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  • I'm going to start by talking a little bit about the history

  • of mortgage lending.

  • And then, I want to talk more recently about how we do

  • commercial real estate finance, and then, residential

  • real estate finance.

  • And then, if I have time, I'm going to try to get into

  • discussing --

  • [SIDE CONVERSATION]

  • PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: So when we talk about real estate

  • finance, it's really about financial contracts that

  • involve real estate, and that particularly use real estate

  • as collateral.

  • So, it's a very complicated history.

  • But I'd like to put things in a long-term perspective.

  • I want to start with the word mortgage.

  • It actually goes back to Latin.

  • Mortuus vadium.

  • And that means in Latin, death pledge.

  • And then, in the Middle Ages in France, they substituted

  • the French word for vadium.

  • And that's [CIRCLES GAGE ON BLACKBOARD].

  • I don't know how to pronounce it.

  • That means pledge in French.

  • And I don't know why they called them death pledges.

  • That doesn't seem to involve death to me.

  • But in the long history of these

  • institutions, it became important.

  • The Oxford English Dictionary says the word mortgage entered

  • the English language in 1283.

  • So, we've got a long history here.

  • Actually, I can take it back further than 1283.

  • I was inspired by the research of Yale historian Valerie

  • Hansen, who has been reading old documents related to the

  • silk trade.

  • And her documents are based on a trove of old documents from

  • the Tang Dynasty in China, between the 7th and 10th

  • centuries, which reflect loans that were

  • made to finance trade.

  • So, you had people going back and forth from the Middle East

  • to China with silk, and other items, and they needed

  • financing for the trade.

  • So, she reads these old documents in Chinese.

  • And I was looking over her work a little bit to see

  • whether they had mortgages.

  • She says that in China, it didn't seem, at least if I'm

  • getting her generalities right, they didn't seem to

  • mortgage property, at least in these documents.

  • But she says that among these documents are some --

  • they weren't all in Chinese, because they were trading

  • between China and many other countries.

  • So, she found some in the Sogdian language.

  • She reads all these languages.

  • It's an ancient language of what's modern day Iran.

  • And it's a dead language.

  • It died out in the ninth century.

  • But she finds some Sogdian documents

  • that look like mortgages.

  • So, some people borrowed money for their silk trade, and they

  • would mortgage their property, or their slaves.

  • You could mortgage slaves.

  • It's an awful thought.

  • And then the contracts would additionally say that you were

  • obligated to maintain the property or the slaves.

  • I guess that meant feed your slaves.

  • Keep them healthy.

  • Those were mortgages from over 1,000 years ago.

  • So, it's a very old institution.

  • But I think it formed its modern form more recently.

  • And it became a well-known term for the general public

  • maybe in the late 18th century.

  • I was trying to confirm that.

  • I'm interested in history, just out of a passion for

  • understanding origins of things.

  • So, I looked up mortgage on ProQuest to find, what were

  • they talking about.

  • And I found an article in the Hartford Courant, dated 1778.

  • Actually, it wasn't an article, it was an ad that

  • someone took out.

  • And I think it's kind of revealing of what the mortgage

  • market looked like in 1778.

  • We here in Connecticut, have -- did you know this? --

  • the oldest newspaper in America.

  • That's the Hartford Courant.

  • So, a man by the name of Elisha Cornwell took out an ad

  • in the Hartford Courant in 1778.

  • And he explains in the ad, that he sold his farm, and,

  • instead of taking the money right up front, he'd mortgaged

  • the farm, so that he sold it for GBP 800 to another farmer.

  • And the farmer was promising to pay him.

  • And if he didn't pay him, he should get back the farm.

  • The farmer subsequently mortgaged the same

  • farm for GBP 880.

  • So he's made GBP 80 profit.

  • Which would all be fine and good, except he still hadn't

  • paid back the first mortgage.

  • And then the guy mortgaged it again for GBP 1,000.

  • And Mr. Cornwell is protesting: "Hey, you didn't

  • pay me for the farm in the first place, so you

  • don't own the farm.

  • How are you mortgaging it multiple times? " So he said,

  • "I thought I better put an ad in the newspaper, so that any

  • subsequent victims of this farmer, would be warned." So,

  • that's the end of the ad.

  • He said, "this is my farm because he didn't pay me."

  • But this shows how undeveloped mortgage

  • institutions were in 1778.

  • Because he had to put an ad in the newspaper to explain that.

  • The problem was that nobody had any systematic way of

  • representing title.

  • The farmer, who supposedly bought it from Mr. Cornwell

  • really didn't, and nobody would know that.

  • You know, he could fool people.

  • I think that's partly why you didn't see so many mortgages

  • in those days.

  • Because the law wasn't clear.

  • The institutions were not clear about property.

  • And so, you couldn't really do a mortgage business, if you

  • couldn't find out whether the guy mortgaging the farm really

  • owned it or not.

  • And so, it wasn't until the late 19th century that

  • government started to get rights to property

  • sufficiently advanced that we could develop a big national

  • or international market in mortgages.

  • So, an important step is in Germany, in 1872, or Prussia,

  • the government created a Grundbuch law that created a

  • system for Prussia that established in a central book,

  • who owns what exactly.

  • That was in 1872.

  • And in 1897, they made it a national German institution.

  • Still, the United States did not have a

  • Grundbuch at the time.

  • It developed throughout the 20th century in different

  • countries of the world, that property rights would be clear

  • enough that one could do a mortgage lending business.

  • So that's, why I think mortgage lending has really

  • taken off in the 20th century.

  • Hernando de Soto was a Peruvian economist. He wrote a

  • book a few years ago called Mystery of Capital.

