Name: How U.S. Airports Might Revamp Security... Using Game Theory
Uploaded: 2021-07-02T07:06:36.000Z
Duration: 11 min 18 s
Description: VoiceTubeの動画で発音を聞きながら英語表現を覚えよう！学べる英語：

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Let's be honest: No one really enjoys airport security.

and it seems like the rules are always changing.

People tell pollsters that they'd fly more if security wasn't such a hassle,

but most people also say they're fine sacrificing some privacy for more security.

But those screening areas where no one knows what to do with their shoes

Every airport is an onion of security measures that all work together,

and those layers are constantly shifting and evolving.

Over the last 10 years or so, at least in the United States,

some of that evolution has been inspired by game theorists.

These researchers have been helping decide where security should be,

how much there should be, and how often it should change.

And one common response to all those questions has been: be random.

Game theory is a broad subject that sits in between math and economics.

It originally focused on how people play games, like the name suggests.

So a game theorist might work out when to bluff in poker,

or why your friend Camille always hoards sheep in Catan.

But while some researchers still do study actual games,

the field has expanded far beyond those early roots.

Plenty of today's game theorists are looking at other situations

where intelligent actors (like groups of people)

interact with each other and make decisions.

So things like soldiers making choices on the battlefield,

businesses competing against each other, or even election results.

Or Braess's Paradox from our video about reducing traffic.

Adding more roads can make traffic worse, not better.

Because we all try to make our own trip faster,

which ends up making everyone's drive slower, including our own.

Governments and businesses also bring in game theorists

to help with crucial decisions or to build new systems.

Like, imagine that you run an international airport in a large city,

who were planning to attack the airport in the past.

So you want police watching for anything suspicious,

you want dogs sniffing for anything suspicious,

and you want security checking people's belongings…

But you only have a certain amount of money,

and you don't want everyone to completely hate your airport

At least, that's what they did in LA back in 2007.

Now, to be totally clear, whether security screenings and the TSA

are the most effective way to find or stop threats

from the one these researchers are trying to answer.

So the goal, both for these researchers and in this video,

isn't to dig into the science or sociology of security protocols in general.

We're just going to explain where game theory has been implemented

at airports so far, and what the reported results and criticisms have been.

And this all really started at LAX, the Los Angeles International Airport.

wanted checkpoints along the roads to LAX,

but there weren't enough police to cover every entrance every day.

So LAX contacted a professor named Milind Tambe

Together, they developed a computer program called ARMOR,

short for Assistant for Randomized Monitoring Over Routes.

It generates recommended security schedules for the airport.

ARMOR is based on a kind of game theory called Stackelberg game theory.

In Stackelberg games, one person makes a move while the second watches,

and then the second has to respond to their move.

to businesses competing against each other to sell something.

One business goes first and charges what they want for, say, a T-shirt.

Then other businesses have to respond and choose what they want to charge

but they're not so cheap that the business loses money.

that others are going to respond to their initial decision,

that changes what the first business does at the beginning.

“they know that we know that they know that we know…” kind of situation.

Tambe and other researchers have realized

that Stackelberg games can also apply to security situations.

The first player is the airport, setting up their security in a certain way.

The second player is someone trying to attack the airport

or even just bring something dangerous through security.

Each player gets to see what the other does

attackers can go to the airport and look at the security,

and security can monitor attackers whenever they catch something.

So based on the optimal strategy in certain kinds of Stackelberg games,

Tambe and the rest of the researchers who were asked for input

said that the solution to LAX's problem was more randomness.

If they couldn't cover every entrance with police every single day,

they also shouldn't have a regular schedule for which ones are guarded.

you shouldn't have police checkpoints at entrances 1, 2, and 3 on Day 1,

then 2, 3, and 4 on Day 2, then 3, 4, and 5 on Day 3.

that on Day 107, entrances 5, 6, and 1 will be covered,

The same goes for paths taken by police dogs patrolling the airport.

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How U.S. Airports Might Revamp Security... Using Game Theory

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