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  • Professor Paul Bloom: So what we're doing today is

  • continuing on the theme of emotions.

  • "Emotions" is a two-part lecture and we're continuing

  • along certain themes. I want to begin by responding

  • to a question which was raised in the last class concerning

  • smiling and nonhuman primates. It was a very good question.

  • The issue was: we know that humans have

  • different sorts of smiles to convey different sorts of

  • information. The question was,

  • "do nonhuman primates, like chimpanzees or gorillas or

  • gibbons, have the same many sorts of smiles?"

  • So, I contacted the world's expert on smiling,

  • who did not return my e-mails. So, I contacted the second

  • world's expert on smiling who told me that the answer is "no,"

  • that primate--nonhuman primate smiles actually correspond

  • almost entirely to appeasement smiles.

  • They're "don't hurt me" smiles. They're equivalent to the "coy

  • smile" that we saw on humans. But that nonhuman primates do

  • not use smiles for greetings; there's no equivalent to the

  • "greeting smile" or "Pan Am smile";

  • nor do they use them as genuine expressions of happiness.

  • There's no equivalent to the "Duchenne smile."

  • That's as far as I know. If the world's expert gets back

  • to me and says something different, I'll keep you posted.

  • Another thing. Going back to the beginning

  • theme of the class, what we started--just to

  • review, we talked about the different functions of emotions.

  • And then we talked about smiling and facial expressions.

  • And then we turned to some--to a nonsocial emotion,

  • the case of fear. And then we shifted to social

  • emotions. And we talked about social

  • emotions towards kin and the special evolutionary reasons

  • that would lead them to evolve. And as we were ending,

  • we were talking about the relationship between an animal

  • and its children, particularly in cases like

  • humans and birds and mammals where there tends to be a close

  • relationship with our children. We invest in quality,

  • not quantity. I might produce very few

  • children in my life. And my evolutionary trick then

  • is to focus very intently on them and make sure they survive.

  • If I were to produce 100 children, I could stand to lose

  • a few, but if I just produce five in my lifetime or two or

  • one, they become very precious to me.

  • And so, the story of the evolution of a species like us

  • involves a long period of dependence and deep,

  • deep bonds between the parent and the child.

  • And that's part of what I talked about,

  • how parents respond to children.

  • And I want to begin this class by giving an illustration from a

  • documentary about parental response to children,

  • but I want to give it in a species that's not us.

  • And here is why. I'll explain why with an

  • analogy. I have a friend of mine who

  • studies the psychology of religion.

  • He studies why people hold religious beliefs.

  • And he tells me that when he's talking to a non specialist,

  • somebody not in the field, he doesn't ever tell them,

  • "Yeah, I'm really interested in why people believe in the Bible

  • or why people light the candles on Sabbath or why people go to

  • church" because these are religions that people around

  • here hold, and if you tell people you

  • study them they'll sort of be puzzled, "why would you want to

  • study something like that" or offended.

  • If you want to talk about the psychology of religion to an

  • audience like this, what you do is you start with

  • the exotic. So, you start by talking about

  • people who put butter on their heads.

  • Dan Sperber talks about a culture where the men put butter

  • on their heads in the summer. And it kind of melts and that's

  • part of--one of the things that they do or--you talk about a

  • culture that believes in spirits or that trees can talk.

  • You say you're studying it and they say, "Oh,

  • that's interesting. I wonder why they believe that?"

  • And you use that as a way to look at more general facts that

  • exist even in our culture. You use the fact that we don't

  • take the exotic for granted as a way to motivate the scientific

  • study of things we do take for granted.

  • And this is, of course, true more generally.

  • This was the point in the William James quote when he

  • talked about things that are natural to us and noticed that

  • some very odd things are equally natural to other species.

  • And it's true, I think, in particular when we

  • talk about things like the love we have for our children.

  • So, one way to look at the love we have for our children

  • scientifically, isn't to look at it head-on,

  • because the love we feel towards our own children feels

  • sacred, it feels special, but look at it in other species.

  • And so, one of the nicest illustrations of this is the

  • Emperor penguin, which was--which--whose

  • childcare and mating practices were dramatized in a wonderful

  • movie called "March of the Penguins."

  • And this is interesting because they had this incredibly

  • elaborate and quite precarious system of generating and taking

  • care of offspring. So, I want to show you a brief

  • clip of the movie to illustrate some parts of this.

  • What they do at the beginning, which is not--which leads up to

  • this, is they take a very long trek from the water to their

  • breeding grounds. Their breeding grounds is--are

  • protected from the wind and they're on a firm piece of ice

  • so they could hold the whole pack.

  • They do the breeding there and it's there that the eggs are

  • created. So, this is where the movie

  • begins at this point. "March of the Penguins" was the

  • second best--second most popular documentary of all time,

  • beaten only by "Fahrenheit 9/11."

  • And people responded to it in different ways,

  • which are informative when we think about the generalizations

  • you could make from animal behavior to human behavior.

  • Some conservative commentators saw this as a celebration of

  • family values, such as love and trust and

  • monogamy. Some liberals,

  • who hate everything that's good and true, [laughter]

  • responded by saying, "Well, yeah,

  • they're monogamous for one breeding season.

  • It's a year. Then they go and find another

  • mate. If you add it up,

  • it's pretty slutty." [laughter]

  • I think more to the point, people were impressed and

  • stunned by the rich and articulate and systematic

  • behavior that these animals were showing.

