字幕表 動画を再生する 英語字幕をプリント The most consistent throughline across the Holy Land is war. From the Maccabean Revolt and the Jewish-Roman Wars, through the Crusades, the Ottoman-Mamluk War, and all the way to the Israel-Arab and Six-Day Wars, it's been attacked and invaded, defended and died for, time and time and time again. The clearest cause as to why, is this: Jerusalem. From the perspective of geography, this city shouldn't exist. Propped upon hills and positioned 30 miles or 48 kilometers from the nearest major body of water, twenty miles or 32 kilometers away from the nearest major river, and without a single river of any sort running through it, this city is dry. Without water, Jerusalem is without a prosperous trading harbor, it's without close proximity to maritime shipping routes, it's without any real industrial base, it's even without easy access to drinking water. Within the walls of the old city are populations that represent four separate cultures and three separate religions. And within these walls are also some of the very holiest sites to the three religions—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism: the world's two largest, and the oldest monotheistic religion, respectively. Because of what's said to have happened here, who's said to have passed through here, and what's been built in their honor here, Jerusalem, sitting high and dry in the Judean Mountains, has served as the center of the world for three massive, powerful groups of faith for more than 2,000 years. And thus, it's been fought over, often under the guise of religion, but importantly, rarely solely because of religion—a case where the simplest explanation is not always the right explanation. Whether wars of empire building in the past, or state building in the present, religion's only part of the story. Today, as it has been for nearly a century, it's not three religions, but rather two nations fighting over the common territory that one group asserts as Palestine and the other asserts as Israel. After decades of attacks on one another, failed negotiations and peace talks, terrorism, and outright war, the outlines of the conflict between two nations promised the territory nearly a century ago looks like this: Israel, a rich, western power controlling all the land between Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon; and Palestine as just these swaths of land often mired by shading or striping on maps to designate its status as a mere partially recognized state by the UN. Despite their shared landscapes, Israel and Palestine are a world apart. Quality of life in Palestine is considered, according to the UNs human development index, roughly analogous to that of its neighbors, Egypt and Lebanon. Israel, meanwhile, almost exactly matches the United States's HDI. From an income perspective, it's even starker—on a per-person basis, Palestinians earn just a third of what their neighbors in Egypt and Lebanon do, while Israelis are on average some of the wealthiest people in the world, bringing in about what South Korean or British people do. This imbalance of wealth is both a symptom and a cause of the imbalance of power between the two nations that is now just about as lopsided as it's ever been, making an already contentious relationship all the more combustible. In consequence, a number of militant groups have arisen to fight both for an independent Palestinian state and against the continued contraction of Palestinian land. This grows the disconnect even further. On one side of the walls there is a high-income, developed, westernized, cosmopolitan nation—centered by one of the wealthiest, most globally interconnected cities in the world. On the other—mere miles away—are active, growing militant groups with the stated goal of the destruction of the state of Israel. In Tel Aviv there are people staying at $500 a night five-star hotels, eating at $100 a plate fine-dining restaurants, then heading to exclusive nightclubs with globe-spanning DJs, while just a one-hour drive south there are rocket-laden militants working day and night to plot their deaths. To maintain this disconnect, Israel has, through the years, developed a sophisticated system of security to protect its citizens while keeping Palestinian life into the enclaves it permits. While this extends nation-wide, nowhere is this more relevant than with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Gaza is a territory encircled on all sides by security—not just in two directions, but three. Israel's mission is near-complete control of what goes in and out so that the Israeli state is entirely isolated from the activities of its captive neighbor. This starts with a wall. Above ground it extends some twenty or so feet or six or so meters, then below ground it extends a certain amount too. Following the discovery of a vast network of Hamas tunnels used to infiltrate Israel—and, in one dramatic case, kidnap a soldier who was then held for ransom—the country spent five years and a billion dollars building an underground wall of an undisclosed depth to make it more difficult for Hamas to cross under the border. As a