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  • TADGE DRYJA: Today we're going to talk about wallets and SPV.

  • And if you don't know what SPV stands

  • for, that will be defined as well, so don't worry.

  • First, you get your software.

  • That's something of a problem, like how

  • do you know you got the right Bitcoin software,

  • there can be issues there, but anyway--

  • there are multiple implementations that

  • should be consensus compatible.

  • I often use BTCD, which is a version written in Go,

  • but the main implementation is written in c++.

  • So, you get the software, and then

  • you somehow connect to peers in the network,

  • but there's all these asterisks, which

  • mean it's not completely decentralized.

  • You have to find where to get it,

  • you have to find who to connect to.

  • Once you do that, you get all the headers, which

  • are 80 bytes each, you verify all the work,

  • and then you start getting the blocks,

  • looking through the transactions.

  • You replay the history of the last nine years of the coin,

  • and then you arrive at a UTXO set,

  • an unspent transaction output set,

  • and it should be the same as everyone else got.

  • Everyone else has the same headers, the same work,

  • the same transactions.

  • They'll get the same set of which coins are encumbered

  • by which keys as you do.

  • And the idea is it would be very expensive to have

  • different UTXO sets because you'd have to do all that work.

  • So that's how a node works.

  • But what about dealing with actual money?

  • So far, we've just looked at here's

  • how to get your node running, here's

  • how to observe the network and come

  • to the same conclusion as everyone else,

  • but you probably want to actually do something

  • with this.

  • You want to pay people or get paid.

  • Those are the two fundamental functions

  • that this tries to address.

  • So the software that manages this feature is called

  • a wallet, and it's not necessarily

  • the same software as what's connecting to the network,

  • downloading, and verifying.

  • In the case of Bitcoin Core, it is,

  • although many of the programmers of Bitcoin Core wish that it

  • weren't.

  • And there's sort of a long-term goal

  • of, it'd be really great if we could pull these two

  • things apart into maybe separate binaries, separate programs,

  • something.

  • But they're really intertwined, and it's kind of ugly.

  • But there are other things that are separate

  • OK, so wallet software functionality-- seems simple,

  • you send and receive money.

  • Simple.

  • Of course, you need to receive money before you can send it,

  • so let's start with that.

  • OK, so we did not talk about receive addresses.

  • We did talk about the script, and how it's generally

  • used pay to pubkey hash, where you put the hash of your pubkey

  • in your output script, and then in your redeem script,

  • in your input, you put the pubkey

  • itself, which is then checked against the hash,

  • and then the signature is verified.

  • Most likely, if you've looked at Bitcoin at all,

  • you've seen these types of addresses.

  • They usually start with 1, they're a bunch of characters

  • long, a weird mix of lowercase, uppercase, Latin numbers,

  • and letters.

  • There is a standard for converting a 20-byte pubkey

  • hash into this address.

  • So the idea is since almost everything

  • is using the same pubkey hash script,

  • you can forget about the opcodes,

  • like op_dup, op_hash160, op_equalverify

  • because they're always the same.

  • And so it's this standard, like, OK we're just

  • taking that 20-byte hash, and now

  • let's convert it to something hopefully somewhat

  • human readable and writeable so that people can write it down,

  • say it over the phone.

  • This is the one Satoshi made.

  • It's got 58 characters and then the last 4 bytes,

  • which ends up being like 5 or 6 of the letters,

  • is sort of a checksum, where you take

  • the hash of the first however many letters

  • and then that's supposed to like equal to the next one.

  • So, hopefully, if you typed something wrong,

  • it doesn't change the hash and then

  • you send it to the wrong place and then no one has

  • a matching key for that.

  • There's a newer standard for this

  • where all the all the letters are lowercase.

  • That's introduced, actually, today in Bitcoin Core.

  • Version 0.16 came out, and so there's

  • a new standard called Bech32.

  • They did some research, and they found

  • it was actually much faster to transmit over

  • the phone via voice because you didn't

  • have to say whether things were uppercase or lowercase,

  • which ended up being very annoying for people,

  • because, you know, 1 big F, a little f, 1, 2, big E, 4--

  • it's annoying.

  • Anyway, the idea is this is just an encoding

  • of the 20-byte pubkey hash, so when you type this

  • into a program, it reads this, converts it

  • into a 20-byte hash, builds the output script.

  • OK, so the outputs are all the same.

  • So this is sort of like a UI thing.

  • The addresses don't really exist at the protocol level.

  • Any questions about addresses?

  • OK.

  • We're not going to put--

  • UI and usability is super important, but not

  • the focus yet of what we're doing.

  • The idea, in a lot of cases, is you

  • want to receive money and know that you received it,

  • or somehow interact with people over computers,

  • and you could put a bunch of addresses on a server,

  • but keep your private keys offline.

  • Because if you keep both your public key and your private key

  • on the same computer, that's kind of an attractive target

  • for someone to break into your system because they say,

  • oh, this guy's running Bitcoin and he's accepting payments.

  • There might be a bunch of money in this computer

  • if I can get into it.

  • I can take all the money.

  • So one issue that people ran up against pretty early is--

  • well, let's say I generate 10 keys--

  • 10 private keys, 10 public keys, 10 addresses.

  • I put them on the server, then I run out.

  • And I can reuse addresses, but that can hurt privacy

  • because people can then see that the same people are

  • using these keys.

  • So is there any clever way we can generate pubkeys

  • without the private key?

  • Is there, given all the fun key stuff we've talked about,

  • can anyone think of any clever ways to do that?

  • OK, well pretty straightforward.

  • This is called BIP32, Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 32.

  • This is a super-simplified version,

  • but this is the basic idea of what they do,

  • and they do it much more involved and complicated.

  • But basically, you've got your public key P--

  • big P-- and some kind of randomized data--

  • randomizer data, r and your private key is just little p.

  • So the idea is you want to send to an address,

  • you want to generate a new address.

  • Well, it's just your public key plus the hash of r concatenated

  • with 1 times G. And if you wanted to make this 2, 3,

  • you can make this any number you want.

  • And then your private key is just

  • going to be that same public key plus the hash of r.

  • So you give someone some extra data,

  • which they can throw into a hash function.

  • Use this as a known private key and you add it

  • to your private key.

  • So no one just knowing this data can spend from it.

  • That's really nice because then the server

  • can generate arbitrary numbers.

  • Does this make sense?

  • AUDIENCE: What's the difference big A and a?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Oh, yes.

  • So in the last one, big A is a public key.

  • It's a point on the curve.

  • Little a is the private key.

  • I screwed that up.

  • That does not have a G. So G is the generator for the group.

  • G is how you convert from a private key to a public key.

  • You just multiply by G, which is just an arbitrary point.

  • Yes.

  • AUDIENCE: So your private key doesn't change?

  • TADGE DRYJA: So in this case, there's two private keys.

  • There's your standard private key

  • that you actually just randomly created-- this number p,

  • multiply it by G, to get big P. But your private key

  • for any particular address does change.

  • You're adding the hash of r, 1 or r, 2, r,3.

  • Yes?

  • AUDIENCE: Assuming the size of r is relatively small

  • compared to p because don't you have to keep

  • track of the nonce?

  • TADGE DRYJA: R should be, like, 32 bytes or something.

  • You know, you don't want any--

  • AUDIENCE: Do you have to start with it every time that you

  • create a new hash code?

  • TADGE DRYJA: You sort of don't.

  • What you can do is, you have your server.

  • You say, hey, I'm going to accept

  • payments for cookies or shoes or whatever I'm selling.

