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  • The most consistent throughline across the Holy Land is war.

  • From the Maccabean Revolt and the Jewish-Roman Wars, through the Crusades, the Ottoman-Mamluk

  • War, and all the way to the Israel-Arab and Six-Day Wars, it's been attacked and invaded,

  • defended and died for, time and time and time again.

  • The clearest cause as to why, is this: Jerusalem

  • From the perspective of geography, this city shouldn't exist.

  • Propped upon hills and positioned 30 miles or 48 kilometers from the nearest major body

  • of water, twenty miles or 32 kilometers away from the nearest major river, and without

  • a single river of any sort running through it, this city is dry.

  • Without water, Jerusalem is without a prosperous trading harbor, it's without close proximity

  • to maritime shipping routes, it's without any real industrial base, it's even without

  • easy access to drinking water

  • Within the walls of the old city are populations that represent four separate cultures and

  • three separate religions.

  • And within these walls are also some of the very holiest sites to the three religionsChristianity,

  • Islam, and Judaism: the world's two largest, and the oldest monotheistic religion, respectively.

  • Because of what's said to have happened here, who's said to have passed through

  • here, and what's been built in their honor here, Jerusalem, sitting high and dry in the

  • Judean Mountains, has served as the center of the world for three massive, powerful groups

  • of faith for more than 2,000 years.

  • And thus, it's been fought over, often under the guise of religion, but importantly, rarely

  • solely because of religion—a case where the simplest explanation is not always the

  • right explanation.

  • Whether wars of empire building in the past, or state building in the present, religion's

  • only part of the story

  • Today, as it has been for nearly a century, it's not three religions, but rather two

  • nations fighting over the common territory that one group asserts as Palestine and the

  • other asserts as Israel.

  • After decades of attacks on one another, failed negotiations and peace talks, terrorism, and

  • outright war, the outlines of the conflict between two nations promised the territory

  • nearly a century ago looks like this: Israel, a rich, western power controlling all the

  • land between Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon; and Palestine as just these swaths of land often

  • mired by shading or striping on maps to designate its status as a mere partially recognized

  • state by the UN.

  • Despite their shared landscapes, Israel and Palestine are a world apart.

  • Quality of life in Palestine is considered, according to the UNs human development index,

  • roughly analogous to that of its neighbors, Egypt and Lebanon.

  • Israel, meanwhile, almost exactly matches the United States's HDI.

  • From an income perspective, it's even starkeron a per-person basis, Palestinians earn just

  • a third of what their neighbors in Egypt and Lebanon do, while Israelis are on average

  • some of the wealthiest people in the world, bringing in about what South Korean or British

  • people do.

  • This imbalance of wealth is both a symptom and a cause of the imbalance of power between

  • the two nations that is now just about as lopsided as it's ever been, making an already

  • contentious relationship all the more combustible.

  • In consequence, a number of militant groups have arisen to fight both for an independent

  • Palestinian state and against the continued contraction of Palestinian land

  • This grows the disconnect even further.

  • On one side of the walls there is a high-income, developed, westernized, cosmopolitan nationcentered

  • by one of the wealthiest, most globally interconnected cities in the world.

  • On the othermere miles awayare active, growing militant groups with the stated goal

  • of the destruction of the state of Israel.

  • In Tel Aviv there are people staying at $500 a night five-star hotels, eating at $100 a

  • plate fine-dining restaurants, then heading to exclusive nightclubs with globe-spanning

  • DJs, while just a one-hour drive south there are rocket-laden militants working day and

  • night to plot their deaths

  • To maintain this disconnect, Israel has, through the years, developed a sophisticated system

  • of security to protect its citizens while keeping Palestinian life into the enclaves

  • it permits.

  • While this extends nation-wide, nowhere is this more relevant than with the Hamas-controlled

  • Gaza Strip.

  • Gaza is a territory encircled on all sides by securitynot just in two directions,

  • but three.

  • Israel's mission is near-complete control of what goes in and out so that the Israeli

  • state is entirely isolated from the activities of its captive neighbor.

  • This starts with a wall.

  • Above ground it extends some twenty or so feet or six or so meters, then below ground

  • it extends a certain amount too.

  • Following the discovery of a vast network of Hamas tunnels used to infiltrate Israeland,

  • in one dramatic case, kidnap a soldier who was then held for ransomthe country spent

  • five years and a billion dollars building an underground wall of an undisclosed depth

  • to make it more difficult for Hamas to cross under the border.

  • As a second layer of protection, they developed a system of sensors to unveil any attempts

  • as well

  • Above ground, Israel sets strict rules to keep Gazans, what they consider, a safe distance

  • awaynobody's allowed within 300 feet or 100 meters of the border; while only farmers

  • are allowed within 1,000 feet or 300 meters, and only by foot.

