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  • Chinese spies are trying to infiltrate the US.

  • From universities to the FBI

  • A former FBI undercover agent

  • Reveals their operations.

  • This is China Uncensored, I'm Chris Chappell.

  • Ever hear of a honey trap?

  • A honey trap is when a hostile foreign government uses,

  • say, a beautiful woman,

  • to seduce someone—a politician, a businessman, a scientist.

  • They might give information to her

  • that could pose a national security risk.

  • Or she could just use the salacious encounter to blackmail him.

  • And let's just say,

  • Chinese leaders know a thing or two about honey.

  • I sat down with former FBI operative Marc Ruskin,

  • author ofThe Pretender: My Life Undercover for the FBI”...

  • to find out how Chinese agents are using honey traps

  • and many other techniques

  • to infiltrate the United States.

  • Thanks for joining me today, Marc.

  • Hey, it's my pleasure, Chris.

  • Thank you for inviting me.

  • Sure.

  • Well, so as a former FBI agent,

  • what have you seen are some of the ways the Chinese Communist Party

  • is trying to gain influence in the United States?

  • Well, the Chinese intelligent services along

  • with other hostile intelligence services exploit

  • a number of vulnerabilities that exist in the United States.

  • And to a large extent, and this may be surprising

  • to some of your viewers,

  • but the majority of the data that they seek

  • is actually available through open sources.

  • Much of it is available legally to anyone

  • who takes the trouble to look for it.

  • Is this what you mean by vulnerabilities?

  • Yeah.

  • By vulnerabilities, I'm talking about open ...

  • manners in which data which can be of use to a hostile power,

  • such as China, can be accessed without necessarily

  • violating any federal or American laws.

  • A lot of the data that is significant

  • and can be used for a hostile adversary purposes

  • is actually available through open sources.

  • Much of it is information, for example,

  • such as a technical report, research, engineering,

  • which has been conducted on a very sophisticated level

  • and has not yet been classified.

  • So there's often a lag time, for example,

  • with advanced research,

  • the publication of the research not being reviewed

  • and being ultimately classified as secret or top secret.

  • But since the Chinese intelligence services

  • are very active and on the ball and alert,

  • often they've already accessed the information

  • and it's out the door prior to it being classified.

  • So what does China do with this information?

  • Well, we're talking,

  • I'm thinking basically information of a technical level,

  • which can then be used by own engineers and their own researchers

  • to advance their own level of sophistication,

  • bypassing the research that they would've had to do themselves

  • in order to reach the same point.

  • In other words, they're taking advantage,

  • and this is a problem with academia in the United States

  • and that we have a very open society.

  • And by having this kind of openness,

  • it gives more access to hostile services to obtain information

  • either through a variety of methods,

  • but often not necessarily to espionage,

  • but often it's simply by being alert

  • and being quick and accessing the,

  • and knowing where the look and when to look.

  • So that's kind of similar to how recently it came out

  • that the Chair of Harvard's Chemistry Department

  • was getting funding from China.

  • Right.

  • Just last month,

  • just at the end of January,

  • there was an arrest of Professor Lieberand announcements by the special agent in charge

  • of the FBI in Boston,

  • Bonaventura,

  • who he explained in his statements that right now China is,

  • in his view,

  • and presumably reflects the view of the FBI today,

  • China's the largest intelligence threat to the US.

  • Whether it's larger than Russia or not,

  • it's kind of like how many angels

  • can dance on the head of a pin type of question.

  • In either case,

  • they're all hostile intelligence services and need to be,

  • we need to take a preventative,

  • counter-intelligence type measures

  • in order to protect ourselves from a hostile act.

  • So, you've talked about how China

  • takes advantage of open source information.

  • How in the case of the Harvard Professor Lieber,

  • how money can buy off people.

  • How does China use foreign agents in the United States?

  • Well, historically there've been a number of ways

  • that the Chinese have used traditional espionage techniques.