  • And it's about the developing world.

  • He argued in that book that property rights, the problems

  • that we just heard about from the Hartford Courant are still

  • very big and alive around the world today.

  • That you can't easily establish who owns what in

  • many or most countries of the world.

  • So, that's a problem.

  • That's why we don't see mortgage

  • finance developing there.

  • You can't make a loan.

  • You know, if you go to some small town in some less

  • developed country, you can ask around, "who owns this

  • property?" And they'll tell you, "that's been in the such

  • and such family for a long time." But if you want solid

  • knowledge of that, if you're going to base financial

  • transactions on it, you can't base it just on hearsay.

  • Someone else might have a different opinion.

  • So even today, in many countries of the world, the

  • laws are not developed well enough.

  • We don't have property rights established well enough.

  • And we have laws that might inhibit mortgages.

  • For example, in many countries, if you give a

  • mortgage on a property, in other words, if you lend on a

  • property, and the person doesn't pay, you're supposed

  • to be able to seize the property, right?

  • But if the court system doesn't function well, or if

  • it's kind of left leaning and supporting the rights of the

  • person living in the home, you might not be able to get it.

  • Or it might take you 10 years to get the guy

  • thrown out of the house.

  • Now, it seems cruel to throw someone out of a house, who

  • doesn't pay on their mortgage, but you have to think of the

  • other side of it.

  • If we don't throw them out of the house, no one's going to

  • make a mortgage.

  • You have to be able to get the house.

  • Right?

  • That's the idea of the mortage.

  • The guy doesn't pay, the lender gets the house.

  • And so, I think there's a general process of

  • development, improving the definition of property rights,

  • and improving the ability of lenders to get the property if

  • it fails, which accounts for the advance of mortgage

  • lending in the 20th and 21st century.

  • So, that's my long history of mortgage lending.

  • But I want to get into some specific institutions.

  • I said, I would start with commercial real estate and

  • then I'll move to single-family homes or

  • residential real estate.

  • I will to talk now mostly about the United States.

  • There's just too many countries to think about.

  • One thing about finance is that it tends to develop a

  • sort of tradition, and a sort of standard contract.

  • It's encouraged by laws and regulators.

  • You have to do the same sort of contract that other people

  • are doing in your country.

  • And I think the standardization is kind of a

  • limitation.

  • We can't be creative in financing, because the public

  • and the regulators will not be receptive to new things.

  • Let me talk about some of the institutions in finance in the

  • United States.

  • It's natural to start with commercial real estate.

  • So, you see a lot of buildings.

  • My question is, how are they owned?

  • I don't know whether you think about this.

  • Who owns these buildings?

  • In much of the 20th century and still today, they tend to

  • be owned as partnerships.

  • Real estate partnerships, which is different from a

  • corporation.

  • In a corporation --

  • we talked about that yesterday [correction: last class]--

  • you might sell shares on the stock exchange if it's public.

  • And it's defined as a legal person.

  • And it has limited liability, so that all the shareholders

  • don't have to worry about being sued as a result.

  • But a partnership is different.

  • And most real estate, that's not part of a larger business,

  • is owned in a partnership, rather than a corporation.

  • And the reason is that they're taxed more favorably.

  • Corporations have to pay a corporate profits tax.

  • They're double-taxed.

  • You as an individual pay an income tax, and your

  • corporation pays a corporate income tax, or corporate

  • profits tax.

  • So, you're taxed twice.

  • If you incorporate yourself, or you set up some friends to

  • do business in a corporation, you get taxed twice.

  • So, you don't like that, and obviously you

  • try to avoid that.

  • The way to avoid it is not to have a corporation, but a

  • partnership.

  • The law allows you to form

  • partnerships to own a building.

  • So, you're building like 360 State Street.

  • It's a new building that just went up in New Haven.

  • You know this building?

  • The biggest construction.

  • Does anyone know who owns it?

  • It's probably a partnership.

  • I haven't investigated that.

  • Or it's called a Direct Participation Program.

  • So, the partnership is an investment that is offered

  • only to accredited investors.

  • It's not generally available to the general public.

  • And what is an accredited investor?

  • The Securities and Exchange Commission takes it upon

  • itself to define, who are accredited investors that

  • don't need the protections of the SEC.

  • Basically, accredited investors are wealthy people.

  • And it's defined in the SEC laws who is accredited.

  • You have to have at least $1 million, or minimum income.

  • And so, if you are an accredited investor, you can

  • invest in a DPP.

  • And then, the income of the property flows through to you

  • as your personal income.

  • It's not corporate income, so it's taxed only once.

  • Think about that.

  • Well, why would anyone want to form a corporation?

  • Because I don't want to be taxed twice.

  • So, why don't we do all business as a DPP, as a

  • partnership?

  • The problem is that the government doesn't want you to

  • do that, and so they have rules about what can form a

  • partnership.

  • One of the rules is that they have to have a limited life.

  • So, a corporation goes on forever.

  • And it derives a lot of its value from the fact that it

  • lives forever.

  • There's no end date.

  • So, we talked about that when I when I brought up the first

  • real corporation, the Dutch East India Company.

  • The reason it got so valuable is, people could see that this

  • was growing as the first multinational --

  • It is this huge company that had all kinds of deals and

  • alliances and business arrangements.

  • And no one wanted that to end.

  • The value came in the growth prospects for that.

  • But a DPP has to end.

  • It's well-designed for a building.

  • You buy the building, and you depreciate it over the life of

  • the contract.

  • And then there's an end date, and at the end date you sell

  • the building to someone else, and then you

  • close down the DPP.