  • Plainly, they didn't pick it up from television,

  • movies, culture, learning, schooling,

  • and so on. To some extent,

  • this sort of complicated behavior came natural to them.

  • And it's understandable that some proponents of intelligent

  • design, or creationism, pointed to this as an example

  • of how God creates things that are deeply, richly intricate so

  • as to perpetrate the survival of different animals.

  • From a Darwinian standpoint, the Darwinian would agree with

  • the creationist that this couldn't have happened by

  • accident, this is just far too

  • complicated, but would appeal to the--to this as an exquisite

  • example of a biological adaptation,

  • in particular a biological adaptation regarding parental

  • care to children shaped by the fact that children share the

  • parents' genes and so parents will evolve in ways that

  • perpetrate the survival of their children.

  • Then there's the other direction, which is how children

  • respond to parents, how the young ones are wired up

  • to resonate and respond in different ways to the adults

  • around them. And we quickly talked about

  • some different theories of this. And I'll just review what we

  • talked about last class. Babies will develop an

  • attachment to whoever is closest.

  • They'll usually prefer their mothers because their mothers

  • are typically those who are closest to them.

  • They'll prefer her voice, her face, her smell.

  • It used to be thought that there is some sort of magical

  • moment of imprinting that when the baby is born,

  • the baby must see his or her mother and "boom," a connection

  • is made. If the baby doesn't,

  • terrible things will happen with attachment later on.

  • This is silly. There is no reason to believe

  • there's some special moment or special five minutes or special

  • hour. It's just in the fullness of

  • time babies will develop an attachment to the animal that's

  • closest to it. They will recognize it as,

  • at an implicit level, at an unconscious level,

  • as their kin. Well, how does this work?

  • How does the baby's brain develop--come to develop an

  • emotional attachment to that creature?

  • Well, you remember from Skinner that operant conditioning could

  • provide a good answer to this. And this is known as the

  • "Cupboard Theory," which is babies love their moms because

  • their moms provide food. It's the law of effect.

  • It's operant conditioning. They will approach their

  • mothers to get the food from them.

  • And they will develop an attachment because their mother

  • provides food. And this is contrasted with a

  • more nativist, hard-wired theory developed by

  • Bowlby which claims that there's two things going on.

  • There is a draw to mom for comfort and social interaction

  • and fear of strangers. Now, in the real world,

  • it's difficult to pull apart these two means of attraction

  • because the very same woman who's giving you comfort and

  • social interaction is also the one giving you milk.

  • But in the laboratory you can pull them apart.

  • And that's what Henry Harlow did in the movies you saw last

  • week. So, Harlow exposed primates to

  • two different mothers. One is a wire mother.

  • That's a Skinnerian mother. That's a mother who gave food.

  • The other is a cloth mother set-up so that she'd be

  • comfortable and give warmth and cuddling.

  • And the question is, "Which one do babies go for?"

  • And as you can remember from the movies, the results are

  • fairly decisive. Babies go to the wire mother to

  • eat--as one of the characters said, "You've got to eat to

  • live." But they viewed the--they loved

  • the cloth mother. They developed an attachment to

  • the warm, cuddly mother. That's the one they used as a

  • base when they were threatened. That's the one they used as a

  • base from which to explore. Okay.

  • And that actually--Oh, that's just--I have a picture.

  • And that actually takes me to the--Oh, except for one thing,

  • it almost takes me to the end of the question of our emotions

  • towards kin. One question you could ask is,

  • "What if there's no contact at all?"

  • Now, you could imagine the effects of how--A lot of people

  • are interested in the question of the effects of the child's

  • early relationship to adults around him or her in how the

  • child turns out later. This becomes hugely relevant

  • for social debates like daycare. So for instance,

  • a lot of psychologists are interested in the question,

  • "Is it better for a child to be raised by a parent,

  • usually a mother, or does it make a difference if

  • the child goes to daycare? What if the child goes to

  • daycare at six months? What if the child goes to

  • daycare at two years? How does this affect the child?"

  • The short answer is, nobody really knows.

  • There's a lot of debate over whether or not there are subtle

  • differences and it's deeply controversial.

  • But we do know that it doesn't make a big difference.

  • We do know that if you got raised by mom,

  • or perhaps mom and dad, or maybe just dad all through

  • your life until going off for school and I--my parents threw

  • me in a daycare at age three months--it's not going to make a

  • big difference for us, maybe a subtle difference

  • though it's not clear which way it would go.

  • But it won't make a big difference.

  • But what if there's no contact at all?

  • What if--What about terrible circumstances where people get

  • no cloth mother, they get nobody for attachment?

  • This is a really--In the real world, of course,

  • you can't do experiments on this.

  • And in the real world with humans, this only happens in

  • tragic cases. But this has been studied.

  • So Harlow, again, raised monkeys in solitary

  • confinement so they were raised in steel cages with only a wire

  • mother. In other words,

  • they got all the nutrition they needed but they got no

  • mothering. It turned out that you kind of

  • get monkey psychotics. They're withdrawn.

  • They don't play. They bite themselves.

  • They're incompetent sexually. They're incompetent socially.

  • They're incompetent maternally. In one case,

  • one of these monkeys raised in solitary confinement was

  • artificially inseminated. When she had a child she banged

  • its head on the floor and then bit it to death.