  • On the other side, Israel has a network of guard towers with remote monitoring equipment

  • like cameras and radar to inform the Israel Defense Forces when an attempted incursion

  • is occurring.

  • As perhaps the most dystopian feature of all, Israel has a fleet of remotely-operated, self-driving

  • machine gun robots that patrol the area, notify the IDF of potential threats, then allow for

  • remote operationfiring a slew of bullets towards Gaza to maim or kill any targets without

  • the need for any human soldier to leave their chairs at their base.

  • While Israel only borders Gaza on its northern and eastern sides, it's exerted at least

  • a certain degree of control on its southern and western too.

  • Gaza borders Egypt on the southern side, but for a period of a few decades the Sinai Peninsula

  • was under Israeli Military Occupation.

  • In exchange for its return in 1979, Egypt agreed to build a border with Gaza.

  • To accomplish this, they split Rafah in halfseparating one city into two through its core, separating

  • families, communities, and businesses.

  • Today, movement is only allowed through the Rafah border crossing which closes quickly

  • whenever Israel-Gaza tensions heat upEgypt wary to let a deluge of refugees in, partially

  • given the impact the depopulation of Gaza would have on the Palestinian mission of statehood

  • that it supports

  • On its western side, the territory of Gaza borders the Mediterranean Sea but, unlike

  • almost every other territory in the world, it does not control its own coastIsrael

  • does.

  • The country forms a box around a slice of the sea and allows a select number of Gazans

  • to fish in it, but no morethe Israeli Navy patrols and prevents any ships from going

  • in or out without their approval.

  • It's the same situation with the airspaceIsrael controls it completely and regularly flies

  • combat and surveillance aircraft over the territory.

  • But that's largely irrelevant because they destroyed Gaza's only airport in 2001 during

  • an outbreak of violence.

  • So today, the only legal ways in or out of Gaza are the sporadically open Rafah and Kerem

  • Shalom crossings on the southern border; and the even less reliable Erez crossing, on the

  • northern border with Israel.

  • This is a crucial lifeline for Gazawhile the Rafah crossing opens to a friendlier country

  • for Palestinians, the neighboring section of Egypt is sparsely populated so when, for

  • example, someone needs access to higher-level medical care, Israel or the Palestinian West

  • Bank are the most likely destinations.

  • But there is no functional right to travel for Palestinians between Gaza and the separated

  • West Bank, so even when heading to East Jerusalem for treatment, patients are required to gain

  • a permit from Israel

  • Only two-thirds of applications, which only happen after a doctor in Gaza refers a patient

  • for higher-level care, are approved in the time needed, and Israel uses the difficulty

  • of travel it manufactures to gain a leg up with its security: patients and others who

  • need to cross the border are routinely subjected to Israeli recruiting efforts.

  • They'll be given a choicesometimes their medical treatment will be paid for in exchange

  • for information, sometimes they'll be barred from entry all-together unless they agree

  • to help Israel.

  • Most try to reject these efforts, rightly fearful for their lives if they give information

  • on Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups, but some sign up.

  • This network of spies ranges from low-level, casual informants all the way to upper-level

  • Hamas operatives compensated with hundreds of thousands of dollars for ongoing inside

  • information about the organizationthe stakes are high, as Gaza's Hamas authorities regularly

  • execute individuals under the charge of espionage for Israel

  • Information gleaned feeds into the Israeli intelligence agencies, and this is combined

  • with  that gained from surveillance aircraft and an advanced system of digital surveillance

  • to give Israel, at least theoretically, a good picture of what's going on in the territory

  • without the need to actually go inside.

  • Through this, Israel at least hopes to be able to thwart all attacks into its territory,

  • but there is one method that Israel can't reliably stop from at least starting: rockets

  • The reasons why Hamas has come to rely on rockets so much are straightforward: they're

  • relatively easy to build using scavenged metal for structure and baking and agricultural

  • supplies for propellant.

  • They're therefore unguided and imprecise: it means Hamas fires them indiscriminately

  • into Israel, regularly hitting civilian targets, rather than the military targets permitted

  • for strike under the laws of war.

  • The rockets can also be launched from within the center of Gaza, where it's easy to hide,

  • and where Hamas can position itself near targets that Israel would hesitate to destroy like

  • hospitals or schools.

  • That leaves Israel with two optionseither they don't initiate an airstrike against

  • the launch site, and Hamas can continue, or they do, and the organization will bolster

  • its case when accusing Israel of war crimes in Gaza.