  • You don't hear about these partnerships as much.

  • You hear about corporations all the time.

  • You don't hear about DPP's.

  • First of all, because they don't get so big.

  • They're typically one building.

  • 360 State, for example.

  • And it only lasts for 10, 20 years, then it's gone.

  • So, it doesn't get advertised in the public, because it's

  • not available to the public.

  • They can't go around trying to bring you in as an investor,

  • because they have to verify that you're

  • an accredited investor.

  • So, it tends to be a project for wealthy people.

  • Now, I mentioned that corporations

  • have limited liability.

  • Partnerships do not, in general.

  • But you can have a partnership that involves

  • two classes of partners.

  • There's a general partner that runs the business and does not

  • have limited liability.

  • In other words, if the business goes bad and loses

  • money, the general partner can get sued.

  • But there are other partners, called limited partners, and

  • they have to be passive investors.

  • And they have limited liability.

  • So what often happens, is a DPP is created by someone who

  • understands and knows real estate.

  • Let's get 360 State Street built.

  • You're going to know that eventually, because once they

  • open, they're going to open a supermarket on the first floor

  • of 360 State.

  • And I bet some of you will be over there.

  • It would be the closest supermarket to Yale

  • University.

  • But it's all part of somebody's plan.

  • There was some general partner who thought up this structure,

  • and got limited partners in, and is managing the building,

  • or hires a manager for the building, and has a plan and a

  • close out plan.

  • The building won't disappear, but they'll sell

  • it to someone else.

  • I really don't know the financing

  • structure of 360 State.

  • But I'm just pointing out, it's likely

  • what's happened there.

  • So, that has been the modern structure of real estate.

  • And if they mortgage the building, the DPP would

  • mortgage the building on behalf of the partners.

  • So, real estate finance in the United States --

  • I might as well write it down.

  • DPP is a Direct Participation Program.

  • And it's direct, in the sense that you as an investor are

  • participating directly in the profits of it.

  • You are a partner, you are not a shareholder.

  • The DPPs became criticized in the 20th century, because

  • small investors couldn't access these.

  • Small investors were confined, because they weren't

  • accredited, they weren't big enough or important enough.

  • They were not allowed to invest in these.

  • It was supposed to be to protect them, I guess.

  • But how does it protect them to subject them to

  • double-taxation?

  • So, it became a cause that why in the United States do we

  • have most of our investors closed out of these lucrative

  • investment opportunities?

  • Basically, individuals couldn't invest in commercial

  • real estate.

  • And people said, well people are supposed to diversify,

  • they are supposed to hold different kinds of

  • investments.

  • So, why would this be limited to them?

  • So, Congress in the United States, in 1960, created

  • something new called a real --

  • [SIDE CONVERSATION]

  • PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: Real Estate Investment Trusts.

  • Or abbreviated REITs.

  • These were created in 1960 by an act of the U.S. Congress.

  • And it was another example of the

  • democratization of finance.

  • And I believe it started here in the United States.

  • Now, they're being copied all over the world.

  • They got off to kind of a slow start after 1960, but they

  • have grown dramatically.

  • The idea is that we will allow a trust to create investments

  • for the general public, for small investors.

  • And they won't be double-taxed, either.

  • So, a Real Estate Investment Trust has to follow the law,

  • and then it can invest in buildings.

  • So, maybe 360 State is owned by a REIT.

  • I don't know.

  • But they are not subject to the corporate profits tax.

  • Now once again, once Congress creates a vehicle that's not

  • taxed, everyone is going to ask, well, I want my company

  • to be a REIT.

  • So, they had to define it so that

  • isn't generally available.

  • It's limited to real estate.

  • So the law says, 75% of the assets of the company have to

  • be in real estate or cash.

  • 75% of the income has to be from real estate.

  • 90% of their income must be from real estate dividend,

  • interest, and capital gains.

  • This is all, I think, in your textbook Fabozzi et al.

  • 95% of the income must be paid out.

  • And there has to be a long-term holder.

  • No more than 30% of the income can be from the sale of

  • properties held less than four years.

  • They don't want real estate churning companies.

  • So, if you define [correction: satisfy]

  • all of that, you've got a REIT.

  • So, that invention, which goes back to 1960 --

  • It's one of those things in finance.

  • It starts out slowly, and most people don't hear of it, and

  • then it starts to grow.

  • And now they're everywhere around the world.

  • Well, maybe not everywhere, but in many

  • countries we have REITs.

  • The U.S. REITs grew in a succession of booms. The first

  • boom was in the late 1960s, when the interest rates in the

  • United States rose above deposit ceilings.

  • There used to be ceilings that the government imposed on

  • savings banks deposit rates.

  • And so suddenly, the REITS were paying better than the

  • savings bank, and the public flocked to them.

  • There was a second boom, after the tax reform of 1986

  • eliminated some tax advantages of DPPs, partnerships.

  • It used to be that the government allowed generous

  • depreciation allowances for partnerships.

  • And people would invest in buildings just as tax dodges.

  • Because if you're allowed to depreciate the building very

  • effectively, you can kind of cook your profits, so that

  • it's not taxable.

  • And so, people we're investing in buildings too much.

  • The government created a distortion that encouraged too

  • much investment in DPPs.

  • So in 1986, the government eliminated a lot of the

  • advantages of partnerships.

  • And that caused the second REIT boom.

  • And then, it was starting in the 1990s with the real estate

  • boom that suddenly lots of new kinds of REITs appeared.

  • And REITs that involved specialized

  • properties, and the like.

  • Now they're big, and everyone talks about them.

  • But it's interesting to me that it took 50 years to get

  • as big as they are now.