  • So, you need to be--you need--This shows--This is kind

  • of a stark demonstration that some early connection,

  • some early attachment is critical for the developing of a

  • primate. Obviously, you don't do these

  • experiments with people but there are natural experiments,

  • humans raised in harsh orphanages with little social

  • contact, and these children--If the--In other words,

  • they get fed, barely, but nobody picks them

  • up and cuddles them. These children,

  • if this happens for long enough, they end up with severe

  • problems with social and emotional development.

  • From an emotional point of view, they're often insatiable.

  • They really need cuddling and support or they're apathetic,

  • they don't care at all. Now, there's some sort of good

  • news, which is if you get these people or these monkeys early

  • enough you can reverse the effects of this bad development.

  • So, there's some research done with monkey therapists.

  • So then, what they do is they take the monkey,

  • they raise it in a steel cage, the monkey comes out,

  • the monkey is kind of psycho, and then they send in a younger

  • monkey who is just goofing around,

  • jumping all around the place and everything.

  • And experience with this younger monkey who just follows

  • them around and clings to them leads to gradual improvement.

  • It makes the solitary monkey become better.

  • There might be a similar effect with humans.

  • So one story more about--of an anecdote than an experiment was

  • a situation where at the age of one and a half,

  • children were taken away from a really harsh orphanage where

  • they had no contact and brought into a home for mentally

  • retarded women where these women gave them plenty of contact and

  • cuddling and apparently, from what we know,

  • brought them back to normal. And this is all I want to talk

  • about, about the emotions we feel towards our kin,

  • towards our children, and towards our parents.

  • Any questions or thoughts?

  • Yes. Student: Do children in

  • orphanages comfort each other? Professor Paul Bloom:

  • It's a good question. Do children in orphanages

  • comfort each other? I don't know.

  • The situation probably wouldn't be there--The problem is

  • children in orphanages who are in these terrible situations

  • tend to be babies and very young and they wouldn't be thrown

  • together in situations where they could comfort each other.

  • It's a really interesting question.

  • What if it was a situation where children were raised

  • without a supportive cloth mother at all,

  • would not be able to pick them up and hold them,

  • but they could play amongst themselves and support each

  • other? I don't know the answer to that.

  • Teaching Assistant: Yes. Professor Paul Bloom:

  • Yes? Is there evidence on that?

  • Teaching Assistant: Yes, there is.

  • [inaudible] Professor Paul Bloom:

  • Yes. [laughter]

  • The answer is there is evidence, [laughs]

  • as everybody knows, [laughter]

  • that this sort of--amongst the young,

  • support can actually help the monkey and the children.

  • Somebody else had a question here?

  • Yes. Student: What does that

  • tell us about the middle ground, if the parent is comforting

  • just a little bit and then not that much [inaudible]

  • Professor Paul Bloom: Right.

  • So this is--The question is, "What does that tell us about

  • the middle ground?" So this is an extreme case but

  • what do we know about the middle case?

  • Say your parent--You're not raised in a cage,

  • you're not in a Romanian orphanage, but your parents just

  • don't pick you up very much. They don't love you very much.

  • There's no good evidence that that has any effect on a person.

  • The problem is, and we're going to talk about

  • this in much more detail in a couple of weeks,

  • is it's true that parents who aren't affectionate have kids

  • that aren't affectionate but it's not clear this is because

  • of a genetic connection or an environmental connection.

  • The one thing we do know is that in the middle ground,

  • effects tend not to be dramatic.

  • So when you get away from extreme cases,

  • effects are hard to see and require careful experimental

  • research to tease out. I think what it's safe to say

  • for a lot--for everything but the severe conditions is we

  • don't know what kind of effects there are.

  • But if there are effects they are not big and dramatic ones.

  • Okay. Animals' good feelings,

  • animals' emotional attraction to their kin,

  • is not a huge puzzle from an evolutionary point of view.

  • Evolution is driven by forces that operate on the fact of how

  • many genes get reproduced and replicated among your

  • descendants. So, it makes sense that animals

  • would be wired-up to care for their kids.

  • It would make sense that kids who are wired-up to survive

  • would develop attachments to their parents.

  • What's more of a puzzle though is that animals,

  • including humans, seem to have exquisitely

  • complicated relationships with non-kin.

  • In particular, animals are nice to non-kin.

  • You are nice to people that you're not related to.

  • There are a lot of examples of this.

  • Animals groom one another. You go, you pick off the lice

  • and the bugs off your friend; they pick it off you.

  • They give warning cries. So, warning cries--All sorts of

  • animals give warning cries. You are--I don't know.

  • You're a little animal and a big animal comes charging and

  • you say, "Hey!" Oh.

  • You may sort of cry and everybody runs away.

  • And that's very risky for you but you do it anyway,

  • often to protect people you aren't related to.

  • Often animals share childcare. And from a cold-blooded,

  • natural selection, survival-of-the-gene point of

  • view, you would imagine that if you

  • lend me your kid for the day I would eat him for the protein

  • and "it's not my genes and actually it gives more for my

  • kids." That's not quite how it works

  • though. Animals share food.

  • In fact, that animal, hugely ugly,

  • the vampire bat, shares food.

  • What happens is the vampire bat--vampire bats live in caves

  • and they fly out. And what they do is often a bat

  • will strike it big. She'll find a horse,

  • for instance, bite the horse,

  • pump in tons of blood and then fly back.

  • And what it does is it doesn't keep it to itself.

  • Rather, it goes around the whole cave and vomits blood into

  • the mouth of all the other vampire bats so everybody

  • benefits. Isn't that nice?

  • [laughter] Now, what you're tempted to say

  • is, "Well, that's really nice. Everybody benefits," but this

  • raises a puzzle from the evolutionary point of view.