  • One in particular that's been very successful is,

  • and it may seem reminiscent of John Le Carre novels,

  • but it's the reality is what's referred to in trade craft

  • as a honey trap,

  • which is using an attractive female case officer,

  • intelligence officer,

  • to develop a relationship with someone

  • who has access to classified information.

  • And it's a longterm proposition to develop an intimate,

  • ultimately physical relationship or maybe even the relationship

  • that the target believes is a legitimate emotional relationship.

  • There was an FBI agent, a Supervisor, James,

  • and his last name escapes me right now,

  • but who with Katrina Leung,

  • was the name of the intelligence officer.

  • Not her real Mandarin name,

  • but she developed a relationship with him

  • and for 20 years that relationship continued.

  • It's hard to imagine for nearly two decades,

  • and he was the supervisor of a China Counter Intelligence squad

  • in the FBI's Los Angeles office,

  • and he was taking, apparently, from what I understand,

  • confidential classified documents to his rendezvouses with her.

  • So until ultimately he was arrested

  • after he retired and entered into a plea agreement

  • with the US Attorney's office.

  • How common are these honey traps?

  • Unfortunately, it's a question that has no real answer

  • because all we know about is the ones that were caught.

  • Right?

  • So from time to time,

  • in the FBI it's not very common that we know about.

  • The first one in the history of the FBI

  • involved an agent called Richard Miller,who was seduced by a Soviet at that time,

  • Soviet Union agent,

  • whose name was Svetlana Ogorodnikova.

  • And so, how often does it happen in other agencies?

  • I would suspect it happens more often in other agencies.

  • The FBI has a pretty serious vetting process for recruiting agents.

  • And as the CIA does as well.

  • But there are other areas where these honey traps could be used

  • and which are not to infiltrate America's Counter Intelligence services,

  • but simply to infiltrate, say academia.

  • You could have this kind of technique being utilized

  • with the college professors or engineers

  • working at nuclear research laboratories,

  • which we wouldn't know about

  • because they haven't come to surface yet.

  • So besides these methods, what other tactics

  • is the Chinese Communist Party using in the United States?

  • I guess the one answer would be

  • whatever they can imagine and come up with.

  • As we all know, the Russians, the Soviets were,

  • since the creation of the Soviet Union

  • has been attempting to influence the American elections.

  • With regard to the Russians, we can read about it

  • because since the fall of the Soviet Union,

  • many ex-KGB officers who worked in the US

  • have been able to publish their memoirs.

  • So you can go to the bookstore and buy Kalugin's book

  • and see how they were in New York and in Washington

  • doing their best through all types of clandestine activity

  • to influence the elections.

  • Now, presumably if the Russians were doing it,

  • the Chinese were doing it also.

  • However, we don't have a bunch of ex-Chinese

  • intelligence officers publishing their memoirs

  • because I would imagine that their longevity would be very dim indeed

  • were they to attempt to do so

  • as would the health of their family members, right?

  • Probably.

  • So we don't know firsthand, but what we do know

  • is what has been uncovered just through ordinary criminal investigations.

  • And for that we can just look back to the Clinton re-election campaign.

  • In the Clinton re-election campaign,

  • there was Johnny Young, and the thousands and thousands of dollars

  • that were being apparently allegedly contributed

  • both directly to the Clinton re-election campaign

  • and to the Democratic National Committee.

  • This is Bill Clinton and the China Gate scandal in the 90s?

  • Right.

  • Of course, it didn't become as much of a scandal,

  • I would suggest as it should have been,

  • because according to reporting in the media,

  • there was direct links between the People's Republic of China

  • Military Intelligence Services

  • and the recipients or the middlemen for that money going to the campaign.

  • So you asked how, in other words, other techniques,

  • I would suggest that contributing to a political party

  • and contributing to a president's re-election campaign.

  • And it's more than just mere suspicion.

  • There was 22 convictions as a result of this.

  • So, this is another tactic.

  • It's a tactic.

  • It's a tactic.