  • And the recurring theme here -- a couple of them --

  • One is that the finance industry finds it difficult to

  • innovate, and innovations take many years to happen.

  • And secondly, that there there's a trend toward the

  • democratization of finance.

  • That if you go back in history, you'll find these

  • same mortgages and partnerships and the like, but

  • they were limited to a small number of wealthy people.

  • And we're moving.

  • With the invention of REITs for example, more and more

  • people are getting involved.

  • So, that's commercial real estate.

  • I want to talk now about residential real estate, which

  • is actually bigger.

  • There are more houses than there are office buildings in

  • this country.

  • Or there's more value in houses.

  • So this is bigger.

  • In the United States, about 2/3 of households

  • own their own home.

  • It varies across countries, but there are many other

  • countries with similarly high home ownership rates.

  • And this home ownership is a product of government policy

  • that encourages mortgage lending.

  • So, I want to talk a little bit about the history of

  • mortgage lending, and the history of problems in

  • mortgage lending.

  • I already took you back to the silk trade in the Tang

  • Dynasty, but I'm going to be less so far back.

  • I'm going to talk about the United States and the Great

  • Depression.

  • So, the Great Depression.

  • The United States in the 1930s after the 1929 Stock Market

  • Crash was faced with a severe housing crisis.

  • Home prices were falling, and people were defaulting on

  • their mortgages in great numbers.

  • In fact, the government had to create what they called the

  • Homeowners Loan Corporations to bail people out, and they

  • ended up bailing out 20% of American homeowners.

  • It was a terrible crisis, and so, what was happening?

  • I am pointing this out, because it's important in the

  • history of real estate finance.

  • Before the Great Depression, mortgages were growing.

  • Before the Great Depression, they tended to be two to five

  • years, and they were balloon payment.

  • What do I mean by that?

  • When you bought a house in 1920, you would go to a bank

  • and they would give you a loan for two to five years.

  • So, if you bought a house for $10,000, they would typically

  • lend you half the money.

  • They would lend you $5,000.

  • And the loan would say, you pay interest every month until

  • two years has ended, and then you'd repay the $5,000.

  • And then, you can try to get another mortgage.

  • You come back to us and we'll do it again, if

  • we feel like it.

  • That was the deal.

  • Banks offered that, and it was becoming an increasingly

  • common thing.

  • When we say a balloon payment, what we mean

  • is, it's really big.

  • Balloons are big.

  • So, you're paying monthly interest, but then in two

  • years you have got to come up with the whole $5,000.

  • But people thought, it's all right, I'll just go back to

  • the bank, or maybe I'll go to another bank.

  • You know I can go wherever I want and I can borrow $5,000.

  • So, this was the way things were done.

  • But what happened in the Great Depression?

  • Two things happened.

  • Unemployment rate went up to 25%, A. B, home prices fell in

  • many cases by more than half.

  • So, if you borrowed $5,000 against a $10,000 home, your

  • home might be worth only $4,000 now.

  • So, what do you do now?

  • You go to a bank.

  • Two years is up.

  • I have got to refinance my mortgage.

  • I go back to the bank.

  • I show up and I say, A, I'm unemployed and my house is

  • worth $4,000.

  • The bank says no dice, you're not going to get renewed.

  • So, what happens?

  • You're forced to dump your house on the market.

  • You declare bankruptcy.

  • You've lost everything.

  • You've lost your $5,000 down payment.

  • If you buy a $10,000 house, and you borrow $5,000, then

  • the other sum is called your down payment.

  • So, that's what happened.

  • It was happening to millions of Americans.

  • So, the Roosevelt Administration decided that

  • there was something wrong with the old kind of mortgage.

  • So, in 1934, a year after Franklin Roosevelt became

  • President, they set up the Federal Housing

  • Administration.

  • And it was trying to get lenders back in to lend to

  • homeowners, because it was a catastrophe in the country.

  • [SIDE CONVERSATION]

  • PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: So, in order to get lenders back

  • in, the FHA started insuring mortgages.

  • And that meant that if you're a mortgage lender, and the

  • person you lent the money to doesn't repay you, and the

  • house isn't worth enough --

  • you can get the house, but sometimes you might lose

  • money, because the house has lost value --

  • the government will make it up.

  • So, the government came in with what's

  • called mortgage insurance.

  • And at the same time, the government said all mortgages

  • that are insured by the FHA must be 15 years or longer.

  • And so, the U.S. government imposed the long-term mortgage

  • on the mortgage industry.

  • And they said, this is better.

  • And secondly, it cannot be a balloon payment mortgage.

  • The government said, this is really imposing too much on

  • ordinary people that they have to come up with a huge sum of

  • money at the end of the mortgage.

  • So, they required that the mortgages be 15-year

  • amortizing.

  • Such mortgages had been offered already by some banks

  • in the United States in the 1920s, but it was innovative

  • finance, and too complicated for most people.

  • They never caught on.

  • To amortize means to pay down the balance.

  • So, an amortizing mortgage has no balloon payment at the end.

  • A 15-year amortizing mortgage has a fixed monthly payment.

  • You make it every single month.

  • And at the end, you're done.

  • You take your spouse out to dinner and you say, we paid

  • off our mortgage, we're done.

  • So, there's no family crisis at the end.

  • It's a fixed monthly payment.

  • Now the arithmetic of amortizing mortgages is a

  • little confusing to some people, and in 1934, it took

  • some education.

  • But I want to just describe the

  • amortizing mortgage system.

  • So, we're going to have a mortgage of maturity --

  • The maturity of the mortgage is in M, and that's in months.