  • Remember, animals benefit more, and to this situation,

  • animals benefit more by working together than by working alone.

  • The benefits outweigh the costs. This is known as "reciprocal

  • altruism" meaning my behavior to you, my good behavior to you,

  • my altruism for you, is predicated on the idea of

  • reciprocation, "I'll benefit from you."

  • And you imagine how vampire bats, for instance,

  • why this makes sense. This is--If you're a vampire

  • bat, it's a better system when anybody strikes it big to feed

  • you rather than for anybody who strike it big,

  • use the blood and then spit out all the rest of it.

  • But here's the problem. Here's why it's such a puzzle.

  • The problem is the existence of cheaters.

  • And in economics and sociology these are also known as

  • "free-riders." And what a cheater or

  • free-rider does is it takes the benefits without paying the

  • cost. Imagine two genes.

  • Imagine one builds a vampire bat that accepts blood from

  • others and shares blood. The other gene accepts blood

  • from others and doesn't share blood.

  • In the long run, "B" will actually out-produce

  • gene "A" because in fact, "B" will be healthy while other

  • vampire bats get sick. And then so the offspring will

  • do better. An even sharper example is an

  • example of warning cries. So, gophers give warning cries

  • when there's a predator. It is extremely adaptive to

  • give a warning cry. Sorry.

  • It's extremely adaptive to respond to a warning cry.

  • You hear a warning cry, you-- "Oh, crap," you run away.

  • It is not very adaptive to give a warning cry.

  • A really good solution then is to listen to warning cries but

  • not to give them. Suppose we had a system--It is

  • very adaptive when people are going to the bar,

  • when people buy drinks to accept the drinks.

  • It is not so adaptive, from the standpoint of one's

  • wallet, to buy people drinks. Here is a solution.

  • Accept drinks but don't pay for drinks.

  • And if everybody fell to that solution, the idea of buying a

  • round would fade. So, there is the puzzle.

  • Since cheating--Since a cheater, in the short run,

  • can always out-win--does better than a non-cheater,

  • how could this cooperation evolve?

  • How could it be an evolutionarily stable strategy?

  • And the answer is "cheater detection."

  • Reciprocal altruism can only evolve if animals are wired up

  • to punish cheaters. Now, that requires a lot of

  • mental apparatus. You have to recognize cheaters,

  • you have to remember cheaters, and you have to be motivated to

  • punish cheaters. And not every animal has this

  • degree of complicated apparatus but actually we know that

  • vampire bats do. So, in one clever study--So the

  • theory says--the evolutionary theory says "yeah,

  • I see what these vampire bats are doing," but you see--and

  • this is a case where evolution makes a nice prediction that

  • couldn't evolve unless bats are keeping track.

  • If bats aren't keeping track, then the system could never

  • exist because the cheaters would just take it over.

  • They must be watching for cheaters.

  • So, the experiment which was done is you--a vampire bat

  • strikes it big, it flies back,

  • and then you keep it--as a scientist you keep it from

  • giving blood to anybody else. Then what happens?

  • Well, what happens is when the other bats strike it big they

  • starve the selfish bat, just as if we go to bars and

  • everybody buys a round except for me.

  • And this happens over and over and over again.

  • Pretty soon you're going to buy a round but you're not going to

  • give me one. And so, just as humans are

  • keeping their eyes out for people who are taking the

  • benefits without paying the costs, so are other animals.

  • And it is argued that this sensitivity to cheating,

  • this focus on reciprocation, plays a powerful role in the

  • evolution of social behavior and the evolution of social

  • emotions. And a classic illustration of

  • this is The Prisoner's Dilemma. Now, many of you,

  • I think, have seen The Prisoner's Dilemma in one course

  • or another? It shows up--It is one of the

  • main constructs in the social sciences.

  • It shows up in cognitive science, psychology,

  • economics, that you could--The teaching fellows are passing

  • around something which you're not going to use right away.

  • But for some of you this is the first time you're going to be

  • exposed to The Prisoner's Dilemma so let me spell it out.

  • Here's the idea. You and a friend commit a crime.

  • You rob a bank, for instance. For the sake of this example,

  • you are prisoner two. You get caught.

  • The police put you in a little room and they say,

  • "We want to know everything that happened.

  • In particular, we want you to rat out your

  • friend." Now, here are the options,

  • and one thing about this is nothing is hidden.

  • The police officer could actually print out a copy of The

  • Prisoner's Dilemma and put it right in front of you.

  • And what he could say is, "Look."

  • You're prisoner two. "You could cooperate--Well,

  • you have two options. You could either cooperate with

  • your friend, you could stay silent, or you could defect or

  • you could squeal." But the police officer says,

  • "Look. If you--Let me tell you

  • something. If you cooperate with your

  • friend and he squeals on you, you'll go to prison for life

  • and he'll walk out. However, if you squeal on him

  • and he cooperates, he keeps quiet,

  • he'll go to prison for life and you'll walk out."

  • So, what do you do? Now, on the nice side,

  • what you can do is you could say, "No.

  • I'm going to be quiet. I'm going to cooperate."

  • Now, if you could trust your friend to cooperate,

  • you're fine, you each get a little stint in

  • prison, but of course your friend might defect.

  • Your friend might squeal. Here is the important structure

  • of The Prisoner's Dilemma. No matter what you--what your

  • friend chooses to do, you're better off squealing.