  • And then you give the server your public key, P,

  • and the randomizer r, and you just say to the server,

  • go wild, make whatever number you want here.

  • This number should be fairly small,

  • let's say less than a billion.

  • And then when you want to find how much you've gotten paid,

  • well, you can generate a billion private keys here--

  • some reasonable number that the computer can actually do it--

  • and you could just increment this,

  • generate a ton of addresses, and look for them

  • on the blockchain.

  • So does that makes sense at all?

  • BIP32 is actually quite a bit more involved and complicated.

  • This is the basic idea, but they make trees of it,

  • and you can say, oh, well, we can make instead

  • of just one level, we can make a whole tree of these things,

  • and have different accounts, and make

  • a really full-featured system in case people

  • want to use this kind of thing.

  • So you can put the public key and this random data

  • on the server.

  • The server can make addresses as needed, really quickly.

  • And what's nice is observers can't link these addresses.

  • If you're just looking at the blockchain,

  • you won't see the difference between a sub 1 and a sub 2,

  • if this number and 1 and 2 because it's

  • going through this hash function, you never see that.

  • To an observer, it looks like all completely different

  • addresses.

  • And if someone hacks into the server

  • and finds this P point, and this r randomizer, well,

  • that will allow them to link everything.

  • Now they can see-- oh, we can also

  • generate all these addresses.

  • We can see that it's all the same person.

  • But that doesn't let them steal any of the funds.

  • So compromising the server with this, well,

  • you lose the privacy, but you don't lose your money,

  • so that's a pretty good trade.

  • Other questions about BIP32?

  • So that's one of the features for wallets.

  • You've got to do this.

  • The basic procedure-- you're going to request a payment.

  • And you're going to say, hey, if you want this jacket, send

  • one coin to address F8f12E.

  • And it's sort of important to note that Bitcoin doesn't solve

  • the problem of people paying money and not

  • getting what they paid for.

  • That's out of the scope of this, although there's

  • a lot of people that say it should,

  • but know it doesn't do fraud protection.

  • It's like, hey, I gave you the coin,

  • you didn't give me the jacket.

  • Well, Bitcoin worked fine.

  • Bitcoin made the coin move.

  • That's Bitcoin's job.

  • The fact that FedEx never delivered your jacket,

  • well, that's FedEx or the retailer

  • or all sorts of things like that.

  • You know, I don't want to say it's not a problem.

  • It certainly is, but it is seen as out of scope.

  • It's, like, you know-- this is a money system.

  • This is money.

  • Your dollar bills don't ensure that you're

  • getting what you paid for.

  • That said, there's all sorts of things

  • that do this kind of thing, and do try to ensure delivery

  • versus payment--

  • atomic swaps, HTLCs that we'll talk about later,

  • Zero-Knowledge Contingent Proof--

  • all these different things do sort of work on top of Bitcoin

  • to try to help these kinds of things.

  • In practice, though, if you're actually

  • buying a physical jacket that someone's

  • going to deliver to you, there's not really

  • a good cryptographic proof of jacket delivery.

  • So some reputation is involved.

  • Then, from the merchant's perspective--

  • so, I sell jackets.

  • I want to know if someone paid me.

  • I have something on the website, put in your address,

  • now pay this address.

  • So you add all your pubkey hashes

  • to a big list in your software.

  • You say, OK, here's all the addresses I've created.

  • They're all these 20-byte pubkey hashes.

  • I put them in a map or some kind of array or some database,

  • whatever.

  • And from then on, every transaction I

  • see on the network, I also look at the output scripts.

  • So before, when I was verifying the blockchain,

  • I actually never had to look at the output scripts

  • until they got spent.

  • So when I was downloading transactions,

  • I would look at their signatures and look

  • at the old UTXOs in the UTXO set and match them up and verify.

  • But where the money got sent in these new transactions,

  • I didn't really care.

  • It could have been sending it to zero.

  • It could have been sending it to some weird address that

  • probably was wrong.

  • There was no-- and I believe to this day,

  • there's still no output validation

  • that happens in Bitcoin as a consensus rule

  • because it's not important.

  • Where are you sending the money?

  • Well, wherever you want.

  • And are you able to spend it?

  • We'll deal with that later.

  • If you want to destroy your money, fine.

  • I'm not going to look at the output.

  • There's no invalid output.

  • There can be an invalid input, which--

  • there can be an output which you can never actually use,

  • but you're free to send to it.

  • So that's sort of one of the rules in Bitcoin.

  • However, when we're actually looking

  • at our own money with the wallet,

  • we do look at the output scripts, mainly to say, hey,

  • is this ours?

  • Are we getting paid with this transaction?

  • So you look at every output script,

  • and if you see one that matches, hey, we got paid.

  • So you see a transaction, one of the outputs--

  • hey, look, that 20 bytes-- that's me.

  • Cool.

  • That's one of the addresses that I have,

  • let me keep track of this.

  • This is now money that's in my wallet.

  • So you keep track of the received payments,

  • you save them to disk in a similar way to your addresses.

  • You use some kind of database or map or something,

  • something efficient.

  • And then you don't need to save too much information.

  • You need to save the outpoint, the txid

  • of the transaction, the index.

  • You probably want to save how much, your amount, and which

  • key it was, so the actual 20-byte pubkey hash.

  • You can look through all your keys,

  • but it might be nice-- oh, that's my 17th key

  • that I've saved in my database or something.

  • You may also want to save the height information, when

  • it got confirmed.

  • So we're not going to talk too much about unconfirmed versus

  • confirmed today, but this can be an issue

  • if you see a transaction on the network that's not yet

  • in a block and it pays you.

  • You're like, hey, I got money, but it's not confirmed yet,

  • so have I really gotten money?

  • I am able to use that output to spend somewhere else,

  • but now I've got two change transactions, neither of which

  • is confirmed.

  • And now the second one can only be

  • confirmed if the first one is, so that

  • can get ugly kind of quick.

  • For simplicity's sake, let's just

  • say that you wait until it's in a block

  • before your wallet recognizes it.

  • Most wallets do not do that, but most wallets maybe should.

  • There can be a lot of weird attacks

  • where you say, oh, I got money, and then

  • since it never really was confirmed at all,

  • it's pretty easy for someone to double spend.

  • The whole point of the Bitcoin system

  • was you can't double spend because it's

  • got all this proof of work on top of it.

  • It's in a block.

  • But if we show in the UI, hey you got a payment that has not

  • yet gone into a block, well, there's

  • no assurance that it won't be double spent yet, because it's

  • not in the blockchain.

  • But most wallets will show that and usually they'll

  • make it in like red, or put a little exclamation point

  • or something to try to indicate, hey, this is unconfirmed,

  • but that doesn't always get across to people.

  • So it may be safer to just not show it at all

  • until it's in the block.

  • OK, so you amass all these you UTXOs,

  • you're running your node, you've got all these addresses you've

  • given out to people, and then every transaction

  • that comes in you look-- hey, do any of these pay me?

  • And sometimes you'll find one that does, which is great.

  • And then you save that to your disk and, great.

  • Now, next, I want to spend them.

  • OK, any questions about the getting money procedure?

  • Yes.

  • AUDIENCE: So, what's the height again?

  • TADGE DRYJA: The height is what block it's in,

  • so height zero is the first block, zero block,

  • and we're now at height 500,000.

  • Usually, in diagrams, it goes this way,

  • but I guess it could go up in numbers, I don't know.

  • Yeah, so next, you need to spend them.

  • Spending makes sense, right?

  • It's not too crazy.