second layer of protection, they developed a system of sensors to unveil any attempts as well. Above ground, Israel sets strict rules to keep Gazans, what they consider, a safe distance away—nobody's allowed within 300 feet or 100 meters of the border; while only farmers are allowed within 1,000 feet or 300 meters, and only by foot. On the other side, Israel has a network of guard towers with remote monitoring equipment like cameras and radar to inform the Israel Defense Forces when an attempted incursion is occurring. As perhaps the most dystopian feature of all, Israel has a fleet of remotely-operated, self-driving machine gun robots that patrol the area, notify the IDF of potential threats, then allow for remote operation—firing a slew of bullets towards Gaza to maim or kill any targets without the need for any human soldier to leave their chairs at their base. While Israel only borders Gaza on its northern and eastern sides, it's exerted at least a certain degree of control on its southern and western too. Gaza borders Egypt on the southern side, but for a period of a few decades the Sinai Peninsula was under Israeli Military Occupation. In exchange for its return in 1979, Egypt agreed to build a border with Gaza. To accomplish this, they split Rafah in half—separating one city into two through its core, separating families, communities, and businesses. Today, movement is only allowed through the Rafah border crossing which closes quickly whenever Israel-Gaza tensions heat up—Egypt wary to let a deluge of refugees in, partially given the impact the depopulation of Gaza would have on the Palestinian mission of statehood that it supports. On its western side, the territory of Gaza borders the Mediterranean Sea but, unlike almost every other territory in the world, it does not control its own coast—Israel does. The country forms a box around a slice of the sea and allows a select number of Gazans to fish in it, but no more—the Israeli Navy patrols and prevents any ships from going in or out without their approval. It's the same situation with the airspace—Israel controls it completely and regularly flies combat and surveillance aircraft over the territory. But that's largely irrelevant because they destroyed Gaza's only airport in 2001 during an outbreak of violence. So today, the only legal ways in or out of Gaza are the sporadically open Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings on the southern border; and the even less reliable Erez crossing, on the northern border with Israel. This is a crucial lifeline for Gaza—while the Rafah crossing opens to a friendlier country for Palestinians, the neighboring section of Egypt is sparsely populated so when, for example, someone needs access to higher-level medical care, Israel or the Palestinian West Bank are the most likely destinations. But there is no functional right to travel for Palestinians between Gaza and the separated West Bank, so even when heading to East Jerusalem for treatment, patients are required to gain a permit from Israel. Only two-thirds of applications, which only happen after a doctor in Gaza refers a patient for higher-level care, are approved in the time needed, and Israel uses the difficulty of travel it manufactures to gain a leg up with its security: patients and others who need to cross the border are routinely subjected to Israeli recruiting efforts. They'll be given a choice—sometimes their medical treatment will be paid for in exchange for information, sometimes they'll be barred from entry all-together unless they agree to help Israel. Most try to reject these efforts, rightly fearful for their lives if they give information on Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups, but some sign up. This network of spies ranges from low-level, casual informants all the way to upper-level Hamas operatives compensated with hundreds of thousands of dollars for ongoing inside information about the organization—the stakes are high, as Gaza's Hamas authorities regularly execute individuals under the charge of espionage for Israel. Information gleaned feeds into the Israeli intelligence agencies, and this is combined with that gained from surveillance aircraft and an advanced system of digital surveillance to give Israel, at least theoretically, a good picture of what's going on in the territory without the need to actually go inside. Through this, Israel at least hopes to be able to thwart all attacks into its territory, but there is one method that Israel can't reliably stop from at least starting: rockets. The reasons why Hamas has come to rely on rockets so much are straightforward: they're relatively easy to build using scavenged metal for structure and baking and agricultural supplies for propellant. They're therefore unguided and imprecise: it means Hamas fires them indiscriminately into Israel, regularly hitting civilian targets, rather than the military targets permitted for strike under the laws of war. The rockets can also be launched from within the center of Gaza, where it's easy to hide, and where Hamas can position itself near targets that Israel would hesitate to