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  • One issue we brought up with President Ma was the incarceration of the former President

  • Chen. One of the red flags of a democracy that it isn't working real well is that

  • the former president is in jail. That is true in just about any country. What are we doing

  • to seek either the humane treatment or the humanitarian parole for the former President

  • Chen?

  • As you know, the former president was convicted on corruption charges after his 2008 presidency,

  • including the transfer of presidential office funds to private Swiss bank accounts. We believe

  • that his conviction was in a system that is fair, impartial and transparent. Rule of law

  • exists in Taiwan. In regard to your specific question, certainly we have heard varying

  • accounts of the status of his health, and certainly we would want Taiwan to review his

  • health condition. I am not aware of any or I don't have an update

  • Let me go on to the next question. Taiwan is spending only half as much of GDP on defense

  • as we are, I don't mind going to my district and say, Let's pay taxes, but Taiwan is

  • on the front lines. I am sure you've had discussions when they say they can't afford

  • to spend anymore. We are all very concerned about the maintenance of their F16 aircrafts.

  • The US taxpayers may not be able to pay for that. Taiwan has only a 5% value added tax.

  • Has the US pushed Taiwan not just to spend more on its defense, but if they say they

  • don't have the money to make its value added tax or other taxes at the rate of our European

  • allies who we also push to pay for their own defense?

  • On the issue of spending more, we have encouraged Taiwan to fulfill what it has said in the

  • past that it will spend up to 3% of their GDP on defense.

  • Why do we accept 3% for them and including veteran benefits, 5% for us?

  • This is what President Ma has stated in the past, and so we do hope that  [interrupted]

  • I think the best way to get the 3% is to start demanding 6%, or insisting that a good ally

  • that seeks our support for a country that faces possible eradication or forced incorporation

  • ought to be doing well more than the US per capita, and I think if we start to talk about

  • the 6% then we may someday see 3 or 4% at the minimum. Finally, what are we doing to

  • push Taiwan to adopt better laws against the peer to peer websites for piracy movies?

  • I think that this is part of our economic engagement with Taiwan. What we've had said

  • in the past, and this is in terms of all our dialogues, we would like to have a little

  • bit more confidence, especially in areas such as intellectual property protection...[interrupted]

  • But are we specifically focusing on peer-to-peer websites, the lack of legislation in that

  • area, and the pirating of our movies?

  • I am not aware of...(both speaking at once)...Intellectual property protection definitely is a priority

  • of ours...

  • A general statement about intellectual property protection won't have the specific effect

  • or may have no effect, compared to the specificity, and I hope that you will specifically focus

  • their attention on the peer-to-peer website piracy of our movies. Finally, what steps

  • is the Administration taking to make sure that Taiwan has appropriate participation

  • in international organizations, such as WHO, ICAO, and the climate control (UNFCCCUN

  • Framework Convention on Climate Change)?

  • As I noted earlier, international space is a priority of ours, and we are looking for

  • opportunities for Taiwan experts and professionals to shine in their fields in international

  • flora. We will continue to do that. That really does help those organizations; it really helps

  • the global community when they participate.

  • Over the past few years and across two different administrations, we have witnessed an alarming

  • number of gushing statements by senior American officials on the US's One-China Policy.

  • Last year, PLA (People's Liberation Army)'s General Chen Bingde, during a visit to Washington,

  • claimed that the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US policy maintains

  • that "there is only one China in the world", and that "Taiwan is part of China." Not

  • long after that, Admiral Mullen shared the view that "peaceful unification of China".

  • Let me ask you, the People's Republic of China, as we all know, is a dictatorship;

  • it is a gulag state and would we have wished that reunification of West Germany into East

  • Germany when Honecker was ruling as a cruel dictator in East Germany? I think not. So

  • I think those kinds of statements are not helpful. I do believe, and I want to ask your

  • view on this, as to whether the time has come for the Cold War relic, and I know all about

  • the Shanghai Communiqué, I've read it, and I've actually had an argument with Li

  • Peng in China, when we brought up the human rights [issues], and he said that the Shanghai

  • Communiqué said nothing about the human rights at all. That was true, but he used it as a

  • dodge and as a way of precluding any discussion on human rights. But shouldn't we have a

  • One-China, One-Taiwan policy?

  • And secondly, if you could, the Taiwan Relations Act Section 2 points out that the "enactment

  • of this Act is necessary to help maintain the peace, security and stability in the Western

  • Pacific". What are the consequences of the US if Taiwan were to come under PRC control,

  • and do we fully realize that such a shift would have devastating implications for US's

  • long standing security partners and allies of East Asia including Japan and South Korea?

  • What I'd like to point to is most recently, as you may probably have seen in the press

  • that there has been more dialogue between the two sides of the Strait recently, the

  • head of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan Wang Yu-Chi with Zhang Zhe-Jun, head of the

  • Taiwan Office. We have gone on record as saying that we support that kind of warming of ties.