  • Let's say you want to send six coins to someone.

  • So what you do is, you look through your set of UTXOs

  • that are your UTXOs, and you try to find some such

  • that the total number of coins is over six,

  • and then you use them as inputs, and then you add your outputs.

  • So, for example, I've got two UTXOs.

  • These are much smaller numbers, but this one

  • has five coins in it and this one has three coins.

  • So I received, at two different times,

  • once I got five coins for a fancy jacket,

  • once I got three coins for a less fancy jacket.

  • And now I want to buy something, and I want to send it to Bob,

  • and I want to send six coins.

  • Well, I've got eight coins in my inputs,

  • so I'll send him six coins.

  • There's two coins leftover.

  • If I don't have this, it just goes to the miners,

  • so I create my new output, which is my change output.

  • And then I send the remainder, two coins here.

  • Now, if it's actually these nice, round numbers,

  • the fee would be zero and it would probably not

  • get confirmed on the Bitcoin network.

  • You do have to have a small fee right now.

  • It's really small, like a couple of cents now.

  • It was pretty high a few months ago.

  • But this will work.

  • This is the basic idea.

  • So, you look through your UTXOs, find

  • some, OK, output six, output two, sign them.

  • Once you've built this, sign it all, broadcast to the network.

  • Make sense?

  • Yes.

  • AUDIENCE: Is the change UTXO, like, your own?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yep.

  • Yep.

  • Generally, what you'll do is, you'll make a new private key,

  • calculate the public key, hash it, make this address,

  • and then add it in here, all automatically.

  • You can, and some software does, just

  • only use one key and one address,

  • and so it'll be pretty clear because the keys

  • for this signature will be the same as this key

  • that it's sending to, and so then it's really clear.

  • Even without doing that, it's usually pretty clear

  • and people can sort of guess, well, either Alice

  • is sending six coins back to herself and two coins to Bob,

  • or she's sending six coins to Bob and two back to herself.

  • Or maybe six coins to one person, two coins

  • to someone else entirely.

  • That's pretty unlikely.

  • Usually, metrics will try to analyze the transaction graph,

  • and say, oh, the smaller outputs are usually the payments

  • and the larger ones are the change,

  • but you don't know if the addresses are all different.

  • Yes?

  • AUDIENCE: How does the fee get paid again?

  • TADGE DRYJA: The fee is the difference

  • between the inputs amounts and the output amounts.

  • So, in this case, the fee is zero

  • because I got 5, 3, 8, and then 8 here.

  • So, really, what you do in real life is, you'd make this 1.999

  • and then the fee would be that 0.001, or whatever

  • that the miner gets in the coinbase transaction.

  • That's another way to try to identify change outputs.

  • If you actually had 5, 3, 6, and 1.999,

  • I bet the 1.999 is going back to yourself.

  • Nice, even, round numbers seem like real payments.

  • And then if you've got one bunch of nines at the end,

  • oh, that was probably just reduced a little

  • to make the fee.

  • But these are all guesses.

  • If you're a third party observer looking at a transaction,

  • you don't know.

  • This could be two different people,

  • or this could be an exchange and it's hard to tell,

  • but you can get some pretty good guesses.

  • Yes?

  • AUDIENCE: In terms of fees, so if you have no fee

  • or you had a really small fee and buyers

  • are requiring something higher, that just

  • sits on everyone's computer.

  • They still share with each other or do they sit there

  • until maybe there's a block?

  • TADGE DRYJA: There are multiple thresholds.

  • So, there's the relay threshold, which right now I

  • believe Bitcoin is one Satoshi per byte.

  • So, I think we said Satoshis are the smallest

  • unit possible in Bitcoin.

  • So one coin is actually 100 million Satoshis--

  • and there's no decimal places, that's just a UI thing.

  • So right now, the minimum relay fee, by default,

  • is 1 Satoshi per byte.

  • So for a 250-byte transaction, you need 250 Satoshis,

  • which is some fraction of a cent--

  • maybe more than a cent now, I'm not sure.

  • And then the idea is if you see a transaction below that,

  • you won't even relay it to anyone else.

  • You'll be like, this is so cheap that I'm not

  • going to bother sending it to everyone else.

  • I'm just going to ignore it.

  • But above that 1 Satoshi threshold,

  • you will accept it, verify the signatures,

  • and then pass it on to everyone else you're connected to.

  • But that doesn't necessarily mean it will get into a block

  • anytime soon.

  • It's actually been really interesting the last,

  • I'd say six months, where the fees went up enormously

  • and you see this really crazy price inelasticity,

  • where people who were paying one cent then

  • started paying 10 cents, a dollar, $10, $20.

  • And what's also sort of optimistic--

  • that made me feel good-- it's like, well,

  • clearly they were getting 20 bucks worth of utility

  • out of this because they're now perfectly

  • willing to pay 20 bucks and they were paying one cent

  • a few weeks ago.

  • That's kind of weird.

  • And then it's now gone back down to, like, one cent.

  • But it's very inelastic in that there's

  • a fixed size for how many transactions

  • you can have per minute or per hour

  • and when people really want to get in there,

  • they have to just bid everyone else out.

  • So we'll talk about the fee markets in a few weeks,

  • and replace by fee.

  • That's sort of a new evolving thing,

  • but it's been really interesting to see in the last few months

  • how it's changed.

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: At $10,000 per Bitcoin,

  • a Satoshi is 0.01 cent, a hundredth--

  • TADGE DRYJA: Tenth of a cent.

  • AUDIENCE: Hundredth of a cent.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Hundredth of a cent.

  • OK.

  • So, the minimum relay fee would be more like 2 and 1/2 cents.

  • So that's-- you know, it's not zero.

  • That's still-- a fee, right?

  • And you get enough of those and you start making money.

  • But it's also interesting recently, it

  • used to be that the initial new coins coming out to miners

  • was just overwhelmingly the majority of what

  • they had earned and people would ignore fees as a miner.

  • But then, in December, January, I

  • believe miners made more money in fees than in new coins being

  • generated.

  • I'm not sure if that averages out.

  • There were definitely weeks where

  • that was the case, or at least days,

  • I'm not sure if it's average or the whole month.

  • But if you-- total aside, sorry, but this guy's site

  • is a cool way to look at the fees.

  • So you can see here's--

  • he sort of organizes transactions by fee rate.

  • It's too low-res to really get everything,

  • but if you just search for Johoe--

  • J-O-H-O-E-- he works on Bitcoin stuff and he made this cool

  • site, which is open source and you could even run it

  • on your own node if you wanted to, and generate the same cool

  • JavaScript color-y things and you can see the fee market.

  • And I'm not an economist, but it is really interesting

  • seeing there's clearly market failures occurring here

  • in that--

  • so, you can pay the green--

  • you can pay 10 Satoshis per byte,

  • and you'll get confirmed in 10 minutes.

  • Or you can pay 1,000 Satoshis per byte,

  • and you will also get confirmed in 10 minutes.

  • And most people are paying 10, but someone's paying 1,000.

  • You know, it's got the whole spectrum.

  • You've got multiple orders of magnitude

  • of people paying for the exact same thing,

  • and they can all see each other.

  • It's just a weird sort of--

  • seems broken.

  • And part of it is just the cost to write the software.

  • If you're an exchange and everyone's

  • sending you support requests, and this happens--

  • OK, I don't know just, pay a 500 Satoshi per byte fee--

  • and then it seems to work.

  • And, yeah, we're losing a couple of thousand bucks a day,

  • but let's just not deal with that.