destroy like hospitals or schools. That leaves Israel with two options—either they don't initiate an airstrike against the launch site, and Hamas can continue, or they do, and the organization will bolster its case when accusing Israel of war crimes in Gaza. Therefore, rockets are perhaps the most regular tactic deployed by Hamas and other militant groups in the region, yet life in Israel stays relatively normal regardless. In nearby Israeli towns like Sderot, bus shelters were built to double as rocket shelters—the automated system only gives about fifteen seconds of warning given the close proximity to Gaza, so these allow residents to quickly flee into relative safety even when out on the streets. In order to allow kids to play, especially during times of heightened tensions, the town built a massive indoor playground in a reinforced, armored building, along with an outdoor equivalent centered with what looks like an oversized caterpillar, yet is actually, once again, a rocket shelter. As distance increases from the border, warning time increases and therefore the ability for Israel to respond does too. And perhaps the most regular response comes from the famed Iron Dome—while incredibly complex technologically, the concept is simple: it's a system that, in a matter of seconds, uses radar to detect whether a rocket is on a trajectory towards a populated area and, if so, sends a small, guided interceptor missile to destroy the rocket mid-air. This works remarkably well—it has a success rate over 90%—but it has its limitations. For one, the interceptor missiles each cost upwards of $100,000, meaning a massive barrage of well-aimed rudimentary Hamas rockets would put a strain on IDF supplies and budgets. This was a long-understood theoretical Achilles heel—Israel had even been developing a laser-based equivalent in order to solve the problem—but around 6:30 am on the morning of October 7th, 2023, theory came crashing into reality. The Iron Dome—recognized, revered, respected the world over—suddenly, spectacularly, and tragically failed as Hamas rockets arced across the morning sky, before, at a rate far too high, crashing directly into buildings in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and other nearby Israeli cities and towns. Israel and its security system was under attack, and the opening move was remarkably simple: get around the iron dome by overwhelming it. In quick succession, Hamas launched some two to three thousand rockets. These rockets—low tech, unreliable, but manufactured on the comparative cheap at about $600 per unit—drowned iron dome interceptors, allowing far more than the usual 10% to make ground fall, sending Israelis across the nation running for bomb shelters. The coordinated barrage served as the opening shots, and tipped Hamas's strategy: keep it coordinated, keep it simple, and move quickly. As sirens blared across Israel, Hamas took aim at the barriers encircling Gaza at at least six verified locations. First they bombed observation towers and communication infrastructure with run-of-the-mill commercial drones carrying explosives to blind the cameras and neutralize the remotely operated machine guns.At the same time, fighters riding fan-powered hang gliders and paragliders floated over the fence to secure territory on the far side. With the smart fence now blind and defenseless, Hamas fighters on motorcycles stormed across the buffer zone, blasted openings into the fences and walls, and rushed toward nearby Israeli communities or IDF bases, in some cases, capturing the military installations before they even knew they were under attack. Following not far behind the blitzing motorcycles were bulldozers that widened the gaps to allow for more Hamas vehicles to pass first into Israel, then, with hostages in tow, pass quickly back into Gaza. Armed with nothing more than cold-war era weapons, retrofitted civilian transportation, and paper maps, roughly one thousand fighters now poured into south and west Israel. Of course, getting beyond a barrier marked only the beginning. In documents later seized off fallen Hamas combatants, it was clear that the invaders were prepared to meet heavy resistance, as an entire page of the document detailed the weak points to attack when faced with the IDF's armored vehicles. And yet, while Israel was able to quickly counter with returning rocket fire into Gaza, its ground forces were nowhere to be seen as invaders pushed into at least 22 separate Israeli towns. Among the biggest failures of the IDF's massive, state-of-the-art security system, was something that had less to do with physical security, or security infrastructure, but with the inability to see this coming. Now, for their part—whether by posturing as a newly restrained fighting force over the two years prior, or keeping the plan of this attack so secretive that not even those who deployed on October 7 knew exactly what they were getting into—Hamas kept this about as quiet as they possibly could have. But limiting leaks and playing tame for two years shouldn't have duped one of the most vaunted intelligence services in the world. And while