  • So, in 1934, they started out with 15-year mortgages, which

  • I thought was pretty aggressive, but by the early

  • 1950s, the FHA was emphasizing 30-year mortgages.

  • That's a long time to pay off on your house.

  • But the idea is, you know, you're typical family, they

  • get married, and they're buying their first house,

  • they're 25 years old.

  • So, let's give them a full 30 years to pay off the mortgage.

  • They'll be 55.

  • Kids will be going off to college.

  • They'll still be working.

  • That's a comfortable length of time.

  • Why not give them 30 years?

  • And we guarantee the interest rate for 30 years.

  • No surprises.

  • You just know you have this monthly payment.

  • The question now is, how do we decide on the monthly payment?

  • The idea of an amortizing mortgage is that you have a

  • fixed payment every month.

  • You have an interest rate.

  • And you want to make sure that the present value of the

  • monthly payments equals the mortgage

  • balance at the beginning.

  • So, the initial mortgage balance, that's the amount you

  • borrow, has to equal present discounted value of all the

  • monthly payments.

  • So, what will I call the monthly payment?

  • Let's call the monthly payment x, it's the

  • monthly payment in dollars.

  • So, the mortgage balance is equal to x all over r over 12,

  • where r is the annual interest rate, times 1 minus 1 all over

  • 1 plus r over 12 to the Mth power.

  • That's just the annuity formula.

  • So, that's the formula that's used to compute --

  • I've shown you that formula before.

  • It's the present value of a stream of payments equal to x.

  • Did I write r over 2?

  • I meant r over 12.

  • So, what you have to do if you are calculating an amortizing

  • mortgage, if the person is borrowing the mortgage

  • balance, and I quote a rate r per year, I have to plug that

  • into the present value formula, and find out what

  • monthly payment x makes the present value equal to the

  • amount loaned.

  • Now, that is a little bit of arithmetic that mortgage

  • lenders would have had trouble doing.

  • It is not that hard to do, right?

  • But I have here a page from a mortgage table.

  • I found this in the Yale Library.

  • Can you read that?

  • This is from a 50-year-old book.

  • This is before they had computers.

  • And so, it was too hard to do this calculation.

  • Can you read it in the back?

  • Sort of.

  • This is for a 10-year mortgage.

  • I just picked 10 years.

  • That was uncommon, that's rather short.

  • Some people would get shorter mortgages,

  • especially older people.

  • You know if you're 60 years old, you don't

  • want a 30-year mortgage.

  • You probably won't live that long.

  • So, they did give out shorter mortgages as well.

  • So, this is the page from a mortgage book for 10 years,

  • and this is for a 5% mortgage.

  • So, it shows the monthly payment for $1,000.

  • If someone's borrowing $5,000, you'd multiply this by five.

  • They show it for around $1,000.

  • And the monthly payment per $1,000 is $10.61.

  • So, what they've done is they've found out $10.61 is

  • the x that makes this present value for r

  • equal 5% equal to $1,000.

  • They've done exactly this calculation.

  • Now, they show the payments schedule.

  • The payment every month is $10.61.

  • But what this table shows, is the break down between

  • amortization and interest. So, it shows the principal for

  • each month.

  • So, at the beginning you borrow $1,000 on this

  • mortgage, and you're paying $10.61 per month.

  • So, each month your balance goes down.

  • In this balance column, they subtract --

  • well, the question is, how do you figure it out?

  • You're paying $10.61 per month, but part of that is

  • interest. What part of that is interest?

  • Well it's 5% divided by 12 of the $1,000

  • balance at the beginning.

  • Your initial interest is $4.17, so your principle is

  • the $10.61 minus the interest. So then, that

  • reduces your balance.

  • So, the initial interest is $4.17, the principal is $6.44,

  • then the balance is $993.56 after one month.

  • The next month, they figure what fraction of your payment

  • is interest by multiplying 5% over 12 times the balance,

  • $993.56, and then that comes out to be $4.14 interest. You

  • see the interest is going to be going down, because you're

  • paying off the loan.

  • But your payment is fixed, so the payment against principal

  • is going up.

  • So, the first month was $4.17 interest, the next month is

  • $4.14 interest.

  • Offsetting that is in the first month, the $6.44 being

  • used to pay off your mortgage.

  • The second month it's more, $6.47.

  • I couldn't show the whole page here, but here after six years

  • six months your interest is down to $1.74, because your

  • balance is down to $407.61.

  • And so, your payment of principal is much higher.

  • The reason this table is important is that people move

  • and they sell their house early.

  • They don't hold it for the full 10 years.

  • So, you have to figure out when someone sells his house

  • after six years six months, what do they still owe?

  • Well, they now owe, instead of $1,000, they owe $407.61.

  • So, that's the idea of a long-term mortgage.

  • Your interest payments are changing all the time, your

  • principal payments are changing all the time, but

  • your total payment is fixed.

  • That was an invention, a financial innovation in 1934.

  • This is called a conventional fixed rate mortgage, and it's

  • now offered in many countries of the world.

  • However, there's only two countries where it's the major

  • kind of mortgage.

  • United States and Denmark.

  • This is a strange thing.

  • This invention has not caught on around the world.

  • It's unique to only two countries, although you can

  • get it in other countries.

  • It's not available in Canada in any number, I guess you

  • could find it, but it's not common elsewhere.

  • Every time I go to a foreign country, I ask the people

  • there, why don't you have fixed rate mortgages?

  • I don't necessarily get good answers.

  • I've been trying to understand why it hasn't caught on.

  • Then I recently saw that Alistair Darling, who was

  • under the Labour government --

  • [SIDE CONVERSATION]

  • PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: Alistair Darling was

  • Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom until the

  • Conservative government took over.