  • And I think that's part of it, is

  • that there's a lot of software out there

  • that just has a fixed fee rate, or even a fixed fee,

  • regardless of how big the transaction is.

  • There's a lot of software that, years ago, wouldn't

  • have to deal with this issue because there wasn't really

  • competition to get into a block, and now they do.

  • So it's kind of cool to look at and see the history of it.

  • But I'll get into depth of fees and stuff in, I think,

  • two weeks or something.

  • OK, any questions about--

  • yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: What was that website again?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Well, it's in some Dutch, or something.

  • Just search J-O-H-O-E, Johoe.

  • He's the guy.

  • It's the first thing on Google.

  • J-O-H-O-E is his Dutch nickname, or something, I don't know.

  • He's a cool guy.

  • He actually-- I think I talked-- did

  • I talk-- there was some randomness

  • problems at some site.

  • He stole a bunch of Bitcoins and gave them back to their owners.

  • He found there was a K reuse, like nonce reuse

  • vulnerability in some wallets.

  • And so he's like, hey, look, there's like 100 Bitcoins

  • that I can just take because I can calculate the private key.

  • And he took them, and he was like, I

  • think I know who these are and can you prove it,

  • and then I'll give them back?

  • So he sort of grabbed-- you know, finding a wallet with,

  • like, thousands of dollars coming out of it on the street,

  • he grabbed them all and tried to get them back to people.

  • I don't know the guy.

  • I've never met him but seems like a nice guy.

  • Anyway.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • That's how Bitcoin works.

  • You don't meet anyone, but you see these people--

  • oh he's a nice guy.

  • Oh, he's a jerk.

  • The weekend was kind of interesting over Twitter,

  • but anyway--

  • AUDIENCE: I saw that.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah.

  • OK, so you build these transactions.

  • There are issues here.

  • Two inputs, two outputs-- that's going to be kind of big.

  • You're going to have two different signatures.

  • It's going to be a little bit higher fee.

  • What would work better than this?

  • It's kind of a silly question.

  • What would work better than having

  • two inputs and two outputs to make this transaction

  • to pay someone six coins?

  • Yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: Maybe if you wanted to have an anonymous transaction

  • doing something like multiple transactions in smaller sizes?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Sure.

  • Yeah, that's-- you could send-- so, that's actually two slides

  • from now.

  • The next slide was just, well, what

  • if you had a UTXO that was exactly the right size?

  • Then it's easy.

  • You just send them the six coins.

  • If you have the exact right size UTXO in your wallet, great.

  • You just send it over.

  • It's like if you go to a shop and they're like, OK,

  • that's $10 for lunch.

  • You're like, great, I have a $10 bill.

  • Here it is.

  • We don't need to deal with pennies and quarters and stuff.

  • It's annoying.

  • So sometimes this happens.

  • It's great.

  • Generally, it won't.

  • Generally, you will have change and multiple inputs and outputs

  • and it's kind of annoying.

  • So coin selection is a tricky problem.

  • For CSE terms it's NP-hard, actually,

  • but there's heuristics that work OK.

  • If you have a ton of UTXOs and you

  • have to send these payments, you can actually,

  • in a reasonable amount of time, calculate the optimal way

  • to do it.

  • But there's some heuristics at work,

  • and the question is what are we optimizing for?

  • Generally, you want to optimize--

  • minimize the number of inputs used.

  • The inputs are much bigger, they're

  • going to be like a hundred something bytes,

  • and the outputs are pretty small,

  • they're like 20-30 bytes.

  • So if you want to minimize size of your transaction,

  • minimize the number of inputs, which is easy.

  • You just pick your biggest UTXO and spend that one.

  • Yes?

  • AUDIENCE: Isn't it like the knapsack problem, though?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah, it basically is, yeah.

  • Well, because it's multi-iteration,

  • if you're just trying to optimize your transaction right

  • now, you just use your biggest UTXO.

  • So for example, it's sort of the analogy of you're

  • at a checkout counter and someone says,

  • OK, that's $12.93.

  • If you want to minimize the number of bills

  • you're handing to the cashier, you just

  • take the 100 out of your wallet.

  • That'll always work.

  • You just say, I take my biggest bill, hand it to you, OK,

  • I'm minimizing the amount of bills I'm handing you

  • in this one transaction.

  • However, that could result in a whole bunch of bills coming

  • back, a bunch of weird change.

  • And then also, long-term that doesn't work.

  • If your strategy is always just hand over the 100,

  • or you go through your wallet and just hand

  • over the biggest bill you have every time,

  • no matter what they ask, that's super suboptimal

  • because if they say $12.93, and you have a 20 and 100

  • and you hand over the 100 like, why did you do that?

  • And then you're going to have four 20s.

  • So, it's very similar to that, except now

  • that the change and bills have arbitrary denominations.

  • There isn't a fixed--

  • you have 100s, 50s, 20s, 10s, 5s.

  • Now it can be any number.

  • So if you're just looking at one time,

  • just pick your biggest UTXO, you'll

  • have the smallest transaction.

  • But you want to minimize next time,

  • so you ideally can eliminate the change output

  • and get you a perfect target.

  • It's actually really complicated.

  • There's really cool research on how do we

  • select coins for long term?

  • Yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: So why don't you just take the biggest

  • UTXO that's larger--

  • or, the smallest UTXO that's larger than your output size?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yep, that can work.

  • That's not-- that's a good heuristic.

  • That's a good-- pretty easy to code, sort your UTXOs,

  • go here, use that one.

  • It's not really optimal because then--

  • it's a lot better than taking big ones--

  • what do I have in my wallet?

  • So I've actually written an SPV wallet and all this stuff

  • just from scratch, and it's kind of interesting.

  • You learn a lot about how it works.

  • I target two inputs instead of one,

  • because then eventually-- if you do that, what will happen

  • is you're going to be using one input, which is great,

  • and then you're going to run out of big inputs.

  • And then you're going to always have to use two or three,

  • and you can get a lot of dust.

  • Dust is like the colloquial term for really small UTXOs, where

  • you've got a bunch of pennies.

  • So that's one issue.

  • Another issue is privacy concerns.

  • When you use two UTXOs or have two inputs

  • in the same transaction, that's linking those transactions,

  • linking those two UTXOs.

  • It's not definitive.

  • You can interactively create transactions with other people.

  • In practice, that doesn't happen.

  • You could say, hey, I want to pay Alice five coins,

  • and you want to pay Bob six coins,

  • and let's put my two UTXOs and your two UTXOs

  • and we'll pay these two people, and we'll put our own change

  • outputs, and we'll sort of mix this transaction together

  • and we'll all sign it.

  • And you can do that securely since you only

  • sign when it all looks right to you,

  • and everyone only signs when it's done.

  • But the coordination problem is pretty severe.

  • You have to find other people who want to make transactions

  • at the same time that you do.

  • It's annoying.

  • So, in practice, since you're just using your wallet,

  • if you see a transaction with multiple inputs,

  • you can you can surmise, OK, those

  • are the same person or the same company.

  • And if you want privacy, if you want maximum anonymity

  • what kind of coin selection or payment strategy would you use?

  • AUDIENCE: Would you make just a bunch of transactions?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah.

  • If someone says, hey, pay me six coins,

  • well I have these three inputs, and I'm

  • paying you two coins here and one coin here,

  • and three coins here.

  • And I paid you six coins but in three completely separate

  • transactions.

  • That no one does either because it's annoying.

  • You could.

  • It would be the most anonymous, but even then,

  • what if they all happened at the same time,

  • and you see they all get in the same block?