  • How successful is it?

  • I can't evaluate it,

  • but it's certainly a tactic that arguably was used

  • in order to influence the outcome

  • for an American political presidential election.

  • And also arguably inference can be made

  • that there's a certain amount of influence

  • that's being purchased through that kind of a donation.

  • So it seems like the Chinese Communist Party

  • is taking advantage of the free and open society

  • we have in the United States.

  • How can the US counter this without giving up these freedoms?

  • Well, there had been an attempts for the FBI, for example,

  • many years ago, had an initiative.

  • It was librarians were recruited,

  • since there's so much access to open source information,

  • the thought was that by bringing in librarians

  • to identify suspect individual patrons,

  • it may sound a little simple,

  • but it could've been very effective,

  • individuals with accents from countries

  • which are known to be hostile to the US,

  • accessing highly technical reports on a continuing basis.

  • It was thought, the idea was,

  • and I think it was a good idea that it could,

  • these could have provided leads in order

  • to identify whether they be Chinese or Russian,

  • or from other hostile powers,

  • individuals seeking to exploit open source information.

  • The reaction from the librarians and from the civil liberties groups

  • was hardly very cooperative.

  • It was just the opposite.

  • There was a big negative reaction that caused the initiatives

  • to essentially have to be shut down.

  • And there was a lot of publicity about it at the time.

  • And at the time in the New York Times,

  • but ultimately it didn't work.

  • A similar attempt occurred after 9/11,

  • when the Patriot Act was passed,

  • there was a clause that was referred to as the library clause.

  • In which again,

  • the FBI and other government agencies were seeking

  • to obtain information regarding access

  • by the Chinese and other hostile powers

  • to open source significant technological information.

  • Again, the reaction was hardly cooperative.

  • It seems almost absurd,

  • but there were signs being put in the library

  • to warn patrons that their access

  • may be subject to government review.

  • So rather than cooperate, it was just the opposite.

  • The librarians were essentially warning off potential patrons

  • who could be identified.

  • So it's a tricky ... it's a balancing act,

  • we want to be-

  • Well, I was going to say,

  • because I can kind of understand that fear,

  • because in going after,

  • China takes advantage of the open source information,

  • but essentially the free and open access information in the United States.

  • So if the government tries to stop that,

  • it's almost like they're trying to stop

  • free and open access to information,

  • which is at the core ...

  • is one of the cores of our society.

  • Right.

  • It's a core value.

  • And I would argue that we want to maintain openness.

  • We want to maintain our liberties.

  • That's what makes this country almost unique

  • among other countries is our Constitution,

  • the Bill of Rights and the privacy rights,

  • which we enjoy.

  • Albeit, some would argue,

  • I would argue that many of the Bill of Rights provisions

  • of being chipped away now, unfortunately.

  • But we do want to continue to enjoy them best we can.

  • And so it's a balancing act.

  • To what extent do we maintain openness

  • and at the same time protect national security.

  • And I think a lot has to involve ethical behavior

  • by our counter intelligence services

  • and our intelligence gathering services

  • and regulations legislation,

  • which is designed or tailored to safeguard our country.

  • And at the same time, safeguard our liberties.

  • So what are some of the ways the FBI

  • is trying to counter Chinese espionage operations?

  • Or is that too classified?

  • I mean, I think the best way to address

  • that is to just refer to the FBI's techniques in general

  • to counter the intelligence activities of hostile countries.

  • And I would suggest that they're not country-specific necessarily.

  • So the techniques that the Bureau uses are ...

  • to fight Soviet, or not Soviet,

  • to fight Russian intelligence activities

  • or Cuban intelligence activities or Chinese intelligence activities,

  • are essentially ... in the unclassified sense,

  • are pretty much the same techniques.

  • There may be, depending on the techniques

  • being used by the hostile power,

  • they may be fine tuning so that

  • they are adapted to that particular country.

  • But overall it's not like it's a whole different bag of tricks

  • for each different country.