  • And I think that one of the reasons why there has been such discussions is that we have

  • been so supportive of Taiwan, giving them the confidence, so they can have this kinds

  • of dialogue. So I think we do have a very strong record of that. We do support the increased

  • dialogue between the two sides. In terms of consequences, I wouldn't want to get into

  • any sort of hypothetical scenarios here. I don't think that that is something that

  • we view as very likely right now.

  • What happens? We do have scenarios that we consider at the Pentagon and at the State.

  • It's not something that is sort of a normal feature of our discussions, these types of

  • hypotheticals. What I can say is that I heard your remarks about the One-China Policy. But

  • this is a policy that has endured through many administrations and...I think that what

  • we have done, and much of this has to do with the TRA but it has given Taiwan a great deal

  • of confidence over the last years to increase the kind of intensity of discussions with

  • the PRC, knowing that the US is always in support is greatly comforting to the Taiwan

  • side.

  • But frankly, some of our diplomats including our former Ambassador Bellocchi has suggested

  • that the ambiguity and the statements that may have made could send the wrong signal

  • to the PRC, particularly as they build up militarily in and around or in proximity to

  • Taiwan. And with the saber rattling we see occurring in the South China Sea and an ever

  • expansive foreign policy, the ugliness towards Japan coming out of Beijing, the useful diplomatic

  • affection, perhaps it was useful for a while, seems to me that it could inadvertently lead

  • to miscalculations by Beijing about what happens if they take Taiwan.

  • I don't think that Beijing questions US resolve on the Taiwan issue. We continue to

  • be extremely supportive and we continue to expand our unofficial relations and that I

  • think does a great deal to help strengthen and to allow for a more peaceful and stable

  • environment across the Strait.

  • I have a one statement before I ask any questions that echoes the Chair's comments. I recently

  • visited Taiwan and met with many government officials, and I found it very very educational

  • and I too believe very strongly that the State Department and the Government should understand

  • the importance of Taiwan being a part of the TPP. And I think that should be a message

  • back. So before I ask a question, many of us think strongly believe that we should do

  • whatever we can to encourage that kind of development.

  • When I was there, I was very impressed with the cross strait dialogue that was going on

  • between Taiwan and the PRC. I would like to know what is our State Department's involvement

  • in that dialogue between Taiwan [and China]. How can we be helpful in promoting engagement

  • between China and Taiwan? It seems to me that President Ma was very proud of the agreements

  • that already had been made, especially the trade agreement, the increased tourism that

  • was going on, the increased flights that were going on between. What are our involvement

  • in that has been? The second question is, what is your perspective on the current and

  • forthcoming political situation in Taiwan, including the 2016 presidential election in

  • which President Ma will be turned down. How will that affect the cross-strait relationships;

  • will that be one of the defining characteristics in terms of that election?

  • In terms of cross strait dialogue, we don't play a direct role. They've had direct talks.

  • In fact, the dialogue that I was referring to between Wang Yu-Chi and Zhang Zhe Zhen,

  • was really the first time in 60 years of such a discussion...What we have done is we have

  • given Taiwan a great deal of confidence, through our policies and through our direct assistance

  • and that has enabled them to have more engagement across the strait. We believe that more engagements,

  • especially if it's at a pace that is consistent with the aspirations of the people on Taiwan,

  • for people of both sides of the Strait, we would very much support that, because we believe

  • that creates a more stable and peaceful environment, but it does have to come at a pace that the

  • people on Taiwan feel comfortable with.

  • In terms of the upcoming election, we don't speculate on how that's going to affect

  • cross strait relations but it's a good time to highlight how we have been and still are

  • on the thriving democracy that exists in Taiwan. It is really remarkable. Just personally...the

  • first time I went to Taiwan was in 1978. You just cannot imagine the change that's taking

  • place there. Mr. Chairman, when you go to Taiwan, it just highlights the kind of values

  • that they share with us. You know very well that it is this kind of energetic kind of

  • democracy that exists there and so I won't speculate; we don't get involved in their

  • domestic policies and how that is going to play out in terms of the cross-strait policy

  • in the future. But it is really a good time to celebrate; it is a remarkable story in

  • Asiathe democracy that exists in Taiwan.

  • I would like to personally thank Mr. Sherman for raising the issue of President Chen, which

  • he did strongly when we were on the Co Del (Congressional Delegation) recently in Taiwan.

  • Prior to that trip, I've been there about a year ago, with another of my Democratic

  • colleagues, the ranking member of the Asia Pacific Committee, Eni Faleomavaega. And on

  • that particular Co Del, Eni and I went down to the prison where President Chen is being

  • held. He has been there going on five years now. You are correct, there is conviction

  • for corruption charges. We understand that completely. There's a whole lot of aspects

  • of that which we can discuss in great detail. For example, there is an argument that there

  • was a judge that was more favorable to him that was replaced by a judge who was less

  • favorable. There are all kinds of stories that you hear; I don't want to go to all

  • the details about that.