  • So, suppose you're prisoner two. You believe your friend's going

  • to cooperate with you. He's not going to be--he's not

  • going to give the information out.

  • Well, then your best thing to do is squeal on him.

  • What if you believe he's going to squeal on you?

  • Well, your best thing to do is squeal on him but if you could

  • get your act together and you could coordinate this,

  • you would both be quiet and get a fairly minor penalty.

  • And you could see this--This is the standard origin of the

  • prisoner's dilemma, why it's called "The Prisoner's

  • Dilemma," but you could see this all over the place.

  • So, here is the logic. The best case for you is to

  • defect while the other person cooperates.

  • The worst case is to cooperate while the other person defects.

  • Back to the police thing. The best case for you is to

  • give up all the information; the other guy stays silent;

  • you cut a deal; you walk home that day.

  • The worst case is you're quiet, he cuts a deal,

  • you go to prison for life, but overall the best is that

  • each cooperate and overall the worst for both is if each

  • defect. And the reason that makes this

  • tragic is this. Regardless of what your

  • opponent does, it pays to defect,

  • but if both people defect both are worse off.

  • I'll give a couple of other examples.

  • No. That's just to show that

  • there's a cartoon corresponding to The Prisoner's Dilemma.

  • It is that common. Here's the idea.

  • I am--I break up with my wife. We've been married for a while.

  • We've decided we're not going to go through it together

  • anymore and we break up. We're living in separate houses

  • and we're starting to talk divorce.

  • It occurs to me--Here's me. I put that out there.

  • "Should I get a divorce lawyer?" I ask.

  • Now, I know divorce lawyers are really expensive.

  • And it's kind of difficult to get a divorce lawyer.

  • But if I get a divorce lawyer--And so neither one of us

  • get a divorce lawyer we'll just do okay.

  • We'll get a mediator. We'll split the money down the

  • middle. That'll be okay but I'm kind of

  • tempted. If I get a divorce lawyer and

  • she doesn't, my divorce lawyer will take everything she's got.

  • I get everything, she loses everything.

  • Maybe I should be nice. Hold it.

  • What if she gets a divorce lawyer and I don't?

  • Well, then I'll lose everything, she'll get

  • everything. Well, we should both get a

  • divorce lawyer then but we'd both do pretty badly.

  • Imagine we're two countries, country "A" and country "B."

  • Should I do nuclear disarmament? That's pretty good.

  • We'd do okay if both countries disarmed.

  • We would live our lives; we'll raise taxes;

  • we'll do whatever countries do. But wouldn't it be cool if I

  • build up my weaponry and they don't?

  • I'll invade, take everything they got.

  • That's kind of tempting. Uh oh.

  • Also, if I don't do anything and they do it,

  • they'll invade my country, take everything.

  • So, we both build up our weaponry and we both do pretty

  • badly. Once you start thinking about

  • things this way, there's no end to the sort of

  • notions that could fall under The Prisoner's Dilemma.

  • A good example is a drug deal. Suppose I want to buy marijuana

  • from you, or "reefer" as they call it on the street.

  • [laughter] So, I have $1,000 and from you

  • I'd like to buy a ton of reefer so--I'm rounding off.

  • [laughter] So, you say,

  • "Wonderful. Wonderful.

  • Let's meet behind the gym, two in the morning on Friday,

  • and we'll do the exchange. You bring $1,000,

  • I bring the reefer." "Oh, cool.

  • Okay. Good."

  • And I think, "that's pretty good,

  • a thousand bucks, I get the reefer,

  • you get a thousand bucks. That's okay,

  • that's the normal thing." But now something occurs to me.

  • "Nobody's going to go to the cops if things go badly.

  • So instead of doing--bringing the money, why don't I just

  • bring a gun? You come with your reefer,

  • I stick a gun in your face, take the reefer,

  • go home." Maybe I won't do that,

  • but now I worry because you're thinking the same thing.

  • So, you could show up with a gun, stick the gun in my face,

  • take the thousand bucks, go home.

  • I'll have no reefer. What will I smoke?

  • [laughter] So, we both think this way.

  • So, we both show up behind the gym, two in the morning,

  • with guns. [laughter]

  • Well, that's not as bad for either one of us if I

  • had--I--you had a gun and I didn't have a gun.

  • But still, we're both worse off than if we could cooperate and

  • just do the damn trade. And so that's the structure of

  • The Prisoner's Dilemma. You can only appreciate The

  • Prisoner's Dilemma by actually doing it.

  • So, here's--here is a numerical equivalent to The Prisoner's

  • Dilemma. Everybody should have a card in

  • front of you, a file card.

  • If you don't--If you didn't get a card, a piece of paper will do

  • just as well. Please write on one side

  • "cooperate" and on the other side "defect" and then please

  • find a partner with whom to play one game.

  • This is a one-shot game.

  • One of you is player one. The player on the right-most

  • side from my right could be player one.

  • The other one is player two. Do you each have a partner?

  • If you have three people, you could cluster together and

  • do two and then two and just think.

  • It is actually best if you've never met or spoken to the

  • person you're about to deal with.

  • And the game is, when I say "go," simply show

  • the person your choice. To be clear,

  • if you are player one and you cooperate and player two

  • cooperates as well, you each get three dollars.

  • If you are player one and you cooperate while player two

  • defects, player two gets five dollars and you get bupkis and

  • so on. On three, just show the card to

  • your opponent, to your person you're playing

  • with. One, two, three.