  • And you're like, OK, well they're

  • not linked nearly as closely, but I

  • am seeing that these three transactions happened

  • temporally similar times.

  • So there's all sorts of things to try to optimize for.

  • OK, any other questions about-- yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: So does this mean that every time people are going

  • to have a smaller and smaller split of a Bitcoin

  • in their wallets?

  • They're just going to have smaller and smaller amounts

  • because you're going to-- if you have a $100 bill

  • and then you're paying $20, then you're going

  • to get four other $20 bills.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Eventually you're just going to have smaller

  • and smaller-- is that a fair implication, or--

  • TADGE DRYJA: OK, short-term, yes.

  • If you start out with a bunch of coins then start using it, yes.

  • But it does reach equilibrium in that

  • let's say you've got all these little tiny outputs--

  • you've got all these $1 bills--

  • but then you need to buy something that is 20 bucks.

  • You have 20 inputs and one output.

  • And whoever you're sending to now gets that one big output.

  • And so, yeah, if you graph that over time,

  • initially everyone was getting--

  • all their outputs were 50 coins each

  • because that's how you mined them.

  • And now they're getting smaller, but there

  • is sort of an equilibrium after you've used it for a while.

  • Any other questions about sort of coin selection,

  • UTXO selection?

  • Yes.

  • AUDIENCE: According to a news report,

  • I guess if you [INAUDIBLE] transaction,

  • you also have [INAUDIBLE] transactions.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah, yeah.

  • So that's costly.

  • That's another reason probably people don't do this.

  • I think the biggest reason is it's just annoying to code,

  • and you can have failures where like--

  • here, give me six coins.

  • OK, I'll give you 3, 2, and 1.

  • Oh, the 3 didn't work, but the 2 and 1 did.

  • Well, now what do we do?

  • You paid me half of it.

  • It's nice to have all or nothing payments.

  • And also we have to send different addresses.

  • There's all sorts of things.

  • Also, it will be higher fees.

  • In practice, it's actually not much higher.

  • Let's say having three one input, one output transactions

  • versus one three input, three output transaction--

  • you don't save too much space.

  • Most of the space is taken by the inputs.

  • And the overhead for a transaction

  • is only 10 or 20 bytes or something,

  • so it is not a huge difference.

  • The main difference is that you're never

  • coalescing into larger output sizes,

  • so you're going to always have to sign since you going

  • to have more inputs overall.

  • This is a really, kind of, cool problem.

  • There's a lot of computer science-y stuff

  • but a lot of heuristics and how people use it.

  • Also, the fact that fees are variable over time

  • means you might want different strategies when fees are

  • low versus when fees are high.

  • So when fees are low now, I should make--

  • or maybe I just make a transaction to myself

  • where I condense all my little $2 outputs into one big $1,000

  • output so that when, later on, if fees are higher,

  • I want to spend my money, I can do so more efficiently.

  • And there is evidence of this with exchanges and stuff

  • where a lot of times fees will be lower on the weekends

  • because people aren't buying and spending Bitcoin as much,

  • I guess.

  • And so certain companies would say, OK, over the weekends

  • we're going to sort of condense all our UTXOs and combine them

  • and then we can make smaller transactions during the week.

  • So there's all sorts of cool strategies here.

  • It's an interesting topic.

  • I haven't gone super in-depth, but the guys that chain code

  • work on it.

  • There's a lot of discussion about it, so it's kind of cool.

  • OK, I'm a little bit behind.

  • OK, next we'll talk about losing money,

  • and that's another really important part

  • of detecting the blockchain.

  • It's hard to do, but you have to detect when you've lost money.

  • And it's tricky because just because you

  • signed the transaction doesn't really mean your money is gone.

  • You can't just unilaterally say, OK, well, I'm making this.

  • I signed it.

  • There, my money is gone from my wallet.

  • Well, not necessarily.

  • Maybe this never gets confirmed.

  • So maybe you still have that money.

  • So you broadcast it, but you sort of

  • have to wait until it gets into a block,

  • and you also need to listen for your own UTXOs,

  • even if you haven't made a transaction,

  • and see if they've gotten spent.

  • And why would that be?

  • Can anyone think of a reason why?

  • I haven't signed anything, as far as my program is concerned,

  • but I might lose money anyway.

  • Why would that be?

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Well, one reason is you get hacked.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Sure, you get hacked.

  • That's the bad reason.

  • A good reason is, well maybe you have the same wallet

  • on multiple computers.

  • You've got the same keys.

  • So, getting hacked is sort of a malicious instance

  • of this problem where I thought the wallet was only

  • on my computer, but actually, someone else has a copy.

  • But even non-maliciously, I've got a copy on my phone

  • and I've got a copy on my computer.

  • It's the same addresses, the same keys, the same UTXOs.

  • That's totally doable.

  • And then when I spend money with my phone and get to my desktop,

  • my desktop needs to sort of download

  • and see oh, money got-- you know, you lost money.

  • And it's like, oh, yeah, yeah, I remember spending that.

  • So you can have that over multiple computers.

  • So if you're designing wallet software,

  • you do definitely need to make sure

  • that even if it's unexpected from the wallet itself,

  • and it doesn't seem like I generated a transaction,

  • there can still be a transaction taking your money away.

  • Wallets without Bitcoin, and that's sort of a cheeky phrase.

  • OK, I don't mean they don't have any Bitcoins in their wallets,

  • I mean they're not running Bitcoin in the same sense

  • that we've talked of.

  • So we talked about running Bitcoin where you download

  • the software, you get the headers,

  • you verify all the signatures, you build the UTXO set.

  • Can you use Bitcoin without doing this?

  • What do you guys think?

  • What's a simple way to possibly use Bitcoin

  • without having to do all these things?

  • So, a really, really simple way?

  • If you don't want to do work, what's

  • the simplest way to not have to do work?

  • Get someone else to do it, right.

  • So, for example, my dad has Bitcoin,

  • but he just gives it-- he's like, you deal with it.

  • So I've got a couple of Bitcoins that's

  • my dad's, and I have to make sure like,

  • no, this is not my money.

  • Yeah, get someone else to do it, right?

  • So that's what we're going to talk about, the different ways

  • to get someone else to do this.

  • And what we called before, running Bitcoin,

  • many now call a "full node."

  • And there's also the idea of a "light node" or "SPV node,"

  • which we'll talk about.

  • Some people don't really like this distinction,

  • and it's like, well, wait.

  • Full node is running Bitcoin.

  • These other things, we shouldn't have to call it a full node.

  • We should just call this a Bitcoin node

  • and these other things are not quite there.

  • I will prefix there's a lot of argument

  • about terms in this space.

  • So there's some people who say, SPV doesn't exist.

  • And other people, this isn't SPV.

  • So people argue about the words.

  • It's not like we have really nice, definitive terms.

  • I'm generally trying to use the most widely used terms,

  • but there's probably people who will take issue

  • with it, so sorry.

  • So, SPV is sort of a step down below running a full node

  • in terms of security.

  • It's called Simplified Payment Verification.

  • It's written up in the white paper on how to do it.

  • And you can verify all the work without doing

  • too much signature verification or having too much data.

  • So the basic idea is you're optimizing

  • for not having to download as much

  • and not having to store as much at the cost of some security,

  • and I'll talk about those costs.

  • OK, so before we have this list of what you do for a full node,

  • the SPV method is a bit different.

  • You still do the same part in the beginning.

  • You connect, you get your headers,

  • you verify all the work.

  • OK, cool.

  • The next step, you tell another node

  • that you're connected to all of your addresses,

  • all of the public keys that you've ever generated.