  • But the fact is that he has been in prison now for going on five years. I've read the

  • medical reports; I've talked to the doctors who have examined him. I have seen him with

  • my own eyes. I have met with him many times when he was the President of Taiwan. He is

  • the second democratically elected president, served for eight years. And I think Mr. Sherman

  • is absolutely right when he says that there is something wrong when one administration

  • comes in, and the previous administration is in prison. Something is not right. I've

  • seen, again, with my own eyes. The man has Parkinson's; he shakes constantly; he's

  • got cardiovascular problems, depression, a whole range of things. We've talked to President

  • Ma and others about it, and I believe that medical parole, as Mr. Sherman mentioned,

  • is a logical Chen medical parole. We are not saying that he'd be free, but at least he can go home to his

  • family for whatever years that he has left.

  • As I noted earlier, we have the confidence in the fairness and the impartiality and transparency

  • in Taiwan's judicial system. And we have made clear to Taiwan our expectation that

  • procedures governing the terms of Chen Shui-Bian's imprisonment and access to health care will

  • be transparent, fair, and impartial, and so if there are occasions, and this is just a

  • general statement from the US Government, when there are cases, when there are such

  • health concerns, we would...make note of that to, in this case, the Taiwan Authorities,

  • but other governments as well, when there may be some humanitarian considerations that

  • could be made. But certainly, we believe that the original case was tried [interrupted]

  • I am not talking about the original case; I am talking about NOW. Still that was an

  • excellent answer. But my question is, does the Administration have a position on medical

  • parole? Well, is there a position? You said he ought to be treated humanely in prison;

  • we are saying that he shouldn't be in prison at this point in time. He has been in prison;

  • he is there now. We are saying that medical parole should be granted...Do you have a position

  • on that? Should he be granted? If you don't have one, that's okay. But I just would

  • like to know.

  • I don't think we take the position [interrupted]

  • Okay. All right. Thank you. That was my question. I will ask you another position if you have

  • this. The President, the Vice President, the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister

  • [of Taiwan] can't come to Washington, D.C. We want to meet with them, we have to go to

  • San Francisco, or Baltimore, or [somewhere]; they are not allowed to come to the capital

  • of the United States, which I think is a travesty for a close ally of the US. We have introduced

  • legislatures innumerable times to dump that policy, which I think is unfair to Taiwan.

  • Does the Administration have a position on that?

  • We continue to have our One-China Policy that is set forth in the Three Joint Communiqués...[interrupted]

  • I am aware of that. Do you have a position on whether they should come here?

  • In terms of the travel of Taiwan Authorities that is consistent with those policiesour

  • One-China Policy ... [interrupted]

  • So you believe we should continue the President, the Vice-President, the Foreign Ministerso

  • they should not be able to come to Washington, D.C.?

  • I think our policy has been very consistent over a number of administrations [interrupted

  • by "I am asking for an answer of yes or no"] and I believe that we will continue.

  • So you are saying that they are not to be allowed to come here; continue with that policy.

  • We are saying that we should change that policy. You say stick with it.

  • I say that our policy has been consistent and I believe

  • we will be consistent in the future.

  • Briefly, what, in

  • your opinion, or the Administration's opinion, does the TRA commit United States to do with

  • respect to the military relationships with Taiwan?

  • As noted earlier, we are obligated to make available to Taiwan defense articles and defense

  • services that are necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

  • It is an obligation that we don't shirk these obligations. The needs of Taiwan are

  • under constant review.

  • Good. I would agree with you. Would you also agree that something Beijing doesn't understand

  • is that big stick of Teddy Roosevelt. We can talk softly, but they got to also know that

  • we also carry a big stick, and that we mean it, that we keep our commitments, and that

  • whatever happens, ultimately, in the Taiwan Strait will happen peacefully. It is not going

  • to happen by military force, and the US is prepared to make sure that it doesn't happen

  • by military force. You think, especially in light of Chinese behavior, in the [Senkaku?]

  • Islands throughout the Pacific Rim that that message is maybe more important than ever

  • from the US with respect to Taiwan?

  • As I noted earlier, I don't think that the PRC doubts our resolve, our continued positive

  • presence in the East Asia Pacific region [interrupted by "Really? With respect to Taiwan?"]

  • Absolutely.

  • United States, in 2001, tentatively agreed to sell diesel submarines to Taiwan. Thirteen

  • years later, where are we in the submarine sale?

  • As you know, we continue to review the defense needs and we make decisions that are appropriate

  • [interrupted]

  • Have we sold a single one of those diesel submarines to Taiwan13 years later?

  • I am not aware of that, sir.

  • Did, by any chance, Beijing object to that sale?

  • We don't discuss arms sales of defense...

  • Did they express themselves either publicly or through private channels that you are aware

  • of?

  • I am not aware of...

  • So why the hang up? Why not sell the diesels then?

  • Again, we make decisions not with the PRC in mind. We make those decisions based on

  • what we feel are our needs.

  • Oh. So the decision tentatively to sell submarines to Taiwan in 2001 is still under consideration

  • as to whether it meets your definition of our appropriate defense for Taiwan.

  • There are a range of systems, there are a range of different packages that we constantly...[interrupted]