  • [laughter] Okay. How many people in this room

  • cooperated? How many cooperated?

  • How many defected? [laughter] Okay.

  • How many people are now five dollars richer?

  • Okay. How many of you got nothing?

  • [laughter] Okay. So, you're learning.

  • You're learning that the person next to you is really an SOB.

  • [laughter] Now, find the person next to

  • you and you get to play again. And you get to play five games

  • in a row. Play five games in a row and

  • keep score. You just show it to each other,

  • record the numbers, show it, show it,

  • show it, show it. Go now.

  • [laughter] Anybody here win twenty-five

  • dollars? Yes, twenty-five?

  • So you-- Student 1: He cooperated four times and I

  • defected-- Professor Paul Bloom: That's twenty,

  • twenty-one. [laughter] Okay.

  • That's good. That's good.

  • So, it really is a measure of honesty.

  • [laughs] Anybody win twenty or more?

  • Fifteen or more. Fourteen or less.

  • Anybody do five or less? You're a good person.

  • It's good. It's good.

  • You played it with him? Student 2: Yes.

  • Professor Paul Bloom: Bad person.

  • [laughter] It's not really about good or

  • bad. There was a great game once.

  • It's a simple game, but it was a great game,

  • a great, famous competition a long time ago,

  • about 20 years ago, set up by the great computer

  • scientist Robert Axelrod. And he put together a

  • competition where people brought in computer programs to play

  • this game, to play The Prisoner's Dilemma.

  • And there were sixty-three competitors.

  • And these computer programs were incredibly--Some of them

  • were very simple, always be nice,

  • always be--always cooperate, always defect.

  • Some were elegant, prime number solutions and

  • prototype responses, genetic algorithms crafted to

  • figure out what the other person was doing and suss them out.

  • But the winner was developed by Anatol Rappaport.

  • And Anatol Rappaport actually died about a month ago at quite

  • an old age, a great scientist. What was interesting about this

  • was he was the winner with his program but his program was also

  • one of the simplest. It may well have been the

  • simplest. It was called "Tit-for-Tat" and

  • it worked very simple. It took four lines of basic

  • code. The first time you meet a new

  • program, cooperate. The first time you meet

  • somebody, be nice. After that, do on each trial

  • what the other program did on the previous trial.

  • This beat sixty-two others. And here is why.

  • It had certain beautiful features.

  • It starts friendly. Remember the best long-term

  • solution is everybody's be--everybody's nice.

  • It starts off nice but you can't--it's not a sucker.

  • If you screw with it, it will defect back on the next

  • turn. It is, however, forgiving.

  • Do you want to get nice with it? Be nice.

  • If you're nice, it'll be nice back at you later

  • on. It's also transparent,

  • nothing complicated about it, and that's actually important.

  • It's not merely that it's not a sucker and forgiving.

  • More to the point, it is--you could tell it's not

  • a sucker. And you could tell it's

  • forgiving. And this very powerful

  • algorithm learned to cooperate even in the situation--and

  • helped--learned to make it out the best even in a situation

  • where there's a risk of cheating and betrayal.

  • Some psychologists have argued that our emotions correspond to

  • the different permutations on The Prisoner's Dilemma.

  • We like people who cooperate with us.

  • This motivates us to be nice to them in the future much as the

  • Tit-for-Tat algorithm says, "If you are nice to me now,

  • I'll be nice to you back." We don't like being screwed

  • with. We feel anger and distrust

  • towards those who betray us. That motivates us to betray or

  • avoid them in the future. And we feel bad when we betray

  • somebody who cooperates with us. This motivates us to behave

  • better in the future. You can break down the cells of

  • The Prisoner's Dilemma in terms of emotions that they give rise

  • to. I did an experiment last night

  • with my seven-year-old and my ten-year-old.

  • I explained to them The Prisoner's Dilemma.

  • I didn't give the divorce lawyer example but-- [laughter]

  • and we gave them a big thing of chocolate chips and--the good

  • chocolate chips. We had the good chips and we

  • had the matrix and we had them play.

  • Now, what they did isn't so interesting, but what's

  • interesting is they were furious at each other.

  • One of them, the younger boy,

  • was--kept being betrayed by the older boy including tricks like

  • he'd say, "Okay. Let's both cooperate."

  • "Yeah. Okay."

  • Then he'd cooperate-- "defect!" And [laughter]

  • the response was anger, though not actually guilt on

  • the part of the other boy [laughter]

  • but rage. And we see these sort of things

  • all the time in real life. You're familiar with The

  • Prisoner's Dilemma but there's another game,

  • which you might not be familiar with.

  • It's called The Ultimatum Game. How many of you have

  • encountered The Ultimatum Game? Okay, some of you.

  • Very simple. Choose a partner.

  • It's a very simple game. When economists study this they

  • actually do this with real money.

  • I do not have real money to let you do this too.

  • One of you is "A," one of you is "B."

  • The one on the right most from this side is "A."

  • The other one is "B." Here is a very simple rule.

  • I'd like "A" to turn to "B" and make an offer.

  • "A" has ten dollars. You can give "B" any amount you

  • choose from that ten dollars, from one dollar to ten dollars.

  • "B" can do only one thing. "B" can accept it;

  • if you accept it, you agree to take home the

  • money and "A" keeps what ever's left--or reject it.

  • If you reject it, you get nothing.

  • Nobody gets anything. Is everybody clear?