  • You tell it to them.

  • Then, for each header you go through--

  • and instead of downloading the whole block

  • and getting all the transactions and verifying them,

  • you ask the other node, hey, did I get any money,

  • or did I lose any money in this block

  • because I've told you all my addresses?

  • Oh, sorry.

  • You also tell them all your UTXOs.

  • You also tell him, here's all the money I have,

  • here's all the addresses I could possibly receive money on,

  • did I get or lose any money in this block?

  • And then they will return to you a Merkle proof

  • of the transactions where they think,

  • yeah, you got some money here, or yeah,

  • you lost some money here, and you can verify this.

  • Yes?

  • AUDIENCE: What's the other nodes' incentive

  • to respond to you?

  • TADGE DRYJA: There is none.

  • You're not paying them.

  • They don't know who you are.

  • There's sort of a meta incentive in that

  • I run a node that will provide these Merkle

  • proofs because it's like, well, it helps Bitcoin,

  • and maybe if I have some Bitcoin and I'm

  • helping other people use it, my Bitcoin will be worth more.

  • But that's a pretty diffuse sort of thing.

  • And it can be problematic because some of these things--

  • I didn't mention that in these slides, but the server side can

  • get a little bit costly in terms of CPU

  • because you're potentially--

  • as a server-- the client requests hey,

  • here's this block.

  • Can you filter it for me, find things that I'm looking for.

  • So now you have to load that block into memory,

  • look through it.

  • It's not too CPU intensive, but it can be-- you know,

  • when you have a bunch of them, like 20 or 30 of them

  • connecting to you--

  • I've gotten 30%, 40% CPU for doing this kind of thing

  • to serve other users.

  • Most-- almost all phone wallets-- well,

  • many phone wallets and many desktop wallets are using this

  • model, and so you'll see--

  • for example, so here's a full node in this building.

  • I actually rebooted it recently, so there's not

  • very many connections incoming.

  • In practice, these two are actual full nodes, I bet.

  • This is a fake node.

  • This is a fake node.

  • This is-- they're all fake, yeah.

  • Well, sorry-- these are all--

  • no, that one may be not.

  • Well, you can look.

  • But a lot of nodes will say they're nodes and they're not,

  • and they're just trying to track where transactions

  • are coming from and keep track tabs on you and stuff.

  • And these are SPV nodes, these bitcore,

  • because they don't really ask for--

  • I don't know what they're doing.

  • They're not asking for anything.

  • So you can look through all the messages.

  • I think Ethan will talk about this a bit more Wednesday,

  • but there are a lot of SPV nodes.

  • There's a lot of stuff out on the network

  • and you have no idea what it's doing,

  • but it's pretty clearly not running a Bitcoin node.

  • So, yeah so I'll go through these steps a little bit.

  • Oh, yeah.

  • So the Merkle verification we talked about last week, where,

  • if there's a block and there's thousands of transactions in it

  • and this server wants to prove that one of these transactions

  • is yours and is in there, you say, OK, here's my transaction.

  • They just need to provide you this transaction ID, this hash,

  • and then you're able to see, OK, yeah, it was in the header.

  • So my transaction is in there, you're not just making it up.

  • I didn't talk about the good part.

  • Well, the good part is you don't really

  • need to maintain a UTXO set and it's pretty small,

  • so it saves space, saves time.

  • What are the problems?

  • There's a lot, and I definitely admit before writing my own SPV

  • wallet code, I didn't think there

  • were a lot of problems with it.

  • I thought it was like, oh this is SPV, this is cool.

  • This is how wallets work.

  • But when writing the code myself, I'm like wait,

  • this is horrible.

  • What do we do?

  • OK, so the first thing you do is you connect, you get

  • the headers, you verify them.

  • This is exactly the same procedure

  • as what a full node does so there's no difference,

  • it works.

  • No difference there.

  • The next step, you tell a node all of your addresses.

  • What?

  • There goes all your privacy, right,

  • because you're just connecting to a computer.

  • You have no idea who they are, who's running it,

  • and you're telling them hey, here's all of my addresses,

  • and also here's how much money I have.

  • Here's all my UTXOs.

  • You can lie.

  • You can add things that are not--

  • you can also add some addresses that aren't yours,

  • or add some UTXOs that aren't yours,

  • and you'll get some transactions back

  • that you can then filter out on your own.

  • So you can you can raise the rate of false positives

  • for that server.

  • And so there's these Bloom filters that

  • are in the Bitcoin Core code.

  • They said the idea was well, you can sort of

  • dial your own false positive rate.

  • I'm not going to go into Bloom filters work.

  • If you've used those in other classes, cool.

  • But it basically gives some data which

  • allows people to match things.

  • But they don't in practice have good privacy.

  • You can create a Bloom filter where they've

  • got 10% false positive rate.

  • And so when the server says, oh, looks like their transaction,

  • maybe it's not because 10% of the time

  • it's just a false positive.

  • However, when you have really high false positives,

  • you lose all the efficiency savings of SPV

  • and it sort of cascades where you've

  • got these false positives and the server thinks,

  • oh, you got money, but it's a false positive.

  • And they add that "you got money" into the Bloom filter

  • itself and the Bloom filter can really quickly

  • become saturated, and then they just

  • start giving you everything.

  • So in practice, and there's some papers

  • about how the people who put the Bloom filters into Bitcoin

  • thought, oh this is good for privacy, it's fine,

  • and in practice, it really is not good for privacy.

  • So you end up basically telling a node all your addresses.

  • And there's research on how to do this in a better way,

  • and it's one of those kind of things

  • where some random anonymous person with a, I think,

  • inappropriate swear word email address posted to the mailing

  • list and said, hey why don't you guys do it this way?

  • And it was like, oh, yeah, we should

  • have done it that way, oops.

  • The basic idea is instead of creating a Bloom filter

  • as a client sending it to a server,

  • basically instead of telling the node all your addresses

  • and asking, what the nodes will do-- the full nodes--

  • will create a Bloom filter based on the entire block.

  • And then the client can retrieve that,

  • match that against their addresses, and see, hey,

  • did this block have anything of interest to me?

  • And if so, request it--

  • much better privacy at a pretty small cost in overhead.

  • And so, just no one thought of it.

  • There's a lot of things in Bitcoin

  • where it's like, no one thought of it, we did something dumb.

  • And then something better came out

  • and now we're working on it.

  • OK, so you tell the node all your addresses.

  • That's a problem.

  • For each header, ask if you gained or lost you UTXOs?

  • So can you think of any problems here?

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Could they lie and not pay some of them?

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yup.

  • Easy to lie.

  • You just don't tell them.

  • If you're a server, you just omit things,

  • and you can maybe mitigate that by connecting

  • to a bunch of different nodes but then

  • you lose even more privacy because you've now

  • shared all your addresses and money

  • with multiple anonymous nodes.

  • But it's really easy to lie by omission.

  • Someone says, hey, here's all my addresses, OK,

  • did I get any money?

  • Yup, yup.

  • And then you see one where they got a bunch of money

  • and just don't tell them.

  • And they don't know.

  • This can be annoying in regular wallets in the Lightning

  • Network stuff that I work on that I'll

  • talk about, hopefully, later.

  • This can actually be very damaging.

  • You can lose money because of this.

  • But, in general, in Bitcoin, you won't lose money

  • because you're not aware of a transaction.

  • So this is also a problem, easy to lie by omission.

  • The Merkle proofs help, but they prove inclusion, not exclusion.