  • He issued a statement saying that U.K. should finally adopt

  • the long-term mortgage.

  • The problem is that any country, that doesn't have a

  • long-term fixed rate mortgage, runs the risk of falling into

  • the same problem that the United States did in the Great

  • Depression.

  • Some kind of crisis like that could mean that people would

  • lose their homes in great numbers.

  • So, he said he'd like to see the U.K. get people borrowing

  • at 10, 20, or even 25 years for their mortgages.

  • But instead what happened was, the Conservative

  • government took over.

  • But you can, in the U.K., get long-term mortgages.

  • I think it's true in most countries of the world.

  • They're just not common there.

  • It's a bit of a puzzle.

  • Why is it that only two countries do this generally?

  • I have a couple of reasons to offer why it is.

  • One of them is that the general public is resistant to

  • long-term mortgages, because they charge a higher interest.

  • If the lender is going to guarantee it for 30 years,

  • they're going to have to charge you a higher rate,

  • because that guarantee costs something to them.

  • And consumers are resistant to paying the higher rate.

  • And that's part of the problem.

  • The other part of the problem is that bank regulators might

  • not encourage banks to make these loans, because it's

  • risky for banks.

  • If banks tie their money up for 30 years, and then they

  • have depositors who can withdraw their money at

  • anytime, the banks could go under, if there was ever a run

  • on the banks.

  • They can't liquidate these mortgages fast at all.

  • So, you need a coordinated effort of a government to

  • first make sure the regulators accept these concepts.

  • And it puts some risk on the public of the possible bailout

  • of the banking system.

  • And then, you have to get past public resistance.

  • You have to make the public understand that, when you get

  • a fixed rate mortgage, it's a clean contract.

  • We have no worries for 30 years.

  • As opposed to problems that have sometimes occurred.

  • In Canada, in 1980, the interest rates shot way up,

  • and we had a duplicate of the problem that we saw in the

  • U.S. People couldn't afford to refinance their mortgages, and

  • a lot of people lost their homes.

  • And so, it was a big problem.

  • But they somehow got through that, and they're not really

  • thinking about fixed rate mortgages in

  • Canada even now, today.

  • I wanted to go on talking about innovation in finance.

  • Another very important innovation is securitization

  • of mortgages, and government support of mortgage markets.

  • In the United States, in 1938, the federal government, this

  • is also the Roosevelt Administration, set up the

  • Federal National Mortgage Administration, which was a

  • government agency that would buy mortgages to support the

  • mortgage market.

  • On Wall Street they couldn't pronounce Federal National

  • Mortgage --

  • or is it Association?

  • I'm sorry, it's Association not Administration.

  • You know what they called it on Wall Sreet?

  • They called it Fannie Mae.

  • That was just an irreverent short name for the

  • Association.

  • It was run by the government.

  • However, in the year 1968, the U.S. government privatized

  • Fannie Mae, and it became a private corporation.

  • So what did Fannie Mae do?

  • It would buy mortgages from banks.

  • They were trying to encourage the mortgage market.

  • So, a bank would lend money to someone to buy a house, and

  • then they're done.

  • They can't loan any more money unless

  • they raise more deposits.

  • Well, Fannie Mae would buy the mortgage from them, and they'd

  • have money again to lend again.

  • They did this in '38, because we were still in the

  • Depression, and the housing market was still depressed.

  • They weren't building homes.

  • There were lots of unemployed construction workers.

  • And so, Roosevelt was just thinking how can we stimulate

  • the economy?

  • And this was one of their ideas.

  • So, Fannie Mae was the mortgage finance giant that

  • was created in 1968 [correction: created in 1938,

  • privatized in 1968].

  • [SIDE CONVERSATION]

  • PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: In 1970, the government created

  • another Fannie-Mae-like institution.

  • Its official name was Federal Home Loan Mortgage

  • Corporation.

  • Wall Street had to invent a name for it.

  • So, they called it Freddie Mac.

  • They thought, well, we gave a girl's name to Fannie Mae,

  • let's give a boy's name.

  • I guess that's a boy's name.

  • Both of these organizations are private companies now,

  • created by the government, and they both use these names

  • officially now.

  • So, that's their name now.

  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

  • Freddie Mac was initially different.

  • Because what the government asked Freddie Mac to do, was

  • buy mortgages, and then repackage them as mortgage

  • securities, and sell them off with a Freddie Mac guarantee.

  • So, once Freddie Mac started doing this, Fannie Mae said,

  • well, can't we do that too?

  • So, they both do it.

  • So, what the government had done is create two private

  • corporations.

  • You kind of wonder why did the government even do that?

  • Anyone can create --

  • Remember we have a corporate law.

  • I can start my own Freddie Mac.

  • My own Fannie Mae.

  • But the government did create them by privatizing Fannie Mae

  • and by creating Freddie Mac.

  • And they are both in the mortgage

  • securitization business.

  • So, they would buy from mortgage originators --

  • the people who lend the money.

  • They'd buy the mortgages.

  • In other words, they would take the IOU from someone.

  • They'd repackage them into securities, and sell them off

  • to the public with a guarantee from Fannie or Freddie, that,

  • if there were a default, the mortgage extra balance would

  • be made up by Fannie or Freddie.

  • Well, they did then get other companies, called mortgage

  • insurers, to insure at least part of the balance.

  • It's a complicated financial agreement.

  • But what we had was private companies created by the U.S.

  • government, that created securities for investors that

  • were guaranteed against default,

  • and based on mortgages.

  • So, the government then also stated that these are private

  • companies and the U.S. government does not stand

  • behind them.