  • So "A" is going to say, "I'll give you so and so

  • dollars." "B" would say,

  • "Okay," in which case "B" walks away with so and so dollars

  • or--and "A" walks away with whatever rest or "B" could say,

  • "Reject," in which case nobody gets anything.

  • So, this game comes in two steps.

  • The first thing: I would like "A" to turn to "B"

  • and make your offer.

  • Don't--"B" doesn't do anything yet.

  • Make your offer.

  • Your offer should be one word. People are explaining their

  • offer. Make your offer.

  • Okay. Stage two.

  • Do not negotiate. [laughter]

  • You're not--I see people waving their hands and it's

  • complicated. It should be a number from one

  • to ten, a positive integer. Now, "B" --I would like "B" to

  • say one word and you can say it really loud on three.

  • Accept or reject. One, two, three.

  • [laughter] Wow. How many people accepted?

  • Anybody reject it? Good.

  • Okay. How many people offered ten

  • dollars? [laughter]

  • How many people offered more than five dollars?

  • Okay. How many people offered one

  • dollar? Okay.

  • When you offered one dollar did you accept?

  • Anybody else offer one dollar? When you offered one dollar did

  • your partner accept? Okay.

  • How many people offered either four or five dollars?

  • Okay. This is an interesting game

  • because the person who offered--who accepted one dollar

  • was being rational. One dollar is better than no

  • dollars. So, the psychology of human

  • rationality is such that, from a logical point of view,

  • you should reason one dollar is better than nothing.

  • A rational person should accept one dollar.

  • And because we're smart, a--you should offer one dollar

  • but not many of you offered one dollar.

  • Why? Because you knew people are not

  • purely rational. People, even in a one-shot

  • game, won't accept unfair distributions.

  • They'll reject them just out of spite.

  • And so, you need to offer more. And this has been studied from

  • a neuro-economic point of view, which basically provides

  • neuroanatomical evidence that people--if you offered them one

  • dollar they get really pissed. [laughter]

  • Nobody likes to be offered a dollar.

  • Now, there's a more general moral here, which is actually an

  • interesting surprise of some relevance to everyday life.

  • A rational person is easily exploited.

  • A rational person's responses to provocations,

  • to assaults will always be measured inappropriate.

  • If you know I'm rational and you're in a sharing situation

  • with me, you could say to me, "Hey.

  • Here's a dollar. Hey, Mr.

  • Rational, a dollar's better than nothing."

  • "Well, okay," because I'm rational.

  • Similarly, you could mess with me because you could harass me

  • in all sorts of ways, take things that I own,

  • as long as you reason that a rational person wouldn't start a

  • fuss about this. There is some advantage to

  • being irrational, to having a temper.

  • Because if you have a temper and you're known to be

  • irrational, people are forced, by dint of your irrationality,

  • to treat you better. Who am I going to take from?

  • The person who's extremely reasonable or the person who has

  • a hair-trigger temper? Well, I'm going to pick on a

  • reasonable person because the unreasonable person might do

  • unreasonable things. And this is faintly

  • paradoxical, but often to be irrational, or at least to have

  • a reputation for mild irrationality,

  • gives you an edge. Now, this isn't focus of

  • provocation but this has also been presented in the theory of

  • why people fall in love. Suppose you're choosing who to

  • devote your life to, and it's a matter of huge

  • trust. We're going to raise kids

  • together. It's very important for you

  • that I don't leave. And I am very rational so I say

  • to you, "We should mate and have children because I find you the

  • most attractive of everybody who was available that I've met so

  • far. I'm very rational and so long

  • as this continues to be the case we'll be together."

  • Well, that's reasonable and rational but wouldn't you rather

  • be with somebody who's head over heels in love?

  • Head over heels in love is irrational but it's also,

  • within certain parameters, endearing because the

  • irrationality of the person means you could trust them more

  • in the long run, just like the irrationality of

  • somebody who has a temper means you don't mess with them as

  • much. The studies have been done more

  • with regard to violence than with love.

  • And in fact, the irrationality--the benefits

  • of irrational violence have been translated in terms of the study

  • of homicide and other crimes. Daly and Wilson describe the

  • cause of murder. Most murder is not caused by

  • reasonable provocation. Most murder is not rational in

  • its response. Most murder is generated by

  • insult, curse, petty infraction,

  • but this is not crazy irrationality.

  • It's adaptive irrationality. Daly and Wilson point out,

  • "in chronically feuding and warring societies an essential

  • manual--manly virtue is the capacity for violence.

  • To turn the other cheek is not saintly, but stupid or

  • contemptibly weak." If I show myself a rational

  • person when picked on or harassed, I'll be known as

  • somebody you could pick on and harass.

  • And in fact, it turns out even in the modern

  • world--This is from a New York Times I just picked up

  • a year ago today. And the point is that the

  • violence is due to people disrespecting each other or

  • giving a dirty look. And you might think "isn't that

  • irrational?" But it's not irrational in

  • circumstances where people live together in an environment where

  • they have to deal with each other over and over again,

  • and often where there's not much support by the police as

  • indications they talked about here.

  • What's particularly interesting is this sort of importance of a

  • reputation for violence differs from culture to culture.

  • And I've been talking so far in this class--and in fact,

  • so far in this course--about universals,

  • about things that are built in, things that show up across

  • humans and other animals. I want to turn now and end this

  • lecture by talking a little bit about a cultural difference.

  • And it's a psychologically interesting cultural difference

  • with regard to the emotions. And it's built around the

  • difference turning around what sociologists call "cultures of

  • honor." A culture of honor has certain

  • properties. You can't rely on the law.