the investigations as to exactly why Israel missed the signs have only just begun, there's at least one partial explanation bubbling to the surface: the most advanced AI and data monitoring doesn't go very far if the people you're spying on don't leave a data trail. Perhaps the signs in the data were missed, or perhaps they never existed as the plan took shape through hushed conversations—like the attack itself, the planning may have been too utilitarian, too 20th-century for the intelligence community of the future. But even then, if they missed the planning, there was the training too. And again, intelligence failed, as Hamas, in the attack's wake, has published videos of training exercises preparing for precisely this style of attack—working with drones, invading an Israeli-styled settlement, and flying hang gliders; some exercises in the light of day. Just as the attack will have cascading implications for years to come, so too will the intelligence failure, both abroad and at home, as questions over the organization's reputation have already begun to surface. Israel's vaunted intelligence missed the ball. Then, making things worse, as their impenetrable fence came crashing down, Israeli forces were slow to swing into action. Light on numbers as some units had been moved to the northern border in anticipation of Hezbollah attacks, and sluggish to mobilize on a holiday, it took hours to first figure out just what exactly was going on across fractured communication networks, then hours to mobilize, all precious time as Hamas fighters rampaged through villages, killing and kidnapping indiscriminately. It wouldn't be for three more days until Israeli forces were able to beat back Hamas intruders. With such a mismatch between Gaza and Israel—in almost every way—it appears that the IDF developed a system of security that was just fundamentally mismatched with the method of warfare that Hamas deployed. With an Israeli overreliance on technology, all it took was the destruction of that technology for both Israeli capability and communication to break down. That's to say, Israel seems to have grown complacent—they assumed correlation equalled causation and that the advent of these new systems was the cause of the recent relative quiet on its border with Gaza. Hamas leveraged this exact dynamic—even purposefully postering on surveilled communication channels that the wall made meaningful attack impossible, according to one report. What makes the Israeli mission so difficult is the very fact that they're not fighting an advanced army—they're fighting a combination of loosely-defined organizations using tactics and technology that nearly anyone could, meaning anyone could be Israel's enemy. This will be the crux of Israel's campaign going forward—the fact that even with all the most advanced aircraft and surveillance and intelligence in the world, little can stop one individuals' willingness and ability to fight in any way possible but another's. As I'm sure many of you know, YouTube, as an ad-supported platform that has to keep its content what's considered safe by its advertisers, has pretty strict guidelines on how you can talk about sensitive issues like the Israel-Hamas war—we had to write and edit this video in a pretty specific way. This isn't really YouTube's fault, but rather a pragmatic reality of the nature of an ad-supported video platform, but there is clearly value in being able to discuss sensitive issues in more detail and depth. That's why we, the creators, launched Nebula—it's a streaming site founded, owned, and run by a group of creators, developed to be the best home to the stuff we make. Knowing the constraints of ad-supported video, we decided to go for a different economic model: there's a paywall, but in exchange there are no ads and we get a bigger production budget for videos which allows us to make higher-quality, exclusive stuff for Nebula, and that's how Joseph from Real Life Lore was able to make his series Modern Conflicts where he presents amazingly detailed accounts of some of recent time's most impactful conflicts. This includes the Israel-Palestine conflict, which he already made an episode on, and he's hurriedly working on a new, updated episode on it which will come out quite soon. But in addition to this series, there are plenty of other exclusive Originals from all sorts of creators who you probably watch, including us: we've made all of these, including our feature-length doc called the Colorado Problem which is about another, different-type of conflict—the one brewing in the catastrophically dry American south-west where farmers and cities are trying to figure out what to do when more people think they have rights to water than there is water to go around. There are so many more Originals on top of ours, and we have a massive slate of new ones in post-production right now that'll release soon, and of course Nebula also has all of its creators' normal videos ad-free. 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B1 中級 米 How Israel's Security Failed(How Israel's Security Failed) 15 0 林宜悉 に公開 2023 年 10 月 31 日 シェア シェア 保存 報告 動画の中の単語