  • People started to say the government created these two

  • corporations, and now they're securitizing and guaranteeing

  • trillions of dollars of mortgages.

  • Is this going to come back and end up being

  • paid for by the taxpayer?

  • So, the government stated clearly, these are now private

  • corporations.

  • Fannie Mae started out as part of the

  • government, but no longer.

  • Now, it's a private corporation.

  • And if Fannie Mae goes bankrupt, woe be tied to

  • anyone who bought their securities, because their

  • guarantee is not backed up by the federal government.

  • So people complained, though.

  • They said, you're saying that it's not backed up by the

  • federal government, but do you really mean that?

  • If Fannie or Freddie goes bankrupt, will the U.S.

  • government just let them go under?

  • Well, the official statement was, yes, the government will

  • let them go under.

  • Guess what happened?

  • In 2008, the real estate market crashed and we had our

  • first housing crisis that was similar to the Great

  • Depression.

  • And in that housing crisis, both Fannie and

  • Freddie went bankrupt.

  • And now, what do we do?

  • We're in the Bush Administration.

  • Republican.

  • They don't particularly like bailouts.

  • So you think, of course, George W. Bush would just --

  • it's the law, right?

  • The federal government's not going to bail them out.

  • But then some people said, wait a minute, you know all

  • over the world people are investing in these, thinking

  • that Fannie Mae was created by the U.S. government.

  • In particular a lot of Chinese, those poor innocent

  • Chinese, are trusting the Americans, and they put many

  • billions of dollars into Fannie Mae.

  • Are you going to go and tell the Chinese?

  • Sorry, we won't back it.

  • Well, someone can say, sure, go tell them that.

  • It's what we've been saying all along.

  • But then the Chinese could come back and say, well,

  • you've been saying that, but nobody believed you.

  • Everyone knew that that wasn't right.

  • And the federal government didn't take all the right

  • steps to make it really clear.

  • For example, the Wall Street Journal used to list Fannie

  • Mae bonds and Freddie Mac bonds in a section of the

  • newspaper entitled ''Government Securities.'' And

  • that's the Wall Street Journal.

  • That's not the government talking.

  • But, the U.S. government should have come in and told

  • them, no, those are not government.

  • So, we poor, innocent, Chinese investors, we've read your

  • paper and it said Government Securities.

  • Now George Bush could've said, tough luck.

  • You guys should have read the fine print, but he didn't.

  • Why not?

  • Because it jeopardizes too much.

  • If the U.S. government lets these agencies that it created

  • go bankrupt, and it lets all those people all over the

  • world down who invested in those securities.

  • They're going to be mad.

  • We have a reputation.

  • The United States is able to raise so much money from all

  • over the world, because they think that it's safe here, and

  • if we just let these fail it's not going to look right.

  • So, the U.S. government took them both under

  • conservatorship, and is paying their debts, so

  • those do not default.

  • What we've learned from this lesson is that you can say a

  • million times that you're not going to guarantee something,

  • but eventually you end up guaranteeing it.

  • I wanted to say something about other

  • countries a little bit.

  • Canada has something like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

  • called the Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation.

  • And so, I'll just talk about other countries.

  • The Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation.

  • It was created by the government of Canada, and it

  • does work that resembles the FHA and that

  • resembles Fannie Mae.

  • But it's owned by the Canadian government.

  • It's not privatized.

  • And so, you might say, well, it's the same in Canada.

  • But the big difference is, it's smaller.

  • They didn't let it get as big as Fannie and Freddie.

  • So, it isn't heard as much from.

  • I was a keynote speaker at a conference on February 3

  • [addition: 2011],

  • that the Financial Times organized in New York called

  • Focus on Canada.

  • And I had to give a talk about Canada to New York investors.

  • They told me there were hardly any Canadians in the audience.

  • What are we doing here in New York talking about Canada?

  • Well, it's because the Americans

  • invest heavily in Canada.

  • So, I was up talking to all these American people, and I

  • was looking at Canada, and the Canada banking system.

  • And I said to the group, Canada and America are just so

  • similar I can't see much of a difference.

  • Canada didn't have Fannie and Freddie.

  • It didn't have these housing problems. But the worldwide

  • recession hit Canada pretty hard.

  • And so I said, Canada and U.S. are kind of like

  • two peas in a pod.

  • They are so similar.

  • People like to make much of differences, but the Canadian

  • economy just moves up and down in lockstep.

  • And I also said, Canada was saved by the oil crisis, being

  • an oil exporter.

  • In 2008, remember when the oil prices shot up?

  • But little to my knowledge, there was a reporter for the

  • Financial Post in Canada in the audience.

  • And my talk got reported in the Financial Post. And then I

  • went on their website and there was

  • angry blogs from Canadians.

  • I don't think it's so insulting to Canada to say

  • that we're just basically similar.

  • And I have say this for Canada, they did not get so

  • gung-ho on supporting mortgages as the United States

  • did, so they didn't have such a big housing bubble

  • that the U.S. did.

  • Part of the reason the U.S. had a housing bubble as big as

  • it did is that these guys really weren't independent.

  • They were taking orders from the government.

  • The government was telling them to increase their lending

  • to low-income, underserved communities.

  • They were promoting the bubble.

  • And so, Fannie and Freddie were told to promote lending

  • to houses during the real estate bubble that preceded

  • the crisis.

  • That didn't happen, at least not so much, in Canada.

  • So, they've had less of a bubble.

  • But still the two countries are basically very similar.

  • The textbook talks a lot about mortgage securities.

  • I expect you to read this out of Fabozzi et al.

  • I actually got complaints in past years.