  • Therefore, rockets are perhaps the most regular tactic deployed by Hamas and other militant

  • groups in the region, yet life in Israel stays relatively normal regardless

  • In nearby Israeli towns like Sderot, bus shelters were built to double as rocket sheltersthe

  • automated system only gives about fifteen seconds of warning given the close proximity

  • to Gaza, so these allow residents to quickly flee into relative safety even when out on

  • the streets.

  • In order to allow kids to play, especially during times of heightened tensions, the town

  • built a massive indoor playground in a reinforced, armored building, along with an outdoor equivalent

  • centered with what looks like an oversized caterpillar, yet is actually, once again,

  • a rocket shelter

  • As distance increases from the border, warning time increases and therefore the ability for

  • Israel to respond does too.

  • And perhaps the most regular response comes from the famed Iron Domewhile incredibly

  • complex technologically, the concept is simple: it's a system that, in a matter of seconds,

  • uses radar to detect whether a rocket is on a trajectory towards a populated area and,

  • if so, sends a small, guided interceptor missile to destroy the rocket mid-air.

  • This works remarkably wellit has a success rate over 90%—but it has its limitations.

  • For one, the interceptor missiles each cost upwards of $100,000, meaning a massive barrage

  • of well-aimed rudimentary Hamas rockets would put a strain on IDF supplies and budgets.

  • This was a long-understood theoretical Achilles heelIsrael had even been developing a laser-based

  • equivalent in order to solve the problembut around 6:30 am on the morning of October 7th,

  • 2023, theory came crashing into reality

  • The Iron Domerecognized, revered, respected the world oversuddenly, spectacularly,

  • and tragically failed as Hamas rockets arced across the morning sky, before, at a rate

  • far too high, crashing directly into buildings in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and other

  • nearby Israeli cities and towns.

  • Israel and its security system was under attack, and the opening move was remarkably simple:

  • get around the iron dome by overwhelming it.

  • In quick succession, Hamas launched some two to three thousand rockets.

  • These rocketslow tech, unreliable, but manufactured on the comparative cheap at about

  • $600 per unitdrowned iron dome interceptors, allowing far more than the usual 10% to make

  • ground fall, sending Israelis across the nation running for bomb shelters.

  • The coordinated barrage served as the opening shots, and tipped Hamas's strategy: keep

  • it coordinated, keep it simple, and move quickly.  

  • As sirens blared across Israel, Hamas took aim at the barriers encircling Gaza at at

  • least six verified locations.

  • First they bombed observation towers and communication infrastructure with run-of-the-mill commercial

  • drones carrying explosives to blind the cameras and neutralize the remotely operated machine

  • guns.At the same time, fighters riding fan-powered hang gliders and paragliders floated over

  • the fence to secure territory on the far side.

  • With the smart fence now blind and defenseless, Hamas fighters on motorcycles stormed across

  • the buffer zone, blasted openings into the fences and walls, and rushed toward nearby

  • Israeli communities or IDF bases, in some cases, capturing the military installations

  • before they even knew they were under attack.

  • Following not far behind the blitzing motorcycles were bulldozers that widened the gaps to allow

  • for more Hamas vehicles to pass first into Israel, then, with hostages in tow, pass quickly

  • back into Gaza.

  • Armed with nothing more than cold-war era weapons, retrofitted civilian transportation,

  • and paper maps, roughly one thousand fighters now poured into south and west Israel

  • Of course, getting beyond a barrier marked only the beginning.

  • In documents later seized off fallen Hamas combatants, it was clear that the invaders

  • were prepared to meet heavy resistance, as an entire page of the document detailed the

  • weak points to attack when faced with the IDF's armored vehicles.

  • And yet, while Israel was able to quickly counter with returning rocket fire into Gaza,

  • its ground forces were nowhere to be seen as invaders pushed into at least 22 separate

  • Israeli towns.

  • Among the biggest failures of the IDF's massive, state-of-the-art security system,

  • was something that had less to do with physical security, or security infrastructure, but

  • with the inability to see this coming

  • Now, for their partwhether by posturing as a newly restrained fighting force over

  • the two years prior, or keeping the plan of this attack so secretive that not even those

  • who deployed on October 7 knew exactly what they were getting intoHamas kept this about

  • as quiet as they possibly could have.

  • But limiting leaks and playing tame for two years shouldn't have duped one of the most

  • vaunted intelligence services in the world.

  • And while the investigations as to exactly why Israel missed the signs have only just

  • begun, there's at least one partial explanation bubbling to the surface: the most advanced

  • AI and data monitoring doesn't go very far if the people you're spying on don't leave

  • a data trail.

  • Perhaps the signs in the data were missed, or perhaps they never existed as the plan

  • took shape through hushed conversationslike the attack itself, the planning may have been

  • too utilitarian, too 20th-century for the intelligence community of the future.

