENIED

  • REPATRIATION FOR TREATMENT AT HOME IF THEY BECAME INFECTED.

  • UTTER CHAOS ERUPTED IN MONROVIA. MARSHAL LAW WAS DECLARED AND

  • CURFEWS WERE IMPOSED. AS MONROVIA WAS SINKING INTO

  • CHAOS, ANOTHER NIGHTMARE SCENARIO WAS UNFOLDING IN

  • NIGERIA. AN ILL TRAVELER FROM LIBERIA

  • ARRIVED AT A REGIONAL TRAVEL HUB FOR AFRICA'S MOST POPULATED

  • COUNTRY. IF EBOLA TOOK HOLD IN THE SLUMS,

  • THE ENTIRE CONTINENT WOULD BE AT RISK.

  • UNLIKE GUINEA, LIBERIA HAD ELEMENTS IN PLACE TO RESPOND.

  • THE NIGERIAN CDC HAD AN EXISTING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER AND

  • INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR POLIO ERADICATION THAT WAS

  • LEVERAGED FOR AN EMERGENCY EBOLA RESPONSE.

  • NIGERIA ALSO HOSTS A CDC FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY FIELD TRAINING

  • PROGRAM MODELED AFTER CDC'S EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

  • WITHIN DAYS, CDC DISEASE DETECTIVES JOINED 13 NIGERIAN

  • TRAINEES AND GRADUATES TO HALT THE OUTBREAK WITHIN THREE

  • GENERATIONS OF TRANSMISSION. CONTAINING AN OUTBREAK TO JUST

  • 19 CASES IN TWO CITIES REQUIRED AN ENORMOUS LIFT FROM THE

  • NIGERIAN EOC AND EPIDEMIOLOGY TEAM.

  • NIGERIA RESPONDED. THEY IDENTIFIED 894 CONTACTS.

  • THEY COMPLETED 19,000 CONTACT TRACING HOME VISITS TO MONITOR

  • SYMPTOMS AND TEMPERATURE. THEY IMPLEMENTED A SOCIAL

  • MOBILIZATION REACHED 26,000 HOUSEHOLDS OF

  • PEOPLE LEAVING NEAR THE CONTACTS, AND THEY ESTABLISHED

  • AN ETU AND TRAINED EBOLA CAREGIVERS IN JUST TWO WEEKS'

  • TIME. WITH JUST TWO ELEMENTS OF THE

  • GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA IN PLACE, NIGERIA WAS ABLE TO

  • CONTAIN A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS EPIDEMIC.

  • AS THE TIDE WAS TURNING FOR THE BETTER IN NIGERIA, HOPE WAS ALSO

  • EMERGING IN LIBERIA. IN SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT OBAMA

  • VISITED CDC, WHERE HE WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE GROWING CRISIS.

  • FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING, PRESIDENT OBAMA ANNOUNCED THAT

  • THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WOULD DEPLOY AS MANY AS 4,000

  • MILITARY PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE THE LOGISTIC AND COMMUNICATIONS

  • SUPPORT ACROSS THE REGION AND IN LIBERIA TO BUILD ETUs THROUGHOUT

  • THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, DOD ANNOUNCED THAT

  • THE FIRST FACILITY IT WOULD BUILD AND MAINTAIN WOULD BE A

  • FIELD HOSPITAL MANAGED BY THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE.

  • THE NEW HOSPITAL WAS OPERATIONAL BY NOVEMBER.

  • THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS A GAME CHANGER THAT BOLSTERED THE

  • CONFIDENCE OF THE LARGER MEDICAL NGO COMMUNITY.

  • OTHER RESPONDERS AND OTHER AGENTS TO ENGAGE IN THE FIGHT,

  • EVENTUALLY PUTTING LIBERIA ON ROAD TO ZERO.

  • IN MID-DECEMBER, THE U.S. CONGRESS ALSO RESPONDED TO THE

  • UNPRECEDENTED EBOLA EPIDEMIC, PASSING THE PRESIDENT'S

  • EMERGENCY FUNDING REQUEST OF OVER $6 BILLION.

  • CDC RECEIVED $1.8 BILLION TO END THE EPIDEMIC, ENHANCE EBOLA

  • PREPAREDNESS IN THE AT-RISK COUNTRIES, ITS NEIGHBORS, AND

  • THE UNITED STATES AND IMPLEMENT GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA IN

  • WEST AFRICA AND BEYOND. THESE EMERGENCY FUNDS HAVE

  • ALREADY ENABLED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN WORK IN 17

  • COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE THREE AFFECTED BY EBOLA.