  • Students found this the least enjoyable part of the readings

  • for this course.

  • But you should know about these things.

  • We have securities called Collateralized Mortgage

  • Obligations.

  • These are mortgage securities that

  • are sold off to investors.

  • And they hold mortgages, but, as is explained in Fabozzi et

  • al., they will divide them into separate tranches, or

  • separate securities, in terms of prepayment risk.

  • That is that there's a risk that the mortgages will be

  • paid off early in times when it's adverse to

  • the investor interests.

  • So, they would divide up the risks into different classes

  • of securities.

  • And some of them were rated AAA by the rating agencies,

  • because they thought there was almost no risk to those

  • securities.

  • And others were rated differently.

  • And these CMOs were sold to investors all over the world.

  • Another kind of security, which the textbook talks

  • about, is a CDO, which is a Collateralized Debt

  • Obligation.

  • These are issued to investors, and they typically hold

  • mortgage securities as their assets.

  • Many of them held subprime mortgages in recent years,

  • mortgages that were issued against subprime borrowers.

  • A lot of these securities that were rated very highly by the

  • rating agencies, rated AAA, ended up defaulting and losing

  • money for their investors.

  • And the investors were all over the world.

  • The United States is a leader in mortgage finance.

  • And companies in the United States, not just Fannie and

  • Freddie, but lots of companies were issuing mortgage

  • securities that had AAA ratings, which meant that

  • Moody's and Standard and Poor's and the other rating

  • agencies were telling you basically

  • there's no risk to them.

  • And so, people in Europe, in Asia, were investing in these,

  • and they thought they were perfectly safe, and then they

  • went under.

  • Part of it was bad faith dealings

  • by some of the issuers.

  • Some of the issuers themselves doubted that these mortgages

  • were so safe.

  • But what do I care?

  • This is what happened.

  • It's gotten to be a complicated set of steps.

  • Somebody originates the mortgage.

  • That means I talk to the homeowner.

  • I have the homeowner fill out the papers.

  • Then, after they've originated the mortgage, they sell it to

  • an investor, like Fannie or Freddie or some private

  • mortgage securitizer.

  • And the private mortgage securitizer finds a mortgage

  • servicer, it may be the originator, who will then

  • service the mortgage.

  • What does it mean to service the mortgage?

  • It means to call you on the phone if you've missed your

  • payment, for example.

  • Or if you have questions about the mortgage, there should be

  • someone you call.

  • So, the mortgage servicer does that.

  • That's a separate entity.

  • And then we have the CMO originator, then we have the

  • CDO originator.

  • It's gotten to be a very complicated financial system.

  • And then the whole thing collapsed.

  • So, there's been a lot of reform to try to see, what can

  • we do to prevent this kind of collapse?

  • Some people would say, let's end the whole thing.

  • Let's go back to 1778.

  • Let's not have mortgage securitizers.

  • But that's not the steps that have been taken.

  • I think that we are making progress.

  • But I want to just conclude with just a little reference

  • to one important change that was made in both Europe and

  • the United States.

  • The European Parliament passed a new directive that requires,

  • or incentivizes, mortgage originators to keep 5% of the

  • mortgage balance in their own portfolio.

  • That means, if you originate mortgages, you can sell off

  • 95% of the mortgages to investors, but you

  • have to keep 5%.

  • So, this 5% limit was then later incorporated into the

  • Dodd-Frank Act in the United States.

  • So, we again have the same requirement.

  • And this is supposed to reduce the moral hazard problem that

  • created the crisis, and retain the mortgage

  • securitization process.

  • So, the idea is this --

  • And I know, I heard people tell me.

  • Mortgage originators sometimes got cynical.

  • They thought, OK, I'm helping this

  • family fill out a mortgage.

  • What do I care?

  • This family doesn't look like they're not

  • going to pay this back.

  • But what do I care?

  • I'll fill it out.

  • I'll sell the mortgage to someone else,

  • and I'm out of here.

  • In fact, it got bad in some cases, with

  • some mortgage brokers.

  • A family would come wanting to buy a house, and the mortgage

  • broker would say, what is your income anyway?

  • And they would tell him the income.

  • And he'd say, you're trying to buy a $300,000

  • house on that income?

  • I don't know if I can do this.

  • But then he'd say.

  • Wait a minute.

  • Think about this again.

  • Is that really your income?

  • You told me your income is $40,000 a year.

  • Are you sure?

  • Why don't we say $50,000 thousand a year.

  • Or say $60,000 a year.

  • And the couple would look at him in disbelief and say, no,

  • we only have $40,000.

  • He would say, well, think about it.

  • You have other sources, don't you?

  • Everybody does this, you know.

  • So, OK, we have $60,000.

  • He says fine.

  • And they thought, well, the mortgage broker gave me

  • permission to do this.

  • And he doesn't care, because he's not

  • going to take the loss.

  • So, the new law is supposed to discourage that kind of thing.

  • And there's lots of new laws that are trying to tighten up.

  • For example, mortgage brokers in the United States now have

  • to be licensed.

  • It used to be just five years ago, you could be an ex-con,

  • fresh out of jail, and you could take up a business as

  • mortgage broker.

  • You can't anymore.

  • So, what's happening all over the world is that we've

  • learned from this experience, but we're retaining this basic

  • system of mortgage securitization.

  • Mortgage lenders that are professional.

  • The basic industry has been retained.

  • And we're hoping and thinking that maybe we

  • have a better system.

  • So I will stop there, and I'll see you on Monday.

I'm going to start by talking a little bit about the history

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10.不動産 (10. Real Estate)

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    Shiau Han Li に公開 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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