  • But even then, if they missed the planning, there was the training too.

  • And again, intelligence failed, as Hamas, in the attack's wake, has published videos

  • of training exercises preparing for precisely this style of attackworking with drones,

  • invading an Israeli-styled settlement, and flying hang gliders; some exercises in the

  • light of day.

  • Just as the attack will have cascading implications for years to come, so too will the intelligence

  • failure, both abroad and at home, as questions over the organization's reputation have

  • already begun to surface

  • Israel's vaunted intelligence missed the ball.

  • Then, making things worse, as their impenetrable fence came crashing down, Israeli forces were

  • slow to swing into action.

  • Light on numbers as some units had been moved to the northern border in anticipation of

  • Hezbollah attacks, and sluggish to mobilize on a holiday, it took hours to first figure

  • out just what exactly was going on across fractured communication networks, then hours

  • to mobilize, all precious time as Hamas fighters rampaged through villages, killing and kidnapping

  • indiscriminately.

  • It wouldn't be for three more days until Israeli forces were able to beat back Hamas

  • intruders.


  • With such a mismatch between Gaza and Israelin almost every wayit appears that the IDF

  • developed a system of security that was just fundamentally mismatched with the method of

  • warfare that Hamas deployed.

  • With an Israeli overreliance on technology, all it took was the destruction of that technology

  • for both Israeli capability and communication to break down.

  • That's to say, Israel seems to have grown complacentthey assumed correlation equalled

  • causation and that the advent of these new systems was the cause of the recent relative

  • quiet on its border with Gaza.

  • Hamas leveraged this exact dynamiceven purposefully postering on surveilled communication

  • channels that the wall made meaningful attack impossible, according to one report.

  • What makes the Israeli mission so difficult is the very fact that they're not fighting

  • an advanced armythey're fighting a combination of loosely-defined organizations using tactics

  • and technology that nearly anyone could, meaning anyone could be Israel's enemy.

  • This will be the crux of Israel's campaign going forwardthe fact that even with all

  • the most advanced aircraft and surveillance and intelligence in the world, little can

  • stop one individuals' willingness and ability to fight in any way possible but another's. 

  • As I'm sure many of you know, YouTube, as an ad-supported platform that has to keep

  • its content what's considered safe by its advertisers, has pretty strict guidelines

  • on how you can talk about sensitive issues like the Israel-Hamas warwe had to write

  • and edit this video in a pretty specific way.

  • This isn't really YouTube's fault, but rather a pragmatic reality of the nature of

  • an ad-supported video platform, but there is clearly value in being able to discuss

  • sensitive issues in more detail and depth.

  • That's why we, the creators, launched Nebulait's a streaming site founded, owned, and run by

  • a group of creators, developed to be the best home to the stuff we make.

  • Knowing the constraints of ad-supported video, we decided to go for a different economic

  • model: there's a paywall, but in exchange there are no ads and we get a bigger production

  • budget for videos which allows us to make higher-quality, exclusive stuff for Nebula,

  • and that's how Joseph from Real Life Lore was able to make his series Modern Conflicts

  • where he presents amazingly detailed accounts of some of recent time's most impactful

  • conflicts.

  • This includes the Israel-Palestine conflict, which he already made an episode on, and he's

  • hurriedly working on a new, updated episode on it which will come out quite soon.

  • But in addition to this series, there are plenty of other exclusive Originals from all

  • sorts of creators who you probably watch, including us: we've made all of these, including

  • our feature-length doc called the Colorado Problem which is about another, different-type

  • of conflictthe one brewing in the catastrophically dry American south-west where farmers and

  • cities are trying to figure out what to do when more people think they have rights to

  • water than there is water to go around.

  • There are so many more Originals on top of ours, and we have a massive slate of new ones

  • in post-production right now that'll release soon, and of course Nebula also has all of

  • its creators' normal videos ad-free.

  • It really is the best viewing experience, and what makes it even better is that you

  • can know you're genuinely helping support the creatorswhen you sign up using our

  • link, Nebula.tv/Wendover, we'll actually get a portion of your subscription fee for

  • as long as you stay subscribed which gives us predictable, monthly revenue that we can

  • rely on to reinvest in the videos without the ebbs and flows of ad-rates.

  • If you'd like to sign up, you can even get 40% off an annual subscription by using our

  • link which will bring the cost down to under $3 a month, so head to Nebula.tv/Wendover

  • and thanks in advance for your support

The most consistent throughline across the Holy Land is war.

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How Israel's Security Failed(How Israel's Security Failed)

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    林宜悉 に公開 2023 年 10 月 31 日
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