  • AT LEAST 13 MORE COUNTRIES WILL BE ADDED IN THE COMING DAYS IN

  • LINE WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT GOAL OF IMPLEMENTING THE AGENDA

  • IN AT LEAST 30 COUNTRIES BY 2020.

  • USING THIS FUNDING, CDC WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON GETTING TO

  • ZERO AND STAYING AT ZERO IN THE EBOLA AFFECTED COUNTRIES WHILE

  • ALSO HELPING TO BUILD BETTER PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS IN

  • COUNTRIES AT RISK FOR EBOLA AS WELL AS IN THE 30 COUNTRIES

  • WHERE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED TO PARTNERING ON

  • GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA IMPLEMENTATION.

  • OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, WE WILL WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH

  • OTHER NATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGENDA IN THE HOPE OF AVERTING

  • TRAGEDIES LIKE THE WEST AFRICAN EBOLA EPIDEMIC FROM EVER

  • HAPPENING AGAIN. THIS IS CRITICAL BECAUSE

  • OUTBREAKS ARE INEVITABLE. CDC'S GLOBAL DISEASE DETECTION

  • CENTER TRACKS OUTBREAKS BASED ON OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS THEY

  • CAN POSE TO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY.

  • BETWEEN MARCH 2014 AND JULY 2015, IN ADDITION TO EBOLA, WE

  • ACTIVELY MONITORED OVER 140 OUTBREAKS OF PUBLIC HEALTH

  • CONCERN ACROSS 170 COUNTRIES. LIKE MIDDLE EASTERN RESPIRATORY

  • SYNDROME, SEVERAL OF THESE OUTBREAKS HAVE AFFECTED MANY

  • LIVES AND JUSTIFIED GLOBAL CONCERN.

  • THE LESSON IS THAT WE CANNOT FOCUS OUR ENERGIES ON ANY SINGLE

  • PATHOGEN OR ANY PART OF THE WORLD BUT INSTEAD FOCUS ON WHAT

  • EVERY COUNTRY NEEDS TO DO TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO

  • INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS BEFORE IT BECOMES AN EPIDEMIC,

  • THAT BEING INVEST AND ROUTINELY PRACTICE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY

  • AGENDA PRINCIPLES TO ENSURE A ROBUST AND RESILIENT PUBLIC

  • HEALTH SYSTEM. IN SUMMARY, THE GLOBAL HEALTH

  • SECURITY AGENDA ADDRESSES THREE RISKS.

  • NEW EMERGING ORGANISMS, DRUG RESISTANCE, THE INTENTIONAL

  • CREATION AND/OR RELEASE OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS.

  • IT ALSO PROVIDES THREE OPPORTUNITIES.

  • STRENGTHEN THE EXISTING PUBLIC HEALTH FRAMEWORK COMMITTED TO BY

  • ALL NATIONS UNDER THE IHR AND DEVELOP AND UTILIZE NEW

  • LABORATORY AND SURVEILLANCE TOOLS TO SUCCESSFULLY CONTROL

  • OUTBREAKS. AND IT FOCUSES ON THREE

  • PRIORITIES OUTLINED IN A PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND

  • MODEL. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION,

  • AND I'D LIKE TO INVITE DR. FRIEDEN BACK TO THE PODIUM.

  • [ APPLAUSE ]

  • >> WE'RE A BIT OVER TIME. I'LL BE VERY QUICK TO LEAVE A

  • FEW MINUTES FOR QUESTIONS AT THE END TO MAKE FIVE POINTS.

  • FIRST, TO THANK OUR SPEAKERS FOR EXCELLENT, INTERESTING,

  • INFORMATIVE TALKS. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

  • SECOND, TO SUMMARIZE SOME OF THE THINGS WE HEARD IN 30 SECONDS OR

  • LESS. THE IMPORTANCE OF SURVEILLANCE,

  • THE IMPORTANCE OF A MEDICAL CLINICAL SURGE, THE COMPLEXITY

  • OF THE FEDERAL/STATE INTERACTION IN THE U.S., THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

  • TO ZERO RISK, UNDERSTANDING THAT WE CAN'T SAY ZERO RISK, AND YET

  • THAT IS WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS SOMETIMES AND HOW DO WE MANAGE

  • THAT DYNAMIC. THE IMPORTANT CAPACITY AS THE

  • DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND HOW WE CAN SINNER JAZZ WITH THOSE AT

  • HOME AND ABROAD. THE EBOLA TEST BEING USED IN THE

  • U.S. IS A DOD TEST THAT WAS APPROVED BY THE FDA UNDER EUA.

  • AND THINKING ABOUT EBOLA, NEVER FORGETTING THAT THOUGH LOTS WENT

  • WRONG AND LOTS WENT RIGHT, IN THE END WE AVERTED A FAR WORSE

  • CATASTROPHE THAT COULD HAVE OCCURRED IF EBOLA HAD CONTINUED

  • TO SPREAD UNCHECKED IN WEST AFRICA OR HAD SPREAD IN NIGERIA.