  • There's no way to construct a proof that--

  • I'm going to I'm going to give you proof

  • that I'm not omitting anything.

  • Although, with the idea of the block-based filters sending,

  • there are ways to construct that,

  • so it's even better in that sense.

  • OK, so these are some of the disadvantages of SPV.

  • Can anyone think of any other problems with it, or--

  • yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: Fee estimation.

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah, OK.

  • So, yeah, you don't know--

  • since you're not downloading the blocks,

  • you don't really know how much fees other people are paying.

  • You're not verifying.

  • So even when you get transactions,

  • you cannot verify any signatures because you don't have UTXO

  • sets, so you just see that it came from somewhere,

  • but you don't know if the thing it's spending even exists

  • or has a key or anything, so you can't verify the signature.

  • You don't know how much money was coming in,

  • so even if you look at the transactions,

  • you can't tell what fees they're paying.

  • You sort of can if you download the entire block.

  • There's ways around it, but it's really ugly,

  • so it can be very difficult to estimate fees.

  • So, in practice, you'd probably ask the same server

  • that you've told all your addresses

  • and all your UTXOs to, hey, what fee should I use,

  • then they tell you that.

  • The idea is, well, if I ask five people, hopefully, most of them

  • will be around the same.

  • So there's a bunch of problems with SPV.

  • OK, so SPV sounds pretty bad, right?

  • I think I'll stick to my full node.

  • But is there anything worse than SPV?

  • Asking for a friend.

  • Can I go worse?

  • So does anyone know something we can

  • do that's worse security, worse privacy than SPV

  • and that's also very popular?

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]

  • TADGE DRYJA: Yeah, that's even worse.

  • But, yeah there's a step in between.

  • So you can take out some of these steps

  • where you just use an API and you just ask people.

  • You have a website, blockchain.info or Mycelium

  • Wallet, or bunch of wallets--

  • BitPay's, Copay, things like that where

  • you don't verify any headers, you

  • don't look at any Merkle proofs, you just

  • skip right to the tell the remote node all your addresses

  • and UTXOs and ask how much money you've gained or lost.

  • So you've sort of outsourced the entire process.

  • You don't store really anything on your computer.

  • And you say, well, but you do have your private keys.

  • You say, I made some private keys, I made some addresses,

  • and then I tell this website, hey, here's all my addresses,

  • how much money do I have?

  • And the servers responds, yeah, you've got UTXOs, cool.

  • So then you can build the transaction,

  • sign them, and send them to the server.

  • So what are some advantages and disadvantages of this?

  • There's probably some obvious disadvantages, right?

  • Can anyone think of an attack that this does not

  • help you against?

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: You can just make up transactions.

  • TADGE DRYJA: The server can just say, hey,

  • you've got 1,000 Bitcoins.

  • You're like, awesome, but it's just completely made up.

  • As the client, you don't verify anything

  • about these transactions.

  • So that's a pretty big problem.

  • And the thing is, in practice, one of the issues

  • is that people are generally not as

  • aware of these types of attacks because mostly people

  • worry about spending their money, and they don't really--

  • merchants worry about charge-backs

  • and worry about receiving and verifying

  • that they've received funds all the time,

  • but most people's experience is they get paid once a month

  • or twice a month with a paycheck,

  • and the money shows up in their bank or whatever,

  • and they never really worry about that.

  • They worry about spending their money

  • and getting defrauded or things like that.

  • So it's not something a lot of people

  • think about all the time is, did I actually get paid?

  • So there's easy fraud that you can

  • do with this kind of attack vector

  • where you sell a car on Craigslist,

  • and someone comes and says, yeah, I paid you the Bitcoins,

  • but they've actually compromised the server

  • and you haven't gotten paid at all.

  • But you think you have, so you give over the goods.

  • So, yeah potential problems-- they can say you got paid when

  • you didn't, they can say you lost money when you didn't.

  • And if it's in a browser, that's even more fun

  • because they can change the code.

  • The JavaScript is not pinned to anything,

  • so if someone compromises that server,

  • they can change the code and potentially get

  • your private keys.

  • So you have, really, very little security.

  • The blockchain is not really providing

  • anything in this case.

  • However, this is much more popular

  • than running a full or SPV node, because you

  • know, blockchain.info, you just sign in,

  • there's a lot of wallets on the phones

  • that work this way as well.

  • And you do at least have your private keys, hopefully.

  • So you've got that, right?

  • You're not giving custody in any sense to them

  • but they learn a lot of information.

  • OK, so not even SPV.

  • Can we do worse?

  • Yeah, so the Coinbase company was an example

  • of "can we do worse?"

  • Yes, you can.

  • Someone else's coins is worse.

  • The case where my dad said, hey can you

  • hold on to these coins for me, it's worse.

  • He doesn't run a node, he doesn't have his private keys,

  • he doesn't really understand Bitcoin that well.

  • He wants to, but he's busy and he's

  • like, hey, you know this stuff, you deal with it.

  • You know way more about this than I do.

  • I trust you since, you know, we're dad and son and stuff

  • so not a huge trust problem there, so I do it for him.

  • But you know, banks, right?

  • So the idea of a site or an exchange or something

  • like this where you don't even have your private keys.

  • You just have a website where they run a node and a wallet

  • and they owe you the money.

  • It tends to end badly, and even if it doesn't end badly,

  • it misses the point.

  • The whole idea of Bitcoin was like, hey,

  • you can have your own money.

  • It's kind of cool.

  • It's running on your computer.

  • It feels like it's missing the point to just hand it over

  • to some bank.

  • And it's not even a bank.

  • Most of these sites, a big reason

  • why it tends to end badly is there

  • aren't the same protections.

  • Banks have to do a lot of work, and there's FDIC,

  • there's all sorts of rules, and they also

  • build these big structures with really heavy stone pillars,

  • so you're like, yeah, they can't run off because this bank's not

  • going to move.

  • It's made out of rocks.

  • And the banks in Bitcoin do not have big stone pillars.

  • IP addresses are really easy to change and move

  • the computers around.

  • Another thing, they're running a node,

  • right, these Bitcoin banks that hold all your funds.

  • Sometimes they don't, so these banks themselves

  • might run SPV nodes or API things.

  • I don't want to name any names, but there's

  • pretty good evidence that big exchanges might even just

  • connect to an API and not even run their own node.

  • Another-- there's a lot of things like this where,

  • when something bad doesn't happen,

  • people just keep pushing it--

  • where miners themselves don't verify the blocks because they

  • think, well, he must have created a valid block

  • and I'm not going to verify it and everything works.

  • So the other thing is, while it sounds really bad, in practice,

  • there haven't been really many SPV attacks or API attacks.

  • We know of this, but in practice it's hard to do.

  • If you want to defraud someone by compromising

  • blockchain.info, you have to compromise blockchain.info.

  • You don't have to do all the proof of work,

  • because they're not validating it, but it's still hard to do

  • and it requires a coordinated active attacker

  • with quite a bit of resources.

  • And so when it doesn't happen, people say,

  • well, SPV is just as good.

  • We don't have any evidence of people being defrauded,

  • so it's just as good.

  • But that is kind of dangerous because when

  • everyone starts doing it, you start

  • to lose these protections.

  • Any questions about the someone else's coins model?

  • There's all sorts of legal issues.

  • There's a very long list of ways it ends badly.

  • I don't know-- what is the half life of a custodial exchange

  • in Bitcoin?

  • It's like a year or two, and they drop off.

  • So why do people do this?

  • And here's a table of trade-offs with these things.

  • It's mainly convenience, and so that's a real reason to do it.