  • For example, I worked a number of cases

  • and they're discussed in some of the chapters in my book

  • as an undercover agent, I worked false flag operations.

  • Now, false flag operations are directed against

  • any number of hostile type of intelligence activities.

  • And they're not country-specific.

  • And the way a false flag operation works essentially

  • is just to briefly summarize,

  • because I don't think that this is popular,

  • known to a large extent,

  • is when an individual is identified who wants to sell

  • or transfer classified information

  • to another country's intelligence service.

  • So it could be to China,

  • to the Chinese intelligence,

  • it could be to Russian intelligence,

  • but they're trying to sell it.

  • So the individuals identified,

  • let's say he is a nuclear engineer

  • at a facility that does research,

  • that does classified research

  • or perhaps an Army Colonel

  • who has access to classified military intelligence.

  • Then he or she reaches out through some tech,

  • perhaps let's say to a friend,

  • do you know anyone in X capital of X country

  • who might be interested in buying this information?

  • And the source then instead of going to someone in that country

  • comes to the FBI and says,

  • "Hey, do you know that professor so-and-so

  • or Colonel so-and-so, or engineer so-and-so

  • is seeking to sell secrets to whoever."

  • And then the espionage unit at FBI headquarters

  • would then reach out to me and say,

  • "Marc, we need you to reach out to this individual."

  • And we very quickly set up an operation

  • where I would pretend to be an intelligence officer

  • working on behalf of that country.

  • Now, depending on the country,

  • I could say that I'm either from that country

  • or if it's obviously I'm not from that country-

  • Like China.

  • Yeah, right.

  • But I could be working for

  • the intelligence service of another country on behalf as a proxy,

  • on behalf of China or wherever.

  • And then it's a hostile operating environment here

  • so they can't send somebody out.

  • But they've asked my country to send out someone in their stead,

  • and I'm ... you are so important and stroking the individual,

  • you are so important that they've sent me,

  • a very high level intelligence officer in my country,

  • to make contact with you and establish a relationship.

  • And these cases were very sensitive because,

  • and they needed someone who by this point

  • I had a lot of experience doing this kind of work,

  • because the first contact was critical.

  • If the individual,

  • the future trader didn't believe that

  • I was who I was claiming to be,

  • that would be the end.

  • It would be shut down.

  • There'd be no second chance,

  • no second bite at the apple.

  • So these were, but once they bit,

  • then we would develop a whole clandestine system

  • for them to transfer information to me.

  • It was something, again,

  • straight out of a John Le Carre or Tom Clancy type thing

  • with dead drops and whatever

  • to make them feel they were really working in clandestine activity.

  • And then they would transfer,

  • we would pay them, they would transfer ...

  • that's what they wanted, was money,

  • it was not ideological,

  • but often most of the time there was money being paid.

  • And then once they were believing

  • they were transferring information to a hostile power.

  • It's actually us who's collecting it.

  • And then at the end of the day,

  • the handcuffs come on and usually lengthy prison terms.

  • Well, so what is the Chinese Communist Party's ultimate goal

  • with these influence operations in the United States?

  • Well, again, now you're calling for speculation as to what, what ...

  • I think that when there's an attempt

  • to influence an outcome of an election,

  • whether through finances,

  • financial contributions or whatever.

  • Presumably, it's being done for a reason.

  • I mean, large quantities of money are not going to be spent

  • unless there's some gain,

  • there's some advantage that is expected to be obtained

  • as a result of that.

  • So yeah, I would suggest, I mean, again and again

  • it's speculation and opinion,

  • but that they're seeking to obtain advantages and leverage

  • in order to expand whatever goals

  • that their central committee has established,

  • be it economic or otherwise.

  • Thanks again for joining me today.

  • It's a pleasure having you on.

  • My pleasure.

Chinese spies are trying to infiltrate the US.

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How the FBI Combats Chinese Spies & “Honey Traps”

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    zijun su に公開 2021 年 06 月 26 日
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