  • THE WORLD WOULD LOOK VERY DIFFERENT TODAY IF WE WERE

  • DEALING WITH ENDEMIC EBOLA IN MANY COUNTRIES IN AFRICA.

  • THAT WAS DEFINITELY WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY.

  • SO THANKS. BRIEF SUMMARY.

  • THIRD, GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY IS THE NEXT BIG THING IN GLOBAL

  • HEALTH. THIS IS OUR UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

  • TO MAKE RAPID IMPROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITY AROUND

  • THE WORLD. FOURTH, WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE

  • NEXT OUTBREAK OR EPIDEMIC WILL BE, BUT WE KNOW THERE WILL BE

  • ONE. WE DON'T KNOW FROM WHERE.

  • WE DON'T KNOW WITH WHAT. WE WOULDN'T HAVE PREDICTED H1N1

  • FROM MEXICO OR MERS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

  • BUT WHAT WE'RE SEEING IS THE INEVITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCE

  • OF NEW ORGANISMS. WHAT'S NOT INEVITABLE IS THAT

  • THEY SPREAD AS RAPIDLY AND TRAGICALLY AS EBOLA DID.

  • FIFTH AND FINALLY, THE REAL SYNERGY BETWEEN THE GLOBAL

  • HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA AND INTERNATIONAL HEALTH

  • REGULATIONS, THIS IS A WAY OF ACCELERATING ADHERENCE TO THE

  • IHR. AS PRESIDENT OBAMA NOTED A YEAR

  • AGO, QUOTE, WE'VE GOT TO TURN THOSE COMMITMENTS INTO CONCRETE

  • ACTION. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

  • [ APPLAUSE ] >> ONE QUESTION FROM OUR ONLINE

  • AUDIENCES. EDITING FOR TIME, WHAT MAIN

  • FACTORS COMPROMISED THE EARLIEST MULTICOORDINATED NATIONAL

  • RESPONSE TO THIS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NOW BY PRIORITY

  • AND BY WHOM TO MINIMIZE THESE CONSTRAINTS IN FUTURE EVENTS?

  • WHAT MAIN FACTORS COMPROMISED THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE

  • COORDINATED MULTINATIONAL RESPONSE TO THIS EMERGENCY

  • EVENT, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NOW BY PRIORITY AND BY WHOM TO

  • MINIMIZE THESE CONSTRAINTS IN FUTURE EVENTS?

  • >> I CAN TAKE A FIRST CRACK AT IT.

  • I THINK ONE OF THE THINGS THAT BROUGHT THINGS TOGETHER WAS

  • TAKING ACTION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS

  • AND DECLARING A PUBLIC HEALTH EVENT -- PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

  • OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. I THINK THAT REALLY RAISED THE

  • IRE OF MANY AROUND THE WORLD AND THE ATTENTION NEEDED TO HAVE A

  • GLOBAL RESPONSE. CDC HAD ACTIVATED ONE MONTH

  • BEFORE THAT EVENT WITH OUR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER.

  • SO CLEARLY WE WERE DEPLOYING PEOPLE AND EXTREMELY CONCERNED.

  • BUT I THINK THAT WAS THE FIRST GALVANIZING EFFORT AND PERHAPS

  • WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT WE LOWER THE BAR FOR WHEN WE

  • DECLARE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL

  • CONCERN. ANYONE ELSE WANT TO ADD TO THAT?

  • >> I WOULD AGREE. I THINK THAT WAS ONE OF THE

  • GREAT CHALLENGES AND SOMETHING WE HAVE TO LEARN FROM GOING

  • FORWARD. YOU KNOW, WHAT WE CHARACTERIZE

  • AS A PHIC, THAT'S WHAT THEY CALL IT VERSUS WHAT WE DON'T.

  • I THINK THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF EFFORTS TO TRY TO REFORM THAT

  • PROCESS THAT ARE ONGOING, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THAT.

  • >> ALL RIGHT. THANKS TO OUR SPEAKERS AGAIN.

  • PLEASE JOIN US NEXT MONTH FOR PUBLIC HEALTH GRAND ROUNDS ON

  • E-CIGARETTES. LET'S HAVE ANOTHER HAND FOR OUR

  • SPEAKERS. [ APPLAUSE ]

>>> GOOD AFTERNOON AND WELCOME. ON BEHALF OF CDC, I'D LIKE TO

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世界保健安全保障の変化。エボラからの教訓 (Shifts in Global Health Security: Lessons from Ebola)

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    richardwang に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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