  • So if you're running a full node,

  • you're going to have to download at least 170 gigabytes.

  • That's a lot, right?

  • It's going to take a while.

  • Storage-- you're going to have to store

  • at least 4 gigabytes long term.

  • And that's going up, but not going up too much.

  • It's actually gone down the last few weeks.

  • That's the UTXO set you have to keep track of.

  • You don't have to keep track of this 170 gigabytes.

  • It, by default, does but you can turn on pruning.

  • But that's also super user-unfriendly.

  • You have to edit a bitcoin.conf file and type "pruning=500"

  • or something, and then save it, and then it'll prune down to 4

  • gigs.

  • There's no-- at least, that I'm aware of-- there's

  • no GUI nice menu thing where you can say, hey,

  • I want to enable pruning.

  • I don't have to store it.

  • Speed-- on a really nice computer,

  • it will take at least six hours to download all this

  • and verify it.

  • That's pretty impressive because it used to be more,

  • but that's still six hours.

  • People don't want to deal with that.

  • Privacy-- certainly, we can do better.

  • There's a lot of research on how to make privacy and Bitcoin

  • better but this is what we got.

  • Security-- this is as good as we've got

  • So then you go down to SPV.

  • Network-- you only have to download about 50 megs, all

  • those headers.

  • If you've got a wallet with lots of transactions,

  • you're going to download 100, 200, 300 megs

  • because you're going to have to download

  • all the transactions that pay you or you're paying out to.

  • Speed-- I said seconds, I think I want to change it to minutes.

  • It's not that fast.

  • It's a lot faster.

  • I think seconds is an exaggeration.

  • Well, it's like 60 seconds.

  • Anyway, it's pretty fast.

  • You download all the headers.

  • That takes the same amount of time,

  • but that can be a minute or two, and then

  • you're syncing the blocks.

  • It's really quick, they're small.

  • Privacy is poor.

  • You lose a lot of your privacy in SPV

  • because you're basically telling random computers

  • on the internet, hey, here's all my money.

  • Hey, here's all my addresses.

  • You're not completely losing everything,

  • but it's pretty easy for actors to reconstruct your wallet

  • from that.

  • Security-- medium.

  • I don't know, there haven't been any real attacks on this,

  • but you're not verifying the rules of Bitcoin.

  • If everyone's running SPV, then a miner can say,

  • hey, I just generated 1,000 coins out of nowhere,

  • and no one's looking for that transaction.

  • It only pays me, and no one's going

  • to see that and reject the block.

  • So if everyone runs SPV, you're not

  • checking up on the miners, which is a very real threat.

  • Miners do crazy stuff and you got to watch out for them.

  • So, security-- questionable.

  • API query, where you just ask a website hey,

  • here's all my addresses, how much money do I have?

  • Network traffic-- I don't know, less than a megabyte.

  • You have to load the websites and stuff

  • but it's pretty light.

  • Storage-- you basically don't have to store anything.

  • I mean, you have to store your private keys,

  • but those can be password-based and derived on the fly.

  • Speed-- like a second, right.

  • It's real quick.

  • You're making an HTTP query, you're getting a response,

  • you're parsing it, it's real quick.

  • Privacy is poor.

  • It's worse than SPV, but because it's really easy

  • because you just hand them over all your addresses

  • in the clear.

  • And security is also quite poor, in that they can say hey,

  • you got money or you lost money, and you just

  • accept what they say.

  • Hold my key-- this is network traffic.

  • I don't know, you have to go to a website, I guess.

  • There's no storage, there's no speed, there's no privacy,

  • there's no security.

  • You're just handing the entire thing off to someone else.

  • So what would you guys guess are the popularity

  • of the different models?

  • Most popular to least popular.

  • Yeah, this is definitely the most popular.

  • Second most, third most, fourth most.

  • Everyone does this, a few people do this, some people do this,

  • and a couple thousand people do this.

  • It's a problem, and this is something

  • that is one of the ongoing problems, not just in Bitcoin.

  • Ethereum would be a little different,

  • but still, it's going to be a lot of this.

  • Ethereum has a weird different SPV.

  • There's other models.

  • There's one in the middle for Ethereum

  • that's also quite popular.

  • It's like SPV with UTXO commitment.

  • Well, no, I guess it would be more here.

  • Anyway, I'm not going to go into Ethereum.

  • But it's a problem and there's different ways to attack it.

  • One of the issues is that a lot of people

  • who program Bitcoin itself really only focus on this,

  • and they say, look, this is not our problem.

  • We can't solve this.

  • We're going to try to make this-- the way

  • we're going to try to solve this,

  • is let's try to get the speed down.

  • If it takes days, people are going to move this way.

  • If it takes hours, maybe a lot of people will say,

  • hey I was using SPV, but yeah, it's not too bad running this.

  • I'm going to run this and get the more security.

  • Let's try to keep this number down.

  • Let's try to keep speed down.

  • Let's try to improve privacy and security of the full node.

  • That is generally what most of the Bitcoin Core developers

  • focus on, which I don't argue with.

  • But it does lead to some neglect of SPV, where there's not--

  • it's been over a year, year and a half, almost two years

  • where we know how to make SPV better and more secure,

  • but there's not a lot of enthusiasm and people

  • working on it.

  • And people argue about the security of these things.

  • This, there's not much you can do.

  • I mean, there is kind of cryptography research like,

  • hey, is there some cool way I can send you all my addresses

  • so that you can figure out how much money I have without you

  • learning all my addresses?

  • That's called private information retrieval,

  • and there's all sorts of papers on that.

  • In practice, there aren't any that use that.

  • And this, well, yeah multi-sig.

  • That's more like regulation.

  • Can we have restrictions and rules on these, essentially,

  • banks to try to make it safer, maybe?

  • These are the two where software development can definitely help

  • make this a lot easier to use.

  • So we can encourage people to use it, but most people--

  • security is hard because most people, if you don't

  • see a problem, this is a lot easier, and a lot of people

  • think, well, I'm not good at computers, so--

  • they are, and it's safer if I give all my money

  • to someone else.

  • In some cases, it could be true.

  • But that has systemic effects where now you've

  • got these five computers in the world,

  • and if you're able to compromise those,

  • they have just billions of dollars

  • worth of Bitcoins on them.

  • And so that's why black hat hacker kind of people,

  • it's like the best thing to do.

  • It's like, there's a computer somewhere

  • and it's got a billion dollars of untraceable money

  • that I can just steal.

  • Like, it's-- what could be better?

  • Yeah, I could get everyone's passwords.

  • That's cool.

  • Or yeah, I could read people's emails.

  • Whatever.

  • Or, I can just steal a billion dollars.

  • So what do you think they're going to do?

  • So this leads to huge concentrations

  • of coins in a very small number of nodes,

  • and people try to attack it.

  • So this is sort of the landscape we're in now.

  • It's certainly not ideal.

  • There's a lot of technology that's pretty good

  • that's not being used.

  • There's a lot of technology that's

  • crummy that's being used a lot and how we make this stronger

  • and faster, how to make this faster,

  • things like that are really interesting research areas.

  • Almost done.

  • Wallets are fun, but usability issues.

  • If you want to try testing out wallets

  • you can try downloading them, playing around with them.

  • They often leave quite a bit to be desired.

  • The one I work on, Lit, leaves enormous amounts to be desired.

  • It's all in text.

  • And Ethan should be here Wednesday

  • and good luck with the problem set.

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6.ウォレットとSPV (6. Wallets and SPV)

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    林宜悉 に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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