  • And it has resources that are easily taken.

  • And sociologists have argued that when those conditions are

  • met it becomes important to develop a reputation for violent

  • retaliation. That becomes important.

  • Examples of culture of honors include Scottish highlanders,

  • Masai warriors, Bedouin tradesmen,

  • and Western cowboysall cases where there's resources

  • such as cattle that are vulnerable and easily taken,

  • but you can't count on calling 911 and having people come help

  • you. But the culture of honor that's

  • been studied the most by modern psychologists is the American

  • South. This was settled by herdsmen

  • and traditionally has less centralized legal control.

  • So, the sociologists say the American South has more of a

  • culture of honor than the American North.

  • But how do you know? What does that do?

  • We're interested in this class in claims about psychology.

  • So, it took Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen to study cultures of

  • honors and look at differences. And they found some interesting

  • differences. Gun laws tend to be more

  • permissive in the southern--in the American South than the

  • American North. Corporal punishment and capital

  • punishment tend to be more approved of.

  • Attitudes towards the military are more positive.

  • In questionnaire studies, people are more forgiving

  • towards cultures of honor. Somebody insults my woman and I

  • punch him in the face. This is considered less bad in

  • the American South than the American North.

  • There's a higher rate of violence but only in certain

  • circumstances. The streets of the American

  • South as a rule are not more dangerous than the American

  • North. The difference is there's a

  • higher rate of crimes that are crimes of honor such as,

  • for instance, if somebody breaks in to my

  • house, me shooting him. Or if somebody insults me,

  • me killing him. Now, this is sort of survey

  • studies. So, Nisbett and Cohen did one

  • of the more interesting psychological studies I have

  • ever heard of. And they did this

  • at--This--Sorry. This is Nisbett and Wilson.

  • They did this with University of Michigan undergraduates.

  • They did a subject pool thing like you're doing now,

  • and on it your demographic information was listed.

  • And what they did was they took white males who are not Hispanic

  • and not Jewish. That was their sample.

  • Culture of honor is a phenomena limited to males and they wanted

  • to make it sort of a clean study so they wanted to focus--get a

  • homogenous sample. So, not Hispanic, not Jewish.

  • And they provoked them. And the provocation was genius.

  • What they did was they said--they brought people in to

  • the psychology building, as you'd be brought in to

  • Kirtland or SSS or Dunham and they said--they had somebody go

  • in to the desk and they said, "Yeah.

  • Go down the hall for the experiment."

  • There was a hallway and then you walked through the hallway.

  • And walking in the other direction at that moment a

  • graduate student--a male graduate student would start to

  • walk. And he's holding some files.

  • And what he does is he bumps the person, looks at him and

  • says, "Asshole" [laughter] and keep walking.

  • Now, to be fair, the graduate student survived

  • bumping into hundreds of males, calling them assholes and then

  • walking to--Fights did not break out, nobody was shot.

  • But then they brought the men--now went in to a room and

  • they were tested. And it turned out that there

  • were differences in the stress response.

  • On average, males from the American South showed higher

  • hormone response and stress response than males in the

  • American North--increases in testosterone and cortisol.

  • There's always differences in later behavior,

  • the people--suggesting that they were made angry.

  • They gave differences in fill-in-the-blank questions,

  • for instance. I don't remember the examples

  • but it's examples like "John went to the store and bought a

  • 'blank'" and then the northerners would say "and buy

  • an apple." And the southerners would say

  • "an AK-47 [laughter] to kill that freaking graduate

  • student." [laughter]

  • Now, again, the American South--people in the American

  • South were not overall more violent than the American North,

  • but they were more sensitive to provocations of honor.

  • Now, when I gave this lecture a few years ago,

  • a southern student contacted me afterwards and said that she

  • felt that picking out the southern minority at Yale was in

  • some regard offensive and that people say things at Yale about

  • southerners--American southerners that they would

  • never say about any other minority group.

  • So, there's two points I want to make regarding this.

  • One is, of course, these are average differences.

  • Not every northerner and southerner would differ along

  • these lines. But another one is I think the

  • effect is real, but it's not entirely clear

  • that it reflects poorly on the cultures of honor as opposed to

  • the other cultures. So, Nisbett,

  • for instance, is himself a southerner and he

  • points out that he went to the North he was most astonished by

  • how rude people are. And this is because the

  • North--the American North is not particularly a culture of honor,

  • and so there's less proper behavior towards other people

  • because there's no fear of retaliation or response.

  • Moreover, the culture of honor virtues like honor,

  • loyalty, courage and self-reliance,

  • are on the face of it not necessarily bad things.

  • In any case, this is an interesting example

  • of how there's an evolutionary background but culture modifies

  • and shifts it in different ways. More generally,

  • I've suggested over the last couple of lectures that emotions

  • like fear, the love you have towards your

  • children, anger, gratitude are not aberrations

  • or noise in the system. Rather, they're exquisitely

  • complicated motivational systems that are crafted to deal with

  • the natural and social environment.

  • And we know this only from an analysis that starts from an

  • evolutionary approach. So, to bring us back to D'Arcy

  • Thompson, "everything is the way it is because it got that way."

  • And your reading response for this week is that.

  • And I'll wish you good luck on the exam on Wednesday.

  • And I'll see you there.

Professor Paul Bloom: So what we're doing today is

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12.進化と感情と理性感情、そのII (12. Evolution, Emotion, and Reason: Emotions, Part II)

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